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Another means to give structure to what otherwise might seein to he an
unconnected series of’ legal and policy analyses is the promise metaphor. Salmon and

researchers

relerence source on the numerous discrete aspects olsalmon history, law, and policy it
discusses. A detailed table olcontents, an extensive index, and table olcases aim to aid

to the chapter analyzing the issue of particular interest, or to the final two chapters, which
draw lessons irom the earher chapters. The book’s principal use may well be as a

This book is neither a doctrinal legal analysis. nor a conventional history, hut it
does contain a large amount Of both legal analysis and history. Because as a whole it
does not attempt a chronological history, chapter I providesac apsule history, which
seeks to put into context the disparate aspects of salmon law and policy discussed in the
succeedingehapters. Some readers maywant to proceed from the capsulehistorydirectlv

the chapters here are not based on earlier writings.

journals, and co—directing the orthwest Waler Law and Policy Project. This book draws
on several of those writings, but leaves none of them unchanged, and more than halfol’

I liase been writing and teach i hg uhoLht Columbia River sal mon and the law br
over twenty years. begin ning with editing the ,ima/iomous [is/i Lau’ Menio published by
the Oregon State University Sea (hunt Program twin I 979 to 1990. In the ensuing
decade, I continued to fbI low the law aflecting Pacific salmon, writing mostly in legal

PREFACE

Preface
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Sal mon
—
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Ihe book has clear points of view on several issues, and does not shy away front

salmon’s future in the ( ‘olunihia I3asin.

increase public liressrue on those responsible fur land and uter policies affecting salmon
at least to make them explai ii clearly the probable effects of their decisions on the

are common in the salmon world, do a greater disservice than technical arguments. fur
they provide the pLiblie ith misin formation. I’ve often claimed that, given the \ ast
scienti tie uncertain1 and potential economic consequences of various sal mon recovery
options, virtually anything anyone says about salmon has at least sonic kernel of truth to
it. Thus, the public can be easily misled by sd f—serving statements that ate not entirely
false. but highly improbable A badly in formed public cannot participate eft’ectivelv in
debates about he sa linon’s bit nrc, and the species has never fared particularly well when
decisions ha e been made by pohicyinalers without public pressure. This book hopes to

One reason fur

riling this book is to explain these promises. what they have and
have not accomplished, and hat they may offer fbr the future. This is not a simple story.
and at times involves some technical legal explanations. Bitt oversimplifications, which

conditions protective of salmon.

salmon runs through hatchery construction. Later, the promc of ha ne both
hvdropo cr and salnioii va contjnucd in the \orth est Powet \ci’s su mon restorI an
promam. \‘lorL recently. the Lndangereci Species :\ct prom sed thu salmon v ould not
go extinct and in fact would recover from the thivat ofextinction, although there remain
numerous questions about whether the statute can achieve those goals. l o largely
overlooked promises are the (‘lean Water Acts proiruse of fishable water quality and the
Federal Power Act’s promise of re—I Icensing nontederal hydroelectric dais with

Sac ii ficing
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dent in the
text.
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lti\\.

In earl icr writings. 1 included copious lootnotes. literally thousands oh I hem.
A 11cr a xvIii Ic I became convinced that the lootnoics detracted Iroiti the readability ol the
text. But 1 have been convinced b’ several re ewers, who felt that documentation \\5
essential, to include cndnotes. Nevertheless. I ha e eon Lined the notes by I imitine them

chore of e aluating events in 2001 and beyond.

Endangered Species and Northwest Power Act plaits, und with a new president who
campaigned against renio lug the four Lower Snake Ri cm dams. hieh many biologists
think is necessary to restore Snake River salmon runs. The book leaves to others tile

once an obscure back\ titer of [lie law, is now e\ptindiitg
a breathtaking pace. There is never an eas wa\ to decide to end an ongoing stor like
the (uI umbia River [3asin saga. This hook ends \\ ith tile end ol’ 2000. with new

Pacific salmon

otice home to the largest salmon runs in the orid
although a coneuding
chapter attempts to draw generic lessons from the Col umoa experience that iiia he
useful to oilier resources in other local ions.

Basin

equal sharing ibm mu In imposed by the Sie ens Tred e, die iii ternat i ona I Pact lie Salmon
Treaty, and the effects oI’the I rnplcmen [atioit ol the N ortliwesi Forest Plan, which is not
confined to the Columbia Basin. But most of the hens o; tWiitioit ts on the Cou;ibiu

Although t lie fiieus ot tins book is on the Co inhia basin. ii oceasionalty sIt as
beyond its cotitines to consider Issues 01 1eie\ ance. such s.LWIC Boidt’s deciSion ott the

in [lie Columbia I3asin, and my opinions mc

rights, the

vei• a decade. I too have Ilirined opinions about the cogenc ol the tribe
effect of hydroelectric de\ eiopiiient on sahnon. the breaching of the Lower
Snake River dams, and other issues central to the story olthe
and luture ol salmon

issues fin

PlelaLe
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Newhouse, and Bill \Varnock. who worked on the final stages of the manuscript. ‘l’he hate
Lenamr MLII ford typed and retyped the manuscript with great care. ‘I’ami (iicrloli’ was a

Schoessler. and Glenn Spain I lull. of’ those co—authors were my students, indicative of
what a collect i\ e effort of I .ewis & (‘lark La\\ School tIns project and the .lnad,’onwuv
Fish Lou’ Memo have been. Literally dozens of former students were involved. reflected
in the dozens of citations to hniuer students’ publications in the endnotes. I lowever.
trying to name them all here would he hazardous because I would surely forget someone.
But I especially want to thank Scot i Althouse, Chuck l3onham, Melissa Powers, Mike

In addition. the elThrts of several of my co—authors in earlier endeavors are
represented in one way or another in the text, including Chris Beckwiih. Lorraine Bodi,
Greg Corbin, Brad Johnson, Laird Lucas, Don Miller, Dan RohlL Andy Simrin, Michael

everything that is written here.

historians, whose detai led review ot’ilie entire inuiluscript was particularly helpful. \one
of these individuals shoLild he blamed for any remaining mistakes, and not all endorse

helped me refine the text and avoid imsiakes, includingNina Bell, Chip MeConnaha, Dan
RohiL John \/olkman, and Jim Weher, all ot whom read portions of the manuscript. My
greatest debt, however, is to John Shuns and Jay Taylor. both prominent natural resource

(.olumhia asin issues, one centered around salmon. when he apuroved the Anado unous
1:’isli law Project at Lewis & Clark Law School in 1 ?79, and he continued to lund it 11w
Art 1.al ranee, Sle c
O\ cr a decade. Second, over the years the deans at my la school
supported the probe! and my other ritints v ith summer
Kanter, and Jim iiuffrnan
stipends. Third. a urant fiom the Rocky Mountain Mineral law Foundation helped
finance research assistants. Fourth. Charles Wilkinson. whose writings speak to the soul
of the American West, encouraged this proeci at an early stage. Fi Ih, many revie ers

Sacriticin the Salmon
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hem/c,’
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Preface —‘
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son
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Sisters. Oregon
.Januai” 200 1

Michael C. [3iumm

he especial lv pleased that we can spend more tine at what really is nuportant:
baseball practice. And I would be remiss in nut remembering my parents. ‘aho always
val ned education even more than baseball.

I’ ma] lv, I want to thank my wi Ic, Jo, and my kids, icky and Aria, for pulling up
with this project much lunger than [promised them the ould ha e to. Mv Ii e—vear old

L;ni it

i/IL’

•_r

the Ida/ni I.an’ RL’llc’Iv,

1
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The salmon returning to the rivers of the Pacific Northwest consist of several
different species. They are part of a vast migration throughout the North Pacific.
stretching across the Bering Sea to Siberia and to (lie northern islands of Japan. These
Pacific salmon (Onrorinucims) were separated from their Atlantic cousins (Subno) a
million years ago in the Great Ice Age. when (he Arctic ice cap joined the North
American continent and blocked the marine Northwest Passage. During the Ice Age, with

—

As they have been for thousands of years, salmon remain the cuitLiral and
spiritual soul ofthe Pacific Northwest. a region whose outlines have been described as
“anywhere a salmon can get to.” From Alaska’s Kotzebue Sound to California’s
Monterey Bay. the rivers of the Northwest once teemed with wild salmon. These
magnificent animals are born in freshwater, ride the rivers’ spring freshet to the sea as
juveniles, spend two to five years in the ocean, then, almost miraculously, return to their
natal streams as adults to mate and die. On Lewis and Clark’s expedition in 1805.
William Clark remarked that “the number of dead fish on the shores and floating in the
river is incredible.” This ritualized fornication, as Timothy Egan has called it, brings not
merely death but also essential marine nutrients to fresh water. Time salmon’s spawnedout bodies supply food for riparian wildlife, ranging from eagles and bears to insects.
These oceanic proteins a treasure from the sea are the salmon’s gift to the rivers
which produced them.’

1— CAPSULE HISTORY

Chapter 1
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__1

are an dwiiious fish: ihev minrate

._

——

provides a kind

—

—

its magical
The mysteries associated with the salmons immense migrations
were attributed to supernatural forces by nat i c
return and its imminent death
poptili1ions throughout the North Pacific. Fot- these people the most important ritual of’
the year was the First Salmon Ceremony, marking the return of salmon in the spm’ing.
‘[his ceremony md tided prllyers and incantations cxpressing)ov, rd icC. and thanksgiving

The First Fislier.c

in greater detail.

explaining the characteristics

Chapter 2 of’ this book

of’ layman’s guide to Pacific salmon.
of’ various salmon species and discussing their life cycles

climbing fish remains a wonder. Surprisingly little is known about the sal mon’s ocean
travels, however. Chinook can travel more than I O,00() miles in the Pact tic, ohen making
several circuits before returning 10 spa n. usually tour years atter descending to the
ocean. I lowever, biologists know relatively little about the monies salmon pursue in the
marine environment, although it seems likely that some fish originating in American and
Canadian waters spend some time mingling with their relat i\ es 1’rom Siberia and .lapan.

The i t’e cycle of’ Pac ftc salmon is both

c—inspiring and shro uded in sonic’
in ystery Although blocked irom much ot their historic’ habitat during the last century.
o)Q miles
the largest and longest tra elers. sockeye and chinook sal moo, still can ascend
inland Ii oin the sea, gaming oer a tine in L’lc\ anon. The ath]eticisnm of’tlee mountain

thuS

Sicrifl cing the SiIrnon

—-

tra\ clers returned to their natal livers. Salinuit
ti’oiu the sea up rivers to spit it

-
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cal studies. eonJudee
that

\\

Although salmon

sere

By the time Nuropcimn c\piorers. seekino the Noi h est Paxsage. began to arrive

Il/I/IL’ .Scii/cnie,ii

it is moi’e accurate to say that the native ways iii reating to salnion and xater were so
l’undamental as to be an essential rail oleulturtif and spiritual norms. In shorl,just as the
salmon adapted to the postlee Age ecosystem, the nati ‘e adapted their Ii Lstvles to the
salmon.

streams (luring salmon season. One tribe even beached its canoes to hail them to a ole
polluting the saimons waters. These ‘laws were en flaved by peer pr ssure and ref igioL;S
taboos, which usually were stung enough to ensure that ih cv were respected. Or per Imps

abundant, the natives did not take [lint abundance rot
granted. They employed elaborate procedures to cue and preserve salmon for walter
flod. Wasting sal mon was general lv proscribed, and c ‘use \\ as nc\ ci depostted in

of

Salmon were harvested annually. Little wonder, then, that ion before the arr.val of’
whites, some Northwest natives called theinsel es ‘I’hc Salmon People. ihe sdrva
was the equivalent of the bullajo to the natives of the plains. 0! the reindeer to the inuu.
5

could be converted to sveali h. In fact, the salmon econoal\ made the nat \ Cs of’ the
Paci flc N orthwest Americas wealthiest aborninals norm olMexiec. M II ions of pounds

as intrinstea liv InKed to the so iniurix uura1ions: the fish v e e not
only vital to their diet, they were also a maj or trade good. Through trade, surplus tis h

Native life

all

(leurce Koidi. alter e\i.aa

3

the Northesl tribes shared a ‘univeisal and parunhunt dependence oii sahnoia

the \ortli\\est Federal l)istie Jo
three years ol’e\idenee. ineludino e.shaustie aullo

bridge and settle

Chipter 1
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assurances of’ “good Ihith’’ dealings and preservation of the natives’ properties.’

provide money ftr the prncleise at white goods. But the in Ilux ot white settlers, who had
been promised li’ee land by the l $51) ( )regon I ,and Donation Act, also led to increased
li’iclion bctw ecu the two cultures. T his inigi’at ion ga e lie to the ( )regon Territorial Acts

treaty
Despite the declining numbers of natives, white settlement after the
with Great Britain in I 846 and the creation of the Oregon Territory two years later
induced the natives to harvest more salmon to meet increased white demand and to

sixth at’ the pre—coittact population.

Columbia, due to non—endemic diseases introduced by whites. In 185 1, the Commission
of [ndian Affhirs estimated that only 8.260 (.‘olttmbia Ri er Indians remained, just one—

for the natives. Lven before the Le is and Clark expedition in 1 805. smallpox brought
by whites had already reduced native populations by an estimated 33 to 50 percent. By
I $34. there was a 90 percent population decline of Chinook Indians on the Lower

Whiles broueht horses, geni. metals, cloth, and blankets, which they exchanged for furs
and salmon. Although whites had little effect on the Northwest environment pnor to the
Orcon Trail settlement cia of the mid—I XOOs, white contact quickly pro\ed disastrous

l3ecaLLse a

Salmon. \ortIi\\ et nati es had the h ithect aboriiti nal population
density north at’ Mexico. Northwest natives cnerally lived in settled communities.
prelerred trade lo war, and quickly de\ eloped a nuitual dependency will] white traders.

pounds. comparable it) wli ic har\ esi\ in the cut between I 883 and 1 919. I lowever. the
native har esi did not have the same adx erse cI tc(s. since it was dispersed throughoui
the basin, not concentrated in the lower river.

4— Sacrificing the Salnmn
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The seeds of white preemption of native fisheries were sown \\ hen the canning
was perfected, making sal mon an export product. The lirsi Paei he salmon
ioc
cannery began on the Sacramento River in 1 ffi4. Within a few years. as increasing

For about twenty years. the intent of the treaty negotiators \\ as largely realized:
native fishing indeed became a vital part ofihe pioneer ceonotny of the Northwest True,
some settlers fenced natives out o their fishing grounds. hut such e\eluSions were not
commonplace, and ultimately they were ruled illegal by the Washington territorial court
in I

TIlL’

(.‘haptcr 3 exanInic’s the orIgins of the treaty—guaranteed right to fish, winch this
book considers the “first promise” concerning salmon. (‘hapter 4 explains the evolution
of the treaty promise in court decisions beginning in the nineteenth century and
continuing through the I 970s.

snt’hcicney.

treaties, 1 hrough their salmon harvests, the tribes were to become an integral clement
ofthe Northwest economy, Salmon were seen as a means to achieve tribal economic self—

one o lie lurgesi real estate transact ions in history. Both government negol iators and the
nati es elearR intended that the tribes would continue to fish as they had betore the

a series of small land reser\ es. onie schools and missionaries, and the right to conu iUIC
to harvest salmon “in common with’’ whites at iii I the native ‘‘usual and accustomed’
tishing grounds. This ire:it right to continue to fish as they ahx ays had was the basis ot

-
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State regulation helped to disentianchisenative lishcrs. hut

0
in the sound and ocean to continue larrtelv unrestrained.
it

utterly tiuled to halt

foisted the burden of salmon conservation on the trihe. while allowing white fisheries

at numerous traditional lishiiig sites o l’manv Puget Sound tribes. In effect, the preserves

Especially a tier Washington achieved statehood in I Xi’Q, the law was
increasingly used to restrict native commercial har ests by closing liesh ater areas hut
leaving saltwater open to fishing. These so—cal led “sal mon preserves” otitlawed lish i ng

.S’taic Rcgtilalion

such as gasol inc—pow ered boats with purse seines and gill nets, pushed salmon harvests
out into the ocean and Puget Sound. This sh i ft in harvest e ‘fort robbed many traditional
2
native lishing sites of’ their locational advantages.

In this

hich Charles Vv’ilkinson ha labeled the lieu,ied Iiee—tu—ai I,” the
response to declining harvests was simply to move tarther north. The first cannery was
built on Puget Sound in I $7; by 1 )O5. there were twenty—four Although at first native
harvests contributed to the canneries, technological and legal developments qtnekly
combined to effectively preempt native fisheries. New saltwater fishing technologies.

pro\ ed to be an uii istuiiable itr\ ct lc\el because, unlike the natRe harvest flrior to
white SeitleiliCili. it VN eoncentralcci in tue loer i’i\ er. not spread throLielloLli the basin.
ihis coilcetiti atcd, uiisclcct I \ C lO\\ ci i ci liurvet \ as more likely to O\ erliarv cst
uidividua I run’,. Seven yeai s later, in I N90, the Columbia’s sal mon runs were in decline,
[I
man’ canneries had closed, and the pack of sal mon tl I by nearly one-hal

6
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ennies alloine fish iasstte Jiirme closed seasons.

( haper I

3m

(oiiumssIon

with silt, Miners and oggers coittponnded their transgressions by building dams that

I lvdraulie eod mmmc,
fitch Pusiiei
thousands ol’tons ot’eai’tll do\\n inouuitai is and buried spa\vmimg beds. contributed to the
decimation of the Sacramento R i\ er runs. Logging on nearl\ c\’er\ \\ atcrshed in Brash
(‘ol ninbia changed runo If patterns, gouging ii \ er beds and eliok I ng spawning grounds

unrestrained as the salmon runs declined.

Perhaps an even more glaring shortcoming of state reculation was its failure to
restrict a Wide variety of’ acti \‘it es that wei’e destroy rig salmon habitat. Mining, timber
harvesting. Ii \‘estoci grazi 1g. dredging and tilling \\ ci lands. and dam btn Iding ci nt nued

century. there were seventy—six of these de’ ices, collecting five percent of’ harvest. They
were lot banned until I 926 in (.)regon, and not until I 934 in Washington°

Oregon

noted that the number o Lion I sa n ion \Vli cli eScapc nar\ est
was well beio\\ that necessary to roduce maxinittin sustained yield. The dirceto:
complained of’ the inelibetiveness of’ closed fishing seasons. wi ich he bel ie\ ed \\ crc
offset by mereased harvest intensity (luring open seasons. Most itteitsive had been Fish
large waterwheels that literally scooped sal mon out of’ tile river l\ enty-faur
wheels
hoLirs a (lay, whieh first appeared on the Columbia R aeer in I S79. By’ the turi i)’ the

Fish

For the fle\t hal ieentnr\. ree ufat on was nelfect Re at O\ ereomne the e eci o
ovei’tishuii.i. o)3, the year the Bonnev He Dam as completed, ushered in the era o
large federal dams in the t. olumbia Basin. Fhat veat, the Uirector of researca for the

receiving or transporting fish during closed seasons ihus criphng cnfoi’cement efforts.

neither stale attempted to coordinate itli the other, and neither en loyed any fish
biologists. \Vorse, there \\ as little or no en lireeiuent. For e\ainple, Oregon original B
had only one en f’orcement agent, and its law did not prohi bit ships or railroads from

traps and veirs to ha e

w.
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more than a 300 percent decline.

genetic integrity).

Between 1900 and I 935. for example, the state of Washington
increased production of hatchet)’ fish from 25 to 90 million fish. During the same 35—
year period, however, the state’s commercial salmon harvest (‘elI to I 5 million pounds,

Nevertheless, in a harbinger ot’ things to come, by I 009 the salmon harvest
declined by more than oiw—third. li’om 3$ to 24 million pounds. Despite limited
knowledge ot’ fish diet and frequent outbreaks of disease, fish managers in (lie Columbia
3asin pursued an increasing commitment to hatcheries throLighout the early years of the
twentieth century. But hatcheries fin led to sustain harvests, due to primitive rearing
practices, disease, and the adverse effects of hatchery fish on wild tish (due to
competition for limited food and habitat and interbreeding which di kited the wild stocks’

propagated.’’

snioll were being released in the Columbia Basin. That year the magazine Paci/u
Fir/wrnia,i claimed that Lilly 75 percent ol’ the Columbia River run was artificially

tripled, then tripled again during the next live years. By 1905, some (2 million hatchery

nsieiid

curtailing the harvest or restrict I ig habitat damage, the conveiit onal
wisdom was that urn flcial propauation would maintain the salmon runs. The first salmon
hatcher,’ was built on the Sacramento River in 1 72. It exported salmnn eggs to the Fast
(‘oasl, FLirope. Australia, and New Zealand. Five years later, in 1 877, the irsi Columbia
Basin hatchery as sited on the Clackamas River. But it was not until the I 890s that
extensive hatchery construction began. Between 695 and 1 900 hatchery pi’oItictiori

Earli flatcliri’ies

S
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the federal government brought to the Northwest during the

ar; and 3) aiding agricu

streams. (Sec map I.) Most of these dams were authorized and constructed in the post—
ar period, intending to produce a multiplicity of benefits: I ) providing work for
returning soldiers: 2) helping sustain an clectricity—intensis e aluminum industry, which

Be tbrc the dam—building era ended
with the completion of’ the last ma instcm
darn on the Snake River in 1Q75
the darn builders constructed nearly twenty nainstern
dams on the Columbia and its principal tribLliarv, the Snake, and many more on tributary

runs as at Grand C’oulcc and inundating spawning grounds s ith other dams, the most
damaging legacy of the dam—building era.°

“absolLitely incapable” of harming migrating salmon. Failure to adcquatety address the
downstream passage problem would prove to be, next to completely sealing oil salmon

salmon at each darn. The Assistant (‘hief of the Army Corps of Engineers, which built
Bonneville Darn, erroneously told Congress that the (lam’s power turbines were

Some adult sal non were able to surmoLint the run—of—river dam at Bouncy lie (as
they could at Rock Island). because fish ladders were included in the project at the
request of lederal and state fish agencies, But little thought was given to downstream
juvenile salmon passage. and downstream passage losses killed up to 15 percent of

blocking access to their

than Bonnc i lie Darn, desirosed the salmon runs of the I. ppcr Columbia by forever
spawning grounds. No longer would salmon reach the
C’olumbias Canadian he:Id\\ aters.
9

began eontruetlng the Bonne\ ilic and Grand (‘oulce I )ains. [3onnc Ic on the lo\\ er
(ni itnibta was lnished in I 93t. the year a icr ( ongress created the [3onne\ lie Power
\dIiunNtranOfl to market the elcctrieii produced by the project. Three ears later, in
I Q4 I ,the in:iss c Grand ( oulee storaee
impoLindingover sixty times more water

(‘hapler I
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reason ibr the basin’s overwhelming commitment to hatcheries. In Fact, in 1 93

,

the

In the (oh umbia Basin, dams are responsihle For roughly O percent oF human—
caused mortalities of sonic sal non species, notably Pil I chinook. A id that figure night
actualI understate the dams’ true e FFeet. because the dams w crc the prmncmpil

,‘ihii’c Hal(/i(’J’IL’.S

sa linon.

Chapter 5 explores the dam—building era and explains the consequences For

mortalities.

system has been operated to store spring flows in this manner. Un Fortunately, the salmon
depend on this Ireshet For etTic lent transport to the ocean. The lost Peshet would prove
to be an even more intractable issue For salmon recovery eFForts than dam passage

stoic

the sprine Freshet in reservoirs to produce livdropow er in the Pill and winter, when
demand was higher. For the last thirtv—li e years, the Columbia River hydropower

ol our large storage projects authorized by the 1 964 Columbia River Treaty between the
U.S. and Canada. which doubled the basins storage capacity. Dam operators could now

I)am bui Idi nmi did mome than

inflict salmon mortal ties at each dam. howe’ er
the inainslem
like (ii and Coulce
Large storage projects in the upper basin
enabled dan i
Columbia and Ida ho Power’s Brown lee Dam on the mai nstem Snake
operators to substantially alter Columbia Basin liver flows, especially a Per completion

the a\ erage death rate lir I ppcr Snake
amounted to just 1 5 percent of their costs
peieent.
River juvenile salmon jumped 1mm 5 to 75 2

10
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Further, scientists began to question whether

hatcheries were capable of rebuilding salmon rtms. Studies showed that hatchery fish
d:uiiaged wild salmon by transmitting diseases, competing br limited food and habitat,

of the hatchery—produced salmon.

deepwater port. Lii tortu nately, this investment was not accompanied by a commitment
to change dam operations to restore sireanihlows to fuci litate the clownstreain migration

The Columbia Basins overwhelming commitment to hatcheries was extended to
the Snake River in the late I 970s. Congress authorized a 570 million hatchery prograill
designed to compensate br salmon losses resulting from the construction and operation
ot the four Corps ol’ Lngincers’ darns on the Lower Snake that made Lewiston a

hatchery fish, vent largely unnoticed until biologists began to focLis on the importance
of’ salmon genetics in the I 9705.24

unselective: fish from many rivers swim together in the ocean, including those li’om
streams predominated by hatchery fish and those producmg only wild fish. Because far
Fewer fish are necessary to produce eggs to sustain a hatchery than the number of v ild
fish necessary to maintain a spawning wild run. hatcheries encouraged harvest managers
to set high ocean harvest levels. Increased ocean harvests produced overharvests ofwild
runs. This incidental overhar est of wild salmon, due to inundating the ocean with

encouraged the harvest effort to move toward the ocean. Ocean harvests are necessarily

Dam. While this location made sense in terms of avoiding dam—related mortalities. it
served to shill salmon miira1ion to below [3onne ii Ic Dam, a ay from the fishinu
grounds of’ the Columbia Basin Indian treaty tribes Moreover, lower basin hatcheries

er the next half century. 5200 million in \l I tchel I Act funds —,tipportcd
construction ol roughly 40 hatcheries. nearly all ot which were situated hcltn\ Bunnevi lie

12
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oJ Dani Bui/tIin

Justice Douglas interpreted federal law to impose an affirmative
obligatton on the (‘ommiss on to preser\’e salmon runs, writing:

Rivers in Idaho.

Douglas’s opinion overturned the Federai Power Commission’s grant of a license to
construct the I ugh Mountain Sheep i)am at the confluence of the Salmon and Snake

came from the U.S. Sunreme Court. in a remarkable 1967 decision by that Court’s first
(and thus far perhaps only) environmentalist. Justice William 0. Douglas. Justice

The 1 960s, still in the era of the Columbia Basin’s headlong commitment to dam
construction, also saw the region’s first rejection ofa dam. Oddly enough, the rejection

7/ic’ Lad

The liilcd promise ofsalnion hatcheries is the subject of Chapter 6. which this
book considers the salmon’s second promise.’

natural river flows. Meanwhile, the hatcheries on the Columbia have been unable to
revive what were once the world’s largest salmon runs.’

effectiveness. British Columbia renewed its interest in hatcheries in the ate I 960s, hut
situated most ot hem on \:aiicoii er Island, not on the I- raser. The salmon runs of the
undammed Fraser are now growing, without hatcheries due to a large—scale commitment
ot constructing spawning channels. fishways, gravel box incubators, and maintaining

.

1’he i larriace ot hatcher es to dam liLt] ding in the Columbia l3astn is per iaps best
illustrated by compariim the Columbia to the Fraser River in I3ritish Columbia. ‘[he
s hich has sLipplanied the ( oluinbia as the worlds arriest salmon producer, is
undamined
Althotiih hatcheries proliferated on the Fraser until 1925. they were
thereafler phased out, due to hudgetiir constraints as well as questions about their

chapter 1
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migration. As a result, I .4 million acre—feet of water was released on the mainslcm
Columbia, but no additional water was made available on the Snake, where a futile
attempt was made to trap and haul downstream migrating salmon in trucks Although the
sal mon mortalities in 1977 proved to be disastrous, the emergency “lisli how ‘77”
indicated that salmon mortalities on the Columbia might be reduced through systematic
changes in dam operations. This lesson would prove to he an important one when
Congress began to seriously consider a salmon restoration program three years later as

-

snowpack produced a record low spring runoll. [“aced with the prospect ot disastrous
juvenile salmon losses due to low streamtlows, fish and wildli Ic ollicials convinced the
Northwest governors to intervene and persuade federal watermanagers —the Bonneville
Power Administration, the U.S. Army (‘orps ot Engineers, and the Bureau olReclarnalion
to release water from storage and manipulate the resulting streamtlows to aid salmon

But blocking new dams WOLlId

be SLitlicient to save the Columbia Basin
salrnon the operation of existing darns had to be changed. The need for changed
operations became apparent in the drought year of 1977, when a hundred—year record low

27
wildlife.

established the I jells (‘anvon National Recreation Area, which prohibited darn
construction and required preservation of the area’s free—flowing rivers and its fish and

This decision effectively saved ftom destruction, for a time at least, Idaho’s
remaining salmon runs. The result was conErmed by Congress in I 975. when it

western waters is so notorious thai we cannot believe that ( ongress
authorized their ultimate demise.

14— Sacrificing the Salmon
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Decision ushered in the modern era of salmoil mailageiltent. in which biologists sought
to .inders Land the sahillon’s coitiplete Ii lb cycle
front sjtus
t

(where non-Indians dominated) to tile rivets and estuaries (where the tribes’ traditional
fishing sites were located). This reallocation required a much more sophisticated
understanding of’ the migration patterns of individual salmon runs. Ihus. the I3oldt

J ridge I3oldt deternu ned that the tribal hav\ est I Pugct Sound salmon \\ as .1 usi
two perceilt ol’the total harvest: afler the decision the tribes had a judicially enlbrecable
right to 50 percent. Fhis had the eflbct of real locating son me oftlic harvest front tile ocean

desegregation cases.”

eventually, in 1 979. by the L’S. Supreme (.‘oui t
sioslantial lv reallocated salmtoi
harvests despite. as one j ridge noted. “the most co certed o hietul and private efforts to
frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed iii di is eeilturv ....e xcept lbr sonic

The ‘‘Boldt Decision,” as it came to he i:lii. was re led by non—Indian
fishermen and state rcgLihitors especially in \Vashingkn \vauie a minor “fish var” sa\\
shots lred. The decision
which \\ as tw ice alL ni ed by federal appeals courts and

under their tieaties. l-cderal district nuge ( ieoi .e l3olut declined to Lite on nie
env ironniental issue, but m 1 974 he concluded that the i citru anuage guaian teeing the
‘‘right of taking tiSh lfl eunlitloil” with non—Indians entitled the tribes to hull’ of the
harvestable salmon dest iiicd fbi traditional nan VL shi ig sites.
’
2

‘‘

[3elloni struck down ( )resn regulations that he found deprived the tribes of a ‘‘Ibir share’’
of the salmon ltar esf [he next year Puget Sound vibes sought to defThc a Ibir share”
in a Washington case in which ilie a Iso claitiied ea iololiefltcii protection mr slith,:

than 60 years before, the legion’s Indian tribes challenucd stale harvest reculations. w inch
they churned unfairly restricted their hin est rights. In I 960, federal district judge Robert

( ‘tsplei I
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The 980 Northwest Power Act was a pathbreaking piece of legislation because
it promised to protect and restore (.‘olumbia Basin salmon i’uns (as well as other fish and
wild lift’) “to the extent afl’ectcd by the development and operation” of the basin’s dams.

,

77w Aori/iii’est Ioiie,’ ic!

Chapter 12 examines the iTmodern treaty tislung rights decisions, labeled here as
the ‘ui ti nate promise’ to salmon, locusing on whether the treaties prom sc the tn bes that
there will be fish to harvest.

tribes to envi roninenta] protection of’ sal mon habitat i-emai us unresolved to this day.

as premature

Although the appellate court did not reach the merits ot Judge Orricks
reasoning, it vacated his decision, concluding that deciding the issue in the absence ofa
concrete factual contro ersy involving environmental degradation ol salmon habitat was
unwise. In the ensuing decade, the tiThes decided to concentrate their efforts to protect
and restore salmon habitat on the fish and wildlife program created by the Northwest
Power Act rather than in court. Thus, the question of whether the treaties entitle the

Judge Boidt had deferred. In what was called the “Phase 2” case, federal district jLtdge
Wi! jam ()rrick determined that rhere was indeed a right oI’cn ironincutal protection idr
salmon implicit in the treaties. hut five years later an appeals court vacated his decision

went

In 1Q80, the year after the Supreme Court affirmed the Boldt Decision, the tribes
back to federal court in an effort to resolve the environmental protect ion issue that

disagreed, federal, state, and tribal biologists often Ibtind themselves ad ocatinti the same
measures, particularly with respect to habitat protection and streninilow restoration

16
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restoration issues. such as the I’easibilitv o

regionwide salmon restoration, and the Northwest Power Planning Council supplied an
open regional lorum in which hydropower; salmon tradeo ffs as well as other salmon

( ulumbia Basin Fish and Wildli fl. Program and the statute which created it marked a
considerable change in salmon law and policy. The staw(e established a goal of

I)espiie its inability to signi ficantlv restructure hydi’oeleutric operations, the

(he critical in igration season.

example, during one spring the water budget was met only six of twenty—six days during

representatives of the region’s fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes. Unfortunately,
this water l.udget contained too little water to produce biologically sound river flows, the
base power flows turned out to be unreliable, and the fl..’deral agencies operating the dams
irequcntlv ignored the tbows called for by the fish and vildli fr agencies and tribes. br

Instead, the Council adopted hat it called a “water budget.” a dedicated volume ofwater
that would he in addition to “base power flows.” and placed it under the control of

measures. and use o 1 hatcheries x\ here they would not conflict with the program’s
preference for reser ing and restoring spawning salmon, lint the river flows in the
program were not the fxed floss the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes recommended.

The (‘ounci I promu leated its pierain in I 2, after lie region’s fish and i IdI dc
agencies and Indian tribes submitted some 70() pages of recommendations for program
measures. The program cal led tori ncreased river b’,’, s lfl the ‘prmg to taci lilate salmon
migration. improements in fish bypass at the dams, habitat protection and restoration

cieiitific knowledge. I lo c\ Li. it cautioned that biological uteomes crc tii\ ored over
economic ones and speci heal l called for restoring ri’, er tlo su fficient to “improve the
protection. ii igration and SUF\ \ al’ o I sal mon rufls.
4

( liapler I
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nstilu tiomail framework established by the statute or agreement becomes rigid and

its

[Iu,i

c’. I

Rcv1ainni

agreements were reached conceming harvest rights. First, in I )77. some nine wars after

F l’fbrts to rebuild Columbia Basin salmon runs in the I 980s did not locus
exclusively on implementing the Northwest Po er Act, however. iwo important

Evk’iu/inm

ii

PiH’t

Chapter 7 ana Ivies the Northwest Power Act and the salmon restoration progmi n
spaxmicd, considered here as the ‘‘third promise’’ to preserve salmon.

’
3
of the prol,lem.

i

ach ie e

basic goal of producing substantial improvements in salmon run sizes. ‘[he
Northwest Power Act experience is emblematic ofa recurrent theme in Columbia Basin
salmon restoration el’l’orts: a statute is passed or an agreement is reached, based on
assumptions that eventually turn out to be false or hal f—truths: then, as time sse;. the

made a comprehensive approach to salmon restoration impossible.
diversions
Moreover, the Act contained weak enforcement language ihat encouraged federal s ater
management agencies like the Army (‘orps ol 1:ngineers and the l3onneville Power
Administration to consider the program’s measures as merely advisory, so they often
tuled to carry out the program’s mainstem flow provisions. The Council also proved to
he a poor overseer of program implementation, as was Congress. Thus. v hue the
program charted an innovative. systematic approach to salmon restoration. it failed to

—---

—

Nonetheless, the statute and the program promised more than they were able to
lbcusing exclusively on the hydroelectric system
deliver. Ihe Act’s limited scope
while O\ erlooking harest regulation, federal land management activities, and irrigaiion

IS
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theplan was pt einised on liatchei.

hac no elict on

n ted to I. oluinbiit
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largely disc redited as a estoral

.

.
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and providing fbi optnmlLnmm produetioii. and

equitabl

app

Ihe resLilt. alter moore than a decade of nemiliatloiN. was the Pacific Salnna
Treaty of’ I 055. The treaty sought to ensue that each country’s intercept ions were
roughly equivalent through I ) conserving the salmimomi resource by prc enting o crdshing

chinook and coho. illustrating time need For a unit inallagcinemtt plan.’

countries

were undertaking large—scale expansions in hateher’ production, and neither
wanted to share the Iruits ol its efforts with inteicepti ng lmshernmen. Moreover. British
Columbia was implementing an aggressive habitat impro\ ement program that promised
to double I’raser Rier sockeye rLmns. which since I 9.30 hau been shared eqtially with the
United States under the terms of’ the Fraser River (‘onsention. Another impetus was that
in the early I )0s. biologists noticed a startling decline in both 135. and (anidian

century.

In the early I 9$Os, however, a number ol developments mnoti\ ated Canada and
the United States to meach a treaty vliose goal \\ as to reUriec Salmon interceptions. Both

In this ‘‘mxen ‘.toc k” flsherv there arc strong
economic incentives to intercept salmon spa ned in other ursdietions, and intenceptmorts
have been commonplace since the beginning ol non—indian fisheries in the late nineteenth

Sound, the Fraser. and other nv ems.

TIme second agreefltenl ai ned to extend the teach o Icoord mated management to
those ‘\laskan and Canadian har\ ests that intercept (‘ulLiinhia—IJoIlnd sahnoi. Most
Columbia l3asin salmon minraic north to man.i.c a the .old >‘,orth Pcilic:n\\atca-.
ii llshore o ‘Alaska and British
ol LI tibia. vhere they Intel ii 1 ngie with sal mon 1’rom Puget

pioduction, which is

isIieric controlled b :\iaska and ( aiiada. \lo:

-

the plan

Ib.storr

and \\‘

scope

Cap.uie

Orceon

runs. I Io\ e\ Li. (ftc

har\ests in state-regulated \\aiels

heem rebuilding the
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Endaiigercd

Species .4c1

In March 1990. after a year in which only two sockeye spavners returned to
Idaho s Redlish lake, the Shoshone—Bannock tribe sought to include Snake River
sockeye under the ESA s protections b filing a petition with the National Marine

under which the first ‘threatened species” listing of a salmon run, the Sacramento River
winter chinook, occurred in I

ot’ extinction, and that the Snake River coho were already extinct. (See chart 1 .) This
ttnsettling in tornialion locused concern on the eakest sal mon runs. rather than the
aggregate numher ol salmon coastwide. Public attention soon centered on the liSA.

again in 1 957, when a conservation biologist working for the Northwest Power Planning
Council reported that over twenty salmon runs iii the Snake River Basin were in danger

The I 990s sav attention shift li’om the Northwest Power Act and the Paci lie
Salmon ireaty to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Actually, the seeds of the ESA
role were sown in the late I 970s, hen salmon were First considered for ESA listing, and

The

Chapter h considers as the ‘fourth promise to salmon the attempt of the [‘aciEc
Salmon Treaty and its 1 999 amendments to reduce international salmon interceptions.

tS.
3
improveinen

treaty was never interpreted to restrain hahilat—ditinagi na acti ii ics like logging, irrigation,
and other coninbutors to ater pollution. As a result, the 1ieat proved to be largel’ a
hat initiated a ne ‘abundance—based”
disappointment, requ ring amendnienis in I
regime br managing harvests. promising signi hcani, if o\ erduc. conserva’ on

20
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.

five

months a tier the Salmon Summit fulcd to reach an

\\‘

hile the NM FS was

considering

.

the ESA petitions, the Northiu est Power
Planning (‘ounci I began amending its fish and wi dli fe progmm to provide increased
These amendments, which offered the first
protection br migrating salmon.
improvements in mainstem flows since I 952. were approved in late I 991 ‘Fhey were too

agreement to increase Columbia Basin streamflows. the Aniedean Fisheries Society
reported that the salmon crisis was not limited to the Columbia Basin but was in Fuel a
Salmon a, 11w ( !‘os.Om/(tv. suggested that tIme
eoastwide problem. Its report.
imperiled (‘olumnhia runs v crc only the tip of an iceberg, with o ci 100 runs of wild
salmon hieing “a high risk ofextinetion” Irom central Ca Ii fomia to ihe Canadian border.’

In March 1

2
releases Iloin reservoirs located in Idaho.

including

the Snake Basin water bank to tease waler for fish flows. This too drew
opposition. this ti inc from Idaho irriuators. Aller Governor Andrus leO office, Idaho
began to OOSC any increase in stream flows for salmon which would req cure storage

.

Sumnit I.” nil matelv crc una He In prodticc a reeover\ plan flw the petitioned sIocs.
I loweser, the summit did ei\ e birtn to i pr0p0Sa. championed h Idaho Governor ( ‘ccii
Ancirus, to draw down the tour reservoirs on the Lower Snake River dtirin the spring
migration to increase river flows, and thereby benefit the salmon rLlns. This reservoir
drawdown proposal was quickly embraced by a coalition otenvironmnentalists, fishery
groups, and Indian tribes, but it Was vigorously opposed by hydropower, irrigation, and
navigation interests Another notable initiatis e was a Bureau of Reclamation study that
examined a variety of options for secu ring water from the Upper Snake River Basin.

These meet ing. dubbed the ‘Sal nina

SacrifIcing the Sal mon

measures to aid the imperiled salmon runs.

22
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been pursuing vi th little appa lent success
program would hecoitie a target of fishery

increased flows. ‘l’he alliance’s prefcned
trucking and barging juvenile salmon. a

L\

Strangely, a I though the prospect of’ ES listing prompted the Northwest Po’\ er
Planning Council to boost rivet’ flows under its program, the EXA biological opinions
actually profuced l’e changes in hydroelectric operations be\
tho

a lack of scienti lie proof’ of the benelits of
sal mon restoration plan relied heavily on
program which federal dam operators have
since the I 117t)s. The controversial barging
advocates in the l

the means.

It especially opposed restructuring Cal unihi:: Ri cr dam opcratlol:s to
increase river flows for sal non and rested this opposition on grounds of science, dat mire

—

The ESAs wider scope of’ likjuir\ also oroaecncd the oppositIon to sa a on
measures, as an alliance ot utilities. ilidListries. in igalors, and poi’ts
named ilte
Columbia River All iaiice
was trmed to pros ale a united front among watei usuts.
Interestingly, the alliance did not claim to oppose he goa of salmon restoration. tilere.\

harvesting, grazing,

and road building. The PSA thus tad the effect of broadening ftc
activities subject to scrutiny aevond hydroelectric operations to include all aspects o ‘the
sal mon Ii Ic cycle.

C\isteflcc

lor LSA—i isted saliioit. thiS eruttn Itas included annual
hydroelectric opelahion are hars•csh iflalaicenicil punts, hatchery operations, iII also
timber harvests and glazing on feder.il lands. For a time. the ES\ I istines even led to a
court injunction barring most federal land a laiget cia activities such as: a be:

of the species.

uder the ISA. oiice a species has iceii isted all f_deia! actions that might
significant I\ dverselv al..i he spec cs 01 is hiiL)ilJi die sCiltiifli/C(i by N \1 i:y m
‘hiolmical opinions’ to eflsuic that such aeli\ tiles \\ Iii ilot Jeopardi/c the continued

-
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when the situation literally cries out For a major overhaul.”

protection.

immediate limits on trucking and hu’ging sal mon. and instead relied on detailed (lain
operatiomti changes that, the Service contenued. would give priority to Fish flows over
hydropower piodticlioii. Throughout the I 9)0s, it was the Service’s plan which governed
riveroperations. In 2000. NM ES proniulgated a new Five—year BiOp which again rejected
reservoir drawdowns or dam breaching in Favor of an improved transportation p gram

NMFS’s revised biological opinion, on the other hand. made no commitments to reservoir
drawdowns, cal led ftr no additional storage water for how augmentation, imposed no

drawdown ol several reservoirs to improve salmon flows. Similarly, the plan advocated
by Idaho Governor Andrus cal led For an additional one million acrc—IIct of storage water
tbr fish flow augmentation and i nposed limits on trucking and barging juvenile salmon.

The response to Ihe court decisions was con fusion, as two separate plans were
developed. The Northwest Power PlanningCouncil’s amended program included a phased

adjustments

culling for increased salmon

One judge described the management nt the
hydroelectric system as “senouslv. ‘significantly,’ flawed because it iS Ion heavily geared
toward a status quo that has allowed all Forms of’ river activity to proceed in a deficit
sittiation.” lie decried undertaking only “relatively small steps, minor improvements and

challenged by a coalition of environmental groups and tribes. Both challenges met with
success. as the courts found that both actions Failed In satiSly statutory requ I renlenis

Ibis preierenc br incremental change would not stand. howe\er. NM ES’s [99
biological opinion on hydroelectric operations was challenged by a coalition ol states and
1 ndian tribes, and the Northcst Power Planning Council’s 199 J anendinents ‘a crc

(

24
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IValer

and l4derai Power ,leis

Although the ESA was widely viewed as the ultimate protection f

The L’lctiss

Further, responding to critics who believed that salmon restoration measures like
reservoir drawdowns were based on flimsy science. Senator Gorton succeeded in
amending the Northwest Power Act to require independent scientific review of fish and
wildlife measures funded by BPA revenues. The scientific review process would
substantially change the ftindingoffish and wildlife projects, especially hatchery funding
and research. But several scientific studies subsequently concluded that effbctive
restoration ofColumbia Basin salmon would require radical restructuringofhydroelectric
dam operations and perhaps even elimination of some Coluntia Basin dams— hardly
the result Senator Gorton anticipated his amendment would produce.
’
5

1995 also itnessed the first serious congressional efforts to curtail salmon
restoration efforts. With anew Republican congressional majority calling for reductions
in orelimination ofenvironniental regulation. Northwest legislators began to suggest that
salmon recovery was too expensive. Senator Slack Gorton of Washington, a prime
sponsor ofa bill to curtail the reach of the Endangered Species Act, claimed that it was
time to recognize that some salmon runs should be allowed to go extinct. Oregon’s
Senator Mark Hatfield. in an eflbrt to preserve the financial viability of the Bonneville
PowerAdministration (BPA), sponsored a bill that would place a cap on salmon recovery
costs. Although neither of these efforts bore legislative fruit, a “salmon budget” was
administratively imposed on fish and wildlife measures.’°

Congressional Inlervenlion

Chapter I—Capsule llLstr—25
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thcaching

underpinnings o I’ its prograni, issued a report that sharply criticized the program br
lacking a coherent conceptual toundation. The scientists concluded that the pr0grLifl
amounted to merely a ‘‘collect ion ol’ i ndi idual measures proposed liv a diverse
constituency” and ‘. as based on the fla\ved assumption that “economically desirable fish

The North est Power PlnnmcC’ounci l’s seasonal drawdown program was never
implemented, due to changes in Council membership which produced a political
stalemate and uncertainties about the prouram’s en tiwceabi I ity. But in I 996. the (.‘ouncil’s
independent scienti tic croup. asked liv the C’orinci I to evalLiate the scienti tic

Dan,

pioiii i se’ of sal iTh)fl protection

flderal acencies to attach inandatore conditions to decisions to relicense hydroelecti-ic
projects. In recent years, these conditions have proclrtcecl significant changes at many
because the cost
Pruects. including some hich ha e been or are scheduled flr removal
otrelicensing them is prohibitive. Chapter 1 1 e\plains these developments as a “hidden

A less obvious vehicle or salmon protection is the relicensing ol’ nonbederal
hydroelectric dams under the Federal Power Act Although the acencv responsible ftr
licensinc, the Federal Enercy Rettulatorv Commission. historically has been insensitive
to fish and wildlife concerns. se eral Federal Power Act provisions authorize other

quality standards in ( )reuoi to liSA hiolocical consultation and audicial detennination
that the o p’ra (ion of Federal da ins on 1 he l_o er Snake River violates Wasliinton’s water
qtial t ‘,tandards. These issues are taken up in Chapter 0, concerning the (lean \Vater
Act’s promise br salmon.

26
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irrigation for only a dozen or so corporate
But the Lower Snake [)ams do create a s lack—’\ ater na eation channel that makes

ill te

:1 J(OflftL’fl1C)I(

LI/I/ i/li’

(

)1L’I’l(!ili I’I(fIiIC

as the era of the Endangered Species Act, the first decade of tile
new mm I lenin nm is likely to become the era of’ ecosystem management. Ihe ft rst
ecosystem ilianagement plan in the Pacific Northv est \s as a consequence of the IJS
\
1
listings of the northern spotted owl and the acconi!)ait ing court Injtulctions of publ:c

If the I Q90s

I:cos1.v1L’nI

C’hapter 3 examines the issue of breaching ile Lo er Snake River dams.

Lewiston, Idaho a seaport, providing some of the most heavi lv subsidized grain transpo
in the
orid Although ses eral economic stud es howed dam breaching to be au
affordable option. breaching has been defl.rred due to significant political opposIt1or.
5

tbrms.

h dropower and no flood control: they supply

work projects toward the emicl of \\‘orhd War II, and today pruduce relatively

‘

resers (iii (lra\vdowlts. which COLt Ir rcriui re ureaca I ic o dams. The cal br dam
breaching enined momentum s hen several tthc SC L-nt fc studies L’UiichICIeU thit
truck and barge transport program \\ as extremci\ UI: iey to recover listed srd iiioit rut
The clani breaching proposa that mcci veu the most jitciull us the PP0
1 10 DecaL
the lout federal clams on the Lo er Snake River. these LUillis \ etc aLitliorized as make—

1 he (ouncilssLleutists ea\e support to calls lornennaneni. ratherthan seasoa..

ca

1 he report suggested that

permanent drawdo’ is of rcservoir, like John I)av and \Ic\ary, to restore sam
spa nine areas were the best s u to restui e the (olun has salmon rLins.
52

producers but which arc

( h: piei I
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here the sales might otherwise satisfy the ESA.

—

vi ldlifc habitat in managing non—federal Ibrest lands. The agreement has produced new
state I’Liles that req uire knrly large buffer zones protecting fish—hearing streams liom the

In Washington. the Timber, Fish and Wi IdI i l’e Agreement is not actually an
ecosystem plan, bLit rather a consensus—based foruni that aims to mtpro’ e fish and

protect coho salmon liahitaL”’’

of the plan, the state’s Forest Practices Act, had no “implementing rules that adequately

speculative measures and could not, according to the court, constitute the “adequate
regulatory alternative” the ESA required. Moreover. NJMFS determined that a centerpiece

ofOregon coho, Ibiled at its initial objective when a court invalidated NMFS’s decision
not to list in delbrence to the state plan because the plan was based on voluntarily and

On private lands, both the states of Oregon and Washington have attempted
ecosystem management plans. Oregon’s plan, an overt altempi to ward oftESA listing

political opposition and may never he implemented.

The tact that it took conrt in junctions to require the land management agencies
to implement the provisions ofihe T’sorthwesi Forest Plan is hardR reassuring, however.
and the fate of that plan in the Bush Administration is far from clear. Moreover, the plan
extends only to the range of the northern spotted owl, which means that public lands east
ofthe Cascades are not included An eliort to devise an ecosystem management plan fbi’
that area, the Interior Columbia Basin icosystem Management Plan, has run into stiff

for violating these pi emises. e en

aqUatic protect ion are judicial l en lorceable. meant ng that ii nber sales can be enjoined

28
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There are several di liereni ways to analyze this new ecosy

les proleciing salmon—bearing rivers.

m

the current costs o fmaintaining the dams, which exceed S200 mill ion per year. by calling
liii increased waler from Idaho reservoirs and increased en forceineni of’ state and local

undammed Lower Snake River would create potential spa\vning groLinds live times as
large as the I lunford Reach on the Mid—Columbia, where the only self-sustaining
Columbia Basin salmon now spawn. The basinw ide reco cry approach will also increase

perhaps water diversions instead of breaching the Lower Snake Dams. e en though
removing the dams would create a 220—mile stretch of lrce—flow ing river which would
substantially increase survival of juvenile fish in the mainstem of’ the river. An

of improving habitat in Columbia Basin tributaries and the Columbia River estuary. This
alternative focuses attention on changing logging, grazing, and miii ing practices, and

One harbinger oh’ the role of’ ecosystem management in the Ihture of Columbia
Basin salmon is a businwide recovery strategy devised by federal agencies to combat all
tour of the principal causes ol salmon mortality: harvest, hatcheries, habitat, and
hydropower production (designated as the “all—I I” approach). The effect of this all—Il
approach is to direct attention away from dam breaching and to emphasize the importance

plans. Some ofthe questionS SurruLinding these plans are discussed at the end of chapter
9f6

adverse c flc ts olti itiher harvests \V itli in the crit cal hahita t a [‘listed ( a Ittinbia and ‘Snake
Rtver salmon. \M FS subNeuuenily signaled its approval 01
approa’h in
its rules under section 4d) at’ the LSA. En addition. everaI timber companies and
nit hues have been negotiai ing habitat conservation plans with federal fish and wildhie
agencies that, once approved, will authorize kilhingoflisted Species ii consistent Vv ith the

Chapter I
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recovery approach

‘

The books final two chapters consider tile future 0 Fwm Id sal lion in the Columbia
l3asi 1 and tile lessons the (.‘ol umbia Basin salmon experience may have for restoration
eltorts ill other i’es in order For ild sainlon runs to survive tile 21st century, both tile
pimbi ic and p01 icymakers need to understand the nature ol tile promises tilat ilaVe been
made about salmon ill the past. and why they have Ihi led. illis in turn reqiumes dispel liilg
a variet of myths that ha e gmo ml up o er the x ears. Chapter I 5 reiterates tile promises

a P P roach

the

ill loin numerous failed in Ttiat I yes I hat ha e been tried over
the years to save (_oiumbia Basin salmon. Chapter 14 assesses the new ecosystem

another Failure to confront efTecfively the largest source of Snake River salmon
mortalities ‘hi Ic making it appear that meaning l’ul recovery e Ports are underway. ilso.

Indian water right claims. Such a settlement could lead to envuonmuentalist suppoil for
impending hydroelectric relicenses, like tile I lells Canyon relmeensing. which would give
stabi lily to water rights holders and hydroelectric hcemisees in return for \vater user
support of darn breaching. Finally, tile new ecos stem approach may si llpiy represent

Ii the resulting habitat protections actually were to pmo’ e su Ii cient ly stringel it
and enForceable, it is possible that the protection may convince Idaho. and perhaps other
states, that it is in the interest of water users to negotiate a comprehensi\ e settlement of

lacking

-—

Sacti licing the Sal moo

runs to o ext net. liii id, it the flC\\ ecosystem approach SCiiO(islV attenlptS to provide
habitat beneflts equivalent to dam breaching, a Firestorm of’ p01 it ical opposition from
c en ereatcr than their oppobtion to dam
restr\ and era/mu nierests
tbrin.
is Iilcelv. One suspects that the vil I to impose such measures may be
hiench nit

30
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Xcientists think that all speeies ot’salnion origitiuted in ireshwater and grudouiy

salmonids to venture into the marine envi onmeni

As tile oceans began to coo aiuuiiu

evolved into anadronious fish by billowing the tlo\\s ol’greLt glacial rivers seaward. i’lii
great li’eshwuter hush di tiled the salt nity u! l h ocealis sufficiently to encouruec

()i’itin.v

grounding in the basics of salmon science .salinun liR\ s and aol icies are likely to he
misguided.

Unlike the other chapters of this book, wh cli locus on salmon law and policy.
this chapter is a kind of’ laypersuns guide to the suirnuil Ii lb cycle. \V ithout an adeuute

This chapter examines the origins and IiIb cycles of Pact lie salmon and explains sonic ul
the distinctive Ii lb cycle characteristics of each species of’ Paci lie salmon.

survive

spawning, but some Atlantic salmon and steelhead trout do. i’his urge to spawn
in the streams which prouuced them has been both a source of human ‘onderment and
human wealth. br the salmons remarkable horn ne nst mci makes them easy to harve’t.

Pacific salmon are members of the timi ly that includes not only their Atlantic
cousins hut also seagoing steelhead and rainbow trout
All arc anadromous fish.
beginning their lives in freshwater, migrating 10 the sea where they spend most of their
adult lives, then returning to their natal streams to reproduce. Pact lie salmon do not

2__riiIEs
,
1
LMoN

(h:jncr 2
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Prior

to the Ice Age.
Ichtll\OiOiZiStS

believe that
sonic

Atlantic NUI mon

(_olumbia Basin Most Pacific salmon spawn in the autumn.

Salmon recently arrived in fresh water from the sea are cal led “brights.’’ Brights enter
tiesh water at di ffrrent times of the year, depending on the particular salmon species.
The timing varies according to individual runs destined fir particular watersheds. In the
Columbia R ‘er, brights refer to a group ol upriver fill chinook which md ucle the
I lanlord Reach fall chinook, the last sd f—sustaining spawning population ol salmon in the

believe they also employ salinity and temperature sensors, especially in estuaries.

The salmons renowned homing instinct, which gives rise to its immense Ii Ic
cycle, is largely the procitict of an extraordinary olfactory sense. Salmon literally smell
their \vav home, searching for the tin ique odor ol their natal stream, although scientists

Lif (‘ucle

spawning, whereas Atlantic salmon often do:

ocean in which to roam. Similarly, except for steelhead. Pacitic salmon do not survive

American continent, blocking the Northwest Passage. Paci lie and Atlantic salmon were
separated permanently. Over the millennia since, the two types (cli liereni genera) of
salmon have developed distinct genetic patterns. as the process ol natural selection
adapted each to the environment in which it exists. For example. Pacific salnmn
generally have more extensive ocean migrations, probably because they have a larger

migrated through mild Arctic seas. makmg their ay It) the Paci lie before there was a
land bridge oem een \orth An crica and Asia. When the Ice Age omed the North

aiiadrom\

\‘l osi scientists believe that the separation of salmon ids into Paci lie sa mon
Oncuri,iIILIiuvt and At antic alnion ( Salnio) occurred long hehue the onset 01
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ci tli on I
lou r or five pounds.

the spews. I lach fertilized redd is then covered with gravel

female, who guards

including thejacks. This competitive spawning helps to preserve genetic variation within

redds. a llo\ ing fertilization by the mi It of’ males other than the spent dominant male,

An elaborate mating ritual occurs as the female takes as
long as three days to prepare several rcdds. Ihe dominant male is usually accompanied
by other mature males as well as underage hut sexually precocious salmon, called jacks,
that encourage the dominant male to remain vigilant. When at last the female releases
her eggs into the redd, the dominant male deposits Ii is sperm, or mi It, nearly
simultaneously, for the milt is viable univ for a very short time, the eggs for less than a
minLite. Many females deposit LI to a thousand eggs in each of three or lour cli fierent

lighting for the right to mate

Upon reaching the spawning trounds, females search for a suitable place to biii Id
a redd. or nest. in the gravel, usually in riffles or just below logs or boulders. Males
congregate around nest—building females, competing with each other and sometimes

to a lmale.

ihct that by the time they reached freshwater, the chums flesh was in ftrior. fit only for
feeding to dogs.) Scientists speculate that these external changes signify a mature male

‘.

deteriorate as they reach their spawning tLrounds. [hey ascend ii schoo1, pausing to rest
in ri er pools. Males change color patterns and. as their sexual oreans deelop.
metamorphose Male chum salmon. for example. grow canine—I ike teeth: hence, their
popular nickname, dog salmon. ( Alternatively, some contend that the name rellects the

\\ hen the\ return to the ri\ er. salmon are in time prime of ilmeur lives. hut the

tat and lisuil I

migrations and reside in l)esli aler for shorter periods heflare spu’. ii imp. iced less body

seighed ti ttv to se enly pounds.

(lBtJer 2
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.hinook fry, which grow luster than cohn. consist of two types: the ocean—type.

as fly while strcaiii temperatures warm in the spring. Most li—v migrate to nursery areas.
sometimes downstream, sometimes upstream, although most chum and pink sal non go
(luickly’ hI sea. Sockeye Fiy can remain in Freshwater lakes up to three years he tbre
beginning their seaward migration as fingerlings, or smolt. (oho, too, can live lbr up to
three years in fl’eshwater, although typically they do not linger th at long.

Lea\ ing ihe redd and yolk sac beh i id. the voting salmon emerge liom the gravel

are highly temperature—sensitive and remain in the redd For three or Four weeks.
consuming their yolk sacs in the dark streambed gravel and avoiding light until they leave
the gravel to begin a pen bus j ournev

Percent of embryos in oxygenated streams in redds ith porous gravel succeed in
or lo water flows
which redLices oxygen levels
hatchiny, but silting ofriverheds
can cause premature hatch tug. In such streams the survival tale is mitch lower. Alevin

lea\ Cs the gravel and begins to feed on larvae and plankton the following spring. In the
spring, when it needs moie oxygen than the stream can supply, the embryo hatches into
an alevin, which is a juvenile salmon that can s’ im but retains its yolk sac About 9)

‘vVithin an hour of’ Fertilization the eggs harden and become sticky. so as to anchor
themselves to the stream bottom. The embryo inside forms within a week, first as a
rudimentary eye and then a yolk sac, which is the only source of food until the young fish

and coumir. But i he’c p edators ‘edom eUflSLilIk’ all of the eni CaSseS \v hich. as the’ rot
and (lecaV. pro ide nutrients troni the sea to the rivers, inking the marine environment
itli the flesliv.aier enviroiiiiienl.

—
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cemi:

is
iloste\

dcii
i) to

90

can take three

timlies

as
long.

tiri lug tnoh

remain

in

the estuL:

tras ci

2,000 miles in

among
to 1 0.000

just over a year
tile ocean, can cover up

over

The distance traveled varies

which can spend up to flur years in

salmon can

provide hsh for Oregon harvests.

and within stocks. Pink

to

chum and sockeye,

species

southward
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in southern California, the Columbia River was historically the great breeding ground of
chinook salmon. There are more than a thousand di flbrent spawning populations within

Alihotigh chinook range from the l3eri ng Sea as kir south as the Ven tutu River

mainstern of rivers or in larger tributaries.

the Olympic Peninsu Ia may have lived a doien years. Chinook generally spawn in the

example, prior to the construction ofilic Flwah River dams, the lilwah River chinook on

Chinook (0. islman’itslma. the largest salmon species, are also called kings. lyee
(chie1 in Chinook jargon), springs, and quinnaull. Chinook now average from I 2 to 25
pounds, but historically some chinook exceeded 100 porinds. Chinook and sockeye arc
the great river ascenders ofihe species. Idaho chinook, for example. iiiust surmount eight
dams over 900 miles, gaining more than a mile in elevation. Chinook general I)’ spend
three to live years in the ocean. although in rare circumstances sonic slay longer. For

(‘h/nook

sections discuss some of the most characteristic difierences amongeach. Not considered
are two species, the cherry salmon, or masu (U. masu) and amago (0. rliothii’iis). because
the are found only in Asia*’

Because all species ol Pacilic salmon POSSC55 distinct life cycles, the lollowing

of the lollowing years returning adults, lbcilitating harvest regulation.

•

hicli return early, after lust one year in the sea, instead oiio In five
ears. l3iologiis think dun these “acks’ supply insurance that female eggs ill he
lertil ited: they also pro ide lislicr managers with a p1ev lew ol the relat m e abundance

precocious males
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to 2(1 pounds.
7

Major coho spawning grounds include coastal Washington and Puget Sound
streams, Lower Columbia trihutaries, including the Willamette, and ( )regon coastal
streams. Coho spawn in California as for south as Monterey [3ay, hut they are rare in (he

around I

coho are mostly foil spawners, usLially in the tipper reaches of small tributar streams,
although some coho stocks spawn as late as March. Like chinook. cohn are found from
the Bering Sea to northern (‘a lil’ornia, although coho are smaller than chinook, averaging

freshwater before migrating. then two years in the ocean. Like other Paci lie salmon.

Coho (0. keta), or silver salmon, stay closer to tite coast than chinook, traveling
neither as far upriver ncr as for in the ocean. Colio generally spend one year in

CoIio

the Columbia Basin. known as the I lanford Reach. Parts of all Columbia chinook runs
arc listed under the Endangered Species Act.’

other hand, enter freshwater later in the year and tend to spawn lower in watersheds soon
ater reentering the river: their fry migrate to the sea some months later. Fall chinook are
the only remaining salmon run harvested commercially by Columbia River tribes with
treaty fishing rights, and wi Id fall chinook still spawn in the last free—flowing stretch of

also usually spend at least a year in freshwater as fry before migrating to the ocean.
Spring chinook generally spawn in a watershed’s highest tributaries. Fall chinook, on the

(Thinook are refrrred to as spring, summer, or foil chinook. (leflol log the time of
Year they reenter freshater. There is even a vinter run of chinook in the Sacramento
River. Spring chinook tend to spend some months in fresl ater before spawning: they

C 13,1 p rer 2
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9

Sockeye U.

lieriw).

Sockeye. like chinook. are ureat travelers, both in fresh or saltwater, where they
spcnd one to tour years. Sockeye spa ii as ftir south as the Sacramento River. but
commercially important numbers occur only north of the Columbia River. The greatest
producer of sockeye is now the Fraser River in British Columbia. Allocating Fraser
River sockeye between Canadian and L’S. harvests was the subject of the 1930 Fraser
River Conention. the I 955 Pacific Salmon Treaty, and the I 999 amendments to the

environments reduces interaction with other species during spawning, incubation, and
2
rearing in fres hw at er.

lakes or in rivers close to them during the months ot May to October. Sockeye spend as
little as a fl.w days to as long as three years in the lakes. The sockeye’s adaptation to lake

also knos ii as bluehack or red sa Inmon. are smaller than
chinook or coho. averagin six to eight pounds. but are considered by many to be the
choicest sal mon of all. At spawning. males have bright red bodies. The sockeye’s chief
characteristic is that it spends most of its ticshvvater rearing in lakes, spawning in the

msteu.

vulnerable to sireani deeradation. such as siltation from limber harvests. In I 997. the
National \‘lai lime Fisheries Service I isted cohn runs in northern Cal i kwn ia and southern
Oregon under the Endangered Species Act. The next year all Oregon coastal cohn were

97. I Iarvcsts declined ftoin 3.9 million Osh in I 970 to one mu lion in 1977. and have
remmiam ned depressed since. it h a hans est ot inst 25_OUt) in p97. Because 1le spend
more time as try in lresh ater than most other Pac i ñc salmon. cohn arc part icularl)

38— Sacrificing the Salmon
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The sina lest of the Paci ftc sal mon is the pink (0. gol/?usc/iu), also referred to as
humphacks, (Inc 10 a noticeable hump that adult males develop. Mature pink sal mon

Chum average about S or ‘) pounds at mai un ty. slightly simm 11cr than coho. Their
most distinctive characteristic is the development ol dou—m ike teeth as they near spa\vniig
and death. once plentiful in the C’ol Llmhia and Oregon coastal rivers and spa\vning as fur
south as the Sacramento River, chum are now lound mostly in Pucet Sound and Brit isli
Columbia streams. But the largest harvests in ‘.ortlm America are in Alaska:’
Pink

the gravel. However, they are great ocean travelers, sometimes covering 10.000 miles
in up to thur years at sea:

Churn (0. kciu), or doi salmon, is the last ol tue Pac i tie salmon to return to
ll’eshwaier in the fall. (‘hum irenerallv do not travel fur unsueain to spawn: some spa ii
ust above tidewater, and the rarely travel inure than 1 00 rules in land, ccept in :he
Yukon River in Alaska. They enter rivers as early as July uiiu spawn lium September 10
January Juvenile chum leave the river enviroiinicnt univ a fey. days after emerging iromn

places to mitigate salmon losses due to dams. Koka nec tend u become anadmmuLls
they are given the opportunity.

populations in the Columbia Basin are in Lake Osovoos and Lake Chelan in the upper
basin. Fraser Ri\ er runs, on the other hand, without bc obstacles presented by darns,
have been healthy and sd l—slLstaining, as have rLtns on undununeci Alaskan rivers. Sinai
landlocked sockeye, called kokance (0. lie/ku Kciiicri’i/). haVe been introduced in many

I-__
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Their historic range was From Alaska to

Unlike salmon, which do not Feed a Ocr returning to lieshwatcr. steelhead do.

northwestern Mexico. although today their southernmost reach is Malibu Creek in
southern Cab Fornia. A total of’ ten steelhead runs were I sled under the Endangered
Species Act by 2000.25

enter rivers in any month of’ the year.

good deal of time in li’eshwater heibre iii grating to the ocean. Generally. [heir [‘our—year
lil’e cycle is divided evenly between the river and the sea. Steelhead spawn later than
salmon, usually in the winter and spring, from December to June, although they may

may spawn more than once. although most do not. A typical nature average steelhead
weighs about 10 pounds. although some ‘each 30 pounds. Like coho. steelhead spend a

Steelhead (0. nivkiss, fbrmerly So/mo gairIiici’i) is a sea—run rainbow trout that
shares many characteristics olsalmon. For example. like Atlantic salmon, some steelhead

Sieelhca I

24
the Columbia River.

otthe fixed two—year life cycle in w hich one year’s population never intcrbrecds with the
next ears. ( )n some rivers, like the Frtscr. pink salmon spawn only in odd—numbered
years in others, like Bristol Bay tributaries, the major runs are in even—numbered years.
Even on streams in which pink salmon spawn in both years, the runs are reproductively
isolated and genetically distinct. Pink salmon are now abundant only in streams north of’

On many Northwest streams, including those in Ptiget Sound and the Fraser
Ri ci’. pink salmon return only every other year, and have done so since the beginning of’
recorded history. Why this occurs is unk sm n. hut it seems ikely that ii is a consequence

40
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Stock (oIluL’pt

salmon hatcheries, and sonic biologists disputed the hereditary basis of stock differences.

That stocks were the building blocks of Pacific salmon was recognized in the
VS. as long ago as 1939 by biologist Willis Rich in a report to the Oregon Fish
Commission. But that report was largely ignored by fish culturists in the operation of

in the spring and the other in the kill. In short, since salmon and their habitat are
inextricahl linked, efforts to !reserve and restore particular salmon species must focus
on their individual life histories and habitat.
27

each stock has adapted to local environmental conditions over many years of evolution,
they are not readily interchangeable \vith other stocks. Chinook destined for the same
Snake River tributary would not he from the same stock ifone began its uprivermigration

particular watersheds that span at a pailicular time, are effecti\ ely isolated and self—
perpetuating, and do not generally inwrbreed with other populations. Moreover, because

to local habitat.” The critical population component of salmon is not the species level,
hut the stock level. Pacific salmon species are composed of populations of fish within

Cataloguing the variouS characteristics of the Pacific salmon species is somewhat
misleading because, as Jim Lichatowich has shown, these generic life histories are just
‘central themes around which each population has developed a rich diversitv in response

The

Vv

—-

lhroughout this hook .zenenc references to salmon include steelhead.

their late returns provided the tribes with
of stcelhead was the (olurnia Basin.
’
2

(‘hipcer 2
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Similarl. hatchery operations, which

.

It was the stock concept which led the authors oh’ the ( /y.vsI’oacl.s report to sound
the alarm at the precanous state of Paci tic salmon Alter Sw\ eying stocks in the ttir
Pacihie Northwest slates, they Ibund no fe er than 214 stocks depleted. Some 101 of

assumed that salmon stocks were tungihie, not only failed to maintain local populations
but masked declines by allowing harvests to continue in the lower river and the ocean.
Worse. hatchery fish can adversely a fhi,ct spawning populations through interbreed inc.
()•
disease. and competition for scarce hood and habitat (see chapter

extirpation of certain breeding populations.

The stock concept means that each run ot salmon is genetically unique. adapted
to local v atcrshed conditions. Genetic difThrenccs hetween breeding populations of
salmon shouldhave influenced harvest management and attenWts to propagate the species
XOs,
arti liciahly through hatcheries. But the stock concept was not accepted until the I 9
which allowed fishery managers to overlook the fact that harvest regulations led to

The stock concept explains why some chinook stocks on the Oregon coast
migrate north, while others migrate south and wh Oregon coastal cli inook stocks ‘arv
widely in terms of leneth ofuveniie stay in freshwater, leneth 01 stay iii saltwater. age
composition oispawners, even egg size. It also explains why Bruce Brown could report
on two stocks of Dungeness River pink salmon, one oh which is an early. upriver
’
2
spa ncr, the other ofwliich spawns much later in the lower river.

into local populations which possess genetic di Ilerences that arc adaptive is the
fundamental basis of the stock concept. and it is this concept that must he incorporated
into management ii fishery rcsourccs arc to he restored and maintained
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envii

to recognize the existence ol ‘‘metapopulations,’’ instead ol isolated stocks.

and satellite populations, which arc less abundant populations occupying lower

habitat. (ore populations buffer metapopli lations against environmental change

—-

and also contribute to the i-es ili ency of regional salmon populations by serving as

quality

habitat

comprised o I core populations

Metapopulations are
large. productive populat ions occupying high quality

recolonation of areas where local extinctions have occ uned.

through natural selection. Straying among geograplt ical lv adjacent populations enables

noted that inlormation on salmon metapopulations was quite limited and that
metapopLilation structure remains a hypothesis. ‘Flie inetapopulation concept is an
outgrowth ofthe salmon’s hdelity to natal streams, with relaticly low hut variable levels
of strayi iig. Fidelity to natal streams facilitates natural adaptation to local environments

The Northwest Power Planning Council’s independent scientists concurred, although they

management

Forty years later, in I -)9ô, the National Research Council called Ibi sa men

3
stocks adapted to local environments.

stocks to the lox er river, in apparent ignorance o(the need to conserve diverse population

in the late 1 940s believed they could successfully transplant Upper Columbia l3asin

diverse populations, the architects ot the LowerC olumbia 1 ishery Development Program

oninental variat ion As
long ago as I 93, biologist Willis Rich recognized that where a species is divided into
ituineious isolated populations. it is important to conserve each individual component
group. While Rich was lot the only biologist to recognize the signi licance ot conserving

which a low them to sustain themselves throwth natural

Related to the Stock concept is diversity, both thin and ainongpopulalions and
species. Sal mon have diverse 1 iI. histories, ecologicu adaptations, and genetic itriatluii

/ )ii’Lu.\//i

( hapter 2
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This environmental sensitivity implicates a host of land and water use activities

suitability of rivers Lw a variety of other uses that depend on high quality water.
35

and from the sea; stable, permeable gravel in the riverbed to promote spa\vning and
incubation; and streamside vegetation and large woody debris in the stream to supply
adequate shelter and lood. These environmental requirements make salmon the ultimate
indicator species of the health of river systems. Like the miner’s canary, salmon test the

Salmon require high quality cool water; sufficient sireamfiows to facilitate muigrat ion to

‘The salmon’s immense migrations, its heroic return to natal sireams, and its
economic, cultural, and religious value are more than sufficient to make sahm)n
management a topical natural resource study. But the salmon’s intluence extends beyond
its life cycle and the allocation of harvest rights because of its environmental sensitivity.

En 1ir(nh,iIeIi/u/ Sensii ii)if

Day Rivers.
’
3

streams where high quably habitat remains, like wilderness areas in Central Idaho and the
headwaters ol tributaries like the Grand Ronde, the lmnnaha. the Yakima, and the John

Day reservoir. Small spawning populations of Lii chinook also exist in the lower
mainsiem reaches of most tributaries, including the Snake River below I lel is Canyon
Dam and the lower reaches of the Grande Ronde and lmnaha Rivers in northeastern
Oregon. Spring and summer chinook spawning populations are confined to headwater

.

Sauriticirig the Salmon

scientists of the ‘sorih est Pow ci Plan ni n ( ounci I speculated that I Ian fbrd Reach
chinook could colonize adjacent habitats near the confluences of the Snake, Columbia.
Yakima. and mali la Rivers and as far do un en as the area flO\V inundated by the John

44
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The National Academy of Sciences reported in 1996 that slightly more than half
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Coastal populations are generally better offthan interior salmon runs: runs in the
north arc usually healthier than those in the south. Those species that spend a greater
proportion oftheir life cycle in freshwater-— spring/summer chinook, coho. sockeye, and
steclhead typically are in worse shape than those like fall chinook, chum, and pink
salmon
that spend less of their rearing period in freshwater. Ilowever, in the
Columbia Basin, fall chinook sulThr from the greatest threat due to an almost total loss
3
b
of spawning habitat as a result of dams.

Over the last century. Pacific salmon have disappeared from roughly 40 percent
oftheir historic range in the Pacific Northwest and California (see maps! and 3-6). And
many cx isting salmon runs are threatened with extinction. In fact ifareas with depressed
runs are combined with those with extinctions, the total area of loss is two-thirds ofthe
historic salmon mn, in the four states.”

Siulux qf iii.!’ Ranis

habitat, coupled with the damage attributable to poer harvest management and hatchery
practices. has priwided a recipe for inaction. Since improvements from rcibrms in one
sector could be canceled out by business-as-usual in another sector, there has been little
incentive to change. and every incentive to point in other directions. An even greater
obstacle to restoration efforts may be the fact that it is usually impossible to trace the
benefits of any particular action throughout the salmon life-cycle due to confounding
variables.”

Chapter 2— The SaIn —45
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Bannock Tribe petitioned for Endangered Species Act (ESA’t protection. The major
fhctors for the decline 01’ the species cited by the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NM FS) in listing the species were hydropower development and operations, water
withdrawals For irrigation and For storage (mostly br irrigation), increased predation
(encouraged by the dams), and natural drought cycles. In I 991 the year NM FS listed the
species tinder the NSA. just Four sockeye returned to Redfish I .:ike. their last remaining

disappeared alter dam construction, agricultin-al diversions, and fish management
practices blocked upstream salmon migration. The sockeye runs were so devastated that
none reached their last remaining spawning grounds in 1990, the year the Shoslione—

Columbia I3asin stocks have suffered some of the most severe declines on the
Pacific C’oast. In the late I 9th century, Snake River sockeye fueled commercial fisheries
on many lakes in the Salmon and Wal Iowa subbasins. I lowever. those fisheries

Washmglon were in good condition, although 70 percent relied in part on hatchery
stocks. Oregon cohn, which constitute the largest cohn populations in the U.S. outside
olAlaska, were oerwhelmingly classified as (lepreSsed. California coastal cohn, which
once numbered in the hundreds of thousands, totaled fewer than 5.000 spawners: most
populations \‘ere threatened or endangered, and the Sacramento River cohn was extinct.

The eport conchitied that coastal clunool\ SiihnOn rLIfl in \‘Vashilgion and
Oregon were in better shape than the Puget Sound runs: ii classi lied some two—thirds of
Washington runs as healthy. ide only slightly more than halfvcre health in ( )regon.
Ilo e\er, 40 percent olihe spring summer chinook runs in Washington were depressed.
and in ( )regon 70 percent of’ south\\ aid flhigrating chinook runs (from the Rogue River
southward) were depressed or of special concern. Virtual Iv all known chinook
populations in (‘aliftn’nia were at risk of extinction, Most coastal cohn runs in
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Snake River thu chinook have fared even worse. The 1901 construction ofSwan
Falls Dam on the Middle Snake cut offreturning adults from over one hundred miles of
spawning habitat. Despite this loss, fall chinook populations stabilized around 70,000
adult salmon until the I 950s. At that time construction ofthree dams in the Hells Canyon
reach of the Snake and four dams on the Lower Snake closed off critical habitat and
presented serious water quality problems. Altogether, dam building throughout the
Columbia Basin destroyed virtually all the fall chinook’s mainstem spawning and rearing
habitat, except in the hanford Reach on the Mid-Coluntia. In 1990, NMFS estimated
that only 78 retuming wild fall chinook passed the last of the Lower Snake DamsY In
listing both spring/summer and fall chinook under the liSA. NMFS cited many of the
same factors which caused the decline of the sockeye: hydropower development, water
storage and withdrawals for irrigation, and water pollution, including siltation from poor
land use practices. Ovuharvcsting was once a serious problem. but NMFS now
considers hydropower development and operations to be the core threat to the species.
NMFS noted that the small populations of both species presented significant risk of
extinction due to random demographic or genetic events. The agency claimed that
existing regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to increase survival chances, noting that
the operational changes made to the dams and decreased harvest rates had failed to
restore the populations. NMFS also determined that in addition to the causes listed
above, spring chinook population declines could be partially explained by poor ocean
conditions. Hatchery operations posed a particular threat to fall chinook.
44

percent

management.

years supplied what might be the coup de grace for salmon runs already reeling due to
habitat degradation and harvest
In 199l, the year before NMFS listed the
Snake River spring summer chinook under the ESA, the species registered an all-time
low, numbering less than one
of their original 1.5 million.’
2
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can

produce ext met ions

Snake River steellicad, neluding

lions

runs

spawning

in tributaries in southeast

timing of the runs coincides with runs o fother non listed, hatchery—produced fish subject
to commercial harvest. NM F’S recognized the inadequacy ot existing regulatory

—

o0l—lriuing objects in streams like boulders and downed trees. Listed steelhead are also
because the
tint i I recently exceeding 30 percent
subject to a large tribal harvest

NMFS cited hydropower development as a key factor in the steelhead’s decline.
Other factors included increased in—stream and oceanic predation (the former.
exacerbated by conditions created by dams), increased susceptibility to disease (due
largely to hatcheries), genetic problems due to hatchery fish, and drought. N MFS pointed
to poor land use pniclices on federal and pri\ ate land, which produce higher water
temperatures and siltation in streams, and h ich draniatical lv decrease the number of

4
events that can produce extinctions.

populations leave Snake River steelhead subject to random genetic and demographic

Washington, northwest Oregon, and Idaho, averaged 71 .000 adults between 1900 and
1 994. But only 0,400 were wild fish, and the late “B run” had only 2.400 wild fish.
NMFS considered the wild runs to have suffered “severe declines” when it listed them
under the ESA in 1998, especially the “B run.’ over 80 percent of the steelhead passing
the uppermost of the Lower Snake Dams were hatchery fish at the time of the listing. in
some tributaries, according to NMFS. hatchery operations jeopardize the continued
existence of wild steelhead in the Snake and Lower Columbia Rivers. Reduced

cond

ceiitur did the cuniulat ye etiects of flcsh ater de\ elopmenls in the Columbia Basin
reduce the i Imun’ abundance and di \ eri t to the porn I whei e ad erse Oceanic

50— Sacrificing Ihc Salnion
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reproducine enough surviVIng oil spring to replace
the mid—I 990s. wild sieelliead iii the Wenatehec and lint iat

were replacing theniselvesat a

extinction.’

Rivers

in

i Id fish are not

themselves. For example,

fish. The remaining

Columbia have continued to decline, both in absolute numbers and relati e to hatchery

randomly in hatcheries. Since construction ol (irand (‘on lee, wild steel head in the I. Jpper

i’ ol salmon at Rock Island Damn, on the M id—( ‘Ol unibia below (irand Coulee. then
transplanted them to hatcheries or released them indiscriminately mit inbutaries bCt\ ecu
the two dams, in an ci tort to produce \\ idespread redistribution.
Ihis program
redistributed steelhead without regard to their streams of origin and mixed stoefts

Wil lainette Rix er sleelitead, along with fi\ e runs of Cal i lornia steelhead. Upper
Columbia steelhead, whose range extends from the YaLit Ri\ er to the Canadian border,
have had their habitat severely restricted b\ (1 iamtd Coulee Dim, which elimutated o\ e:
• 100 mi iCS of’ habitat in l 939. I3etvveen 939 and I 943 1 isherv agencies trapped all

Steclhead numbers in the \‘lid—Colnmhia arc higher in the aggregate than the
were in the I 930s. again due to hatcheries. Bitt lniiieen of fihleen spawning NtOe5 of
summer steelhead are ciepiesseO. and another eic\ en ate extinct. By 2000. N I I S bad
isted Upper, \iiddle, and Lower Columbia steel cad, Snake River steelhead, and i pper

populations in the \1 iddle or I. ‘pper(’olumhia iii e aP listed under the Endangered Species
Act. Cohn populations are largely cx tinci, as they tte iii the Snake.

passauc at irrication

dani. Suiimier and hill chinook in the ‘vld-( oiumoia are no 1IUIC
ibundaiit o eral I thai in the I 030s. due to h eheiesbii fIve ot fourteen \Vild stocks .re
depies.ed I’fie stronoest population in the Couinba Has! is the fall chinook spi!s’ flifl
in the last 1rce—flo ing stretch of the mamsiem river, die I Ianl’ord Reach. Spring chinook

(Iiipter 2— ilie
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see how the current situation is not a blatant violanon ol the tm’catv promie.

kimily—wage jobs.

But elearR those who have lost the most are Indian tribes, the
Northwest’s first ushers. This is especially true ot’ the Columbia Basin tribes whose
locations upriver make them particularly vulnerable. In I ‘,))6, the Chairman ol’ the
Columbia River Inter—Tribal Fish Commission reported that the avem’age tribal fisherman
luvi $7,000 annually. Since, us the following chapters show, the tribes’ 140—year—old
treaties have been interpreted to assure the tribes a livelihood from lishi ng, it is hard to

The decline of the salmon has imposed hardships on both commercial and sport
fishers, particularly in coastal towns where salmon harvesting has been a way of life for
generations. Estimated costs are approximately S500 million per year and 25.00(1 lost

logging, agriculture, and urbanization. I lydropmver has played less of a role in the
churn’s decline than other salmon, but nevertheless has destroyed some chum hahitat.

woody debris from streams, which actually is true throughout the Columbia Basin,
adversely aff’cting all salmon runs. (.)ther actions contributing to the decline include
waler withdrawals, loss ofriparian habitat, and increased sediirientation in streams From

inland human acti ties that are so devastating to sockeye. chinook. steelbead, and coho.
Most damaging to chum was the use of sirearns for log transport and removal of large

to a crash ot the population iii the I )50s, are also at less than one percent of their historic
abundance. Even though there has been no commercial chum lisher’y since the I )50s, the
population remains depressed. both in total numbers and in genetic diversity. In listing
NMFS cited freshwater habitat destruction as the major
the churn as threatened iii i
cause of the species decline, althouih churn spend relatively little lime in freshwater
compared to other salmon, making them less susceptible to the deleterious effects of
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during the “free— flw—al 1”

o

By all accounts, the native harvest of salmon was prodigious The most recent
estimate is 41 million pouilds annual lv, roughly the same harvest that would take place

The Pie- Trcati Fishc’n

world view. IThis attitude ensured that salmon were never wantonly wasted, and v ater
pollution was generally forbidden.’

for the salmon’s return and aimed at ensuring the salmon’s continued abundance. These
symbolic acts, attitudes of respect. and concern br the well—being oi’the salmon reflected
the interdependence and interrelatedness of all living things that dominated the native

natis es coincided with annual fish runs. Most tribes celebrated a First Salmon (.eremony
which, despite regional variations, invariably invol\ ed a religious rite thanking the deity

Salmon gave these tribes the economic prospenty to support a population density higher
than anywhere north ol Mexico. Salmon were abundant, available for harvest at
predictable limes, and could be preserved for later consumption. Salmon were the
centerpiece of the nali es diet, their lifestyle, and their religion. Seasonal migrations of

Salmon dominated life in the Pacific \orth est heibre white settlement. Irade
in salmon enabled \orthwest Indian tribes to become one ofthe world’s frw hunting and
gathering economies that generated wealth beyond what was needed for subsistence.

3

Chapter 3
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The Inst white explorers of the Northwest were much more interested in the

i/ic (hive!

were alienable, inheritable piuperty.

‘

rights. hut large fishing sites were controlled by villages. While many tribes shared their
sites with biiends. neighbors and isitors. they were quite clearly granting use rights only.
retaining their claim to ownership and monitoring harvests. Similarly. di pnet plat forms

.

fishing sites, including the great commons like (eli lo Falls, where more than Ow million
pounds of salmon were harvested annually (see figure I ) Although these commons
dommated in land fishing, most lobes recognized a system ot private ownership to
moderate harvests. Coastal and Plateau tribes especially recognized individual pioperty

Trade among these natives s as brisk: salmon were exchanged for raw materials
and manufactured goods. The accounts of the first s hite explorers documented the
salmon—centet-ed Ii festvle of the natives. Both Manuel Quiniper in 1 790 and George
Vancouver in 1792 reported trading with the natives br salmon. On their overland
tourney down the Columbia in I X05. lewis and Clark observed more than a hundred

Snake drainages, including the Salmon Rivers headwaters. Natives used various harvest
techniques. includmg seine nets dragcd by canoes. liarpoons and spears, snia II dams or
wet rs to trap salmon, hook and I inc and di p nets: they also hui t fish alat lorms from
2
which they could access rapids and narrows with nets and spears.

2) the \Vishrani, L’matiHa, Walla Walla. Yak:mia, and Nez Perce trihesol the plateau east
ofthc Cascades and cx tending into the I o er Salmon River drainage in Idaho: and 3) the
Paiute, Shoshoni, and Ban nock peoples of the ( ireat Basin. in the Middle and 1ppr

54

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

—

—

I

L-

-

\t;ve Fishing Ai (eu Fais

I—li-sr l’i ,,,,lsc: ilie Stcirns iiiil I’e,1me I i-eutie

FIgLUC

(hapter 3

I

—

55

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

0

Sacil ticing

the

Sal mon

sea otters, a halfceiiiur belcire siini lar exploitation decimated ihc

—

suggests that by I $41 malaria had reduced the native population along the Wi I lamette and

diseases had reduced their numbers by more than 80 percent from the 50.000 who
inhabited the region at the time of the Lewis and Clark expedition. A recent estimate

accommodation with the indigenous populations. Congress affirmed its intention to take
the natives’ land by treaty, not by force, no ftwer than five times between I $48 and I 853,
promising, br example. not “to impair the rights ol’ persons or property now pertaining
to the Indians” in the Oregon Territorial Act. Yet Congress also authoriied \\ lute
homesteading of Indian land in the Oregon Land Donation Act of 1 850. Large—scale
homesteading made it imperative to reach an accommodation over land titles to avoid
war. Many natives were receptive to a negotiated settlement, since by mid—century white

became apparent that peicelul settlement of the region would require reaching an

But as white settlers began arriving in numbers in the “Great immigration”
beginning in I 843. fiiction with the natives increased because the settlers wanted land as
well as furs. When the United States and Great Britain settled their boundary dispute in
the treaty ot I 846. the white migration along the Oregon Traii increased, and it soon

Fish to the fur traders, native—harvested salmon reached markets in New York. San
Francisco, I Iawaii. and e en Great Britain. South America. and China by the I 840s.
Since there was little Fishing by whites. Indian Fishing increased to meet the demands of
this export market.’

.

The natives had commercial relations with the für traders
predominantly the
British 1 ludson’s l3ay ( ompany
in the early years of the 19th centur By selling their

the near extinction
bulla 0
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es to retain sovereignty over a portion of their lands, rather than being

was later lost when the U.S. government adopted an “allotment policy” in the late 19th
century under which much reservation land was divided into small parcels and awarded

for just S I .2 million. The tribes retained less than six million acres, two—thirds of which

acres that now comprises much of the states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington

representatives of over I 7,000 Indians that terminated Indian title to some 64 mnil lion

Stevens and Oregon territorial governor Joel Palmer signed nine treaties with

affairs and a surveyor of a l.otcntial transcontinental railroad to the Northwest, began to
negotiate treaties to “paci fy” Indians along the proposed route and open up lands for
settlement and gold mining. In a remarkably short period of time
about seven months

Territory, Isaac Ingalis Stevens, who was also the territory’s superintendent of Indian

Against this grim backdrop, the newly appointed governor of the Washington

California.’

completely removed from while settlement areas.

The Office viewed this as being
removal,
established in the relocation of
inconsistent with the existing Indian policy of
the tribes in the Southeast to Oklahoma in the previous decade. As a result, Congress
Failed to rati Iv the treaties, and violence broke out in southern Oregon and northern

allowed the

hunt inr, hishi rig, and gathering places were not on the new reservations. Moreover,
whites hn led to wait Far ( ongress to ra Li fy the treaties before moving onto Indian lands,
and white commissioners decided treaty disputes tin favorably to the natives. The Of1ce
of Indian Affairs refused to reeonmiend that Contress ratify the treaties, because they

of treaties
ith tribes in Oregon’s Willarnette Valley, hut the results vere
uflsatistac(ory to the natix es because they required remo al to small reservations with
oilier bands and tribes with whom they may not have been friendly and because their

number

Chapter 3

—.
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Point

ElhoH:

lie is

My children. I have simply told you the heaii of the (ireat Father and
what are his \vishes and desires. But the lands are yours and we swear
to pay you fur them. We thank you that you have been so kind to all the

do).

industrious and to become a happy and prosperous community, Is this
good and do you want this! II’ not we will talk further tAll answer, we

berries hack in the mountains, lie wishes you all to he virtuous and

willing that you should catch lsli in these waters and get roots and

learn to read and can he made lirmers and he taught trades.

children and he wants you to have a school where your children can

you are Christians, looking to a future state, and that you have wives and

a paper showing your desires and wishes. The Great Father thinks you
ought to have homes as I hel’ore told you. The Great l:ather knows that

hearts are all the same. The Great Father wishes you to send him hack

All this rejoices my heart, my heart is right and I am glad yours is. Our

(O i’ei’noi’

Chief Scalth (Seattle) at the Treaty of

fhe record of the treaty negotiations reveals that both sides made good—tiith
pronouncements, as indicated in the lbllowing exchange between Governor Stevens and

Under this compi om i se. numerous small reservati otis crc established in v estem
Washington; east of the Cascades the reser\ alions were larger.N

SS

[__
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medicine 1mm him.’

paper to the Great Father.

Iceling to\vaiuS yoLi, anLI \Vi

01

the Indians have the same good
I send it on
All of them, men old men, women and
children rejoice that he has sent you to take care of them. Mv mind is
like votirs. I don’t want to say more
My heart is very pood towards
[)r. Maynard (a physician who was present t I want al ays to gel

I look upon you us tir lather. I and tIte rest reguru you as such Al I

Scoil/L.

aiid then sc will sign our names.

your hearts. you have my heart, We will put o ui heurts down on paper,

There aic lone, and there are none in our lterts.”’

Each side recoenized that the treaties aimed to benelit both the natives and the

it.

white settlers. The settlers were to receive clear title to most o Ithe legion’s land. while
the tn bes won Id receive money, missionaries, schools, and lcdera I protect ion ol I lie ir
reserved properties. Governor Stevens explained to the Chinooks and (owlilz along the
Lower Columbia that the Great Father not only wanted to Pay them Er the lands the
white settlers had seized but would also provide tliermi with homes where no white man
vmll go v ithout your ish.’’ lie also told the tribes east ol’ the Cascades that it’ they

spots on

The Makah tribe symbolized its trust by piescillmg Stevens with while liags at the Treaty
olNeah Bay. One of’ the Makah leaders explained, ‘‘Look at this l]au, see i l’therc are anr

(‘hid

---

and otlleH to build and sail ships. My children, I believe that I have rot

(ioipkr 3

I
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other “tribes,’ which would thereafler represent the subordinate

they would fish together; another slated thai v1ii Ic lie (lid not wish to leave his land, lie
would give the ‘hi tes hal 1 retaining for himself ‘‘the place where the stream conies in.”

that he was willing to sell his land, but he wanted to retain the right to lish another said
lie only needed a small piece of land where lie would live as a friend to the whites, and

their historic fishing practices, due to their economic, cultural, and religious dependence
on salmon. For example, one native chief at Neah Bay explained to Governor Stevens

The natives recognized they had to part with much of their land, but they notonly
resisted relocation to distant, centralized reservations, they zealously sought to preserve

documents, nor any culturally—sanctioned method of alienating land*’

‘‘negotiation” meetings. In the Edera I government’s view, those who signed the treaties
had the authority to sell land, although there was no native precedent for signing legal

have some familiarity with Chinook jargon, a simple dialect
of about 300 words, derived from several native languages as well as from French and
English. Many of’ the natives could not understand Chinook jargon. but Stevens
interpreter could, although there is some question as to his thcil ity with native languages.
The treaty language itself was written in English and was drafted before any fiarmal

to

All “chief’s’’ had

-

subordinate status
groups.

friendly contact with whites, ahlhiotich most were men of importance in their
communities. Various ‘‘hands,” or framents of tribes, were arbitrarily assigned a

aid of lawyer and et hnoiogist ( Teorge ( nhhs, he orgafli ed small bands ol natives into
larger tribes. clTcctively creating new political entities, for the pm,oe of negotiating the
treaties.
11w chiefs” that Stevens appointed \\ ore naturally those who had sonic sort of

60— Sacrificing the Salmon
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question should he set at rest by law.

is one

Commissioner

of [ndhm AfThirs, he

upon which legislation is
demanded. It ne ci could have been the intention of Congress that
Indians should be excluded from their ancient fisheries, but, as no
condition to this effect us inserted in the donation act, the question has
been raised whether persons taking claims, including such fisheries. do
not possess the right of’ monopolizing. It is therefore desirable that this

I lie subject of the nght of [isheries

rote to the
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54 letter Stevens

—

.

shall we eat if’ we do so? Our only food is

I wish to speak my mind as to selling the land

Great Chief’. What

to send oil kettles and fishing apparatLis to allow them to continue to fish. During the
Treaty ot’ Point No Point negotiations, a native chief’ expressed sinmi lar concerns:

ali’aid that if he could not take halibut where he wanted, he would become poor.
Governor Stevens intormed hint (hat, fur from wishing to stop native fishing, he wished

treaties. At the Neah Bay negotiations, an Indian known as Kuichote Neah Bay thought
he ought to have the right to fish, take whales. and get Ibod where he liked, lie was

Protection ol native fishing was clearl a prerequisite to the signing ol the

.

In December 1 54, another territorial ofticer wrote the Commissioner of Indian AtThirs
that ‘[t]he Indians on Puget Sound
orm a vemy considerable portion of’ the trade of
the Sound.
They catch most of our tish, supplying not only our people with clams
and oysters. hut salmon to those who cure and export it.b

Stated

In a September

Chtpier 3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587
and

also ehtldren of the Great Father? What

SL(i/i’(’s

...

adequate hood SUPP ly. As Stevens noted in trunsmi tti ng the treaties to Washington for
Senate ratification, the provisions as to reserves and as to the taking of fish ...had strict
to their actual wants and to the part they play and ought
rcli’encc to their condition

customary fishing locations in common wi tb’ the white settle rs. [1 was c lear at I lie Ii inc
oh negotiations that the natives bargained for this language in the belief thai it mild
assure them access to their traditional fishing grounds, especially those outside of [lie
newly—created reservations. The tribes were particularly concerned that the relatively
small reserves did not contain a sufficient number of fishing sites to supply them \Vitli au

Stevens assurances led to the sign iIig of treaties which extinguished nat i\ e
claims to sonic 64 mil lion acres but which also reserved to the tribes: I ) the exclusive
right to harvest fish on their land reser\ atkins. and 2) the right oftaking fish at all their

can hunt. gut her roots and berries.

von, fish. Does not a hither give food to his children’? Besides fish you

doctor to leach and cure you. Is no that fatherly’? T/iLc pcijw,

not a father send his children to school’? It gives yoi mechanics and a

will I not do for my children and what will you not br yours? Would
YOU 1101 die for them’? This paper is such as a man v ould give to his
children and I vi 11 tell you hy. This paper gives you a home. Does not
a father give his children a home’? Ihis paper gives von a school. Does

Are you not in ehi ldren

Governor Ste ens c lear1 heard and understood these coniiis. Ic repeatedly assured
the natives that signing the treaties would guarantee the right to continue to fish as they
alwas had. At the same Point o Point treaty neg liations. he said:

62— Sacii living (he Salmon
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the

ol’ the canning process and the advent of’ transcontinental mail transport combined to
increase significantly the export market br salmon in the East and overseas by the I 0s.

By the I SSOs, however, a number of technological developments created
increasing conflicts bet ccii native fishing and the prol i Feral i rig white settlers. PerFection

natives. For a vhi Ic Stevens prediction of’ the natives playing an integral lirt
Frontier economy through their fish harvests pros ed to he an accurate one

Alter hostilities subsided, there were Fe dispLm[es over native fishing or some
two or three (lCciides. ihis quiescence was due iimrge!v to the kict that salmon crc
ahundanL white settlers relatively Few, and most ot the fish were harvested rind sold 1w

some 01’ the treaties until

\s a result. Congress delayed ratification oF

East oF the (.ascades. however, the tribes were not

“pacified’ For some three \‘ears, until I

leader, Chief Leschi, hanged.

out and quickly spread west over the Cascades to Puget Sound. The Northwest Indian
War was a briefone, as the nati’es in western Washineton were quickly routed, and their

y opening up Yakama lands to
to their ne reservations. hut he broke ihat promise 5
white settlement only l dye days after eoncludint neotiations. As a result, war broke

Although the eoai of the treaties \VUS to promote peaceful white settlement, peace
did not conic mmediaiclv. Steciis had promised the tribes Iwo years in which to move

f/iL’ :I/h’iiiia/Ii

\ oriin esi 1 rih.s.

estate iraisdution In l1!stoi\. ul also thc urei; oi rinGer, sovereignR to

(.‘hap(er 3
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—pcrlbnned the hidians dip nets.

as

a response to those shortages.

Both were products of a fundamentally

regulation, invariably displaced native fishing grounds.
22

fisheries bore the brunt of fishing clostues, while the ocean and Pugel Sound fisheries
generally were not restricted. “Salmon preserves” where fishing was proscrihert by

The political process also worked to disenfrancluse the tribes by regulating
harvests to favor non—Indians. Especially after Washington achieved statehood in 1889,
the state legislature acted to control tribal fishing in the name of “conservation.’’ Not
only’ were restrictions imposed on traditional tribal harvest practices, but the freshwater

different economy’ that white settlement brought to the region.

followed

The technological preemption of tribal fisheries was a part ol massive changes
that the landscape of the Pacific Northwest was undergoing in the late 19th century,
which combined to create salmon shortages. Political preemption ol tribal lisheries then

construct canneries and operate fish traps. On the Columbia, canneries caine even more
quickly and in greater numbers, growing from one in 1866 to thirty—seven in 1884.2!

ad\antageous locations Io\er in watersheds. Their use of gasoline—powered engines
enabled them to introduce white troll fishenes in the ocean and in Puget Sound which
Ilirther reduced the Indian harvest. Puget Sound canneries mushroomed from three in
1894 to twenty—i our in 1905. as numerous investment syndicates ftrmed companies to

The whites also effectively preempted upriver native fisheN by seizing

seine nets, hooks and lines, and harpoons.
’
2

traps. and fish wheels. The s hites new recluiulogies o

64
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and their gitl economy. By the turn of the century 1 .1 million people lived in the states
of Oregon. Washington. and Idaho. Fewer than 20,000 were natives, who had
experienced a 95 percent decline in their numbers since the onset of’ white settlement,

—

The new market economy introduced by white settlers was fundamentally
di l’l’erent. Salmon and other natural resources were commodities to be captured and sold
For prolit. Unlike the gift economy, in \vhich cultural and religious taboos supplied an
inherent cheek on excessive harvests, the market economy contained no such checks. As
white settlers began to arrive in numbers
the non—native population of the state of
Oregon grew fromjust over 50,000 in I 860, Lu over 90,000 in 1 870. to over 1 75,000 in
1 880. to over 300,000 in I 890. to over 400.000 in 1900
they overwhelmed the natives

The economy of the prc- bite settlement Northwest has been described by Jim
Liehaowwh as a ‘‘gill econonw,’’ \ hich had evolved over I ,500 years. tn this economy,
one attained social position not by accumulation of wealth but through the size of one’s
gifts. Gills were the basic source of exchange and commerce. Natural resources, like
salmon harvests and fishing sites, were gifts from nature, not for individual ownership
and exclusive possession, but to be shared with others and passed on to succeeding
generations. Salmon. which had a conscious spirit, would remain abundant if treated
with respect. The natural world was Filled with such spirits, which humans needed to
cultivate to ensure a continuous food supply and other necessities.
23

The

renimtn1 ot the al mon runs, part cu larR in the ( ‘oltimbia Basin where t hey were at a
geographic disad anlage.

(‘IL Ipter 3
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miners, irrigators, loggers, and boosters transformed nature in ways that

landscape was relatively benign. Salmon encountered a Cir di fThrent
appers, farniers,
world in the second halfof the nineteenth century

Oregon country Indians had harvested massive quantities of sal muon for
many centuries hellire whiles arrived, but their impact on the rest of the

summarized (lie sit nation

The second consequence of the introduction of the market economy was habitat
loss. As heavers were trapped. streams mined. f’arins irrigated. livestock grazed, trees
logged, mills operated, and cities settled, salmon habitat shrunk. .loseph Taylorconcisely

existing gi fi economy. 2

New harvest technologies, including fish wheels, captured higher percentages of
particular runs. Waste at canneries was widespread, something not condoned in the pie—

million pounds

the manner of harvest was materially different, concentrated in the
lower river and compressed into a four—month season (the tribes generally fished nine
months of’ (lie year), in order to concentrate efforts on the most prized salmon species

—

The ne’a market economy did more than just displace tribal fishers: it had
devastatmne ef1cis on the salmon resource. ‘[ here were two reasons !‘or his result:
changed fishing techniques and loss of salmon habitat. Even 1’ the white—dominated
tishery of’ the 19th century did not harvest mome aggregate fish from the Columbia than
and recent estimates place peak harvests of both just over 40
the native harvests

important

dislai it

Savri [icing ha’ Sal mon

iuarkeis. not local subsistence. Short—term wealth became more
than long-term sustainable use.’

demands of

(,
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an increasingly scarce resource would become a vexing proolem forscicntists, regulators,
and reviewing courts:

possessed the better harvest technology hut who had the netter narvesi. rights. Allocating

thus not univ preempted tribal harvests, it damaged the sal mon
runs themsel es. liaresis declined 50 percent het ecu LX$4 md I 8S9, reL,ouilclee
briefly as haresiers s\ itched twin ch iiiook to colio and socKeye, then i1] again. Thiit—
nine cannenes in I 7 became t enty—onc by 1 b9. By the turn ol’ the century, harvests
in both Alaska and British Columbia exceeded (OliinihiL River harvests. Ihis tree— Ow—
all was over within just thirty yeuS. Never again WoLlid (O1LLiUbia Basin salmon he
thought of’as a limitless resource. Throughout the 20th century. there would always be
more harvest capacity than available salmon: the chic’i issue would become not who

The

Chai>ter 3
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J,,te,prelatioii.c

The first decision to interpret the meaning of the treaty fishing right was an I $87
case involving the Yakania tribe’s access to their Tumwater fishery on the Columbia
River at Wishram. 0. D. and Frank Taylor had secured homestead patents to the
shorelands and proceeded to construct a fence that blocked native access to the usual

[i-st .Judicial Treaty

Despite these rulings, state olficials responsible for regulating salmon
harvests used their discretion to deprive the tribes of a fair share of the resource. Not
until the I 970s did the federal courts rule that the treaties required the states to guarantee
the tribes one—half of the salmon harvests. By specilving a precise harvest share, the
courts substantially reduced the discretion ofstale officials and Lishered in the modern era
of sal mon management.

regulations.

confirmed that the treaties ofthe I $50s reserved to the tribes a “right oftalcing fish” that
could not be denied by property law concepts, fish wheels, license fles, or discriminatory

realistic possibility of saliguarding treaty fishing through the political
process. the tribes, assisted 1w federal Justice Department officials. turned to the fi’dera1
courts. Lnlike slate judges. who usually are elected ibr terms, federal judges are
appointed fir life and thus are somewhat removed from the political process. They
therefore may he more sensitive to minority rights. l3eginning in 1887 and continuing
over the next century. the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, repeatedly

With
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The Warm Springs tribe had similardi fliculties accessing their traditional lishing

4
“bitter ii not hostile” at the lack of justice.

Despite this court victory, the Yakam:is’ access to their Tumwamer fisheries was
hardly secure. The tribe complained that the Taylors were uncooperative the year
following the I 887 decision, and by I 891 white fences and tish wheels again excluded
native ushers from Tumwater. The local Indian agent reported that tribal members were

historic fishing places.

adhering to past customs and traditions.” .Judge Hoyt concluded that the treaty preserved
tribal access to traditional fishing places like the Tumwater fishery. Thus, according to
the court, homesteaders like the Taylors took title to land subject to the treaty—guaranteed
easement that ensured tribal access to their historic lishing grounds. In short, the court
recognized that the treaty created a property right in the tribe: an easement to reach their

at the time of the treaty would have been most likely to have desired and understood.’
This rule led him to conclude that in the treaty the tribe reserved preexisting lishing
rights: the treaty was not a grant of rights ironi the government to the tribe.
Consequently, the court rejected the Taylors’argumeni that the treaty guaranteed the tribe
only the same rights to lish as white citizens. Instead, in light of what the court
characterized as “common knowledge that these Indians were always tenacious in

The district court at \orth Yakima upheld the Tavlors. but on appeal the
Washington Territorial Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the federal government’s
grant of homestead patents to the laylors did not extinguish the preexisting tribal fishing
right Judge I Iovt employed a u.S. Supreme Court rule that treats rights must be
‘liberal ly construed in favorot’the Indians” to ‘best subserve theobject hich the Indians
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hich disclaimed state jurisdiction o er tribai and federal lands.
5

to

take legal action, and the local U.S. Attorney,

that native fishers had built lbr curing salmon. While the case was pending, the local
district court decided that tribal members should he allowed access to their traditional
sites, giving the natives a temporary victory. But because Judge (‘.1—I. I—lan lord limited

homestead patents to shorelands adjacent to the falls on the Washington side of’the dyer.
Invoking these authorizations, the Winans brothers fenced their lands and destroyed huts

(‘duo Falls under license f’rom the state of Washington. They also possessed lederal

In the mid— 1 XOOs, Lineas and Audubon Winans operated four fish wheels at

i7ie Jf’inans Doctrine

fishing rights I Ii roughout the region

William Bricker, filed suit against Winans Brothers us a test case to reestablish treaty

pressured the Deparin ien t of’ J list CC

local canneries constructed fiDnees excluding the natives, the Ot’fice of’ Indian Affairs

investigations on the conflict, one investigator termed the tribal exclusion li’om Cell In
Falls ‘a great injustice” another suggested that land be purchased for a permanent tribal
fishery there. Finally, in I 95, after the Winans Brothers Packing Company and other

while Indians complained to fl_deral authorities, and special agents conducted

nearly forty years after the treaty of 1855, whites attempted to monopolize the fishery,

It was at Celilo Falls that the most bitter and longstandinu conflict occurred. F or

constitution,

th white flsheriiicn o er tribal access to tidelands
within the boundaries of’ their reservation in a 11)03 dcc sion. The court ruled that those
lands could 1101 be sold by the state consistent with the state’s act of admission and its

—

with the lulalip tnbe in a dispute

4
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burdening “every piece ol land as though described therein,’ giving the Indians the right
to occupy and make use oF lands despite “the contingency oF Future ownership.’ Thus,
the Court made clear that the treaty servitude took precedence over Pri\lte land titles.

These reserved rights included access to historic Fishing places, the Court
concluded, impressing a “servitude,’’ or ‘right in land,” that burdened the Federal
government and its granlees like the Winans brothers. This servitude was a property dght

—

The right to resort to the Fishing places in controversy was a part ot
larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there
was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less
necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they
breathed. New conditions came into existence, to which those rights had
to be accommodated. Only a limitation o ithem, however, was necessary
and intend ed, not a taking away. In other words, the treaty was not a
a
grant of rights to the Indians, but a erant ol rights From them
reservation of those rights not granted.

of the Nation for more.’ In eloquent prose that survives the passage ot the years. Justice
McKenna drew a clear distinction between preexisting rights reserved by the natives in
the treaty and rights granted to the natives by the fideral government:

reservation fishing grounds, notwithstanding the issuance of state licenses or federal
homestead patents. The Court rejected the argument that the treaty right entitled the
tribes merely to equality of treatment, suggesting that such a result would be an “impotent
outcome to negotiations and a convention that seemed to promise more and gi’ve the word

Jinc years later, in 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, in a landmark
decision thai remains the bedrock ol Indian treaty fishing rights. The opinion by Justice
Joseph McKenna concluded that the treat’v recognized tribal property rights in oFF—
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unwarranted “servitude on Oregon soil,” the Cotiri pointed out thai there was sufficient

noting that the treaty had to be interpreted as the tribes would have tinderstood it. and that
native tishers from all tribes used both sides of the fulls betdre and after the treaty.
Responding to the Seufert brothers’ complaint that this result would impose an

side ofthe Columbia River, the treaty right to take
fish did not extend beyond the mid—pomt of the ‘i ver. The Supreme Court did not agree.

States in its I 55 treat was the

the fulls, so the company excluded native ushers from the Oregon side. Seufcrts position
s as that since the boundary of the lands the Yakama Indian Nation ceded to the United

1’he H Jnan case may have established enduring principles, but it did not
conclusively settle fishing rights at Celilo Falls. The Seufert Brothers Packing Company
interpreted W/nans to forbid fencing out native fishers only on the Washington side of

The IF/nuns Pmgeni

guaranteeing physical access to historic native lishing grounds, subsequent cases would
expand upon the Winans principles to help ensure that the treaty promise of the right of
taking fish” was a meaningful one.

,

of another landmark decision authored by Justice McKenna three years later: FVinwi v.
US where the court applied the reserved rights doctrine to water diversions. And while
the IVinans court held only that the treaty right created a iribal property right

rights to private land titles, and its re)ection ol the argument that statehood divested treaty
rithts articulated lundamental principles of Indian law. iiinan.s was also the harbinger

Despite the ( ‘ourts unfortunate statement concerning state regulation, the Winunc
decision as a landmark case. Its articulation a] treaty promises as reserved rights, its
use ot’ rules of treaty construction tivorahlc to the tribes, itS applicat i0fl 01 treaty lishing

—

4 Judicial Infrrpretathin of the ieatk
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argument, the (_ourt confirmed that the

treaty

recognized

an

unusual

The Supreme Court rejected Washington’s argument that, while the treaty fishing
right guaranteed the tribes access to their customary places, state sovereignty allowed the
state to charge the same license fees as it did to white fishermen. By ejecting the state

could not be “reconciled vi th a fair construction of the treaty.”

employing the rule that the treaty was to he interpreted as the tribes would understand,
the Court. in an opinion by .Iustice Black, reversed the conviction. The Court determined
that the state license reqm.nrement served both to raise money to Support state goverilment
and to regulate the harvest for conservation purposes and concluded thai ihe stale’s
legitimate conservation concerns could he accomplished without charging tribal members
license fees. Because the state was unable to show that the fees were “indispensable” to
the effectiveness ofthe state’s conservalion concerns, Justice Black decided that the fees

sold salmon without a S5.OO state dipnet license. No licenses were required ibr hook and
line fishermen, effectively exempting non—Indian recreational fishermen. Again

A quarter century later, in 1942, the Supreme Court returned to the Yakama
treaty, reviewing a Washington State Supreme Court decision which alTirmed a 1939
criminal conviction against Sampson Tulee, a Yakama tribal member who caught and

understood them.

This judicial recognition that the treaty fishing right burdened tinceded lands was
significant f’or two reasons. First, it meant that the treaty promise protected all customary
fishing places regardless of boundary lines established by the treaty. Second, courts
would not employ ordinary common law rules in interpreting the treaty fishing right.
Instead, they would construe the treaty as the tribes, ‘an unlettered people.’’ would have
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otitlawi ng net harvesting, it eliminated an exception for streanis on or bordering Indian
reservations, e i’fectivcly banning native steelhead harvest and eliminating an important

I losti I tv to native fishing was not Ii nuted to the state Lidiciary. In I 927. two
1ter
the Washington legisiatLire declared that steelhead were ‘game’ fish,
years’

These arrangements were but the announcement of our benevolence.
which, notwithstanding our Iiequent lia ii ties, has been contintioiisly
displayed. Neither Rome nor sagacious Britain ever dealt more liberally
with their subject races than we with these sa age tubes, whom it was
generally tempting and always easy to destroy and whom we have so
often permitted to squander vast areas of fertile land before our eyes.

The Indian v. as a child, and a dangerous child, of nature, to he both
protected! and restrained. In his nomadic Ii Fe he wus to he ieh so long as
civilization did not demand his region. When it did demand that region,
he was to he allotted a more con fined area with permanent
subsistence.

The premise of Indian sovereiunty we rcicct. The treat is not to be
interpreted in that light At no time did our tiiccstors. iii getting title to
this continent, ever regard the aborigines as other than mere occupants,
and incompetent occupants. of the soil A n title that could come from
them was always disdained
Only that. title was esteemed which
came from white men.

natives had no lawful right to fish outside reservations except as permitted 1w state law

aslunctun Supieme ( ourt’s up] )idtng U lulces COflVICIi0fl \‘ as rather
typical ol the state courts hosti I ity to treaty rights. For exaniple, a decade alier the
Ii inanc case, that court erroneously suggested, in pationlting. racist language, that

ihe

4
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“conserving” fish [‘or non—Indian

I lad the appeals court’s use of Tn/ce’s indispensability language survived, that test

commercial and recreational fisheries.

“conservation’ was otlen a guise for allocation:

imposed a signi (leant burden on slates: to show that conservation measures affecting
natives were both necessary and indispensable. The appeals court recognized that

in the words of the Supreme Court in the Tu/e’ case, “indispensable” to conservation.
The court also ndicated that this standard required the state to show that the conservation
ohcctive was not achievable by regulating the non—native fishery alone. Thus, the cotni

therefore, the bans were not “necessary” because the slate failed lo show that they were,

allowing in—river harvests by non—Indians. A h.deral appeals court determined that the
state’s regulation was not a “necessary” conservation measure because the ban was
designed to protect non—Indian sport and commercial harvests. In both cases, measures
to protect the salmon could have been adopted withotit banning the native harvests

upheld the state, the court of appeals reversed, ruling that the state failed to demonstrate
that the ban was necessary for conservation. Ac ross the river, Oregon also attempted to
use its authority to regulate for conservation in order to disenfranchise the tribes. In
I 958. the slate banned fishing on all Columbia and Snake River tibutaries, while

A decade later, in 1950. the coastal Makah Tribe sued Washington’s Director ol
Fisheries over the state’s ban on native net fisheries A [though the fideia1 district court

apart (loin discriminating against tribal harvests, banning fixed har est gear made
no biological sense, since it redirected clThrt downriver and to the ocean where salmon
sou[d be o erharvcsted in mixed stock fisheries. [I was this la banning fixed harvest
gear of’ which Sampson Tulee was convicted in 1 939.

QLLi Ic
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loss

far the non—native harvesters whose license fees were an important source of state

wrote a sharp critique of the Court’s decision, warning that tinder the rubric of
“reasonable conservation measures” the state had and would continue to ‘‘conserve’’ fish

the state merely showed that the regulation was a “reasonable and necessary’”
conservation measure. an issue left to the state courts to decide. Professor Ralph Johnson

indispensability requirement. which imposed a heavy burden on t]ic state, to license fees.
By doing so, it seemingly approved v idely—ranging state regtilation of the treaty right if

was permissible ifthe state could show that it was a necessary conservation measure, and
the court remanded the ease to the trial court to determine whether the ban was in fact
necessary to conserve Puyallup Ri er steelhead. Surprisingly, the U.S. Supreme Court
took the case and issued a confused opinion by Justice William 0. Douglas Although
the Court indicated that the treaty right “may. of course, not he qualified by the state.’ it
indicated that “the manner of fishing. the size of the take, the restriction of commercial
fishing, and the like may be regulated in the interest of conservation, provided the
regulation
does not discriminate against the Indians.” The Court restricted Tn/cL’s

Department of Game filed suit seeking to enforce the state’s ban against net fishing of
steelhead at the Puyahlup tribe’s fishing grounds. The state Supreme Court ruled the ban

The conflict on the Puyallup River began in 1 963. when the Washington

The Puva/lup Tri/ogi’

by cx paiidm2 hatchery prodtictioii Preoccupation v ith d isadvantatiin tribal
harvests thus helped to divCrt attention from the real caises of declining sahtiion runs.

habitat

habitat destruction at the root of the decline, the states concentrated on using their
regulatory authority to reserve harvests tor White fishers and attempted to compensate tor

4
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a significant development.

slate regulations to restrict tribal harvests, this evolution of the treaty fishing right was

exercise oftreaty fishing rights agnnst physical obstructions, like fences, hut also agnnst
discriminatory regulatory obstructions. Because the states had a long history of’ using

The PulL/I/u/i decisions i-eli ected a judicial xviii ngness not only to protect the

I’m sh lioin the apportionment f’ormu Ia, however.

off—reservation. The court declined to rule on whether the state could cxci Lide hatchery

Justice Douglas’ dictum. The Court therefore approved a state court’s allocation o145
percent of steelhead harvests to the tribe, regardless of’ whether the harvests were on— or

harvest rights on the lowest seven miles of (lie river would allow the tribe to “interdict
completely the migrating fish run and ‘pursue the last living steelhead,’” in violation of

proceeded on an erroneous premise. Over Iwo dissents, the Court. in an opinion by
Justice Stevens (.lusticc Douglas having retired). fiared that the claim to exclusive

harvest rights and where the state had no regulatory jurisdiction. But in its third Piiiil/up
decision the Supreme Court was Linwulling to concede that twelve years of litigation had

The Supreme Court was not able to extricate usd1 from the Pux’allzip controversy
without a third decision because in 1974, alter the lirst two decisions, a federal court of
appeals delermined that the Puvallup reservation had not been extinguished. illeaning that
mostol the tribal harvest actually took place on—reservation, where the tribe had exclusive

cmptcd by non—Indians. is allowed.” lie called for “a fair apportionment” of harvest
rights, warning, however, that “the Treaty does not give the Indiansa federal right to
pursue the last living stecihead until it enters their nets.”

because all Indian net fishing is barred and only hook—and—I inc fishing. entirely pie—

78

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

lucIkial Iiikr,nteuuitni
t’/ f/ic

I JCU(ic5
79

hr in

the second Pine//up case.
2

would

—

.ludge Bel loni concluded that the native fishers

\\

crc entitled to

‘

l

as the Supreme Court later
that Oregon’s ‘‘conservation’ regulations were meant not only to ensLire the
perpetuation of the species. but also to allocate salmon among competing harvestei s.
A mid in so doing. the upriver closure fluistcd the cut ire conscr\ ation burden on tilC tribes.
while allowing non—native sport and commercial harvests to continue unabated.

first Pine//tip case. But Judge Belloni was able to see

Oregon argued in .So/nippi that the upriver closure of net fishing was the kind of
necessary conservation measure the Supreme Court had approved a year earlier in the

i le the ion g—rLmnifle Pine//tip coulro\ersv played Itse! I ouL lederul distrtci
iudges ii ( )rcgon and \Vash ugton heard cases that c\ ci: ut iy would produce the kind i)
judicial allocation ol salmon harvest rights thatJustice Douglas suggested was necessary.
In the mid—I )6Os, members o I the Yakania Indian Natioii, soon oined by the faderal
government, challenged longstanding Oregon regulations that limited Columbia River
harvests above The Dailes Dam to hook—and—jinc isitertes, effectively closing that part
of the river to net fishing traditionally used by the tribes. Like Washington, Oregon
interpreted the treaty fishing right to give the tribes only the same rights as other citizens.
Federal districtjude Robert Bel loni. in So/iu/ipt i. Sm/i/i. replied that ‘‘[s]ueh a reading
would not seem unreasonable i fall history. anthropology. biology. Prior case law, and the
intention of the parties to the treaty were to be ignored.”

Justice Douglas called

Neither the state nor the tribes could be certain that the states conservation” reeiilauoiis
would pass udicial nuster, and every season ‘as ulucrubic’ to court injunction. \Vhui
was needed was an alt nnati\ C rieht to a share of the liar\ cst: the ‘fair aiiponltinlneii’’

4
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closed many historic tribal fishing sites to net fishing “while permitting commercial net
fishing l’or salmon elsewhere on the same runs of fish.” Irial evidence showed tribal
harvests to be only about Ii’ e pcmeent of the total harvest .Judue Boldt noted that

A tier nearly four years of proceedings, Judge George l3oldt handed down an
historic decision which concluded that Washington’s regulatory scheme systematically
discnminated against native fishing. State regulation had, the court concluded, totally

on which the salmon depended.

government and the tribes also claimed that hatcliemy—produced salmon should be
included in the tribes’ harvest share, and that the treaties implicitly protected the habitat

“

government, on behalf’ of numerous Washington tribes with treaty rights, flied suit
claiming that the hur share’ to vh cli Judge I3elloni referred meant that the tribes were
entitled to harvest half the salmon destm ned for tlicn traditional fishing grounds. The

Although no one appealed the E3elIoni Decision, numerous members oftribcs in
Washington continued to he arrested lbr violating that state’s harvest regulations.
Consequently, in 1 970, the year aller Judge Bclloni handed down his decision, the Federal

The Bold! Dec/s ion

revolution to be eodi lied into a comprehensive management plan

restricted.

The Belloni Decision, as ii came to be called, revolution zed salmon
management on the Columbia Ri\ er. although it would take neari a decade ‘or the

restrictive which can be imposed [on the tubes] consistent with assurini the necessary
escapement of fish br conservation pLurposcs.’ meaning that non—Indian coininercuitl and
recreational fishers had to bear conservation burdens before the tribes harvest, could be

80— Sacrificing the Salmon
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crc not

all demands, and that regulation of’ both the nause and non—nati\e

.

claiming ii was contrary

1977, in response to a suit brought by non—native lishers, Ihe Washington State Supreme
Court ruled that the state lacked authority to implement Judge Boldt’s sharing formula.

the case. Widespread noncompliance with the state’s grudging efforts to implement the
coLirt’s orders occurred during I 975—77: shooting threats were even reported. Then, in

Like southern whites fighting desegregation two decades earlier, the state of
Washington and its citi7ens resisted the Boldt Decision vigorously, despite the fact that
the federal court of appeals quickly affirmed, and the Supreme Court declined to revies

including hatchery fish in the allocation formula and for protection ol salmon habitat
until he decided the allocation issue.

.

allowed the tribes to harvest 43 percent of Puget Sound harvests, although, due to
exclusions such as those mentioned above, this amounted to only I 1crce1t of the total
harvest of Washington salmon .Judge Boldt defarred deciding the tribes’ claims for

waters, even if they were destined for the tribe’s fishing grounds. By 1 977, this formula

the equal sharing formula fish harvested by tribes on reservations as well as fish not
destined to pass the tribc’s historic fishing sites
fish caught outside Washington

.

[That language meant, according to the judge. by dictionary definition and as
intended and used in the Indian treaties
sharing equally the opportunity to lake lish”
destined br historic tribal fishing grounds. Thus, he instructed the state to restrict the
non—native fishery to 50 percent of the harvest of those fish Judge Boldt excluded from

with.’

.

salmon must ha fairly allocated between natives and non—natives .ludge Boldt arrived at
a formula for allocation based on his interpretation ol the treaty language ii common

as necessary to ensure pernetuaiion of the salmon runs, he concluded that

sulTiciciil to

harvest

luduui! I1IIL’rpl’enuioil o/the irL’atis

Becatise Judge Ho ldt determined that salmon harvests in the state

4
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reservation hark ests as well as ceremonial and subsistence harvests in the tribal share. and

The Court ii id modestly reduce the tribe’s share in two ways: b’. i ncludine. on—

According to Justice Stevens. under this ‘moderate living” standard, the tribes’ share
could be reduced below fifty percent where a tribe dwindles “to just a f’ members’’ or
finds “other sources of support that lead it to abandon its fisheries.” In the two decades
since the Court’s decision, there has been no evidence ofeither ofthcsc Iwo conditions.

the central pr iciple here must be that Indian treaty fishing rights to a
natural resource that was once so thoroughly and exclusively exploited
by the Indians secures so much as, but not more than, is necessary to
that is to say. a moderate living.
provide the Indians with a livelihood

could destroy the other’s share of the resource. The Court concluded that:

This conilict between federal and state courts at last induced the Supreme Court
to review the case. In 1 S)79, the Court, in a 6-3 decision by Justice Stevens, largely
Lipheld Judge Boldt. Ratifying the 50/50 sharing formula, the Court noted that the treaty
right prevented the stale trom “crowding out” the tribal fishery and that neither party

...

Salmon

lie stale’s extraordinary machinations in resisting [Judge Rotdt’s I decree
have fbrced the district court to take o cr a large share of’ the
management of the state’s fishery in order to enforce its decrees. lxeepi
the district court has faced the most
for some desegregation cases
concerted official and private efforts to fi’ustrate a decree of a federal
court witnessed in this century. The challenged orders in this appeal
must be reviewed b this court in the context of events forced by the
15
I itigants who of Icred the court no reasonable alternative.
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hich now had an economically important

economic

I ivel ihoods br tribal ieniber.’

proSpLL’i 0:

once

governmental regulatory authority. The j ucige recognized tribes as hish managers, not
merely harvesters, a ruling subsequently a fhirmed by the Ninth Circuit. This recognition

rights to harvest at their traditional tishnig sites (al lox ing them to cross the land ofothers
and to he lice of state license lktes and discrnninator\ state regulations), they also ha \ e

A second consequence oh the [3elloni and Boldt I)ccisions was the hlict that, as
Judge I3oldt recognized and an appeals court con Ii rined, the tribes not only have properly

again sustaining

eligible to in eke the tribes harsest rights. Salmon iilr\ ests ohlered the

resource to allocate a mone their members. It became important to be a triba mci uher

tribal i ation among Northwest Indian tribes

Perhaps the most discernable result ol’ the two decusions was a kind of re—

‘

consel \ at ion ;)rob em once the sat ton
reached the nati e tishing grounds by allocating \rtaa Iv a olthe harvest to flOfl—nati \ es
downriver and in the ocean .1 udge Boldts sharing tormula removed most ol the
ambiguities involved in satisfying the treaty right of taking flsh” while ensuring
conservation oh the salmon resource. Judee Bellon: soon appi cd the Boldt lorniLiti to the
Co 111111 hi a 2

hiom using its regulatory authority to create a

ilinoiu liI\\
decisions eoitliitiueu toe Pitt ti//lip eases’ reveiatnii thi.: the Irettis right was inoi thai, a.
access right or an insulation Ironi license tes. l3u:. mItRe the Puuu//iip hitieauuun.
I3eiloni and Boldt Decisions rcttched beyond a part
ar i egaation on a ptii icuhi r
to impose systematic restrictions on state regtilati.Judge F3el oni lorhade the state

‘IYie
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As a consequence of the tbrmation of’ their coalition with the state (and federal)
tish agencies, the tribes began to concentrate more on legislative and regulatory issues
than on litigation in the years tol lowing the 13e1 Ion i and Boldi I )eeisions. Li tigat ion was

negotiation of an international treaty to govern salmon harvests in the Pacific Ocean.
Only a decade afler shots had been fired in the Northwest fish war.” the slate fishery
agencies and the tribes had become allies on many issues that (lid not involve harvest
allocation, especially those involving the environmental degradation at the root ot’ the
salmon’s decline.

this coalition would submit comprehensive recommendations that became the bedrock
of the rebuilding program. The coalition would also prove instrumental in the successful

lobbied br congressional action to establish a program to rebuild the Columbia River
salmon runs that had been decimated by the world’s largest hydroelectric system. Later.

respect to hydropower developments adversely affecting salmon habitat. By the late
I 970s the state agencies and the tribes forged a ‘fishery coalition that successfully

Throuh the harvest co—manaeemcnt process. the stale fishery at.zencies and the
tribes, long mortal enemies, began to see that they had much in common, at least with

sharing information and undertaking cooperative research, the state of the art of salmon
biology advanced.

1 lie e\’olutioll ofiribes as liarsest co—managers edounded to the henetit of the
salmon. State biologists now had to coordinate with tribal biologists, and both needed
more information about the salmon’s life cycle to manage the resource ellcctivcl. By

These commissions
co—uninaecrs

85

enabled the tribes to become effective
harvests with the states’
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harvest. hut also provided the salmon with protection against environmental degradation.
in early 2001 twenty tribes flied suit against the state of Washington, alleging that ftiulty
construction of culverts that block salmon from 3.00() miles ol’streams violate their treaty
rights. This part of the story is taken up in chapter 1 2.

Washington. But harvests in the Alaskan otIshore have yet to be subjected to treaty
rights limits, although the threat oldoing sO led to the Paci lie Salmon Treaty in I 95, as
discuscd in chapter In the 1 t)(tS. the ri bes prnnari lv locnscd on regulatory processes
that pronused to restore salmon runs. After those processes liiled to produce the
proniied restoration in the mid—I 990s, the tribes began to consider re iving their ong
held assert ion that the treaty right to take lish not only entitled them to access to
traditional fishing sites, insLilation from state license fees, and a 50 percent share of the
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\Vil I iam Dietricli lias aptly cal led the (‘olumb ia the quintcshcnt ml 20th ccntuiy
river
in contrast to the Mississippi, which remains in the Americat mind a 0th
century river o l’”Tnm and I luck. ot sternwiieeler and liatbotit, of i:ic siege oi\ic.sLiurg

and hydropower. Today, there are eleven large dams on the mai nstem of the Columbia.
seven more on the Lower Snake. Sonic 150 dams C\ st throughout the C’oluiubia Has iii,
prod ucing over 40 pci-cent ol’ the nation’s hydropow er:

—-

The sheer size of the Columbia was not mightier than the human imagination,
however. In roughly forty years ot the twent ie ili century
tioin the I 930s to the mid—
I )70s
the Columbia was tamed in the name of flood control, navigation, irrigation,

more than I 0.000 ears.

times that of the Rio (irandc. itS salmon runs

\\‘asliiigton. The Columbia is the West’s biggest river svstc!1i. with the force to pIerce
the Cascades. The C’ol umbra has seven times the 1o\ ol the Colorado, two hundred

0 the Pacific \or\est.
Rising in cential BriLishi Columbia and emptying into the Pacific Ocean at the border
between Oregon and Washington over ,200 miles do\vnstreaill, the river drains more
than a quarter of a mi lion sq uare miles. an area lareer than France. The Cohi mbia’s
principal tributary, the Snake, rises in northwest Wyoming, f1o s through Idaho, marks
the boundary between Tdaho and Orcoon, and meets he Columbia in south—central

The CoiLimbia River is the defining natural resource

5—DAMMING ‘FIlE COLUMBIA BASIN
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the development and operation oh’thc largest interconnected hydroelectric system in the
l3asin and
\ orld. This chapter explains how hydropower came to dominate the Columbia

‘Faming the Columbia caine at great cost, however. Clii nook salmon and
steelhead are now extinct in over 50 percent of their historic Columbia Basin range east
olthe Cascades, and only two percent oh the basin’s watersheds have strong salmon runs.
Although it is true that salmon habitat has been damaged by logging, grazing. and miii ing
activities, the predominant cause of’ the decline oh most ( ‘olumbia Basin salmon rtms is

as potatoes. sugar beets, and alfal lh Approximately six liercent ol Columbia Basin
stream flows are diverted to irrigate sonic 7.8 million acres oh’ land .3.8 million acres.
nearly half of that total, are irrigated by some 73 percent of Snake River tiows above
lvhilner Darn; there are altogether 13.5 million acre—fret of storage in the Snake Basin.’

i’his invented river of the turbine and (he dynamo today produces an average of
1 8.500 megawatts of electricity, providing the Northwest with the cheapest electric rates
in the nation and supporting a large aluminum industry which subsists oft cheap
hydropower. The dammed river also yields a deepwater port at Lewiston, Idaho, 465
miles Irom the sea, from which barees now supply cheap transportation for wheat and
other grains as well as crops irrigated with water horn Columbia Basin reservoirs, such

3
American (‘entury, come to the (‘olumbia.

urplane. It is the river ci Tom Swi Ii. Fiankl in I). Roose eli. [‘cpu/u;
tfe(I7u;;!L, and Nagasaki. In the first three decades after World War hi,
major (hams were completed in the Columbia T3asin at a pace Faster than
one per vear It is a river not so much transformed as seemingly
invented, It yoi want to see how America dreamed at the height of the

•
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blocked passage ol authorizing legislation until 19 I 7. and then succeeded in terminating
the Commission as part of a compromise by which the Federal Water Power Act was
pissel in 1920.

including na igal ion, flood control, water power. irrigation, and po
11 ution control. The
Coininissioji advocated creation of a centralized, national waler planning agency that
would employ scientific principles, not congressional politics, as the chief litmus test for
water project development. I lowever, many in Congress opposed a centralized water
agency, as did the Ll.S.Arniv Corps ol’ Engineers which since l X24 had been (and
remains today I the nation’s chielnavigation agency. The Corps and its allies in Congress

\Vaterwavs Commission, which in I Q0 declared water to he a public resource and
recommended basin—wide tedera I \vater development planning to serve multiple purposes,

developments on public waterways should be government—regulated, subjected to limited
license terms, and required to pay annual charges. Roosevelt appomted the Inland

Ilydropower was a key element ol’ the Progressive Conservationist agenda
because unlike electricity generated from coal, water ays were considered public
resources. Pi’ogrcssives likeTheudore Rooseelt andGif[’ord Pineliot insisted that private

as planner. regulator, and developer ot hydroelectric projects.

maclimes. l’rogressives were especial lv concerned with the growmg monopoli ation ot
the emerging electric power industry because monopohes produced high rates and poor
service. To combat electric monopo]ization and ensure widespread distribution of
electricity at low rates. Progressives advocated an aeli\ e role br the federal government

crime that accompanied a seven-told ii reuse in the nat ion’s urban population between
I t60 and L) o• i’hey sa\s governmc’nt—snonsored natural ie’ouiees projects. especial I
s atei’ de\’elopments, as a means to preserve the rural. snial I town, individualistic 1ift that
post—Civi War industrialism threatened with higeorporations, big cites, and big political
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reclamation and hydropower proJect at Grand Conlee in 191 i and continued to trumpet
the ploJect throughout the next decade—and—a—hal l’

as large as 19 12 Portland. Thus, the ascendancy of’ priate iover in the I 920s, coupled
with limited public flnancia I resources and inadequate demand fur electricity, impeded
the Progressive dream of comprehensive water development ofthe Columbia Basin. The
dream was not abandoned, however. In Cict. it was adopted by local economic boosters
I ike Ru fcis Weeds, publisher of (he U cnne/ieL’ it el-id. ho began advocating a large

But completely harnessing the Columbia River’s flo s proved to he beyond the
financial resoLirces of pri ate utilities. Moreo er. dams on the C el umbia could generate
lhr more electric power than ihe Northwest needed. I ‘or example, a 1 91 2 study estimated
that a dam at The Dalles would gencrate enough electricity to power a city thirteen times

the I 930s. fueling interest in public power.

Federal Po er Coinmision. created by the 1920 Act to regulate pri\ ate hydropower
development, but hampered by limited staff and funding, functioned as little more than
a clearinghouse. With fe regulatory requirements and nominal federal charges, private
hvdropowerboomcd. Concerns over electric monopolies declined. In 1926 alone, there
were more than 1 ,000 private Liii lily mergers. Mergers would become an issue again in

Progressive principles fell out of favor in the I 920s normalcy years, as the
businessman, rather than the scientific bureaucrat, became the national paradigm. The

earmarked t’or federal multiple—purpose purposes). I Io\vever. the 1920 Act did reflect
Preuressive thinking in its prevision for limited—term licenses, which reserved Liltilnate
ov nership in the public, and its iret’ereitce for water projects which \\ crc publicly—owned.

—

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

—

Da,nniiizi
tilL’

CoIu,,,hjt,
JJucin
--

91

Conies

Tine

‘

completion on the Mid—Columbia south of Wenatchee. That Pnuect. although only 40—
let high (only about, one—ninth ot’ the height of’ the proposed 3

that the next l’ederal hydropower pro,iect wou Id be on the (‘o I uinbia River. Actually, as
Roosevelt spoIe, the rst dam oit the Columbia. the ut Ii ty—owned Rock Is land Dam, built
by the holding company controlling Puget Sound Power and Light, was nearing

When New York (Iovernor Franklin I). Roose\ eh. Ito had established a public
power agency in his slate, hroLight his presidential cilinpaign to the Northwest in the fil
of I 932. lie told a cheering crowd of’ public power partisans in Portland that the federal
government would never part with its sovereign control o I’ ater 0\\ er, and he promised

Liii lilies deemed uneconomic to scr e and could also produce
public power that ‘vou Id serve as a “yardstick’ by which to measure the reasonableness
of’ private power rates.

rural areas that private

Federal water prolect development was also a response to the high prices and nauec;uute
distribution ol electric power provided by pLihlic Liii litres. Federal pro_Teds could eeetri

Although the philosophical underpinnings of’ Colu,ibia l3asiit watLi proleet
development Ia in the Proeressl\e npulse, the ecoutow IL real ItCS 01 1 he ( reat
Depression ti’aIlSt()imed that philosophy into action, The Corps 305 report. on the
Columbia supplied New Dealers with a handy blueprrni to implement their hehefthat the
federal government could stimulate economic recovery through public works prolecus.

The Von’ Deal: The Di’oani

not advocate federal financing of what wou Id be the largest de\ elopment ol any ri
basin in the world instead, the report saw the ecieTh ‘ole as being I united to
coordination and regulatIon. Such a role \\ould not real c the Ulejuns (lIthe hooNter

Chapter 5
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like the Tennessee Valley Authority, which would have comprehensive authority to

Grand C’oulec). But allocating the ‘surplus power” from the projects invoked old tensions
between urban and rural areas. between public and r” ate power, and between advocates
oh central planning and market forces. Public power and rural partisans lavored an entity

Neither project was authorized prinlari lv liar hvdropo cr generation: their
authorizing legislation made hydropower secondary to navigation (in the case of
[3onneville) and flood control, downslrearn how control, and irrigation (iii the case of

With construction proceeding both at Bonneville and Grand ( ‘oulee, the Supreme
Courl threw an unexpected monkey wrench in 1935, when ii ruled that the projects had
not been authorized by Congress. But the dams quickly received congressional
authori7ation, and construction proceeded. Resolving how to distribute the electricity
produced by the prolccts would pro\;e considerahl more time consuming.

Tue Bonnemi/le Project Jci

workers and, when flnished. woukl begin the transformation of both the river and the
Pacific Northwest economy. 2

a federal dam on the C o bumnbia was hardly clear.
The precise beat on
ho\\ e er. I3oosters in Washington. like Senator Clarence Dill, lobbied for the Grand
C’oimlee site, win Ic boosters in ()reuon, like Governor Charles Martin and Senator Charles
MeN arv, advocated a site on the Lower Columbia closer to Portland. Roosevelt, the
masterol compromise, gave each state what they warned, and in 1933 construction began
both at Grand Coulee and at a site near the Cascades on the Lower Columbia that would
become Bonneville Darn. Ibese tvO protects would eventually employ up to 10,000

92
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The efibets ofthe Bonneville and Grand Coulce Dams on the Columbia’s salmon
runs were not entirely ignored in the rush to market the projects’ power. Four months
before enactment of the 1937 Bonneville Project Act, the Senate adopted a resolution
directing the Commissioner of Fisheries to study the effect of the dam on the salmon and

And What ofthe Salmon?’
6

Beginning in 1935 thirty-eight bills were introduced in Congress to govern power
marketing from Bonneville Dam, but old conflicts over power allocation prevented
passage of legislation until the Bonneville project was nearly completed in 1937. Then
influenced by the recommendations of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Board,
a public-private advisory committee, Congress passed a compromise bill that rejected a
comprehensive planning authority and left the Corps as project operator, but established
a new agency to market power and construct transmission lines. The bill also gave
preference to public bodies, although it did not prohibit sales to private utilities or
industries. By creating a regional power marketing agency but denying that agency
authority to initiate new projects. the legislation planted the seeds ofregionalism without
comprehensive planning authority. The result was the beginning of a complex mosaic
of institutional jutisdictional boundaries that would eventually inhibit development of a
truly comprehensive response to the decline of the Columbia’s salmon runs.’
5

reflected the cost of transmission, and they wanted limited federal transmission line
construction. The Portland Chamber of Commerce feared that postage stamp rates and
kderal transmission line construction would lead to increased electric rates in Portland
and undermine its locational advantage close to Bonneville Dam.
4
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i’he 1937 report led Congress to enact the Mitchell Act a year later. ‘1’he Mitchell
Act, discussed further in chapter 6, authorized funding of measures to preserve and
protect Columbia Basin salmon, includinu hatcheries, fish ladders, irrigations screens,

ehance.”

protection of individual runs menaced by \ irlual extinct ion must at the Present be Ic ft to

uncertainties persist. I lowever, these scientific uncertainties neverstopped hydroelectric
developments pending their resolution. Even t lie federal (‘oniinissioner of Fisheries
assumed water development must pm’oceed, despite his unsettling conclusion that ‘the

The 1937 report on the Bonneville Project Act also emphasiied linding scientific
research into salmon migrations and the effects of dams on fish runs. Because of the vast
areas traveled by salmon during their ii h cycle. considerable scienti lie uncertainty has
always surmunded salmon niigrai on. I)espi te over a hal I cent ury ol studies. these

7.
habitat due to Grand Coulee was irreplaceable

—

‘Ihe Grand Coulec prolect. which damaged salmon far more than the Bonneville
also
because it sealed oIl’ more than I ,000 miles of spa ning grounds
protect
prompted unprecedented mitigation etIort. As discussed in chapter 6. the Coulee project
induced a massive effort to relocate tipper basin salmon to Inbutaries below the dam.
This sort of transplantation effort was not unusual in Columbia Basin hatchery
operations. hut transplantation generally produced poor results. and the extensive loss of’

ocean harvests were all noted as potential problems in the Coniniissioncrs report. These
proh hans would coot inne to cofli n hute to the (led inc of the salmon runs O\ er the ocx
all’ centuy.

—
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lie uncertaintY was the construction

110

compensation for i nany years.

productive in terms 01’ ret urning ado Its than hatchery sal mon. Many biologists

110W

transmission of disease, and loss of’ genetic iiltegri t through inbreeding. I latchery fish
also perform poorly ill the \(ild: one study 10(111(1 \\ ild salmon to he eight times nioie

idespread recognition that heavy ic lance on ha tcherv
fish damages \vi Id fish productivity through competition for h iiiitcd lood and habitat,

Even worse, there is now

of’ the dam—related losses with little or

consequences, as upper basin fishers, mel tiding Indian tribes and I dahoans, bore the brunt

of’ hatcheries funded under the Mitchell Act. Most of these hatcheries crc situated in
the Lower Columbia I3asin below the dams, so that tile sal mon 111ev produced would not
be eonli’onted wi iii (Jul11 passage problems. I his produced on fortunate distributional

(inc activity that dd proceed despite

Although these agencies funded the \ ora of
numerous biologists studying various aspects of the saillOfl : n cycle, the demand for
scientific certainty inhibited meaningful protection anu resforation efforts.

before making operational changes

managing the dams ensurcu the decline of the ahmn ions by employing optililistie
assumptions about the adverse effects ofthe dams and by coiling for inure scicflti lie study

Thus. aithoLigh Congress never expressly indicated that Columbia Basin salmon shuu d
be sacri iced ill pursuit ol flavigation. irri1aiion. or hyeropJwer. the l’cdera imi:es

bile scienti lie studies ere underta!en, hiii de;l 0\\ Ci marketing and (1afl
operating agencies increasingly look the position that no changes in river operul ions to
henelit salmon could take place unless they were gwanbed uu sc:enti
li’L an ati itudc
that ou Id become pervasive concerning al acti\ ilies with ad\ erse e llvcts on sa hinon.

\

lose’’

continue

you

—

()ver the years, scientific uncertainty has heen Lu i ed into a
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l3onm. il Ic Dam began getici at inelectrieity in I O3S Grand Coulc’e came on line

War II ainl h. l!lrIvlcllI(

In the Columbia Basin, the foundation forthese congressional authoriiations was
laid in 1938 when the Corps of lngineers re iewed and amended its l,lai liar water
project development. Whereas the Corps’ original 1932 plan called liar ten dams on the
_olumhia, the locus of the 1938 plan shi lied attention to the l...ower Snake River. even

projects.

Driven by a fear of a oSt—ir depression, Congress authoriied an
unprecedented number of water projects in the 1 944 Flood Control Act and the 1945
Rivers and I larhors AcI.

bust cycles associated with farming. fishing, and forestry. As the war drew to an end.
regional planners sought to preserve the wartime economic boom with additional water

Thus, the war turned what had been an overabundance of’ electricity into a lure
for an electricity—intensive industry that would establish inanuflieturing as an important
part ol’ the Northwest economy, a legion that had long been subjected to the boom—and—

woduccd alnminum.
1

the prospect of abundant, cheap hydropower, Alcoa began building the first aluminum
plant west (lithe Mississippi River in December 1939. Five more plants SOOll followed.
and by 1942, aluminum plants consumed three—quarters of the electricity produced at
F3onneville and Grand Coulee. During the war, ihe Northwest produced over 40 pci-cent
of the nation’s aluminum, supplying essential components br airerall. ships, and other
war—related construction. Today, the Northwest still produces over 40 percent ol U.S.—

three years later, just eight months belore Pearl I arbor. Tue defense build—up that began
in I )40 provided the demand thai obviated concerns over excess electricity. I ‘ured by

1
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Congress did not, however, intend dam building on the Lower Snake to
extinguish the river’s salmon runs. In the same 1945 statute authorizing the Snake
projects, Congress authorized construction of McNary Dam. situated just below the
confluence of the Columbia and Snake, pledging that “adequate provision shall be made
for the protection of anadromous fishes by affording them free access to their natural
spawning grounds.” By promising access to natural spawning grounds, Congress might
have been interpreted to have established federal policies ofensuring that dam operations
provide maximum fish passage and of favoring wild fish protection over hatchery
production. But those who managed the dams and the salmon never interpreted the
statute in this way. Instead, the operative assumption was that dam-related losses could
be offset through hatchery production. This reliance on one technology to minimize the
adverse effects of another proved disastrous?’

Seven years later, in the 1945 Rivers and Harbors Act, with no specific mention
of any project or location. “the wicdom of Congress” authorized “such danv as are
necessary” to produce the navigation channel, allow irrigation, and provide “surplus
power.” In this rather cavalier fashion Congress authorized four dams on the Lower
Snake, the last of which was completed thirty years after its authorization, in 1975.
These dams transformed the Lower Snake from a free-flowing river into a series oflakes
and led to a precipitous decline in Snake River salmon which culminated in Endangered
Species Act listings in the I 990s.

—

local shipping and agricultural interests convinced the Corps to leave the issue “to the
wisdom of Congress.”
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built no dams on these tributaries, utilities made no such commitment. Aided 1w
expansive court interpretations ofthe Federal Power Act. titilities succeeded in obtaining

Among the more notable broken promises of the 1_ower ( olumbia R i’er
l)evelopment Program was its commitment to avoid damming lo er basin tributary
streams like the Deschutes, Lewis, and Co lilt Rivers. Although the fuderal go ernment

whose fishing grotinds were upriver from the program’s focus.

As a result of increased hatchery production, fishery managers designed harvest
seasons that would prevent too many hatchery flsh returning to the hatcheries. Little
thought \\ as given to the effects of these high harvest levels on wild salmon, or to the
elTects of hatchery fish in terms ol the carrying capacity of the ri ers or ocean feeding
grounds. Consequently, the federal money br the lower liver bishery lgmm proved to
be, at best, a Faustian bargain. The progiim also disregarded treaty rights of tribes.

nutrition.

money to construct hatcheries situated almost exclusively in the lower basin. This li.deral
money funded fish biologists to study hatchery technology, disease prevention, and

(discussed more fully in chapter 6) began the Lower Columbia River Fishery
Development Program. The program aimed to maintain salnwn harvests by using federal

.“

mitigatiig upriver rLlns Lw ‘developing the salmon rLins in the lower tributanes to the
This commitment, coupled with a I 94$ interagency
highest level of producti, it
agreement catTing for ftderal—state coordination in implementing the Mitchell Act

the Corps’ I 94 report gave considerable allention to salmon protection,
outl in ng a $20 mit lion plan of lish ladders. irrigiil ion screens. habitat improvement, and
hatcher’’ construction that focused on the ]..ower (ni uinbia. The plan envisioned

98
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ii

negotial

Canada. wIt crc hi ice storage s: cs

oils since 1 9—4. No agreement could be

ii

and another inundating Canadian lands.

II O\\

‘.

The treaty called for the construction of four storage pro ects. three in Canada

U.S. rd uctantly agreed to share downstream benc fits on an eciual basis. Tb is agreement
I signing of the Columbia River Treaty.
led to the I
27

two decades. Canada finally broke the logjam in I lie late I 050s by threatening to proceed
vi th an alternative, unilateral development plan on the Peace River. Consec
1 nen t i y, the

reached because C’anad ian storage \\ on I cli ncrease he j)O\\ er general i ng and loud cOntrol
eapahi Ii iv of every dow nst rca ni dam iii the U S., a id Canada \ an ted a share of tl iose
downstream benefits. The U.S. would not agree, and the ensuing deadlock lasted nearU

existed, had been the subject of treaty

Damm ng the (_ol unihia near its head ate is

worthless for power production. the unharnessed lreshct xas vital to ihe efficient
transportation of young salmon on their journey to the ocean each spring.

they crossed the hoider. Asar esuit. in years of hi cli runoll, much of the Columbia’s
spring ftcshet had to he spilled around lower basin dams, producing no power. Although

E,Os. neatly all of the sites ftir large hydroelectric projects in the ‘.S.
F3y the I 1
Pact he NorthwesI had been developed or were under construction. Even so. the 30
percent of Columbia River flows that orwinated in Canada remained uncontrolleci until

7’Iiu Co/ion/un

more di fl’ieult.’

O\\

s
50
ihe c\pilnSion ol flri\tte h’ydroe;ee.r:c Je ehpiiietit in the I 1)

coord natimi the

OR)Liil(lS.
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Nivuroi vs. Re

Chart 2
:tYe,I los’s

The Changed I—hid rograph

changed hydrograph is a reflection of hydropower’s status as the dr/ado dominant use

stored for release in the fall and winter to meet power demands (see chart 2). This

with large spring/summer flows to one in which much of the spring/summer freshet is

system operators the means to change the hydrograph of the Columbia River from a river

high river flows in the spring and early summer for transport to the sea. The treaty gave

generalorsto capture

the river’s increased powercapacity. These modifications increased
the ability ot darn operators to meet peak electric demands. Lii fortunately, seasonal peak
loads in the Northwest do not occur during the spring and earl summer high flows but
instead during the winter, when electricity is used for space heating (an inefficient use
ol the electric resource). Consequently, hydroelectric operators seek to store the
spring/summer freshet for release later in the year. But young salmon are dependent on

Ratification of the Columbia River Treaty signaled the beginning of a mature
Colwnhia Basin hydroelectric system. Not only did the treaty projects double the basin’s
storace capacitY, the treaty induced donstream project operauns to install additional

100
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a fully

consideration to environmental impacts or public involvement. The operative assum

At least until the Lndangcred Species Act began to affect system operations in
the I 990s. annual planning under the Coordination Agreement gave little or no

concept.

opcrators agreed to hilly integrate system operations. ollen i’eflrred to as the ‘one utility”

utilities agreed to detailed operating criteria, power exchange principles, and a lormu Ia
for allocating downstream benefits, Through this long—term contract. the region’s pi’oiect

time, the treaty’s prmciple of sharing downstream benefits was premised on
integrated system. l’his integration was ensured by the signing of the 1964
Northwest Coordination Agreement,
In the agreement the Bonneville
Administration (BPA), the Corps of hngincers, and a number of public and

.

The most important planning process ushered in by’ the treaty was formalizing
coordination of the new treaty projects among federal and nonlederal project operators
downstream Although project operators had been coordinating voluntarily [hr some

dams belo the treaty projects were au1horizecl hydropower
remains a secondary purpose of these projects. Further. the treaty contains a prn’ iSiOfl
which appears to allow a reduction in Canadian power benefits when water bypasses
power generators and is not used for power production. Yet system operators often cited
the treaty’ as justilication for hydropower’s dominance of Columbia Basin system
operations, and there is no question that the planning processes spawned by the treaty
largely ignored the needs of salmon.
’
2

of the purposes for winch

The loss ot the natural Iivdrograph is a major reason 1hr depleted ( olumbia Basin
saiinui runs. Nothing in the Columbia River ‘Ireaty expressly eicuted hydropo er tO
the ,tatus oldoniinant use. i1u\ C\ er. No pro\ ision of the tieatv purported to change any

—
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treaty

Thus. the legacies of the Columbia River Treaty were many and varied. ‘[lie
prompted full integration of system operations, produced enhanced hydroelectric

aluminum loads, had been satisfied.

aller

it approved intentie construction funding. The Preference Act limited Northwest
surplus after the needs of the Northwest, including the
Power exports to

flared the new (‘ali fomia markets would jeopardive its access to the cheap hydropower
which initially drew the industry to the Northwest. As a result of these concerns,
Congress also enacted the Nonthest Preflrence Act, signed into law only three weeks

Another example of how the treaty cemented BPA’s central role in Columbia
Basti system operations concerned the construction ot [3PA’s transmission line that
electrically connects Northwest dams with California markets. Congress authorivecl
construction of this “intertie” shortly ailer the treaty was rali tied in I Qô4 to ensure that
there would be markets l’or the additional iiower generated as a resLilt of’ the treaty
liruects. I lowever, the prospect of an intertie alarmed the al uini n um industry_ which

was not used to ire ciii the decline of Columbia Ri er salmon.

Perhaps the most signi hcant result ol the Columbia River Treaty and the
(oordination Agreement \\ as continuation of RPAs central role in svstcni operations.
For example. BPA purchased the Canadian Portion ot’ the downstream benefits lbr a 30—
year tenn, which the Canadians eaii er had sold to a consortium of L.S. utilities. Thus.
through 1998. BPA had complete control over the Canadian entitlement. but this control

it
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fleet peak loads. River flows, in short.

\\

mild he mnmnmpuatcd to couicmdc with bib

hydroelectric capacity, which would largely reach is unit with tile coiuplelion oh’ the
Columbia River treaty projects. (See map h.) The program cn’ isiolled coal and nuclear
plants serving base loads, wit i Ic ilydroelectric power, with its great flexibility, wouid

plants. adding new generators to Columbia Basin dams to meet peal load demands, and
expanding transmission lines. This ‘l-lvdroihermai Pm er Progrini was an integrated
pdillicpri\’ate partnership designed to expand the orth\\ est electric system beyond IN

increases in electric consumption. The upshot was an expected tripling ot anticipated
ower deinand. In response, B PA and a consort i am ot over a hundred public and iri \ ate
iii ties formed the .Joini Power Planning (‘ounci I to develop a plan br expanding the
Northwest electric poc er system. The plan was to cun1ruct a series o coal and nuclear

By the late I %Os, regional electric horecasts were predicting large—scale
shortagcs. Tilts rather rapid swing from surplus to shortage was due notj ust to mcreased
industsial power sales, but also to an expanded planning horizon and torecasts oh steady

This strategy kept Northwest electric rates low. but it increased demand on the svsc:u
and, within a few years. made power shortages appear n1m i lent.

cost of the hydropower shale of the flderal dams. Instead of raising rates to increase
revenues, however, the BPA Administrator decided to double industrial power sales.

Lwe’: projects hui It in the I 050s. like those on the Mtd—
Columbia and Middle Snake. As a result. BPA revenues hell, and the agency experienced
a series of budget dehictts that teopardized its ability to repay the U.S. Treasury ‘or the

proliferation oh’ nonfederal

fite Bonnevilk. Pmvcr Administration (I3PA) began the l)Os with a SlirpitiS ol
pciver due to an economic recession and new electric marketplace competition horn a
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this financing scheme was an lnventi\e way around I3PAs lack of congressional authority
to construct proects. The scheme allowed a coalition 01’ public utilities with little

LL to 5 percent ot the utility’s
‘electricity lutures’ by issuing credits to thc utility
13 PA bill br \ liole’ute power and iruiSifltSSioT1 lute scrvices. Known as “net hilling.”

As initially concei ed. the centerpiece ol the I lydro—Therma I Program v as a
cicat ‘ee tinancing scheme under h ich B PA on Id purchase in advance the output of a
thennal plant constructed by a uti lit\ customer of B PA. [3PA would iy lbr these

--
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flay. BPAs indtistrial eustoniers would stipply residential and Ilium electric consumers

A central element ofthe Phase 2 program was renegotiatingpower contracts with
B PA’s industrial customers to allow greater interruptahil i ty of industrial loads. In this

more thermal plants hut was dependent on BPA’s negotiating experience instead of its
deep pockets. Rather than purchase the future Otitput ol the proposed plants, under Phase
2 I3PA would negotiate agreements between the uti lilies constructing the prtjecls and
I3PAs ctistorners. This would guarantee the till lilies a market for their power. but the
uti lilies, not BPA, would bear the risk of plain delays or I’ai lures.

As a result, E3PA and its customers quickly agreed to a new version ol the I lydro—
Thermal Power Program, christened “Phase 2.” Phase 2 sought construction ol seven

Five years aller its I 96S initiation, the l—lvdro—Thermal Program came to an
abrupt halt. First, skyrocketing construction costs exceeded BPAs capacity to ‘net bill.’
as the cost oveiuns outsiripped the amounts the participating utilities owed BPA.
Second, the Internal Revenue Service revoked he tax exemption br bonds financing net—
hilled plants. When I3PA terminated net hilling in 1973, seeral nuclear plants were
tinder construction, hut the region was left with prqjected electric shortages and no plan
to address them.

plants xs crc stil born.

regional l\ insured. as I3PA eftcuti\cly assumed the risk ol plant lailures. Assumption of
this risk \ mild eentiial l\ cost F3PA roughly 7 billion, and fbur of the WPPSS nuclear

capital. kiioe n as the \\ashin glon Public Power Supply System (WPPSS 1. to begin
consti hut (‘fl 01 three nuclear power plants. In effect, these three W PPSS plants. along
\ itli part o I the Froan nuclear power plant built 1w Portland (cneral Electric. were

(hapier 5
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The impending shortages and growing rate inequities pronpted a search or a
congressional solution. I3eginning in 977, many bills crc introduced in Congress to

3
entitled to preFcreice dghts to [3PA po\r.

on an interstate war over hydropower emit lements. Prospects Lw this war heightened
when the Oregon Legislature enacted a law authorizing a public authority that would
become a BPA preference customer for all domestic and rural consumers in the slate. The
cit’ of Portland also filed suit seeking a judicial declaration that its residents were

those served by privite utilities (which had been largely cut oil Irom BPA’s low—cost
power in 1973) became apparent. Since most ol’ the private utilities were in ( )regon.
while most ol the public utilities were in Washington. the region seemed ready to embark

The demise of the Hvdro—Thermal Prouram thrust the Paci tic Northwest into an
electric power crisis. Not only was the region kicing apparent p()\\ er shortages. rate
inequities between consumers served by I3PA’s lreIercrice customers (public utilities) and

with NEPAs requirements. it took BPA nearly live Years, until I 9O, to produce the
required documentation. In the interim. 13 [‘A nod fled its preidrence customers that it
could no longer guarantee to meet increases in their power demands after I 983. The
agency also informed its industrial customers that their contracts would he unlikely to be
renewed when they expired in the I 98Os)

Thus. BPA could not proceed with plans to expand the electric system until it
produced an cn ironmcntal inipact statement on its I lvdro—Thermal Program. Ln t’amil iar

on Nh PA grounds, fur it also had been lurniulaled with no consideration of
environiiiental nnplicatioiis and no public invoRenieiit.
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scr lug the nuclear plant debt. Especially as market ales Fur electricity declined in the
I Q90s, this debt became a key Factor in BPA’s rcs:stuncc to changes in svstciii operations

The $7 hi I lion nuclear power debt ic’ erbernied throughout the region For years.
Among other things, it meant that a s i gni ii cant percent age ol’ B PA reven ties ‘en t to

authority. BPA was able to find implied authorttv to use tel ht I jug to invest $7 bill ion
in nuclearplants, yet the agency claimed it had ito authority to lake into account the needs
oF migrating salnmn in the Formulation and implementation oF its I lvdro—Thermul
Prog rtuui.

On the other hand. hydropower authorities were broadly interpreted. The
C’olumhia River Treaty was oFten cited as auihoriiation Frr hydropower dominance.
despite the absence oF any clear directive in this regard. Perhaps the epItome oF this
\villingness to stretch existing a uthorities was I3PA’s invent ton oF the ‘net hilling’
concept which a I lowed the agenc to i fl\ est in nuclear plants I thout appare lit legislative

salmon niiuralion and hold back the sprin Freshet that sidmon need for transport to the
sea, no federal ,ia[utc nut hori,es hvdtoi,owci Jot itnanec o\ e salmon. In Fact. the
v1cNary Dam authortzaton ol’ I 45 arguably retnred maximum passage for wdd hsh,
hut the hydroelectric system’s operators never ink prete (1 the statute this way. Similar\
the ecretarv of Interior construed his apparent plenary authority to conserve sa mn
tinder the I 93X Mitchel Act narrowly. largely imuted to Funding hatcheries in
compensate for dam-created losses.’

huikliii tratisforine the (.ofit:nhii into what Richaic \Vit
lias cal led “the organic machine.” But aIthouth the dams have imposed obstacles to

.Sa/mo,i
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[3asin salmon tinder the Endangered Species Act.

hydropower dominance was without legislative authority, ignored the warnings sounded
as early as the I 937 report of the Commissioner of Fisheries, and se erelv crippled the
signature natural resource of the Columbia Basin. Consequently. by the late I 970s,
federal fish and wilcllih. agencies were considering the propriety of listing Columbia

minimum interlerence” with salmon habitat, the CorpS pursued what Ed Chancy has
called a “shadow policy” of pretending that the operation ol the dams to maxilnite
hydropo’a er mild not significantly damage salmon runs. or assuming that whatever
damage occurred could he ofRet by the smallest investments possible. particularly by
building hatcheries. This ‘‘shadow policy” allowed the Corps and BPA to elevate
hydropower as the dominant purpose of Columbia Basin streamliows. Jiox\ ever, this

It did not have to be this Wu\ 1 he public nature ol waterways articulated by
Progressives and recogniicd by ew Dealers could have been interpreted to include both
hydropm\er2encration and salmon migration. But even \ lien system operators appeared
to tccogniye that salmon were among the multiple users lw which Columbia Basin dams
should he operated, as in the Corps of Engineers 194k report. the operators quickly
ignored their promises. Instead ol taking seriously statements that salmon were to he
protected by the ‘best possible means” ol Esli passage, and that the dams were to produce

I (iS
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HATCHERI ES

SECOND PRO’1ISE: THE FALSE HOPE OF SALMON

Second I’,’o,nie:

—

widespread recognition of the costs that hatchery fish impose on naturally spawning fish,
including disease. competition for lod and habitat, and loss of’ genetic diversity’.
Scientists began to refer to hatcheries as an ill—advised technology aimed at fixing the
damages caused by another technology, the dams. Some even churned thai hatcheries

In the last decade, listings under the Endangered Species Act have caused
scientists to begin to question the efficacy ofhatcherics. The century in which artificial
production was the salmon mitigation measure of choice apparently had ended, due to

Indian harvests.

era ended in the 1970s. more hatcheries were touted as the way to increase run sizes so
that court—ordered allocations to treaty Indians could be satisfied ‘. hue mainhnning non—

a means by which the region could have both hydropower and salmon. As a result, for
nearly a tall—century. hydroelectric dams and salmon hatcheries were inseparable
elements of Columbia Basin \\ ater resource development. Then, when the dam—building

The initial impetus Ibr hatcheries was overtishing
19th century
cannery owners sa hatchertes as a means ol maintaming commercial salmon harvests
in the thee of a massive increase in fishing. In the 201 h century, hatcheries became
‘mitigation” to oliset the effects of development and operation of Columbia Basin dams:

River in I X77,

At IC npis to enhance (‘ol uinbia Basin salmon runs arti licial ly through hatcheries
began a cciii mv and a quarter ago when the first hatchery was situated on the Clackamas

6
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salmon eu Itura lists began experimenting with
se survival rates, as some 50 mill ion uveni Ic

Ii tIeen hatcheries operating on the West Coast.

century,

were some

turn of

of the century, there

the mid—I 80s, although its resumption in I 587 encouraged the construction ofcanneries
and the shipping of fresh salmon to markets in San Francisco and elsewhere. By the turn

.

In I i’77, Stone journeyed to the Columbia Basin to build a salmon hatchery on
the Clackamas River in Oregon flir cannery owners on the Columbia River. [3ut
according to Stone, the Clackamas hatchery suffered from “unflivorable conditions.’’ such
as timber harvesting, mill operations, dams, and being “too near civil izat ion.’’ As a result.
the operation proved to he a disappointment, and it was shut down in I i I although it
was later reopened asa federal hatchery in I 8. The McCloud hatchery also closed in

30,000 eggs survived the journey, but few adult salmon were produced, largely due to the
fact that the transplantation was done in complete ignorance ol the [bet that salmon are
divided into individual stocks with different genetic traits. In fact, Stone did not
recognize the stock concept, believing that salmon returned to streams in a random,
haphazard manner. Still. by I S77 Stone was shipping salmon eggs all over the world, to
3
places like Prussia, Germany, the Netherlands, England, France, Canada, and Australia.

Che first salmon hatchery on the West Coast was founded by Li ngstofl Stone
on the MeUloud River, a tributary of the Sacramento River, in I 72. The thinking was
that a Pacjlic coast hatcher would a] Io chinook salmon to be transplanted to denuded
Eastern streams. Stone shipped the live eggs from the McC’Ioud hatchery across the U.S.
in refi’werated railroad cars flr placement in Eastern rivers A.bout 20 percent of the

Ear/i’ Hisloii’
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lhe implicit assumption was that hatchery technology could overcome the

Lmndeniable atlracti encss to assuming that hatcheries \\ould compensate or all habitat

considering the effects on salmon, vet mai itaining sa mon harvests. Another assumption
underlying the piol I feration of hatcheries was that the limiting factor in a species’ overall
productivity s as spawning and rearing habitat, either because of habitat damage or
because human intervention coLild improve on natural spawning. Although there was an

adverse effects of damaging technologies like dLinIs. mills, and timber harvests.
I hitcheries offered the apparent promise of developing aLluatic resources without

century.

although fishery managers were aware o fihe adverse e fldcts of habitat dcstrLlct ion in the
1 9th century, they either chose not to attempt to a\uid habitat loss or preSumed they could
not control it. Instead, they locLiSed on enhancing sa mon production despite the habitat
loss. fhis single focus on increasing prod uction conlnued I hroniihoni most oil he (lth

I li57. George Pcrkms \iarsii recoun ted the Lianinging effects ol development on fish
habitat. but concluded that habitat restoranon iii \e’a i:ngiand was “impractical” Thus.

The early experience with hatcheries refccted an overarching assumption that
human intcr\ ention coLlid implove upon and successfully manipulate nature. As early as

relationship between parent spa wners and the health ol the I isit runs. That wisdom
not widely understood south of the Canadian border miii I the I 930s. howe\

‘.

grasped the “home stream’ theory as early as I tdO. ‘a hen AC. Anderson, the provinces
Inspector ol lisheries, introduced tile notiOns that sal mon were organized into separate
stocks. that the supply of salnion aricd finni riei’ to ii\e. nile that there as a

‘‘

ctilturalists continued to tianslr salmon cees en a erR out ofthe basin hich produced
them, ignori iig the e ol ing home treani’’ theor\ ‘a lie] \\ as chaT lengine tonC’s
“random chance” theor\ ofsaimon mieration. l.ritish (olniiibia scientists iiadprcscienilv

was no disceiiiiiile scientific evidence showing that hatcheries improved run sites. But

(hapter 6
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In 1937, the year Congress enacted the Bonneville Project Act the U.S.
Commissioner of Fisheries reported to the U.S. Senate on the expected effects of
Bonneville and Grand Coulce Dams on Columbia River salmon. The commissioner
described “a dearth of information” about the effects of the dams and suggested what
would become known in a later generation as an “adaptive management” approach to
salmon conservation: modil3’ing policies as new information became available. The
report called for a new federal commitment to salmon research and described an
“extensive program of transplantation of millions of fry” involving collection and
reprogramming of upper basin salmon that would be blocked by Grand Coulee. The
commissioner observed that “large investments are soon to be nmde in fish-cultural
apparatus and property and millions of fry will be produced to compensate for the runs
obstructed by Grand Coulee Dam.” Consequently, he called for research on fish
commercial harvests on individual

The dam building era, which began in earnest in the 1930s. saw hatcheries take
on a new significance. Hatcheries became the means by which Columbia Basin dam
proponents could claim that the hydropower. flood control, and irrigation benefits of
dams could be had without significant losses to salmon runs. In fact, as early as 1910,
the policy ofthe states ofOregon and Washington was to allow dam buildem to construct
hatcheries instead of tlshways for salmon passage. Given the fact that the efficacy of
hatcheries was assumed and, at any rate, would take a long time to disprove. dam
proponents could employ the promise ofhatchery production to suggest that salmon runs
would be unaffected by the dam construction and operation. Failure to impose a burden
of proof on hatchery effectiveness allowed development to proceed unabated?
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The next year, in I Q46, Congress amended the Mitchell Act, removing the

Also authorized was McNary Dam on the Columbia just below the
confluence with the Snake. But Congress also expressly called for safe passage for
salmon and ‘free access to their natural spawning gmu nds.” This provision could have
been interpreted as a federal policy fiworing spawning fish over hatchery production, but
none of the federal agencies interpreted it in this manner.’

Snake 1)amns.

Lower Snake River flr navigation and irrigation. These dams became the lnir Lower

As World War 11 drew to a close, C’ongres authorized more dam building in the
Rivers and I larbors Act of’ 1Q45. The act authorized “such dams as are necessary’’’ on the

was never interpreted broadlx’ by’ the secretary’ to enable him to change the operation of
dams to facilitate salmon migration. The operati\e assumption as still that fishery
concerns could not a I ter de e iopmen t.”

also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to ‘perform all other activities necessary for
the conservation ol fishery resources of the Columbia River Basin.’ but that provision

scientific studies. Although the \‘l itchel Act was desiuned as iin emergency measure to
compensate for salmon losses due to l.onneville and Grand (.oulee, the statutes cap of
just S5OQ,000 annually pres’eiiled hatcher construction and limited fishery managers
activities to a census and survey of most of the Columbia River tributaries. The stattite

authoriicd

funding ot.a wide ariet\ of remedial salmon measures in the Columbia Basin.
including hatcheries. fish iaduers. irrigation sci’cefls. habitat restoration projects, and

C
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notably, treaty Indians and Idahoans

of’ replacement salmon.’

Mitchell Act. By the mid—I 9$Os, Mitchell Act hatcheries were releasing approximately
100 million hatchery salmon annually in the (‘oluinbia River and its tributaries. roughly

were never taken seriously liv the Corps or other dam operators, which apparently
believed that fish protection was some other entity’s problem: they were empty promises,
forgotten iii the rush to proclrice every possible kilowatt of hydropower from the
Columbia River and its tributaries. The Cite of’ the Columbia Basin sal mon runs was to
be lefi to the hatcheries called For by the Lower Columbia program and funded by the

of sal mon and other migratory fish to the maxi mum practicml extent,” 2) “miii i mum
interference
with existing fish and ildli fe habitat,’ and 3) “the best possible means
(if passing salmon upstream and downstream at the dam sites.” I lov c er. these promises

Also in 194$, the Corps of Engineers re ised its plan fbr developing the
Columbia River and its tributaries, which endorsed the Lower Columbia Fishery
Development Program as the best means of maintaining the basin’s salmon runs while
continuing to construct dams. The Corps’ revised plan also cal led br I ) ‘‘conservation

upriver fishers

transplanting of upriver runs to the lower river, and establishing fish refuges. most of’ its
attention was focused on hatchery construction. Between the late I 940s and the early
I 960s, Congress used Mitchell Act authority to fund construction of twenty—four
hatcheries called for in the plan, twenty—three in Oregon and Washington but just one in
Idaho, reflecting the lower basin bias of the program. This bias may have made sense in
terms of minimizing the effects of the dams on hatchery—produced salmon, but it deprived

problems wei•e overcome. hut the I 94$ agreement assumed that attemptrng to halt dam
consiruction would be f’uti Ic. Although the program cal led for removing obstructions to
fish passage, abating water pollution, sereenmg water diversions. constructing fisliways.
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teaching hatchery fish to adapt to the hatcheR eiiv ironimient by becoming tolerant of

.

in the wild, especially when artificial select ion is accompanied 1w inbreeding resu Ituig
from mates sharing the same genetic characteristics Artificial selection also ‘actors n

[nder the artificial selection ofthe hateher. salinoit are selected on the basis o
desired traits like large sinolt size, early spawning capability, and early ietun tmwe.
Unfbrt unate ly, these traits often have little or nothing to do with successful reproduction

Diversity islC onsequenee of years of reproduclve isolation. which in turn is due to
physical isolation and hunung instincts. 1 lalcnerv—produccd fish ale die piuduci of
artificial selection, not natural selection. That means that their offspring are less likely
to have genetic traits favorable to survival in the \\lld.

ArLnahl v. the (01 umbma I3asin’s dependence on hatchery salmon has maintained
aggregate Salmc)n numbers while reducing genetic diversity. 1 lowever, genetic diversity
is the key to healthy reproductive populations because natural genetic variability, tile
product of natural selection, is a reflection of tIme populations fitness to its habitat.

f1lee,.cL’ E//wi,v of Hate/n 7/c,v on l4h/ S’a/nion

to the dams, the Snake Basin incurred

ipensated losses. The plan called
for releases of 27 mu ion hatchery fish from nine hatcheries and eleven rearing facil tics
in the Snake Basin. but it emphasized sports fish. like sprmng chinook and steelhead, and
made itt Ic attempt to replace I chinook (the tn hal mainstay). sockeye, or chum.’

,

and I larbois ,\ut. No hatchery fish ere produced under I he I o\v ci Snake plan unti
I 9 1 lu! lv 35 ‘ears later and ume Iwo dcc c1e a her the first o the Lower Snake i)u’t;s
were finished. Thus. even hatciteijes could effectively eulnpeiisate or habitat lost due

( ‘Inipler (
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Perhaps the most significant indirect adverse effect ofhatcheries on wild salmon
stocks concerns mixed stock harvests. in the ocean, where stocks are intermingled,
harvest managers historically set harvest rates based on total abundance ofsalmon. This
allowed maintenance oftraditional harvest rates but also produced overharvests ofweak
wild stocks. Thus, the adverse effects of hatcheries on wild salmon include not merely

and dam bin Iding.

effluent releases of polluted water: the latter due to the fact that hatcheries became the
initigationtechnique ofchoice. helpingto justify liahitat—damagingactivities like logging

infectious hematopoietic necrosis, lurunculosis. and whirling disease. Hatcheries have
had both direct and indirect effects on habitat: the former occurring when hatchery fish
exceed stream canying capacity through mass production ofa faw selected species and

stressful conditions are fertile incubators of diseases like bacterial kidney disease.

competition

for food and rearing habitat. I latchery fish also carry and transmit diseases
harmful to wj Id populauons. Hatchery overcrowding, poor water quality, and other

and habitat, and the introduction of diseases. Since hatchery salmon are typically more
abundant and often older and larger, they frequently swamp wild juvenile salmon in the

1—latchery salmon also adversely affect wild salmon through competition for food

established while diluting wild fish survival characteristics.

low numbers ol lounding” salmon. Thus, hatcheries greatest ui reat to genetic d versit
is due to the hybrid tat ion of hatchery salmon and wild salmon. I lvbnd niRpri nc.i have
lo er ur ival rates in the iId than i hi fish and lower survi a I rates than pure hatchery
fish in hatcheries, reflecting the low fitness le ci of hybrid fish. The problem is that
interbreeding of wild and hatchery tish pre eiiis the traits of wild fish from heeonii ng
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as close

as possible to

genetic legacy.”

genetic

assessment

concluded that the program at least managed to avoid adversely a fti.eting [he
di\ ersity of’ salmon stocks in the Mid—Columbia, since it apparently lell little

all over the world. One notable transplantation program was the et’f’ort in the I 940s to
mitigate the et’t’ects of the Cirand (oulee Dam’s destruction of over 1 .00t) miles otsalmon
spa\\ ning habitat. Fishery managers collected salmon trying to surmount the dam.
trucked them to a hatchery. spawned them artificially, reared the offspring for a year in
the hatchery, and turned them loose in tributaries below the dam. This effort to
reprogram the upper basin stocks to the Mid—Coltmmhia was first regarded as a success,
but a quarter—century later was critici7ed for salvaging nothing. Flo ever, a I

Supplementation efForts have a long history, beginning with Stones program in
the I $70s at the MeCloud and Clackamas hatcheries, from which lie shipped salmon eggs

runs

the genetic composition of’ native runs. The ultimate goal is
to create heal thy runs which will no longer require hatcheries. Critics Fear that
supplementation will incur the same genetic problems as traditional hatcheries and claim
that it represents yet another technological lix that encourages fishery managers to avoid
eonlronting the root causes ol salmon declines, like habitat destrtiction and overfish ing.

Supplemental ion in ol\ es changing hatchery practices h using native, wild
broodsiock, matching the broodstocl to the local en’s ronmcnl, and rearing ish in
conditions as natural as possible in order to houst productivity of’ weak stocks or to seed
barren streams. Supplementation, as the name implies, seeks to supplement, not supplant,
wild salmon stocks. Advocates of supplementation hope that it will produce spawning

Snpp/cnwn1n/n’n
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As hate heries became the prime

out

ith a concern for maintaining genetic diversity, can he a valuable recr)\ cry

liateher production in the lower basin, believe that the risks are negligible and are
oLitweighed by the potential benefits. The tribes point to many tiThutaries where
spawmng salmon have been largely cx tirpa ted and urge that supplementation. ii carried

disregards the real causes ofsalmon decline. The basins Indian tribes, on the other hand,
whose upriver locations meant they were served worst ftoni the historic emphasis on

Wild fish Proloneilts oppose supplementation. claiming that it will Further exacerbate
risks of genetic harm to wild stocks. They also maintain that a reemphasis on
supplementation would be just another short—sighted attempt to increase harvests that

The (‘[3F\VA\ plan helped initiate a regional debate on the merits ol
supplementation to help restore spa\ ning sal mon stocks, which continues to this day.

plan in June oil 991 which included supplementation as a primary means of promoting
salirion recovery.’

The listings served as a

ake—up call to regional fishery olticials who, through the
(‘ol umbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority ( (BFWA), an interagency organitation
comprised of tideral, slate, and tribal lisherv agencies. released an integrated basinwide

In the I 9SOs. fish managers rediscovered supplementation. This renev ed interest
was a consequence ot the serious adverse consequences stemming trom reliance on
hatcheries to maintain harvests, although it reflected the same mechanistic world view
The ESA listings of the early I 990s confirmed that the existing system was badly broken.

production tools, managers concentrated on building new rearing ponds, developing
bet er fish food pellets, and discovering new drugs instead o lprcser ing natural liabi tat.

e lThrts to reestablish natLL ally spawning

118— Sacrificing 11w Salmon
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The report ident i lied habitat alteration or destruction as the priluaiy cause ol fish
population decline and concluded that hatcheries were not a sri itihle substitute for lost
habitat. For exantple, the report lbund that mitigation based solely oit hatchery
production failed to halt population declines. Instead, it recognized habitat protection and

and to suggest ways in which the program could foster ecos stem management
objectives. The resulting I 994 report called lw a fundamental redirection of the
program, accusing it of lacking definite goals, objectives, and implementation and
evaluation strategies.

National P/v/i i-Iatc’lic’ri’ Rei’icu Panel (1994). In response to a request from the
Director ofihe U.S. Fish and Wi ldlifb Service, the National Fish and \Vi Idli lb Foundation
convened a panel of scientists to review the Fish and \Vildli lb Services hatchery ogram

production effbrts. Following is a discussion of those studies.

to listed salmon from current hatchery programs and numerous cal IS for protecting and
restoring habitat and observing ecological principles in the design of all arti dciii

But most of the studies evinced considerable skepticism about the ability of existiiir
operations to avoid harm to wild salmon. The studies included two tindings olieopardv

maintaining hatchery production iii an ef’tbrt to produce a bti-tce between cont inning
ocean and lower river harvest levels and minimizing adverse effects on spawning salmon.

CapabilitY ot traditional hatchery operations to namiam run syes wthont produe i v
substantiat adverse eltvcls on nat urailv spawning imon. One study did reconu ice

Over the last decade, there have been c\ eiJ e\ il unlu ns of the effectiveness of
Colimbia Basin sal ii ion liatcheries. All of the studies epicsseu SeFiOUs doubts about the

iSS(.5Vi1iL11I 5 0/
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alternatives rejected was one that would have shifted emphasis away horn supporting
harvests to enhancing natural product ion from supplementation in order to achieve a 75

The preferred alternative selected by the drall E[S was to continue to provide
hatchery lish in the lower basin to support harvest, while increasing natural production
to about a 35 percent seeding level within twenty—live years, mostly by increasing
supplementation in the Snake and Upper (‘ol umbia subbasi ns. In short. the draft
attempted to change policy from pmdc ig hatcher salmon almost exclusively for
harvest to producing lish for both harvest and natural stock recovery. Among the

acclimation. upstream release sites, and use of older smolts.

wild lish in reservoirs and in estuaries and predation, which is exacerbated by predators
attracted by the numerous hatchery lsh. The draft EIS also suggested thai hybridization
othatchery and wild fsh might be minimized by improvements in streamliows, increased

The drail LIS explained many of the negative eiftcts of hatcheries on wild lish
discussed above. but ii also emphasized the competition that occurs between hatchery and

capacities.

nianageinent challenges were necessary. The draft considered a variety of basinwide
policy alternatives hut no specihc hatchery orsupplementation programsor local carrying

program enviromnental Impact statement EIS) on hatcheries for three federal agencies
which operate or fund hatcheries: the National Marine Fisheries Service, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, and the Bonneville Power Administration. The draft ETS, which
has vet to be put in final form, ealuaied the ettects ol Columbia Basin hatcheries in
recognition that changes in hatchery operations “to meet historic and new lishery

i/ic’ CBFW4 Draft I’,vgrain EIS / /9%;. In 1996. the (‘BFWA prepared a draft
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did several dishing

—

scientists recommended undertaking a comprehensive evaluation of Columbia Basin

carefully limited its endorsement of supplementation by describing supplementation as
an experimental approach requiring careful design and rigorous evaluation. The

The scientists suggested that the role of hatcheries in the Columbia Basin ought
to be redefined, limited, and integrated into a comprehensive restoration strategy focused
on habitat protection and restoration. The report acknowledged that liatchefies could
have a useful temporary role during the time it takes to reduce the causes of natural
mortality or to rebuild depressed populations through supplementation. But the i-eport

was substantial evidence that hatchery fish not only do not compensate fur habitat
destruction, they adversely affect wild fish due to spread of disease, increased
competition with wild fish fur fuod and habitat. overharvests in mixed fisheries, and
genetic interactions reducing ii tncss and genetic van abil i

reliance on hatcheries, observing that since 1960 hatchery production has increased
substantially while returning salmon have not. Moreover, the scientists clammed that there

olhatchery origin, that fully 40 percent of the expenditures on salmon restoration during
the I 9XOs was spent on hatcheries, and halfofthe Councils expected increase in salmon
proltictioii was to come from hatcheries. The report was critical of this continued

CBFWA report discussed above, nolmg that 80 percent olColumbia Basin salmon arc

which considered, among other issues, the role of hatcheries in salmon restoration. The
scientists were much more skeptical of the value of hatchery production than was the

Return to the Riier (‘1 996). Also in 1996. the independent sCienti t]c group
advising the Northwest Power Planning Council issued its report. Retion to l/ie Rue,,

mild
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/IW Puci/ic •‘Vo,-/Ilic.%/. The reports perspecti\’e on hatcheries was quite sinu ar

—

Reç’ioiial Rt’i’ieo’v: R.’1SI’c,iuIIHUl” Two other notable hatchery’ reviews were

habi tat rehabilitation is good. The report concluded by advocating a goal of conserving
genetic divet-sity among and with in both hatchery and naturally spawning Populations,
meaning that all hatchery practices contributing to genetic interact ion between wild and
25
hatchery—produced salmon would he care Ili I ly inoni tored and control led.

should he considered merely as an experimeilt, tised only as part ola piogilm ol adaptive
management, and excluded altogether from areas where the progi1os of fresh ater

aimed at rebuilding naturally spawning salmon, and confined to areas where freshwater
habitats are limited both in the short and long terms. Lipstieain counseled that hatcheries

have no protocols to ensure that the

vi II operate consistently with other hatcheries or
with a genetic conservation policy. The report recommended that hatcheries be tested br
their effects on wild tish, dismantled or reprogrammed if they interlre with strategies

The report conc [tided that current hatchery operations fail to operate within a
coherent strategy based on the genetic structure ol salmon populations. Most hatcheries

habitat loss to being a component ola comprehensive restoration plan in which hatcheries
21
will be employed only where they will not harm wild fish.

to that ol’ Re/cia Iv i/ic Riii’r. Ihe report considered hatcheries, despite their 120—year
histor to he an unpro en technology that has damaged wild runs and which is an] ikely
to compensate for habitat loss over the long run. The report did see a short—term role for
haicheries as a temporary aid in rehabilitating natural salmon populations. But I
cautioned that the purpose of hatcheries had to change, from being a mechanism to
maintain harvests or compensate for losses of juvenile fish due to hydropower—related

So
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The TFIOT report is a kind of’ haicicrv
operations
manual,

inch.iain

to

Basins carrying capacity. While its biological opinion ( BiOp) found no speci tic hatchery
operation likely to jeopardize a listed species, NM ES did f’ree,’e hatchery releases at I 994

River salmon because the operations were inconsistent with its proposed recovery plan.
N\’IFS expressed particular concern that hatchery production was exceeding the Snake

Unlike the optimism expressed in the (13\\ 1A drali LIS. NM ES concluded that
continued hatchery operations would in lhct jeopardize the continued cxi stence o iSnake

operation 0125 hatcheries that it operates under Mi tedel I Act an thori tv. In c’omainat ion.
the hatcheries annual lv release over 200 million hatchery fish into basin streams.

The NlIfS RiOps.
27 In 1995, NMES evaluated the eflcct of 71 fiderai and ion
federal hatcheries operated by five federal agencies and three states in terms of their
effect on ESA—l isted Snake River salmon. NM ES also consulted internally on the

popti lations. it did not address the adequacy of nion during and assessment programs
achieve these policies.

performance standards and guidelines on Ish heath. ecological interactions, and
genetics. ihe report established a goal ol producing hatc.icrv fish with minimal dices
on wild stocks, while contributing to harvest opportunities and spawning popu iatioiis.
But vlii Ic the report cal led lot hatchery progri ins to in iii in tic adverse c ifcis on aquai ic
ecosystem productivity and to maintain :ideqiiaic genetic variation and fitness iii

t’aci hitics.

1’he 11 lOT grew out o the Northw est Power Planning Counci Is 1 992 prom
anwndments and cal led for i mprovenien ts in the coord mat ion and operation of hatchery

and run liming; identifying limiting factors in fish popul:iiions and subjecliri all
supplementation projects to risk analy sis and close monitoring and evaluation.

Chapter 1)
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The Spirit o/ the Salmon ‘aould use supplementation both to increase diminished
runs and to create salmon populations where they do not exist. The tribes maintained the
genetic risks associated with supplementation could be in ni mited, and they challenged
the notion that the best way to restore salmon runs is to concentrate exclusi\ ely on
conserving the genetic integrity of severely depleted runs through conservation elforts.

operations which employ rearing and release methods.’

Sahnon. A centerpiece of the tribal plan was its advocacy of supplementation to recover
fish “populations that are liagmenred and declining, and where other remedial actions
cannot he implemented quiekly enough or on a scale that is large enough to halt further
population losses” The plan stated that hatcheries should simulate natural conditions to
ensure that natural and hatchery fish groups are managed as a single gene pool. The goal
\ras to reestablish naturally spawning salmon runs, instead of continuing hatchery

—

In 1995, the main proponent of
The Sirit of the Salmon (1995).
supplementation, the four Columbia Basin tribes with Stevens Treaty fishing rights
the tribes of the Umati T a. Yakama, and Warm Springs reservations and the Nez Perce
through the Columbia River Inter—Tribal Fish Commission (CRITF’C ), released
tribe
their comprehensive salmon plan. lJ’i—Kaii—Uch—;’rli 1Ja—kish—J1’ii, or The’ Spiel of the

2
hatcheries, the first time such operational changes were required by the ESA.

hatchery stocks threatening the listed species with genetic introgression. The F3iOp
consequently imposed a number of conditions on perationsat severn] Columbia Basin

In I 99g. NM CS issued a new BiOp that, as discussed in chapter 9, determined
that huchery operations would jeopardize the continued existence of listed Lower
( olumbia and Snake River steclhead. Jeopardy was a consequence ol non—endemic
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The Council’s report adopted several policies to guide the use of artificial
production. These included a policy of considering hatcheries only in the context ofthe
environment in which they will be used, thus allowing artificial production to proceed
only if consistent with an ecological, science-based foundation for fish and wildlife

The Council observed that questions about the efficacy ofhatcheries have grown
in recent years because the issue of efficacy is no longer judged solely on hatcheries’
ability to produce fish for harvests but also includes 1) broadening harvest opportunities
to more areas: 2) improving the survival ofhatchery fish by using techniques that mimic
natural spawning, rearing, and migration patterns; 3)avoiding harm to naturallyspawning
fish; and 4) actually assisting in preserving and rebuilding naturally spawning fish runs.
The report suggested that. given the uncertainties and complexities surrounding
hatcheries, the key issues to be resolved by policymakers is how much risk to accept, and
33
how to manage that risk.

The M;rvhweslPowerPlanning CouncThc Rei’kw qiHuicIwsy l’rodueiirsa (1997).
In 1997, Congress asked the Northwest Power Planning Council and its Independent
Scientific Advisory Board to review all federally funded hatchery prograim in the
Columbia Basin and recommend a coordinated policy to spend limited tWeral dollars in
a cost-cl’fecdve fashion that also maximized benefits to the fish. In November 1999, the
Council released a report which, remarkably, noted that even after nearly a century and
a quarter of experience with hatcheries, artificial productioWs Success at providing
harvest opportunities remains questionable, especially in terms of providing long-temi,
sustainable harvests. Yet the report noted that hatchery fish comprise roughly 50 percent
of Columbia Basin adult fall chinook 70-80 percent of Columbia Basin spring/summer
chinook, and 95 percent of Columbia Basin coho.”

(‘hapter(, -Second I&onsbe: The FuIse Hope ofStains Haklseriea
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sustain.

of proof that hatchery proponents. including the tribes’ supplementation projects, must

including supplementation programs. The upshot seemed to be to impose a new burden

the experience reinforced the necessity of independent scientific review of all projects,

to recommend not funding numerous CBFWA hatchery projects in I 999, including
several belonging to tribes. The panel subsequently recommended funding most after a
second review, and the Council ended up conditionally funding many of the projects. F3ut

Initially, these policies caused the Council’s independent scientific review pamel

operators.

were a temporary expediency, an assumption not widely accepted among hatchery

hatchery operation will persist. The latter requirement seemed to imply that hatcheries

hatcheries must explicitly I ) identit’ the purpose of the fucility, 2) explain the underlying
biological problem the hatchery attempts to remedy, and 3) determine how long the

Although the Council’s report acknowledged that production for harvest remains
a legitimate management objective, that goal was secondary to maintaining naturally
spawning populations. Perhaps most signilcantly, the report stated that entities operating

using

locally
adapted or compatible broodsuocks and reducing stock transfers and use ofnon—endemic
stocks. While it sounds revolutionary, this suggestion merely repeated the advice given
by ( ‘anadian biologist RLmssell Foerster a half century heflre.

biological diversity. l’his may be accomplished, the report suggested, h

biological dR ersity than simply increasing abundance.’ Consequently, a central
consideration in all hatcher program designs must he to minimize effects on biological
di\ ersily and use artificial production, where possible. to help reverse declines in

126— Sacrificing the
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id siilniuii in mixed Stock hshei CS. HaleheriCS are also
C\:)1I .: \

habitat problenis.

hatchery practices produce the same prollenis in terms of flooding ecosystems with
artificially introduced fish, along with accoulpans mn low snrvmsal rates and neglect nt

programs involving stocks with short fleshwater Ii lb c c es. Supplementation ofehinook.
however, has usually thiled. And supplementation projects that mimic traditional

supplementation programs seeking to reestablish naturally spa ii ing runs in areas \\ here
sa mon have been extirpated have demonstrated sonic success, as have supplementLtn in

Moreover, adverse effects on wild stocks have oeeulTed. But if hatchery stock
is closely i-elated to natural spawning stocks, the chances liar success improve. And

studied, juSt 25 successfolly supplemented existing naturally spawning runs.

example. one study of sLlpplemnentation projects found that success is mare: of 3 16 projects

of proof. given that it remains largely an unproven, although intriguing, teehno loev. For

virtually all of the 20th century. But supplementation probably ought to bear the burden

Ihe in hes’ supplementation plans are perhaps more meritorious. although they
too must now shoulder the burden o proof to obtain federal funding. That nay be
frustrating to the tribes, who were neglected by Columbia Basin lmatcherv policy br

Planning Council’s apparent determination to make hatcheries ust fy their operation as
a prerequisite for funding. is open to serious quest ion.

mainstay of Columbia l-asin salmon harvests. partIcularly in light ofthe \orth\\ est l’ov, er

\Vi II ineness o pn lt:cmuns 0 contInue to appmup:n
dollars
to operate them. For all these easom , tIme In hire of hate herm ts as ihe
taxpa er

to operate and dependent upon ihe

L)\

tanacement is a major lacto in the decline oi( olunittia Basin salmon, causme loss at
genetic diversity. overuse of and ad erse efflcts on habitat, disease proli t’eration

U h picr 6

I
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traditional hatchery technology throughout most of the basin.

( not ‘ntircIv) in stRams without spawnJng salmon. with local broodsiock and species that
hac short freshwater life cycles. Given the desperate state of most of the salmon runs
the in bes depend upon for their li lihood, their religion, and their culture, it does not
seem unreasonable to allow the tribes to experiment with supplementation, especially
since the region continues its longstanding, although utisuccesslul, experiment with
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PROMISE: THE NORTHWEST POWER ACT

--

passage at dams and improved river flows 1mm upstream

reservoirs

which, the statute

The “co—equal partiership” the Northwest Power Act sought to create was
actually the product of a flilse premise: that C’olumbia Basin salmon could be restored
through altering hydroelectric operations alone. The Act emphasized improved fish

create

the “co—equal partnership” envisioned by the ‘\ct’s drafiers led to the Endangered
.’
5
Species Act listings of the l9O

two decades of iinplenientation. this parity goal remains elusive, as hydroelectric
operators continue to resist restmeturing system operations. Eventually, the inability to

with a stains review examining whether Columbia I3asin salmon runs had declined to
such an extent that they warranted listing under the Endangered Species Act. The search
for a response to both crises led Congress to draft legislation designed both to restructure
the Northwest electric power industry and to rebuild depleted Columbia Basin salmon
runs. That remarkable law, the Northvest Power Act, signed into law by President Carter
in late 1
eslablished a number of paihbrcaking fish and wildli l principles. These
principles included the concept that Northwest electric ratepayers should pay the full cost
of restoring fish and wildlife damaged by the construction and operation of the
hydroelectric system. The goal was to make fish and wildlife restoration a “co—equal
partner” with hydropower generation. to prodrice piiity between the two resources. Afier

The torecasted power shortages, late inequ ties, and court injunctions described
in chapter 5 that caused the Northwest electric power crisis ofihe late I 970s coincided

7— THIRD

Chapter 7
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adiourned in late I 97. Some thought all that was needed was a one—sentence hill
authoriting I3PA to acquire new pow’r sources to serve increased demands. I loever.
many of BPA’s customers were suspicious of granting the agency more authority, and
11mev wanted assurances that their access to low—cost hydropower would continue.’

designed to resolve the regions electricity problems. Neither that hi II, nor a less complex
successor introduced a year later, progressed very hir by the time the 95th (‘ongress

In September 1977, the Bonneville Power Administration ([3PA) and its
customers dratted legislation introduced by Senator I lcnry Jackson of Washington

origins

3
resist changes which would threaten their hegemony.

because it reveals how easily economic interests wishing to prescrve thc status quo can

and even ii its processes were eclipsed by the Endangered Species Act in the I 990s, the
1 980 Act and its implementation are still worthy of study. For one thing, hydroelectric
dams remain the major source of human—induced salmon mortalities. For another, the
regional focus ol the Northwest Power Act is more attuned to an ecosystem approach
than the single-species locus ol’the Endangered Species Act. Finally, however misguided
its basic premise, the Northwest Power Act was unable to achieve even its limited
objectives. That failLire is instructive for other, more ambitious restoration efforts.

Iven ilihc basic premise and optilnislu of the Northwest Power Act

2
ecofloili call’ inarru nal t,’deraf dams on the I over Snake.

address prulcctioii and restoration ot’ ciii ica spa ning and rearing areas. As chapter 1 3
argues, restoring the endangered Snake River runs will probably reqLure breaching the

130— ScriIieing tiw Salmon
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fundamentally modi lied each ol’ them. First, t lie Act changed the widespread tise
directive by giving priority to conservation and efficient use of’ electric pow er. a
reflection o fthe fhct that conservation
arc o lien the cheapest means of nieetmg

possible rates” according to ‘‘sound bust ness nil iciples’ to encourage ‘\\ idespre:c
electric use.’’ Although the Northwest Power Act did not repeal these provisions, it

Time ,\emm

Senate had time only to accept or reject the I louse bib. l o days after its passaec in I
I louse, the Senate agreed to the I louse version of the bill, and President (‘inter signed the
Northwest Power Act into law on December 5. I

provisions. By the time the I louse passed [he hill in November 1 9X0, the election of
Ronald Reagan had occurred. many members olCongress had not been reelected. and the

vehicle for fish anti wild] i Ic restoration, the bill would not piss his committee. Lnder
Dingeli’s leadership. the I louse bill included a number ufunprecedenled fish and \vi 1db be

I{ouse Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingel I of Michigan. who had
fished for steelhead in the Northwest, made it clear that unless the Senate bill became a

reporl which concluded that Columbia Basin dams were the chef cause of the decline ol’
the salmon, fish and wiidh Fe concerns becaitte a major issue in the I ltitisc ol
Representatives, delaying the bill for over a year.

a

included in the hi] I that passed the Senate in August 1 ‘)7-). The Senate bill contained only
\ agile provision regarding fish and wildlife. But aided by a General Accounline Office

to BPA power bar public utilities bitt dinti nishing raw disparities between pub] ic and
p1 ivate Ut ii it es. ihe bill a Iso authorized long4erni nd iistrial cont mets. which were

-‘
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Third. and perhaps most important. the 1980 statute modified the mandate of

availability oij udicial revicw.’

those BPA made in the I 970s in its nuclear program, by establishing a new system based
on open and pluralistic administrative processes, shared decision making po\vc and the

interstate agency v ith an uncertain amount of oversight over federal agencies Ii ke [WA
and the Corps ot Engineers. In short, the Act sought to reduce the risk of errors, Ii ke

commiment to open process was the statute’s concept ol shared powers. best reflected
in the creation ofthe interstate regional Council. An eight—member agency comprised of
two gubernatorial appointees 1mm each of the lbur <orthwest states, the Council was
created to impose a check on BPA, ensuring against unwise investments through its
authority to veto large BPA power acquisitions and promulgate a regional electric power
plan to forecast electric demand. The (‘ouneil is an unusual entity, since it is not a
hderal agency, vet derives its authority from a federal statute that vested the new

Second, by creating the new interstate Council and also cal 1mg br involvement
of the states, local governments, and the public in regional electric power planning, the
1980 statute recognized that ‘sound business pdnciplcs” is not a technical question left
to the engineers and accountants at BPA. Instead, the Act required BPA to seek out and
involve the public to ensure that ‘sound business principles” result from a pluralistic
process and systematic consideration of divergent perspectives. Closely related 10 tIns

expensive (and
riskyt coal and nuelcar plants. hi the I 990s. technological dcelopments. electric
deregu at ion, and mai’ket tbrccs made gas turbines the resource of choice to meet
inc rca sed dciii a ii d Y

—

Council helped the region a oid continuing to make commitments to

132

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

—

Third Promise: The Nurthi’evt Pos’er Act
133

JI11O-(l/i1I

Second, the Act

remedial action by requiring that the program I

he based on

revolutionized the philosophy ot w i ldli f mitigation by emphasizing changes in dam
operations instead of merely creating substitute resources, Third, where operational
changes could not compensate for losses—-that is, where losses were irretrievable—the
statute authorized “oltsite enhancement,” in order to Ibeus restoration efforts on areas
where habitat remained. Fourth, Congress lowered the burden of l)rOOl for undertaking

a svstemwide remedial program for the entire Columbia Basin.

To achieve these objectives, the Act included a number of innovative pro\’isions
that place it in the vanguard of’ federal fish and wi Idli fe law. First. the statute called fir

measures” could avoid “unreasonable” power losses because po’er interests had testified
that they were ‘‘anxious to accommodate fish and vi Idli t needs.”

purposes. The congressional architects recognized that this co—equal partnership would
necessitate pov losses, but they v crc confident that “imaginative and effective

The Northwest Power Act directed the Northwest Power Planning Council to
create a program “to protect, mitigate, and enhance the Columbia Basins fish and
wild Ii ft.’ “to the extent affected by the development and operation” of the basins
hydroelectric system, The Act specifically ordered improved river flows and bypass
systems at mamnstem dams for better salmon migration. The statutes legislative history
admitted “past mistakes” and envisioned that the Councils plan would make fish and
\Vildli te “co—equal partnerl sj” with hydropower production, “on a par” with other project

.Sio/iiio;

embraced a theory of entcrprRe liability which recognized that electricity prices should
include all the costs ol production, including fish and IdI f and environnienial costs.

( hapter 7
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unwillingness to involve itself’ in implementation issues allowed a number of imporlailt
progiim pro\;isions to be essentially ignored. In addition, the deference that Congress
expected the Council to give to the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes on biological
issues was achieved only inconsistently; it was especially lacking concerning mainstem

—

A less successt’ul institutional innovation was the Northwest Po er Act’s attempt
to give the nonfederal Council some control over the federal witcr projects and operators
namely [3PA, the Corps of Engineci’s. the Bureau of Reclamation. and the Federal
charged with iinplemcnline the Council’s program.
Energy Regulatory (_ommission
I ntortunately. the statute’s ambiuously drafted en fm’ecmeni pru isiuns and the ( ‘ouncil’s

4
Salmon Treaty in l95i

state agencies and tribes

subsequently forged a regional coalition that pro\’ed to be an
effective \ oicc for tishcry restoration measures A prominent example ofthc success of
this coalition was the negotiations which culminated in the ratification of the Paci tic

—

allocation of salmon, to the detriment ofthe resource itself. The 1980 Act continued the
of these foes into allies. The
begun by the 1974 Boldt Decision
transtorination

regionalism. Less obvious, hut perhaps of greater long—term significance, was the
statutes persistent recognition of Indian tribes as the equal of slate fish and wildlife
agencies in the development and implementation of the Council’s program. Historically,
state fish and wildlife agencies and Northwest Indian tribes ftught epic battles over the

Finally. the Northwest Power Act substantially revised a number of institutional
relationships. Most notable was the creation Of the mtei’state C’otii’icil 1S 3 voice for

of relying on future congressional appropi-jations.

the restoration
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the

its opposition to material changes in the status duo in scienti tic terms. On the other hand.
there was no governmental opposi tioii to, (or example. Ii shery agency recommendations
(hr continuing to lund the legions large—scale eoninntnient to haichermes as the mitigation

users:’ the fideial agencies vh ich have opera ted the i’derai dams largely to max mite
hydropower pioduction and the utilities and industries which bemie I (loin cheap
Cr
and transportation. This opposition prevented tile Council (rom calling (‘or signilicant
changes in the way Columbia Basin dams operated at times the Council even articulated

The fishery agency and nba reconimendat ions concerning
hydropower met sti ITopposition by hat the Ninth Circuit termed as “entrenched river

Fish and \V i dli Ic Program

exhibit biological hubris concerning hydroelectric operations, because ol the interest
group politics that doni natcd the development and i mpleinentat Ofl 0 tits Columbia Basin

The (‘ounci I could be too de t’erenlia to the lishery agencies and tribes, lead:
to a program that rescnibled a hodgepodge ol’disconnectcd measures, vet at the same dine

a lrtigntentcd pi-ograni one not focused on the Col unIaia I3asin ecos-stem anu hov to
repair it. This view held that the Councils relat\ e weak scienti lie expertise put :t in
a poor position to create an integrated. ecologicall\ -based vision ot the luture.i
6

product o I individual reconimcnUutons Iroill tisherv acencies and tribes. This pioduee

A di lereni cri; cism ot the nnplemcntauon of the Northwest Power Act came
roin the Not thv est Po\ Cr Planmriu C ounci l’s o\\ a iidepcndent setenti tic group in 1
The scientists ftiulted the (‘ouncil’s lish and wi Icili Ic program for lacking a coherent
conceptual foundation They cIa mcd that a decade—and—a—ha Ia her its promulgat ion, he
program \as merely a CollectIon ol poorly connected nieasurcs, most ot which were the

(_

olumbia l3asin 1’ isli and W Idlile Program. esciiueci beiw, \\ crc the
Council’s biological hubris and its lack ol interest in enk)rceiuen1.

( hapter 7
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in predictable

managers, including mandatory coimsu Itation with fish and svi ldl i Ic agencies and the
tribes. The coalition presented the most comprehensive set of recommendations the
Council received: hence, their suggestions thnued time basis of much of the program the

Columbia River Trears and the Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement could
accommodate the recommended river flows. In addition, the coalition made detailed
suggestions br increasing interaction between fish and wildlife experts and fderal water

recommendations to the Council These recommendations included increased riser
flows. improved fish bypass at dams, habitat protection and restoration measures, and
imatchers facilities. The fishery coal i lion maintained that there wasa strong correlation
between river flows and fish survival: therefore. its recommendations set forth detailed.
month—by—month minimum flows at several Columbia Basin dams. The coalition also
recommended a series ol actions aimed at achieving ‘coequal partnership’’ in system
operations, including studying how BPA’s power marketing and its implementation ofthe

,

Because Congress realized that the newly formed Northwest Power Planning
Council would have no fish and w i Idi iCe expertise. it created a unique process to des elop
the program. Rather than have the Council fashion the program out of whole cloth,
Congress directed the Council to request recommendations from the regions fish and
wildlife agencies and Indian tribes as well as from power interests and the public. In
April 1981 five months afler the statute was siuned into law, a coalition of federal and
state fish and wildlife agencies (fishery coalition) submitted over 700 pages of

lie ( oltimbin Basin Ii.cli (1/1(1 Wild/i/c Program

lashion.

seeking. In both contet. the (ounci I responded to interest group

z__

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

-

137

Although the water budget was its centerpiece, the Council’s fish and wildlife
program contained other provisions designed to provide salmon a safer journey on the
Columbia and Snake Rivers. In addition to improved flows, (he Northwest Power Act
ordered the Council to improve salmon passage at mainstem dams. Mainstem passage
survival for downstream migrating juvenile salmon can be improved t

Although it became the centerpiece of the Council’s fish and wildlife program,
the water budget suflèred from at least three shortcomings that ultimately undennined its
effectiveness. First, the budget tbiled to provide a sufficient volume ofwater to meet the
fishery coalition’s recommended flows on the Snake. Second, the budget was supposed
to be in addition to specified “firm power flows,” which turned out not to be provided by
the hydroelectric system’s managers. Instead, in low flow years they essentially ignored
the Council’s directives to give budget flows priority over secondary power sales and
reservoir refill. Thus, the budget was regularly unmet. For example, in 1985, budget
requests were satisfied on onlysix oftwenty-six days during the critical migration season.
Third, the budget period from mid-April to mid-June had no real biological justification,
since the peak migration of many runs extends beyond mid-June.

—

—

the coalition. instead adopting a dedicated volume of water
known as the “water
budget” to lhcilitate downstream salmon migration. This budget could be “spent” at
the discretion of representatives ol the fish and wildli tè agencies and tribes. The water
budget concept had two advantages over the recommended fixed flows: it would cost less
in terms of foregone hydropower revenues, and it would involve fishery representatives
in day-to-day system operations. It therefore seemed to be precisely the kind of
“innovative and imaginative” approach that Congress sought when it enacted the
Northwest Power Act?

Chapter 7- ThIrd Ftomtw: The Nua*uw AnrerAa

-
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where the flows are the lowest and the runs are the weakest. They never accepted
art i ficial transportation as a substitute for improved river conditions, however. as the
benefits of transportation have never been clearly demonstrated. This is perlmps because
transported fish suffer from stress due to collection and handling that adverscly affects
them a tier their release in the lower river. Moreover, heca usc substantial numbers of

With the water budget unable to provide the river flows that the fishery coal ii ion
recommended, and ‘ ith little assurance that biologically—based spills would be supplied.
of salmon
transportation of juvenile salmon by truck or barge became a vital
protection measures. The Corps of’ Engineers favored truck and barge transportation as
an alternati e to in—ri er measures like increased flows and spills because it reduced
hydropower losses. The Corps opposition to substantial changes in river management
helped to make fish transportation a lull uccompli. Fish and vvi ldlife agencies acquiesced
in truck and barge transportation during low flow conditions, especially on the Snake

dams operated by the Corps. although it set no deadlines for bypass installation, perhaps
in recognition ot the fact that funding for these measures was a function of the
congressional appropriations process Moreover, the Council was not specilic about the
an issue which haLinted the program for years.
level of interim spills

The ( ‘ouncj l’s prociani emphasized usia] ling niecha nical bvpas S\ St ClflS at the
dams, in part because such systems cost less in terms of Iregonc hydrepu\\ er revenues
than spills (because spilled ater cannot he run through power turbines). Ihe Council
called upon the Federal Energy RegulatorvC’ommission, which has jurisdiction over non—
fdderal hydroelectric projects. to require mechanical bypass at fle \‘l id—Columbia public
utility district dams by I 9X7, and to prescribe spiii pr grams in the interim comparable
to the best available bypass system. The Council called for similar measures at federal
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tietmi

ot
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Council’s prograili
\‘

at

Cl! as

should occur.

1) impro\ tug the eHectiveness of adult 1sh

Cc\elopment

B PA
lo pursue

runs in Cell Ira 1 Washi ngioiI’s

10 Cii

lorccntent of its pmvisions.

ilte

ui

tile

prograill or explain in writing

hv

lederal

The

was ‘‘ph ysical iv.

ater managers had to
illpheillcn tatio n

that tile

Over tIle next Iwo decades, the Council amended t lie program several

-

Li nes ill

legally, or otherwise impracticable, ileluditig all possible allowances to iienn
jill 1 emen tat ion.”

implement

Council interpreted these di recti es to mean

every relevailt stage of their decisionnlaklng to the liii lest extent practtcihle.’’

managers (13PA. the Corps, the I3ureau of Reclamation, and the Federal Luergy
Regulatory Coitimission ), in tortLious language. to ‘‘Luke the piogrurn I ilto account at

Northwest PowerAet paid ittleattention to en!orceiiicni. inereivsiating that I3PA shioud
act in “a manner consislent” \ ith tile program. Tile Act also instructed all fluderal \\ uter

Final lv. the prourain devoted attention

a mend its progra niL

iii

‘‘the must expeditious means’’

luau

B PA’s inability to fluid program measures

instructed

expeditious manner would soon cause the Counci I

of funding program measures.

Yakima Basin. The Council also

harvests), and 3) giving special attention to restoring su

ladders, 2) pressuring ocean harvest managers to set hur ests 10 ensure that an adequa IC
number of salmon return to the river (the Council has no direct authority 0\ ci ucLan

In addition. it included measures aimed

a promise to designate streams where no ne’ h droe,cetric

\

us its Inclusion oh condittons to

ildli t- in new hdroelcetric prolee in the Columbia Basin, as

aeiiievenieui

protect fish and

signi

deviated ruin the rccui oniendations of the tsherv aceiieics, hich enlphasiied reliance
on hatcheries as \ el us habitat !inproeinents to i estore run sizes. But the (ounct
eontinueu to appioc bliRhilig ot hatcheries despie is \\itd-Stuck iwefrence. ‘\iiuilki

(liapter 7
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The most significant of the ne deadlines established by the 1984 amendments
were those for installing mechanical bypass systems at several Corps dams, thus
correcting an oversight in the 1 982 program. However, while focusing on installment ot
new bypass litcilities, the (_ounci I failed to take action to improve fish p:ige at the
darns in the interim. It rejected recommendations to base spill levels on bypass
efficiency: that is. to base spills on the percentage of fish avoiding the po’er turbines.

2) establishing protections against new hydroelectdc development, and 3) increasing
svstemwi de prod uction capac itv.

quality and quantity of’C’olumhia Basin salmon through ellective use ofthc water hudgeL

because BPA proved unable to adequatelysupervise studies that would allow the Council
to establish program goals, the amendments established interim goals of I) increasing the

The Councils original program. appru’ed in November I 982. ran into
implementation di tlicules almost immediaielv. As a result, afler only tv o years of
implementation. the Council substantially revised the program in I 984. Most of the
amendments aimed to increase the spcciflcily ofprogram measures because ambiguities
had allowed federal water managers to disagree with fishery agencies and the tribes over
the pace of funding, the scientific basis for taking action, and the anticipated biological
consequences. The nmary innovation of the I 984 amendments was a [i c—year action
plan that established deadlines fiw implementing numerous program provisions Also.

1 984 :Iiimen/iiiciits

the Council changed. resulting in a deadlock under \hich the Council became unable
either to change the program or muster the v ill lu implement it.
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Council with formulating.

Although it

fixed

hydropower’s responsibility at

developments throughout the Columbia Basin. This historical study was unprecedented,
since it essentially established the scope of the remedial l)i’ogiu11 Congress charged the

In 1 97, the Council amended its program to establish an interim goal of
doubling existing Columbia Basin sal mon runs, to appmximately 5 mill ion returning
adults. This goal as based on a rather remarkable Council study v. hich estimated that
the hydroelectric system was responsible br 5 to JO million of the estimated 7 to 14
million salmon lost annually, a result of a habitat loss due to water proJects and other

which showed high salmon mortality rates in reservoirs. The Council also refused to
require the ( omm of Engineers and the fishery agencies and tribes to agree on a spill
program. i’hese actions encouraged the Corps to ignore the agencies and tribes spill
requests. The spill decisions revealed a Council reluctant to defer to the biological
expertise of the fishery agencies and tribes, as the \orthwest Power Act required. The
Council had apparently anointed itself as a “super fish and wildlife agency, in direct
opposition to the instructions in the Acts legislative history. Moreover, by not producing
a signi licant improvement in fish passage at mainstream dams, the Council’s program as
inconsistent with an express statutory directive.
2
/ 9N 7 .1nic,ulineni,s

Although the lishery agencies and tribes con’. inced the Council to reconsider the
90 percent sur\ Ru) standard in I 0S6. the Council rcjccted its O\\ n stalEs
recommendations to increase the sur\ ival standard. The Council members claimed that
a more stringent standard lacked “significant biological benefit,” due to computer models

percent of!. ppur Snake Rier runs winch must pass eight dams \vouldsur\ ive to below
the dams. only 35 percent ol t;pper (‘olumbia River runs (s hich must pass nine dams).

(hapter 7
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Further, fish that survive transportation do not return as adults as often as in—river fish
which survive the dams. Most likely this is because of the stress associated with being

to juvenile salmon. They believe that transportation can never substitute for better in—
river condi ions because not all juvenile salmon can be collected and transported.

The I Q7 amendments also refused to increase spill level and rejected a fishery
agency and tribal proposal that would have required the Corps to agree jointly with them
on an annual fish passage plan. I lowe\ er. the Council also rejected a Corps proposal to
maximize artificial transportation of juvenile fish under all flow conditions. The (orps
has consistently favored maximizing transportation because that optioil requires the
kwest changes in hydroelectric system operations. But the fishery agencies and tribes
transportatioii except at low lows when river conditions are part men larly let hal

assumed the ole of a “super’ fish and wi Idl i f agency.

Worse. often the promised ater budget flows were not provided, as the Corps regularly
ignored budget requests and instead shaped flows lbr power sale, flood control. and
reservoir refill purposes. The fishery agencies and tribes asked the Council to amend its
program to establish a dispute resolution process concerning use of the water budget. but
the Council refused. The Council also refused a request to account for water budget use
on an average daily basis. Instead, the Council decided to employ an average weekly
basis, claiming that average weekly flows were less costly and just as biologically
ellective as average daily flows As in its approach to fish spills the year before, the
Council seemed to ignore the biological expertise of the fishery agencies and tribes and

The 1 9X7 amendments did nothing to improve fish lo s. despite the hict that it
was now e ident that an unintended effect ofihe ater budgets boost inc ofspring flows
hen nian sahnon runs crc si ii migrating.
‘ as a reduction of flO\s in the suninier.

-
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resolution caine, however, not through Council leadership. but as a result of a lawsuit
brought by the state of Idaho. environmentalists, .rnri trhes, \\ Inch gave the fishery

period (April I 5 to .1 une I 5) for the first time. The Council Lluiekly adopted the
agreement as
of’ its progrtnii in February i.h, cndmg the longstanding dispute o\ er
the inagnitLide and timing ot spi I Is to Facilitate sal non passage at inainsteni dams. Tue

passage that the hshery agencies and tribes unsnccesshillv sought from the Council
earlier. The nev agreement pro’. ided tish passage protection outside ot’the water budget

In late I o)• as a result of lawsuits challenging BPA’s attempt to upgrade is
transmission lines to California without considering t lie effects on salitton migration,
IWA agreed to a ten—year program of spills at ma mstem dants, supplying the kind of fish

and BPA have deterred, also sho\\ ed that protecting against future de elopmen is
considerably more popularpolitically than attempting to restructure existing hydroelectric
operations which damage hsh and wi Idi fl habitat.
27

rivers

hydroelectric development, a signal ofwidespread agreement thai. the regions
were
overdeveloped. The designations, to which the Federa Energy Regulatory Comnussna

k

thin the ( oluinbia basin, lio eei and also prevents the l3onnevil Ic Povcr
Adininistrat ion horn purchasing the output of any new pin cci m a protected at ea. These
designations represented an important regiona commitment to discourage ne\v

.

In
I lie Council amended the pr grain to des n1c approx iinatel 4—l-.h( )i)
streaiii miles as “jn oteeted areas,” where new hydropo\ er developments ould ne
restricted bee use tlie’ \oihld cause nit ccc tatile harm to fish ama wild ife Iiiiliitiit.
Protected area status has no clct on the operation of evistiilg protects and does not
entirely foreclose hydropower development. It does iiia\e edera licensing more di thee

/ cs/,
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Council seemed more intent on overruling the fishery agencies and tribes on biological

additional power in the Northwest in the spring and summer, although there are markets
in southern Cali tiwnia and the Southwest, especially in the summer. Second. theagencies
which control the operation of the hydroelectric system lack an ‘cal incentive to
consider seriously material changes in operations, since the Northwest Power Act was
ambiguous concerning the Councils ability to require operational changes, and the
Council made lv significant demands on the operators in any event. Instead, the

Fish flows are a difficult issue for several reasons. First, although they do nut
reduce the hydroelectric system’s capability to produce power, they change the timing of
i,ower generation. l’rom fhlI and winter to spring and sunhiner. The price of’ hydropower
in the marketplace, however, is largely a l’unction of timing: there is little market for

mechanical bypass systems at mainstem dams, no small liat in an era cf immense federal
budget deficits. But the interstate agency proved unable to restructure hydroelectnc
operations to accommodate the biological needs of salmon. The only reason that spills
improved at the dams was a negotiated settlement of’ a lawsuil, and spring flows under
the water budget increased only marainally, arguably at the expense of summer flows.
The result reflected the continued inequity between salmon and other river interests.

production goals on a watershed by •atershcd basis, and announced a policy ol
maintaining genetic di\ ersitv while doubling the basins salmon runs. The Council also
showed itself’ to he an effective advocate lhr obtaining congressional lunding [Or

By I )O. a decade a her it was auth rized lv Congress, thc Columbia I3asm Fish
and Wildlife Program had a decidedly mixed record. It had designated stream reaches
protected from most new hydroelectric (le\ elopments. established a program of setting

7’he Fivli I-/on Iwo.
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in retrospect. if’

Congress

minimum operating pools,” 2) releasing 900,000 acre—Feet of water from Dworshak Dam
to provide fish flows in low water years. 3) shifting 1100(1 control storage space from
Snake River reservoirs to Columbia River reservoirs. 4) lapping uncontracted storage in
Bureau of Reclamation and Idaho Power projects, and 5) using innovative water
practices, such as leasing water rights and ftmnding efficiency improvements. All told,
these measures weme epccted to produce about I .4 million acre—fet of water for fish
flows. But the Councils program still only prescribed spring monthly flow averages of
85,000 cubic feet per second, which were the same flows the program had been calling
for since 1982 (and ust 60 percent of’ the flows that the fish

improvement in Snake River flows since the prograni was first promulgated in I 982 by
calling lbr I ) lowering of the Enir Corps reservoirs on the Lower Columbia to “near

In 199!, the C’ounci I was again induced to amend the program. this lime in
response to impending salmon listings tinder the Endangered Species Act (described in
chapter 91 Although this attempt to ward ofT such listings was in vain, the I 99 1
amendments nevertheless had positive effects. The aniendmcnts made the first

(‘1? l,

it should have given the imuthoril

TI, c’ / 991 .1 )1i L!1€/iii

L)peratioris.

wanted to make material changes in syslem
to prescribe biologically—based Fish flows
to the regions lisheiy agencies and tribes, instead of giving the chore to a new interstate
agene comprised olpolitical appointees with no biological expertise. it also should have
imposed ii sta1utor deadline for achieving the prescribed flows.

the changes

staunch oppos ton of’c.’ntrenched acencies like the Corps and B PA. and with its members
ser ing iiiiii ed ternis. the (‘ouncil proved reticent in requesting changes to old ways of
doing huincss. Even when it did ak for modest changes. it lacked interest in en brcing

(:hapter 7
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had ample opportun 1

for study and charged that the Council remit med

too

sensitive to

those impmvcmenls aim to achieve. Although the Council recognized that its amended
program would not he sit iTicient to restore the Coltimhia’s salmon, it mostly opted fur
more study before more action. Many critics thought that the nearly I 0—year—old progrwii

Still, except For til I chinook, the program irepared to enter its second decade
without any detailed biological objectives, apparently content with calling For
incremental improvements in hydropower:sal mon tradeolis hefure establishing the goals

of the species by 2000, and eventually produc ng one thousand spawners by 2004—2009.
Finally. the amendments established a committee to study how to obtain an additional one
’
1
mill ion acre-feet of water fur lish migration in the Snake River.

passing mainstem dams and an average of’ 300 or more spa wnmg fall chinook (luring
I 992—1995. reaching the 500 annual spawncrs necessary to preserve the genetic integrity

.

shown to be structurally. or economically infeasible, biologically imprudent, or
the Northii est Power Act.’’ The Council also established some
inconsistent with
biological goals: fur example, calling for a 23 percent improvement in surv ii al of ñsh

The 1991 amendments did otTer some hope for improved rivet conditions in the
future. They called fur proceeding with a drawdown of one of the rcser’oirs in the Lower
Snake River durmg the peak juvenile salmon migration ui ihe spring by 1995 “unless

the noi•m.

lloivs. hut the (oLincil’s modest llo\\ targets meant barge and truck transport was to be

alit

—

licial transport of’jui eni Ic salmon is supported by most lisliet y
agencies only in extremely low flows, ii hen in—river migration is particularly lethal. Most
iishcr agencieN d 1(1 not view arti ficia transportation as a substitute for i mproi ed river

Iwo decades earlier,
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as surprising, since the I

I aiiiendnients to the program

increased sa mon protection and because the program had gone lulella hlenged liar iiemirlv
ten years. The court faulted the amendments liar I ) ni I jig to establish biological

The court’s ruling

mandates oft he statute.

-

But despite these legislative innovations, the court
concluded that the program
which the Council once touted as ‘‘possibly, the must
efl’or
ambitious
in the world to save a biological resource’’
liii led io satisfy the

and

mitigation to emphasize changes in darn operations, is lowering of the burden of prou I
Ibr undertaking remedial action, and its tapping ohhvdroelectric revenues for ILinding bib

innovations, including its basinwide perspect I sc,

‘‘

policy,” aimed at ‘‘making fish and wildlife a ‘coequal partner’ with the hydropower
iildListry. Judge Thomas Tang noted that the I 9t’0 statute contained severn I legislative

The court observed that Columb a Basin salmon had dec meG horn 1 0—1 6 mill ion adult
fish to 2.5 mill ion, and that hydropower was responsible for ) percent of the decline.
The court lauded the ‘sortllwest Power Act as ‘‘iiiark ingj an mpor1anl shill in federal

natural resources of the Columbia River Basin

Appeals unanimously agreed with the environmental isis and the tribe. The court
described the case as a “classic truggie’’ between Salmon and avdropower. ‘the to great

On September 9. 1 9)4. a three—judge panel of the federal

the amendmiicnts

hvdropo\\ er, a coal lion ol en I ronmentalists and the Yakamu Indian Nation tiled so it
claiming that the I l9 I amendments of lered too liii le lish protection. In response, the
industries served by lo\\ 13 PA rates (mostly a Iummnumn Companies I lied sit it, claiini n iha

\‘

!hii-d I’,o,uiw: The ,orihii’et Poiicr ic!

enOLigil tar the I ish.” 1)issatis lied
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oleconomic hardship. Rather than asserting its role as a regiona leader. the Council has

the premise ‘that only small steps are possible. in light of entrenched river user claims

also to their interpretations of the Northwest Power Act. This rather remarkable
conclusion is a reflection o F the fact that the court assumed that the key implementation
entities of the statute. in ternis of fish and wildli be restoration. are the fishery agcncies
and tribes. not the Council. The court concluded by criticizing the Council for adopting

agencies and tribes, including allowing for ‘‘reasonable inferences and predictions.” but

The courts decision served to institutionalize the progmn recommendations of
the region’s fish and w ildlife agencies: the Council could no longer fashion its program
outside the statutorily prescribed receiving and considering ofrecommendations. A key
ruling of the court was its establishment of the deference pnnc iple. The Council owed
deference, according to the court, not only to the scientific opinions of the fishery

industry sought.’

to meet a cost—benefit test would have hogged the program down in endless economic
studies arid delayed program inplementation. Presumably, this is precisely what the

The \inih Circuit also rejected aluniinuin industry arguments that The measures
iii the program had to satisfy a cost—benefit test, noting that “a tish and wildli Ic measure
cannot he rejected solely because it will result in power losses and economic costs
hecaLise the sorthwest Power Act “prevents cost considerations tom precluding sound
o long as an adequate,
restoration of anadromous fish in the Columbia River Basin
efficient, economical and reliable power supply is assured.” Requiring progmm measures

recommended low reglinc and continued to rely heavik on an artificial tianspoitiition
program that mosi flslicrv agencies and iribes opposed.
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as in addition to the 427,000 acre—feet authorized in the Council’s [991 amendments.
The Council also endorsed the mainstem passage experiment under which salmon
survival woLild be careful ly monitored, and the results of the increased flows would he
compared to the results of the transporlation pogram. Under this experiment, roughly

The chiefmeans to meet these increased flows was the purchase ofan additional
one million acre—feet of water from willing sellers in the Snake River Hasin. This water

much (liscretion to dam operations and recommended that flow measures he imposed as
“operating constraints” that would take precedence over poer produeIion.’

daily averages, which are much more dependable than the average monthly targets’
established by the Council’s program. In lact. the National Academy of Sciences’
National Research Council criticized the use of monthly targets because they gave too

transportation program. The amendments called flar a comparison in fish survival
between transported fish and fish migrating under improx-ed river conditions. The
improvements were the result of setting new monthly Snake River flow “targets” of
$5,000 cubic feet per second (ci’s) to 140,000 cfs in the spring and 50,000 cis in the
summer. On the Lower Columbia, the Council cal led fbr flows o1220.000 ci’s to 300,000
cfs. The peak flows of 140,000 cfs on the Snake and 300,000 ci’s on the LowerColumbia
were the same as the state fishery agencies made in the 1991 how proposal. except the
Iisherv agencies expressed their recommendations in terms of instantaneous flows and

‘.

manageiiicnt principles to the Issue of whether river conditions should be improved to
accommodate j u en tIe sa mon migration or whether to continue the truck and barge

In l)ecenibci’ I 994. the Council approved progmm amendments that in pail
csponued to the court’s opinion. For the first nine. the Counci applied adapli \ e

The /994 .1 iiicndmeiii

C. hapter 7
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interfering with naturally spn\ning salmon populations. i’he Council also promised to
the tribes, to assess their
scrutinize supplementation pmjects, including those proposed by

that which dominated salmon management throughout the 20th century. (Jnder this new
policy, continuation of BPA lunding for existing hatcheries would be conditioned on
consistency with the basin’s carrying capacity, conserving genetic diversity, and not

The 1 994 amendments also cal led fur restricting barging and trucking of uven i Ic
sal mon to “extremely adverse cotidit ions.’’ as determined by the fishery agencies and
tribes, except for fish transported br purposes ob the mainstem experiment. In addition,
the C’ouncm I adopted a fundamentally di blerent policy toward hatchery product ion than

is s lie.

words. the Council sought to practice aclapti ye management, which it had long employed
in other aspects of its program but never previously applied to the mainstem passc

adverse impacts on irrigators and other reservoir users. The Council was frank that
efficacy of reservoir drawdowns \4S linproven, hut maintained that the best way to
analyze their cflectiveness was to conduct them and monitor their effectieness. In other

On the 1_owerColumbia. the Council called lorJohn Day reservoir to be operated
at near minimum operating pooi on a permanent basis beginning in I 9)6. 1—lowever, the
amendments made this reservoir drawdo\\ ii contingent upon “full, prior mitigation” of

for a Rvo—inonth, 2)—tool drawdown of Lower Granite reser ow in I 995, and a 45—foot
drawdown in 1999. Little Goose reservoir mild be drawn do n in 1999 to spillway
crest le ci ( making the reservoir level with the dams spi11way br i’. o months during the
spring. In 2002, the amendments called for the Council to decide whether to draw down
the other two Lower Snake reservoirs to either spiliway or natural river levels.
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So, while a deadlocked Council could not manage the vi II to implement its

1)94

against which it won Id be ineasu red. The ISG P laved an extremely i uportant role iii tile
wake of the Council’s I 994 amendments. The new Idaho members charged that tile
amendments were based on baLdly science and clciiiandcd independent scientiflc review.
The 15(1 supplied this review which largely (not entirely) vindicated the amendments.

with reviewing the science underlying its salmon restoration progriiin and developing a
scientific conceptual toundation br the prgwm
on which it would he based and

in I 994, in the wake ofthc Columbia Basin sa mon listings under the Endangered
Species Act, the Council l’omed its Independent Scientiftc Group (ISG) and charged ii

17w Scarce lor Bcqte/ .Scic,i e

carried

attempt to undertake a mainstem passage experiment was never
The amendments’ shi fl ot the burden of proof on hatchery programs
receiving ratepayer money to demonstrate their effectiveness eventually
produced
substantial changes in hatchery operations, but hether juvenile salmon \ crc trLicKeu or
barged or left in the river
and the river conditions to \\ hieh lhe would he subjected
were left to the federal consultation process under the Endangered Species Act, as
discussed in chapter 9.

1994 amendments’

Idaho oppi )sed seasonal di a’ do us and strenuously I esisted any attempt to pirchse
water rights to unprove river l1os, so the Council as deadlocked: Linable to amend the
program it approved. ‘/Ct LiilWil line tO attempt to iinpicnient t. ‘Ihe upshot as that the

tact thai thc\

crc appro\ ed on h a ole ot (-a. ‘ tb bow vtoiitana memher vol ir
against the ainendiucnis. Shortly a [ci the amenuilients v crc approved, the incnibcrsliip
oithe Council chancd considerably. Idahos [)el!Iocratic (io einor, Cecil Andrus. \\ aN
replaced h\’ a Re oh] can. 1 he newi appointed Rep ubi ican Counc i members :v

(h. i0cr 7
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areas. This recognil on of the importance of the ma unstem as a spa wning area led to the
report’s most arresting recommendation: to restore mainstem spawnmg habitat by
permanently drawing down reservoirs like those created by the John 1)av and McNarv
Dams. By reestablishing the ecological conditions that historically allowed these

The most significant revelation ofRL’’urIi In the Riicrwas its finding that the big
historic producers of salmon were the mainstem of the Columbia and lower portions of
major tributary rivers. These alluvial reaches were biologically rich areas that had
supported “metapopLil ations” ol salmon: populations large enough to colonize adjacent

a result, the report tirged fundamental change: to move trom a view of the Columbia
River as a vehicle fur economic development to a view ‘‘ hich accommodated both
ccon omic activities and a functional salmon—producing ecosvs tem.

—

The report emphasized that changed hydroelectric operations alone could not
restore Columbia Basin salmon: it noted that upland management. estuarine protection.
and favorable oceanic conditions were also necessary. ‘[he scientists claimed that the
Council’s program was merely a collection of individual measures proposed by diverse
interest groups, based on the “fundamentally flawed” assumption that fish populations
can he managed in isolation from other components of their ecosystem. The program’s
us a
like hatcheries and truck and barge transport
emphasis on technological fixes
substitute for lost ecosystem Functions had failed, in the judgment of the scientists. As

Columbia Basin wild salmon face extinction in the next hal I’ century. The report
proposed an ecologically—based li’ainework which would seek to reestablish healthy
salmon runs through hat the report referred to us ‘‘normati\ c’ river conditions, or
7
conditions that provide functional norms essential to productive salmon runs.

152— Seriticing the Salmon

bia and Washington will remain at I 995 levels.
For
chum, recently added to (he U.S. Endangered Specie
s Act list, Canada agreed to release
summer chum, and both countries promised to collect
better data on chum stocks.”

In additi on to the ne\v harvest regimes. the I 9Q amend
ments estahl shed t\vo
funds to support restoration and enhancement svork
in the northern and southern areas

covered by the treaty. Although the total amount
the unds is SI 4() mu lion over ten
years. obtaining the inone\ is uncertain, dependent upon
annual appropriation decisions.
The new agreement also established a Committee on Seietm
t i he Cooperation to improve
scientific data collection and analysis and resolve
se lemi lie disputes. Finally, the
amendments met uded a provson eoncenn ng the
:mportance (if habitat protceaon a:d
restoration, requiring the two countries to use tliei
best elThrtswproteci and restore
habitat and provide saft passage thr sainmon. The (omm
ission must report annually on
those salmon stocks fir which harvest nianagenicut
cojarois are insufficient to ensure
their viability, suggest options br restoring those
ocjs. and cxpitun implementation

2
elIor
’
ts,

On/look Ecu 1/ic’ Fiiui’

The I 999 amendments to the Paci fc Sal non Tieaty
etnesented a breakthrough
in a stalemate that lasied br most of the I 990s. kite
cottimutnieni to ahundaucebased
management

is no doubt a therapc ut development. \Vhcthcr
the ‘‘svc: k—Nk ‘e
provisions ofthc agreement will be suthcment to preven
t the slide ofwcak stocks toward
extinction is not clear. khe promise of better science
to infirm pol cyuakers is 5k eleone.
of course, bitt scientists do not make policy, and the
results of scienti lie research have
often been nanipulamea i mm-scientists. The funds
fir ehaitecuient and resturalul:
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the status quo, the
Although the 1999 amendments are an improvement from
ly to dissipate quickly.
friction created during the last decade among the panics is unlike
by the Canadian federal
The British Columbia government, kept out ofthe negotiations
the amendments remain too
government quickly charged that Alaskan harvests under
. The head ofthe Alaska
high to provide sufficient protection for Canadian-origin salmon
harvesters are bearing an
Trollers Association, on the other hand, claimed that Alaska
, since Alaskans have
unfair burden of protecting southern-originating salmon stocks
the focus needs to shift
already incurred significant harvest cutbacks. He claimed that
attitudes will make
to habitat restoration instead of reduced harvests. These
challenging.
’
implementation of the 1999 reforms 2

—

Pacific Salmon
The decades-long experience ofnegotiating and implementing the
salmon harvests by
Treaty provides a ease study in the difficulties of allocating
stalemate over treaty
consensus. The need for the two countries to agree produced a long
was itselfdeadlocked
implementation hardly a surprising development, since the U.S.
erm allocation issues
over the issue of Alaskan harvests. And concern over short-t
. The 1999 amendments
persistently overwhelmed any long-term conservation efforts
n disagreements counsels
may herald a new era, but the past 15 years of implementatio
optimism.
warns against 2
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its billing as the most ambitious biological restoration proje in
ct world
history. by 1990 it was obvious to many that the Northwes
t Power Act’s Columbia Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program was not going to achieve its
goal of doubling the basin’s
salmon runs in a genetically sensitive manner. Although spen
ding considerable suim of
money, the program suffered from imperfect design. poor
enforcement, and lack of
authority overharvest management, hatchery operations, and
habitat-damaging activities.
Its tiilure to fundamentally restructure river flows led the
Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Authority, a coalition of federal and state fish and wild
life agencies and Indian
tribes, to propose in 1990 a completely revised flow regim
e, one that would significantly
boost flows in the spring and summer. This flow regime was actua
lly quite similar to one
the fishery agencies and tribes originally proposed to the Nort
hwest Power Planning
Council in 1981. which the Council rejected in fhvor ofits flaw
ed water budget. Nearly
a decade later, little progress had been made in restructuring
the flows in the mainstem
Columbia and Snake Rivers to reflect the biological need of
s salmon.’

The situation was actually considerably bleaker than a mere
inabil ity to change
the status quo of hydropower’s dominance of the river.
The salmon runs were
experiencing a steep decline. In fact, in 1991. the Ameri
can Fisheries Society’s
Endangered Species Committee reported a Pacific Coas
t-wide salmon crisis: 101
naturally spawning salmon species fitced “a high risk of extin
ction;” another 58 had a
“moderate risk of extinction;” and 54 more were judged
to be of “special concern.”
About one-third of those fish runs were in the Columbia
Basin. This report helped to
launch the Endangered Species Act (ESA) era ofC’olumhia
Basin salmon nianageinent?

Hut nearly a decade after the first Columbia Basin salmon listing
s under the ESA.
it was evident that the ESA was no panacea for the basin’s
imperiled salmon runs.
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salmon.

JilL’

i/ic

Druii’,’/oiin Pi’opucii/

n to list Snake River
In March 1 990. the Shoshone—I3annock tribe filed a petitio
I 990. a coalition of environmental
sockeye under the ESA. Two months later, in May
coho runs. In response to these
groups petitioned to list Snake River chinook and
series ot meetings with major river
petitions. Oregon Senator Mark I lat held convened a
d the “Salmon Summit” 1w the
users in an effort to seek a way to avoid I istins. Dubbe
the listings. but they succeeded in
press, the meetings Ihiled to produce a plan to avert
restoration efforts: a proposal.
generating a noteworthy contribution to salmon
draw down Lower Snake River
championed by Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus. to
to increase water how velocity
reservoirs during the spring by 25 feet or more, in order
ch to salmon restoration because
to speed salmon migration. Idaho favored this approa
ir, a drawdown would allo\s [‘low
by reducing the cross—sectional area of a reservo
reservoirs upstream. Reservoir
velocity increases with less water released hi’om Idaho
restoration proposals.
drawdowns would become a prominent issue in subsequent

-

r I hatfield’s request that the
Another response to the ESA petitions was Senato
>ational Marine Fisheries Service
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and the
salmon runs. The figures in the ensuing
(\MES) produce a status report on the petitioned
their
For example. spring chinook were only six percent of
report were so alarming
that there was little
al tributary
I 961 quantity in the Salmon River. the Snake’s prmcip
doubt thai the ES.\ listings were mninminent.
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to their last remaining

spawning

ground, Reclfish Lake.

Five months latel, in April 1 992, NM I’S respondet:
to the environineiitalists
petition by listing two species of Snake River chinoo
k under the Act. Snake River
spring/summer chinook, which once accounted for
more than 40 percent of a! the
chinook in the Columbia Basin, had declined to less
than ten percent of their historic
strength by the O9Os, and just one percent ot their former
.5 iìii lion adult fish returned
in I 991
Snake River fall chinook lured no better. for the
irst ha f of the twentieth
century, despite the I 901 construction of Swan Falls
Dam on the Snake in south cenirid
Idaho
which cut off kill chmook from over 00 miles of their
spawning grounds
the popu fat ion stahi li/ed at around

70,000 fish But ilL construct ion and operation of
four federal and three kiaho Po\ er Company clams on Lower
Snake between i
and
1 975 devastated the kill chinook. In 1 990, only 7X salmon
surmounted Lower (irani Ic
Dam. the last passable dam on the Snake River. The reason
s for the chinook decline were
similar to those for socLce. lThcy included hydr
opu er de\ eiopmncnl. water stonge,
water withdrawals for irrigation, siltation, and wale:
pollution.”

These listings in late 09] and early 1092 ushered in the
Endangered Spce:e” \c
era o Columbia Basin salmon. A tier the listings. :ciilier
the interpretatIon o the statute.
nor the species would be the same. Un fortunately, the
former changed considerably moore
than the condition of the latter.
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E ).
in the evolutionary legacy 0
other populations and represent an mportant component
isolation seems misguided, since
the species.” The policy’s emphasis on reproductive
g and interbreeding that is
salmon experience a certain amount ot natural strayin
spawning stocks. I latchery and
important br the colonizing ol new habitats by healthy
as an ESU separate from
wild stocks also interbreed, so a wild stock might not qualify
could foreclose the listing ofscarce
its hatchery counterpart. Thus, plentiful hatcheiy fish
and ecological value.
wild fish, despite their differences in terms of genetics

a species is “the genetic
According to NMES, the evolutionary legacy of
events and which represents the
variability that is the product of past evolutionary
s.” In other words, if a
reservoir upon which future evolutionary’ potefltial (lepend
nt a sign ificant loss to the
particular population became extinct, would its loss represe
seems to be a sensible criterion,
ecological or genetic integrity ot the species’? \Vhile this
policy apparently elevates
reproductive isolation is still required. Thus, the ESU
statutory policies, like protecting
reproductive isolation of the species over other
tions even when a species is
ecosystem health, conserving imperiled domestic popula
ing management flexibility in the
relatively abundant elsewhere in the world, and provid
re likely to cause unanticipated
face of scientific uncertainty. The ESIJ policy is therefo

decisions.
’
difficulties for NMFS in salmon listing 7

epriditct ire

.
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e
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The linxnicuice qiCLilizesi Petilivins

The citizen petition process has been absolutely critical in the era
ofthe liSA in
salmon restoration efforts. Under the liSA citizens may petition
to list a species, and the
pertinent Secretary (Interior in the ease of terrestrial species.
Commerce in the case of
marine species including salmon) must respond by determining
whether the petition
presents substantial information indicating that a listing may
be warranted. If so, the
Secretary must perform a status review ofthe species within twelve
months of the filing
ofthe petition. This review is to determine whether the species
is in danger ofextinction
throughout all or a significant portion ofits range (an “endangered
species”), or is likely
to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future
(a “threatened species”).°

The great virtue of the citizen petition process is that it trigger
s the USA’s
science-based decision making, since the agency must make its
decisions on scientific
grounds. Hence, biological information, not economic concerns,
is the driving force
behind liSA listing decisions. All of the initial Columbia
Basin salmon 1isting and
many of the later ones, were triggered by the citizen petition
process. Without this
“action-forcing” provision of the liSA, it is quite doubtliil that
the federal government
would have decided to list Columbia Basin salmon populations on
its own motion, given
the widespread changes in land and water use decision making that
were likely to result.
77w Enlarged Mandate

Listing of Columbia Basin salmon tinder the USA subjected many
activities to
systematic biological scrutiny br the first time. Prior to the first listing
s in 199 I—92,only
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salmon mortality

endangered. The statute’s
The ESA proscribes the ‘taking of species listed as
habitat modification where the
regulations broadly define taking to include significant
essential behavior patterns Ii ke
result injures the species by significantly impairing
must not jeopardize the conflnuccl
breeding, feeding, or sheltering. Federal agencies also
critical habitat. The key to
existence of species or adversely modify designated
bia Basin was the statute’s tbderal
implernentingthe ESA’s enlarged mandate in the (.‘olum
the Act. This procedure requires
consultation procedure. established by section 7 of
te the etlect of their proposals
federal agencies to consult with N MFS in order to evalua
s is to remove significant dectsion
on listed salmon. The effl.ct of the consultation proces
and to give it to NM FS, which
making authority from the agencies proposing the action
adversely afftct listed species.
issues biological opinions (BiOps) on proposals that may
specifies the expected effects ot
Tn these BiOps, NMFS. using ‘best available” science,
ts alternatives designed to avoid
proposals on listed species and their habitat and sugges
habitat According to the
jeopardizing the species or adversely affecting its critical
es proposing actions. I3iOps are
Supreme Court, l3iOps are “virtually binding” on agenci
g species jeopardy or adverse
thus the means by which the NSA’s directives of avoidin
habitat modification are carded out.

apply only to federal
There arc limits to the scope of BiOps. however. They
licensing of lnvate activities.
activities, although that includes federal permitting and
subject to fldcral control, nor
But land use decisions on pri vale lands are not typically
activities can run atoul of the statute’s
arc most decisions on water withdrawals. Those
usually easy. Where a take is
ban on ‘takes.” but proving that a take has occurred is not
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iii/1(ponci

BiOpc

process loi Columbia Basin salmon has been a series ol Bi( )ps.
2
Tue Inniul

—

—

NM ES issued its Iirst I3iOp on Columbia Basin hydroelecidc operati
ons shortly
aller listing Snake River sockeye and chinook. The agency determ
ined that proposed
1992 operations would not jeopardize the continued existen
ce oF the listed salmon
because the 199 I amendments to the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program tinder
the Northwest Power Act promised to miprove Salim)n survival
over previous years.
Even though this standard was controversial
since improvements over the status quo
would not necessarily reverse the decline of the species
the l992 BiC
1 was not
challenged in coLirt.’

N MFS’s jeopardy standard was not to go Linehal enged for long, howev
er. In
1993, NM ES refined he standard to include a two—step anUlysIs, requiri
ng I ) improved
survi\ al over a designated “base period,’’ and 2) hyriroeleetric
operations that, in
combination with all other human eh’tets on salmon, were reason
ably likely to reduce
mortalities to stabilize salmon populations in the lone run. Since
it detcnni ned that
proposed 1 993 operations met both cnteria, NM ES again issued
a ‘‘no ieopardv’ pinion,
including the rather modest goal ol merely sLopping the cecline oHalm
on populations
within tour salmon ii Fe cycles, about Ii ftecn years. However, the
states of Idaho and
oregon promptly lied suit, claiming hat the I 99 l3iOp viuiatcd the
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was neither factually accurate nor biologically sound. NMFS had employed longer
n over
baselines in its 1992 BiOp, and Judge Marsh decided that the agency’s concer
d
maintainingconsistent management practices was biologically suspect because it focuse
salmon.
more on the hydroelectric system’s capability than upon the needs of the
ely easy
Choosing a baseline comprised of years of poor salmon returns made it relativ
ons would
for NMFS to produce a “no jeopardy” opinion by claiming that 1993 operati
instead
improve the status quo. Judge Marsh determined that this focus on the status quo,
of the stabilization of the species. represented arbitrary decision making.”

cle
Second, NMFS’s “nojeopardy” opinion was flawed because it relied on life-cy
case
modeling that discounted pessimistic assumptions and disregarded worstof its
consequences. This approach allowed NMFS to inflate the confidence levels
small
optimistic projections and to ignore completely the risks associated with
ions.
populations, where inbreeding and environmental catastrophes can produce extinct
The judge concluded that NMFS’s failure to consider the fill range of risk assumptions
was arbitrary.”

To remedy its flawed methodology and arbitrary decision making, Judge Marsh
e
suggested that NMFS modify its analysis in two ways: 1) consider alternative baselin
fic
periods, and 2) satistt the ESA’s directive to employ “best available” scienti
latter
information by considering the views of state and tribal fishery biologists. The
le”
ruling suggested a pluralistic approach to interpreting the meaning of “best availab
of
science. Judge Marsh concluded his opinion by advising that, given the state
Columbia Basin salmon runs, small, incremental changes would not satisfy the ESA:

.
i;
a
4
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al disrupt ion.

No major overhaul in system operations would he torthcoming,
however. in part because
the tishery agencies and tribes could not agree what the
overhaul should involve, and in
part because, in the face of this disagreement, the courts
were unwillmg to overturn
NM ES’s risk assessment decisions.

The /995-09 BiO
1

Following the litigation over NMFS’s 1993 l3iOp, NMFS issued
a live—year BiOp
designed to govern hydroelectric operations during 1994—
98. Environmentalists

challenged this BiOp as ‘el I. even though it called for an
additional 500.000 acre—feet
otwater stored in federal reservoirs in the Snake basin to
be released for fish flows. They
claimed that the new multi—year BiOp violated the ESA by
erroneously relying on truck
and barge transport to conclude that there would be no
jeopardy. I lowever, the court
delayed hearing the stnt, giving NMFS a chance to bring
the new l3iOp into compliance
with its decision in the k/alio Dept. of Itch and (i’wne
case.

_t

-

In early 1995, NMFS began circulating a series ofdraft l$iOps
which eventually
became thc new 1995—99 l3iOp. The first draft stated that “the
evidence suggests... that
transportation alone is not likely the solution to rebuild
ing listed salmon populations.
I nsteacl, it called for an additional 3.5 million acre—feet of storage
v ater to he released for
fish flows in the Co luinhia and an additional one million
ac ic— feet to boost Snake River
tlos s. ‘I he draft also called for a detailed schedule of
minimum flows, including
biweekly average minimLim Iluws of 5.000 to 00.000 cubic
flet per second in the
Snake in the spring, and 50,000 to 5.O(H tin the Snake in the
summer. 1 he Loss er Snake

-
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ng agencies should “take
as the earlier dra Ii but reduced the flows to a ‘goal” that operati
a bi—veekly average to a
into account.” Moreover, the flow objective was reduced liom
more flexibility but
seasonal a verage, giving the operating agencies considerably
ments to obtain 3.5 mil lion
depriving the salmon ofdependahle flows. The earlier require
nhia and one million acre—feet
acre—feet of Canadian storage to boost flows in the ColLn
exhortations to release water
to boost flows in the Snake disappeared, replaced by vague
conditioned on funding to
for fish enhancement. The John Day drawdown was now
on LIiflS and boat docks ..A 24—
supply “economic mitigation.” such as moving irrigati
disappeared. The final BiOp
year period for judging whether jeopardy was likely to occur
proposed actions had to
also adopted a dual probability standard for jeopardy:

a ‘‘moderate likelihood” (50
demonstrate a “high likelihood” o fspecies sur\ ival, but only
derably easier to avoid jeopardy
percent probability) ofspecics recovery, making itconsi

conclusions.’

s on biological
The final BiOp made no attempt to justify any of these change
modations with cost concerns and
grounds; NMFS explained them as reasonable accom
res was subjected to biological
other system uses. None of the new compromised measu
alternative would in fact avoid
modeling, so NMFS could not he assured that its selected
eleventh—hour changes were
species jeopardy. an apparent statutory violation. All of the
had warned earlier. None
concessions to the status quo against which Judge Marsh
favored salmon.

--------

-----

-------

-

.--

------

old program of
‘1 he revised BiOp continued to rely heavily on a twenty—year
barge instead of inlpruv ing river
transportingj uveni Ic salmon downstream by truck and
spring/summer
\MFS estimated that about 74 percent o Snake R.i ver

---

conditions.

---
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A coalit ton ol envi ronmeiital groups ella lenged the revised
l3iOp, claiming that
it violated the ESA by authorizing mortalities
ofup to 56 percent ot juvenile Snake River
sockeye and spri ngsununer chinook and up to
percent olu enile Snake River Hi
chinook. The environmentalists also challenged the dual standa
rds I&jeopardy, ignoring
critical habitat, and bii ling to implement key provisions like
the John Day dra\\ down
Althou gli Judge Marsh had struck down the I 9)3 l3iOp three
veais earl icr. lie upheld the
I ‘)95—99 l3iOp. even though lie noted that [a]s a long—I i
me observer and examiner” of
salmon restoration ellorts. he coLild not help but
‘‘l°° the soundness of NM[
5s
1
selected level of risk tolerance. Despite these reservations,
he concluded that the ES
\
1
“says 110th ing about risk tolerance, and the limits of udicial
review dictate that 1 no
interfere with a federal agencies sic) exercise olprofessiona
i judgment or theirreasoned
f

1
evalua
tions.’

The court was influenced by N MESs claim that tt was
implemeiti rig an
“ecosystem management” approach to saltnon reeovc
rr by establishing a sy stcrnH tic
comparison of the ability ot transported fish to return to spawn
as compared to fish Ic
in the river. In addition, N NI ES noted that oilier species, like
bull trout (a freshwater
salmonid ) and sturgeon, might sri ffer from tile higher
river flows that the
envirtminentalists sougltt. Finally, unlike the ease tlnee sears
earlier, Idaho tlip-Ilopped
its position, now Suppotling NM ES. and the (oiuinl,ii Has
in tribes split over (lie l3i( )p:
the upper basin ( ol ii lie and Spokane tribes sought to prot
eel rescr\oir levels in I
Roosevelt, the reservoir tot ned hr ( irand (ni lee I )ani
i ii eli would he lo cued tu
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promised improvements n
u—river salmon until 2000. The court noted, however, that
salmon survi al were essential:

long Iem
whether the salmon may he saved in time to benefit from such
es have
system improvements is the risk that NMFS and the action agenci
rs, time is
assumed with in this process. (jiven the dwindling numbe
clearly running out.

The court oI appeals affirmed Judge Marsh in early I
P,’oce.v.v
The Seu’c/i For Beii’e,’ Science: 77w PA JH

e it ignored the
Judge Marsh struck down the I 3 BiOp in large part becaus

one of’ the innovations of the
biological advice of the slates and the tribes. In response,
of scientists to assist NMFS
I 9959o) BiOp as tc create an independent v orking group
infhrmation. This group, known
in gathering and evaluating the best available scientific
was comprised of’ about 25
as the Plan for Analyzing and Testing hypotheses (PATI-l).
d under accepted scientific
federal, state, tribal, and independent scientists who operate
agency process applied Iil’e
procedures and whose work as peer—reviewed. This multi—
and survival, generatcd
cycle models to estimale historical trends in salmon reproduction
ed the effects of future
hypotheses about sources of’ salmon mortality, and project
tions.
2
management acuons on salmon popula

Darns would be
The PATH results indicated that breaching the low er Snake
Snake River fall and

rds for listed
much more likely to meet survival and ice overy standa
the I o)Q599 13i( )p. Lnder
spring;siimmcr chinook than hydroelectric operations uudcr
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70440 percent (although there are questions about quality of the
habitat) and eliminate
high mortality rates in Little Goose reservoir. PATH did not analyze listed
sockeye and
steelhead. but NMFS agreed that the likely results from breaching could
be infirred from
the spring/summer chinook analysis, except that there are significantly
higher mainstem
harvest rates for steelhead. meaning that there might be alternative paths
to recovery for
that species?(
The L’uuwlalive Risk lu//lathe

Perhaps because it did not like the answers it was getting from the PATH
scientists, or perhaps (as NMFS claimed; to complement the PATH proces
s and examine
factors which PATE! did not consider, in 1999 NMFS established its own
“cumulative
risk initiative” (CR!) to help the ageiry decide on a new 5-year BiOp
on hydroelectric
operations. The CR! team, comprised of about 25 NMFS scientists,
did not limit itself
to improvements in the hydroelectric system but alsoconsidered opportunities
to promote
salmon recovery through the salmon life cycle, including changes in hatche
ry operations,
harvest controls, and habitat improvements. The holistic CR1 approach
is in keepingwith
the ecosystem management concepts. discussed in chapter 14, but its compr
ehensiveness
may divert attention from the hydroelectric system, the chief cause of human
-induced
mortalities.

w

The CR1 analysis, which is detailed in chapter 13’s discussion ofdam breach
ing,
concluded that some spring/summer species have “considerable” risks
of extinction
within ten years. For example, for two Snake River “index stocks”
(Marsh Creek and
Sulpher Creek) the extinction risks were 15 percent and 10 percent.
respectively. All
index stocks for spring’summer chinook, fall chinook, and steclhead
had “substantial”

:%
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recent studies suggested that
With respect to the latter issue, the (‘RI analysis noted that
the PATI I studies assumed:
transported fish su fftr from lower mortality rates than
e as Signi heant a boost
therefore, according to the (‘RI, dam breaching might not provid
that breaching the Lower
in survival as the PATI I studies showed. Moreover, (‘RI noted
not other listed species with
Snake Dams would assist only the Snake River species.
k and steelhead and Middle
declining growth rates, like Upper Columbia spring chinoo
stcelhead.
Columbia and Upper Willamette 2

The 200/-.05 B/Op am!

Columbia Basin
In December 2000. NM ES released a new live—year F3iOp on
lower basin. 3 I upper basin
hydroelectric operations, including fourteen dams in the
salmon transportation
pro)ects operated by the Bureau of Reclamation, and thcjuvenile
recovery strategy produced
program. Accompanying the I3iOp was a hasinwide salmon
Federal C’aucus, which aimed to
by several federal agencies, collectively known as the
the salmon Ii t cycle. Like
prevent salmon extinctions and fostering recovery throughout
not only on hydropower
the CR1 analysis. the basinwide recovery’ strategy ft’cused
measures.
’
operations, hut also habitat. hatchery, and harvest 2

.

ons \ouId likely
The BiOp concluded the proposed hydroelectric operati
species which spawn above
jeopardize the continued existence ofall eight listed salmon
. Upper Columbia
Bonneville f)ani, including all listed Snake River species
ad, and Columbia River
spring/summer chinook and steelhead. Middle Columbia stcelhe
ting measures which, when
chum. To avoid jcopard\ NMFS developed a series ol mitiga
g recovery strategy,
combined \k ith the recovery measures outlined in the accompanyin
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rotect ion

a 1(1 7
restoration:

The centerpiece of the l-3iOp was a series ot penionitance standards needed
to
avoid jeopardy. I lydroelectnic systems measures, described as the best the hydros
vstein
can do without breach inc, included 5V5te1llvide survi al rates of 50 percen
t bar Snake
juvenile stceihead, 57 percent juvenile Snake River spring/sunimer chinoo
k, and
perceilt

River

66

as lambda

for tiveni Ic Upper ( olumbia sp lO:suilliner ellitlook. The
BiOp estab! ished
hydrosystem survival rates bar both adult and juvenile species
at each darn as we! I as
svstemwide. These standards must be met on an a eraec basis over ten yeats.
aithouch
NM [S promised to review and evaluate tile results afler fl
ye and eight years. In those
reviews, NM FS “will rely on estimates of ii i static survival
increases and product ivit,”
A lambda of I I each year over eight years \vi II produce a

referred to

failed.”

population doubling: on the other hand, a lambda of0.95 on an annual basis
Will produce
halving of the population. NM FS stated that with lambda values below
0.5 by 200f1 lime
species “would he considered at risk ofextinction,” and the
BiOp ‘‘will be considered to
Lambda values between 0.)5 and I I will rejuire a new i3iOp.

have

To improve the prospects of satisfying the requisi:e lambda, NM FS continu
ed to
endorse artificial transportation, in fact directincan increase in transportation during
the
summer. On the other hand, \MFS rejected transni
tal1oi loin McNary Daimi ill the
spring, due to poor results, It also directee a change in
transport of Snake River stocks.
transport while (lecreas inc truck transpurt:
increasing barge

Time BiOp iiieltided several x ater itiufluteenem measures, litIStly eottnuu
iti
various water releases hull storage to fleet stream flow objectives and
establish c
reservoir levels to lacilitate sltiuii nhitiration. ii continued seasonal
t]o\ obJeca\ e at
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spawning

water use,

River
of Reclamation to provide 427.000 acre—feet ot storage water from Upper Snake

reservoirs; boosting river tiows through waterconservation, ehininating illegal
te
and purchasing water rights: and increasing [al I and winter flows to promo
nevi lie Dam.
below Bon

through
The BiUp contained numerous other measures coven ngjuvenile passage

e were the
reservoirs, adult tish passage, and water quahty. But perhaps more notabl
e1 in the
BiOp’s i.e ferences to habitat, harvest, and hatchery measures proinis
was
accompanying basinwide recovery p1 an. Only through improvements in these areas

recovery. To
the BiOp able to conclude that there was a 50 percent chance of salmon
p a series ol’one
implement the l3iOp. NMLS required various federal agencies to develo
of species, recent
and llve—year implementation plans, which are to evaluate the status
probabilities of’
data and research results, the feasibility and timine measures, and their
meeting performance
success. Regular reportingot new information and progress toward
anticipated
standards was also required. In this manner. the BiOp was able to enlist
t. that ProPosed
improvements in non—hydroelectric actions as a reason to sugges
t breaching the
hydroelectric operations could avoid jeopardy to listed salmon withou
3
Lower Snake Dams.

The NMFS BiOp did not entirely rule out the possibility of breaching the Lower
alternative
Snake Dams, which it cc ferred to as the most risk—adverse alternative, an
\\ ould other
providing ‘more certainty of tong—term survival and recovery than
dams
measures. This risk assessment originally caused NMFS to call for breaching the
period in a draft
unless dramatic improvements in survival were attained over a 5—year
Bonneville Power
[hOp. Ilo ever. when agencies like the Corps of Lngineers and the
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In this fashion the NMFS BiOp deferred the breaching issue, while
endorsing a
lit%-cycle approach to recovery which emphasized not only improv
ements in the
hydroelectric systems but also endorsed what the BiOp referredto
as “ofl’site mitigation:”
improved hatchery practices, harvest management, and habitat restora
tion. Critics ofthe
draft BiOp charged that it relied on overly optimistic assumptions
about possible
increases in survival due to offsite mitigation and a failure of the
CR1 process to consult
with state and tribal biologists, which seemed crucial to the BiOp%
conclusions. These
arguments were quite similar to those that convinced the district court
to strike down the
1993 BiOp. Critics of NMFS’s failure to endorse dam breaching
could also point to a
statement ofthe director ofthe U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, who
observed at a press
conference that it was a “no brainer” that a free flowing river was
an improvement for
salmon and other wildlife. The debate over the dam breaching
issue is e’cplored Ibrther
in chapter l3P

Whether the BiOp’s reliance on off-site mitigation to avoid jeopard
y satisfies the
ESA is a fair question. First, most ofthe offsite mitigation measures
are contained in the
accompanying non-binding basinwide recovery plan. It is hardly clear
that NMFS may
conclude that species jeopardy can be avoided through a docum
ent containing no
enforceable promises and directed at agencies other than those proposing
the actions that
triggered ESA consultation. Second, the effect of relying on off-site
mitigation, mostly
habitat protection and restoration, efThctively shifts restoration respon
sibilities from the
federal government, as operator of the basin’s federal dams.
to state and local
goernmnerits. which control most landand water use practices. One
wonders whether the
federal government may legitimately shift the consenation burden to
other governments
in thu manner. Third, the BiOp’s designation of 1980 as the
baseline by which to
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operations.
proceedings challenging the 200 I —05 BiOp on hydroelectric

i/ic

state statutes authorizes
As (liscussed in chapter 5, a patchwork of federal and
mon harvests and 10 try to
hatchery plogrilms in the (‘olumb in l3asin to support sal
lectric development. Although
compensate fir the effects of habitat loss from hydroe
izing statute. NM FS’s decisions to
each hatchery is subject to the standards of its author
considering the combined eliect of
list salmon under the ESA provided a framework fr
all hatchery programs on an ecosystem—wide scale.

non—federal hatchery
In I 995 NMFS considered the effcts of 7 I federal and
. These programs are operated
programs during 1995—) 99 on listed Snake River salmon
NMFS analyzed the numerous
by live ibderal agencies and three states. In its BiOp,
its 1995 recovery plan. NNiFS
hatchery programs in light of the goals proposed in
the continued existence oflisted
concluded that the hatchery operations wouldjeopardize
istent with the recovery plan.
Snake Rivcr salmon because the operations were incons
would exceed the basins carrying
NMFS expressed concern that the hatchery operations
levels of genetic introgression
capacity ftr Snake River salmon and would allo\
r), competition, and predation
introduction of a gene from one gene complex to anothe
result, the agency imposed a
beyond that tolerated in the proposed recovery plan. As a
hatchery releases in the Snake
cap on hatchery Osli releases at 1994 levels (20.2 million
and other n ensures designcu
Basin and 1 97.4 iii I lion throughout the Columbia Basil))
\‘IFSs proposed recovery
to address differences between the hatchery program and N
the 1995 documem, and NM F’S
plan. This use of the proposed recovery plan gave life to

‘--

-—:--—
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product

pol icy—cooi’dinat ing body representing the flaur Lower Cot umbia Basin
tribes with treaty
fishing rights, released its own plan fur (01 umbia Basin
sal mon restoration. Like
NM IS’s proposed recovery plan, the triba plan (discussed in
more detail in chapter (
and 14) recoenized a role br hatchery production to restore
salmon inns. Unlike the
NMFS plan, the tribal plan relied on supplementation (explained
in chapter ( ). a ornl ol
hatchery production that is less intrusive to wild salmon
populations than traditional
ion, but which nevertheless has its critics, inclLiding 3
NMFS.

hatchery

.

and eval uaton

Despite its misgivings about sLipplCnientation, in I 7, NMES
issued a Bi( )p on
a hatchery proposed in the Northwest Power Planning Counc
il’s program fur the Nez
Perce reservation i not ving s uppi eulentation
The nioposai was subject to ESA
consultation because it was to he funded by the Bonneville
Po\\ er Administration and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Nez Peree ‘lrhe prowsed a
suppiernentation progra mlor
the (S learwater River in the Snake Basin, aiming to produc
e more than 700,000 spring
chinook sinolt and 2.X million Liii chinook smolt ii5l witiiir
10 years. Using techniques
characteristic of supplementation. the Nez Peiee haLehery would
outplant suffleent fish
into Clearwater tributaries to establish healthy and harvestable
salmon runs within twenty
years. This proposal, conditioned on an innovative ecosystem
monitoring

program, was subsequently scaled back to about ha if the propos
ee size by the N orthv est
Power Planning (‘ounci I. alter its Independent Science Revi
e Panel suggested it was
otseale with the lest ofthe Council’s program. fairy reiurns
oa test olsupplementanon
of Snake River full chinook showed pronnse. ho\\ C\er’’

NM ES concluded that the \ez Peree proposal \\ as not
likely to eopar h,e the
continued existence of hsted salmon, even though it determ
ined that ‘a ny furti er
degradation of [the listed species biological requueinentsj
would have a signi I cam
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populations consistent with the plan. Consequently, NMFS determined
would not produce spec iesjeopardy.”

that the program

BiOps
NMFS’s evaluation of hatchery programs in these twi hatchery program
KMFS’s use
is part ofa trend of considering hatchery programs on an ecosystem level.
le ol’this
ofits proposed recovery plan as a baseline Ibrjudging the programs is an examp
Planning Council
trend. Another example is Congress’s directive to the Northwest Power
Basin and to
to review all federally funded hatchery programs in the Columbia
ensuing report
recommend a coordinated hatchery policy (discussed in chapter 6). The
at the sub-basin
called for integrating natural salmon production with hatchery production
level based on scientific principles?
The 1999 FluIcliesy BiOp

•

:

...:

that
In 1999, NMFS updated its I 995-98 BiOp on hatchery operations. noting
er chinook. 50
hatchery fish made up 95 percent of coho. 70-80 percent of spring’sumrn
Basin. The BiOp
percentof fall ehinook.and 70percentof thesteelhead in the Columbia
hout the
considered the effect ofhatchery programs that produce unlisted salmon throug
notjeopardize
basin on listed salmon and concluded that most hatchery operations would
d that the
listed species. With respect to the Nez Peme hatchery, the BiOp assume
adults killed in
supplementation program will have a net benefit on fall chinook because
k abundance
hatchery operations would be offset by increased natural tall chinoo
of net benefit
produced by the tribal program. The BiOp admitted that the assumption
had “not been rigorously tested,” howewr?

•
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Hnvc.vi BiOps

)verexploitalion of the region’s salmon encouraged the siting
of ntiineious
hatcheries which are now the foundation ofhoth ocean and in—river harves
ts. Once nearly
unregulated, harvesting salmon has evolved into a complex manag
ement system tr
allocating the resource among commercial, recreational, and tribal
harvesters. Recent
harvests pose considerably less of a threat to salmon survival
and recovery than
hydropower operations, hatchery practices, and hali dat loss becaus
e managers have
restricted harvests to account for these other sources of mortality. Still,
any harvest of
listed salmon directly a ffects the population by reducing the numbe
r of spawning adults
returning to natal streams.’’

Although listed salmon are not the object of harvests, they do su 11cr
incidental
takes in both ocean and in—river harvests aimed at non—listed salmon
. To minimize

incidental iakes, harvest decisions are subject to a number ofinanageme
nt plans derived
irom a maze ol treaty rights obligations, court orders, and adininistraue
actions. Despite
this apparently coordinated harvest management, however, salmon numbe
rs continue to
decline. ‘With the listings of salmon under the LSA, NMFS became a
key decision maker
in the area ot harvest management because without its approval of harves
t decisions
through the ESA biological consultation process. individual harves
ts would he required
to obtain an incidental take permit. This is a tinie—consunung and expens
ive process that
would include preparation of a habitat conservation plan. Thus. ihe
\MES RiOps on
harvest management plans efIcti\ ely authorize individual takes
of listed 42
species.
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by the North Paci ic
Conservation and Manartement Act. Alaskan harvests are governed
and N PFN’IC
Fishery Manare,nent ( ‘ouncil (N PF\4C) under the same statute. The PEMC
ry o F (‘ommcrce,
prepare lishery management plans subject to approval by the Secreta
t to ESA consultation,
throuch NM ES. Because that approval is a hdera I action subjec
ize listed salmon.
NM ES must consult internally as to whether a plan is likely to jeopard

lirst time
In I 9)6, NMFS issued a BiOp on the PFMC’s plan that For the
Evaluating the
considered the plans consistency with NMFSs proposed recovery plan.
determined that
plan in terms ol’ its etlects on all the listed Snake River species. N \4 ES
ts take Few. iF any,
PFMCs plan would aFRct only Foil clii nook. since ocean harves
r, a lack oFdata and
sockeye and only a small number oFsprin/sunimer chinook. I loweve
ible For NM ES
it
uncertainty in estimated mortality liotu the ocean harvest made imposs
t rates over a live—year
to luanti t’y the actual loss o F Fall chinook. But by modeling harves
t oF listed kill
period. NM ES estimated that all harvests combined took 43 percen
Alaskan
chinook. The PFMC—controiled harvest accounted br 26 percent oF that total:
and Canadian harvests accounted For the remaining 74 percent.’’

iOps. NMFS compared the ocean harvest ate For
3
As in the case oFthe hatchery F
ry plan adopted
Snake River kill chinook against its proposed recovery plan. The recove
the Pact tic Sa mon
the management strategies oFthc Paci he Salmon (_ommission under
a baseline For
k,
Treaty, which set rebuilding goals For naturally spawning chinoo as
species. But the
determining whether the Pl’MC plan was likely to jeopardize listed
n I 993 and the 1 99(
treaty har ests Foiled to meet the established rebuilding goals betwee
t ( ‘onsequent ly.
Bi( )p, and the treaty control led over two—tlurds ot the ocean harves
to p101cc t Snake
N \4 ES determined that it ci mId no longer ieiy on the international treaty
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/}98 SiLc’/Iicu/ B/Op. Managing in—r:ver har\ ests also
plavsac rucial role in
determining the fate of listed Columbia l3asin sahnon. The
91 $ Columbia River
Compact between Oregon and Washington created an in Lerstal
e agency which al locate.s
in-river harvests between

the two states. Net until the tribes sued the states
in the ate
I 960s did the courts order the slates to ensure the trities
received a fair sbare of t lie
harvests. As explained in chapter 4. that shaie is hail ot
the harvest. Since the ate
I )60s, the f deral district court in Oregon has resolved dispute
s between the states and
the tribes and also induced the parties to negotiate the Colum
bia River Comprehensi ‘. c
kislt Management Plan to govern in-river 1
harvests.
”

A wel l-pLibl iciied dispute erupted in I 99$ o ci trihai commercial
harsests o fhf
chinook. The conflict began when NM ISs regiona admin
istrator suggested limiting
tribal harvests of listed stcelhead from 20 percent to 5-7 percen
t of the available iarvcsi
in response to the fact that the wild Upper Columbia steel head
run had dccli ned to arounu
1)00. only about 20 percent ofNM ES’s goal
of4500. This harvest reduction would have
the eliect of significantly limiting the tribes harvest of fall
chinook, the tribes onv
remaining commercial fishery, because stecihead we caught inciden
tal to the fall cht nook
harvest. The tribes therefore objected to the restrictions, pointin
g out that their i ncidenta
harvests were small in comparison to mortalities caused
by the hydroelectric s st:i a
Eventually, N MFS and the tribes reached an agreement that
reduced the tribal incidental
harvest ol stcelhead to 15-20 percent. a considerable reduction
front the 32
tlgue
in the court—approved comprehensi e plan. But \V lien NM
FS sought approval el the
reduction floin .tudge Malcolm Marsh. the states
Ilitected on the grounds that NMlS had
failed to subject the agree merit to ESA 4
consultat:on
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plan was actually the
River. NMFS claimed that there was no federal action, since the
through court order, and
product of the settlement of a lit Igat ion and implemented
r. Judge Marsh focused
therefbre ESA consultation procedurL’s did not apply. I loweve
winch included federal
on the ict that an interagency technical advisory committee,
reasoned that this was
members, had written an assessment of the agreement. lie
requirements under the
so fflcient federal involvement to trigger Federal consultation
statutes broad definition of federal action.”

n. NMFS issued a
On September 10, 1 998, just a week after the corut’s decisio
ded that the most
l3iOp on the effect ofihe agreement on listed species. The BiOp conclu
migrating species. on
vulnerable species was the Snake River B—run steelhead, a late
harvest. This amount,
which the agreement anticipated a 20 percent incidental tribal
result. NMFS imposed a
NMFS determined, would produce species jeopardy. As a
t or less. In reaching this
requirement of reducing the incidental harvest to 15 percen
which the B—run steelhead
decision, NMFS conceded that it did not know the degree to
noted that survival would
numbers had to increase to avoid jeopardy. [lowever, the BiOp
ions on the tribal fishery,
he primari ly a ilme lion of actions other than harvest restrict
t over its ten—year
observing that the tribal fishery had now been cut back by 38 percen
subject to the 15 percent
average. NMFS theretre allowed tribal harvests to continue,
e the reductions.
ceiling, while deferring to the tribes discretion as to how to achiev

salmon protector
The in—river harvest conflict highlighted NM ES’s role as both a
ting concerns of
and manager of harvests among competing fishers. The compe
rcial tisliery (the iii hes
maintaining the tribes 1tl I chinook harv ests. their last comme
chinook in 1977), while
ended their harvests of summer chinook in 1964 and spring
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//iOp.

trust oblications to the tribes is unclear.
requires federal agency actions curbing tribal rights
available, suggests that the I t
t
5
)9i l3iOp did not.

Fla/niat

to

A recent Secretarial Order which
he the ‘least restrictive alternative”

Protecting salmon habitat has been a neglected issue of salmon
restoration
efforts, overshadowed by the perceived need to obtain
immediate changes in
hydroelectricoperations and hatchery practices. Habitat protect
ion cannot promise short—
term improvements in run sizes. En fact, it is hardly clear
what the loss of a particular
spawning and rearing habitat nay mean in terms of run size
declines. The uncertainties
in correlating habitat protection to run sizes have made habitat
I3iOpsan overlooked area
salmon restoration.

of

Anotherreason lorthe relative ohscurityofhabitat BiOps is
that NMFS has taken
steps to reduce their prominence. Tn August 1 QQ5, N4MF
S signed a memorandum of
agreement (MOA) with the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, and
the Bureau of Land Management. The agreem nent established
an interagency process to
“streamline” project—specific ESA consultations. This \4OA
was revised by the federal
agencies in FehrLiary 1Q97. is now employed throughout Idaho,
Oregon. and Washington,
and may well become national policy. Under the MOA, which
represented N.\IFS’s
response to congressional concerns that ESA consultation was
impeding timber sales.
NM ES and the federal agency proposi ig the action \viil establi
sh interagency teams. This
I iiicragenev cal lahoram ion Will help the
agency produce better biological assessments. a
precursor document to a I3iOp. by attempting to reach
consensus on whether there is
adequate data on listed species and the eflcts of the proposed
action on listed species.
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5.
record
of a lull biological ’

—

l Ta!Id!’liaInIgcuIlL’iul
Pee//k Riix’,.v ( eu 0(11 i. ilionues: RiOp. on Evix/ing Federa
ned in April I 992. the NSA
Plans. Alter the listing of Snake River chinook as threate
e and the Bureau of Land
required federal land managers like the U.S. Forest Servic
ement activities
Management to evaluate whether a host of federal land manag
the listed salmon. Although
principally timber, grating, and road projects— niiglit affect
ed activities to biological
the land rnanagersagrced to sLibmit ongoing and propos
t previously approved land
consultation under the ESA. they did not agree to subjec
ded that the ESA did not
management plans to consultation. The federal agencies conten
ement plans were not
apply to plans approved before the listings because land manag
instead were merely programmatic
ongoing’ activities subject to NSA consultation but
documents that did not authorize any speci he actions.

to challenge the
Environmental groups, led by the Paci he Rivers Council, sued

ement plans of the (imali I Ia and
Forest Service’s fuilure to submit the land manag

ngton to consultation.
Wallowa—Whitman National Forests in Eastern Oregon and Washi
that the NSA contained no
The Federal district cOUTE agreed with the environmentalists
ement plans. However,
exemption From consultation for previously approved land manag
ting any new timber sales
although the court enjoined the Forest Service from conduc
projects.
g or announced 5
pending compliance with the ESA, it refused to enjoin ongoin

and the Ninth Circuit
Both the Forest Serviceand the environmentalists appealed,
The court ruled that land
upheld the environmentalists’ position in a 1994 decision.
management plans governing
inanagenieni plans. which it described as ‘comprehensive
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their importance “in establish i na resource and land use policies for
the forests,” the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the FSA required previously approved plans to
undergo biohogtea
consultation. The court also ie ersed the district court’s rub i ng that
timber sales \\ hiei
had already undergone cons u bitt ion could continue, orden ng the timber
harvests enjoined
until the forest plans governing the sales had undergone consul
tation as well. This
decision was subsequently applied to enjoin ongoi hg timber sales in
six national forests

These decisions brought ESA consultation to public land manag
ement plans

in ldaho.
5

throug

hout the poll ion ofihe Columbia Basin still accessible to salmon
. Land managers
could no longer authorize individual activities consistent with
a land management plan

without considering the plan’s effect on listed salmon and their habitat
. This pri iciple (
requiriig plan consultation is especially important uiven
NM ES’s policy of’ using the
s to enforce proviSionS in pre—existing areawide plans, as eviden
ced

consultation proc
in the hatchery

PACI 151 1

proieetions

—---

__

___

-_____

and harvest contexts. The obligation to consider salmon habitat in public
land decision making encouraged new approaches to federal land
managenien t. F or
example, the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management. Projec
t, a massive land
planning process covering sonic 75 million acres east ot’ilte Cascades,
otTers the promse
ot’ significantly changing the concept ol mLiltipe usc
ii pab: ic and managcme:i,
although the project laces an uliceriai n political Future An igi cemen
t between the U.S.
Forest Service and the Bureau ot Land Management piovin
es mien in protection. known
as PACIISI I, pending approtl ol the Interior Colimtbia Basin Projec
t. But PACI ISI I
applies only to federai lands, which \MFS has indicaten nrovid
es insuftictein salmo:
piotectloll. Moreover, the Columbia River lntcr[’n
bal Fish (foituntssion maintains that
tils io ;im’oteet salmon habitat even where it
implementation ot

4.
ipplies

-
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se to the
management program, the Northwest Forest Plan, which was created in respon
within and
listing of the northern spotted owl in 1990 and which includes lands both
in oldoutside the Columbia Basin. The plan not only attempted to preserve owl habitat
n reserves
growth forests but also to establish a system of watershed analysis and riparia
Northwest
aimed at protecting aquatic species. In 1994, a federal district court upheld the
ed that the
Forest Plan as satisfying the ESA and other statutes, although the court caution
plan’s legality rested largely on its successful implementation.”

..•

al.
In August 1996, a little over two years after the Northwest Forest Plan’s approv
species just
NMFS listed as endangered the Umpqua River cutthroat trout, a salnionid
logging
outside the Columbia Basin. The listing, which cited habitat degradation from
issue a BiOp
as a principal threat to the species’ continued existence, prompted NMFS to
the listed
on the effect ofthe Northwest Forest Plan and the activities authorized by it on
ded that
cutthroat and several other species proposed for listing. The BiOp conclu
y and
meeting the aquatic conservation strategy ofthe forest plan would avoid jeopard
plummeting populations
satis& the ESA. but the BiOp did not specifically consider the
the BiOp
ofcutthroat and the poor habitat conditions in the Umpqua Basin. Moreover,
tting
did not complete consultation on particular habitat-degrading activities like clearcu
team of
and roadbuilding, although it did establish a matrix and checklist to help a
required
biologists determine whether additional BiOps on individual activities would be
clearcuts,
to satis& the ESA. Government biologists had recommended eliminating the
h they
but the Forest Service and the l3ureau of Land Management did not do so. althoug
timber sales
did cancel new road construction. NMFS subsequently approved dozens of
systematic
in individual consultations completed in 1997, even though it conducted no

..—.
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n required by the Ninth Circuit in the Poejilt Rivers Cou
ncil case would not
receive close judicial scrutiny, due to the level of
generality employed in land
management plans. But courtawill not allow specific
projects to proceed on the basis of
NMFS’s assumption that the protections promised in the
land management plans will be
implemented. Instead. NMFS must demonstrate at the
project stage that the proposed
actions will actually comply with the aquatic prote
ction strategy contained in the
Northwest Forest Plan. Ifadopted by other courts, this
decision may mean that the ESA’s
biological consultation process could become a vehicle
to ensure that the broad promises
made in ecosystem management plans are in fict carried
out. Moreover, the court quite
clearly considered compliance with the Northwest Fore
st Plan irrelevant to compliance
with the ESA: the plan and the statute imposed discrete
duties?’

Ifthe ESA consultation process is to become a mechanism
to achieve ecosystem
management promises. the courts will apparently have to
continue to oversee NMFS. In
December 1998. NMFS employed its new concept of
“streamlining” the consultation
process to approve nine BLM Umpqua Basin timber sales
that had been enjoined earlier
by the court, with virtually no changes from the proposals cont
ained in BL.M’s biological
assessments. NMFS concurred in these tinter harvests
without perfonning a BiOp.
despite admitting that the sale areas were “dominated
by conditions rated largely as ‘not
properly functioning’ or ‘at risk’,” and acknowledgin
g that the environmental baseline
“does not currently meet all ofthe biological requirements
for the survival and recovery
of the listed species within the action area.” Neverthel
ess, NMFS reasoned that there
would be no jeopardy to the species because the sale wou
ld involve only “minor shortterm adverse effects” like increased sediment loadings
, due to mitigation measures such
as those contained in the Northwest Forest Plan. NMF
S reached this conclusion even

-.
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reiterated that the Northwest Forest Plan
Rothstein o Fthe Western [)istrict of’ Washington
aquatic conservation strategy at the
required timber sa cs to comply with the p Ian’s
strategy at the watershed level was not
individual timber sale level: compliance with the
the record indicating that the proposed
enough. Since there was considerable evidence in
terms of’ increased sediment loadings.
sales would I oduce adverse aquatic efl’ects in
d large woody debris, the court
altered flows, decreased pool quality, and reduce
istent with the requirements of’ the
determined that NMFS’s lliOps were not cons
ruled that the plan required NM FS to
Northwest I’orest Plan. Judge Rothstein also
ts, not merely their ciThets afer ten
consider the short—term effects of’ the timber harves
d the Plans ri parian reserve
In addition, the court held that NM FS violate
reserves without evidence of any
requirements by authorizing timber harvests within
years.

—

ol’ the second Umpqua case seemed to
aquatic benefit from the harvests. The results
at
rvation at all costs” statute. the ESA
indicate thai, despite its reputation as a prese
est
is less protective of aquatic habitat than the Northw
least as interpreted by NMFS
Forest Plan.

Iiiipacfs and 11u’ I:,it’irwtiiicntal
Inland Land BiO,: lakiiigSei’wu’lt’ Cun,iilaiit’c
timber sales is the Inland Land BiOp.
Baseline. Standing in sharp contrast to the Limpqua
concluding that a proposed withdrawal ni’
where NMFS took a contextual approach in
salmon, due largely to the htologicall
Columbia River water would jeopardize listed
s existing environment. NMFS determined
unsatisfactory nature of the Columbia River’

ilio listing ( iscused tbose in
.Judw I tniins ovatidation orihe Oregon
the itct
5).
iote
tb
It! tpua cutthroat (discussed ahoe in text
L’oLlptct itti \\‘IFSs detisting
tootnote
listed
d, since there do not scent to he tiny reuujainiuto
nay beau that the conieuctl tiutiber safes can procee
ifcid by thc uule
secIe a
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igable waterway, the project needed a permit floin the U.S. Army Corps
oIingineers.
triggering ESA consultation requirements. As a result, the Corps
wrote a biological
assessment which concluded that the proposal \voud have no advers
e effects on listed
salmon. In an illustrative

example of the contested nature of current salmon science.
NMFS determined that the Corps assessment was inadequate. The
Corps then re ised
its assessment, again concluding hat the proposal would produc
e no adverse e
because the pumpmg operations effect on sa mon uiigrat ion
would be “nearly
immeasurable.’’ NM ES again emphatically disagreed, concluding
in its HiOp that :he
facility would jeopardi7e listed salmon.”

—

—-

1

--—

-

NM ES’s reasoning in the Inland Land Bi( )p \vas grounded largely
on the
biologically unsatisfactory state of’ Columbia ttnu Snake River
flows. The agemie\
conci tided that the proposed pmjeel
in conceit wi di existing and reasonabR
foreseeable fLiture withdrawals
would make an al ready unsatis factory situation orse.
NM ES estimated that some 30 mu lion acre—feet ofwater is withdrawn for
irrigation from
Columbia Basimi streams each year. That amounts ti roughly 40 percen
t of the average
ann ual natural river flow at \4cNarv Darn in lo\-\ flow years. NM
ES determined tNa
these irrigation withdrawals were “the pnncm pa reason’’ that
the flow objeett \Cs
established in its 1995 !3iOp on hydroelectric operations went umnmet.
In fact, N’vI ES
asserted that “[hint fir irrigation withdrawals, sw mcr t]o\\- oojeeti
ves [fir the Snake
River at Lower Cii’anite Dam] would be met eveiv year ...w lercas
\viih witlidi’awals.
summer tiow objectives are met less than [i fleen CiCcfll oldie time.”
The situation \‘i1S
similar on the Lowei Columbia, where summer 1o objectives would
he met 74 percemmi
ilidrawals, but are act idy 20 creent of the uric wid
01 the time
thorn irrigation
c uncut w mthdra\val s.c”

-
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proposal, in
to a lack of federal agency action, NMFS decided that the bland Land
future
combination with the cumulative impacts produced by existing and likely
d, NMFS
withdrawals, would produce species jeopardy. This jeopardy could be avoide
s during
concluded, only ifthe project were conditioned upon “no net loss” ofstreamflow
to enstire that
the spring salmon migration season and several other measures designed
conditions
NMFS’s flow objectives would likely be met on a weekly basis. These
perspective.
essentially made the project infeasible from Inland Lands 62

.

.

The Inland Land BiOp produced allegations from some in Congress that the ESA
gwater right
was unlawfully abrogating state water rights, since Inland Land had a pendin
that its usual
from the state of Oregon for the pumping facility. NMPS responded
courts have
position is to “meet liSA water needs consistent with state law,” but that
cases that
required state water right holders to act consistent with ESA requirements. The
have
have considered the intersection between ESA requirements and state water rights
do water
ruled that I) the Corps ofEngineers could require a federal permit from a Colora
holder had
right holder because ofESA concerns in Nebraska; 2) a California water right
3) Texas
to exercise its right in a manner that did not violate liSA requirements; and
habitat in an
groundwater pumpers had to observe liSA-imposed restrictions to preserve
different
aquifer. NMFS’s restrictions on the Oregon water right holder hardly seemed
has yet to
than these cases. Even so, whiLe blocking the Inland Land withdrawal, NMFS
contracts
subject continued water deliveries to irrigators under Bureau of Reclamation
ts are not
to liSA consultation. despite Ninth Cireuit rulinga that existing water contrac
requirements.
’
immune from regulatory requirements, including liSA 6

?.
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contradictory results may reflect NMFS’s inconsistent implementation of thc ESA.
Or
the difference may bedue to the fact that in the Umpqua situation NMFS claimed that
the
timber sales were consistent with the requirements of the Northwest Forest Plan,
an
ecosystem management plan promising both sustainable species and timber harves
ts (a
claim that the court did not accept). On the other hand, in the Inland Land BiOp, the only
relevant ecosystem plan was NMFS’s own BiOp on hydroelectric operations,
which
called for specific flows for salmon migration. and those requirements had not been met.
The Ihct that the ecosystem plan for the river contained specifics that the forest plan did
not may explain why NMFS’s decision making on the individual projects was materi
ally
diflbrent

£waping ESA Consuliathm: PERC-Liceused Dune Opernlions and Bureau
of
Reelansathut Wales Deliveries

Despite the broad scope ofactivities now subject to ESA consultation, not every
federal activity having significant adverse effects on listed salmon has or is undergoing
biological consultation. Two glaring exceptions are dam operations licensed by
the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Bureau of Reclamation water
management activities.

There is no question that a decision by FERC to relicense a dam is a federal
action triggering ESA consultation. Thus far, however, operation of federally license
d
damq has managed to escape consultation, largely on the basis of two curiou judicia
s
l
interpretations ofthe Federal Power Act’s provision authorizingjudicial review ofFER
C
actions. First, a district court ruled that environmental plaintiffs could not challen
ge
FERC”s failure to consuLt on the ongoing etYeets of a licensed dam because section 313
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ions in annual
Federal Power Act. fuil to consider protective fish and wildlife condit
may exempt
operating licenses while a relicensing proceeding was underwa. If FFRC
vely enable federally

itself from ESA pmcedures by choosing not to act, ii will effecti
federally owned
licensed dams to escape the consultation requirements imposed on

dams!’

ed to escape
The Bureau of Reclamation is another agency that has thus far manag
operates a series ol
ESA consultation on its Columbia Basin operations. The Bureau
ofwafer.
dams in Idaho. Oregon, and Wyoming, collectively storing 6.5 nii Ilion acre—feet
to irrigators, some
Neither the Bureaus operation of these dams nor its water deliveries
been subjected to
of whom are not authorized to receive sLich federally stored water, has
BiOp on the Bureaus
comprehensive analysis in a Bi()p. In 1997. NN4FS wrote a drall
obtain the 427.000
Snake River operations. but that analysis considered only efforts to

it did not evaluate
acre—feet of water for fish flows called for in NMFS’s existing I3iOp:
ver. in I 9% the Bureau
the effects of Bureau project Operations on listed salmon. Moreo
ng the I lells
signed an agreement with Idaho Power Company. the FERC licensee operati
way that ensures that
Canyon dams, in which the Bureau agreed to limit flows in a
met. Neither that
salmon flow aigets downstream on the Snake River usually wil I not he
t to consultation, and
agreement nor its implementation has ever been subjec
environmentalists are considering an ESA suit.

that. hue the
This evasion oIESA consultation by FERC and the Bureau shu s
government to
ESA has subjected most salmon—damaging activities of the federal
ting federal lv control led
consultation, the statute is not vet truly conipreheusl\e in subicc
not authorize
salmon—damaging activities to biological scrutiny. Since the FSA does
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Section 9 of’the ESA prohibits “taking” of listing species by anyone. The
statute
defines a take broadly to include harming or harassing species. and
the implementing
retulations include habitat modification which adversely affects listed species
essential
behaviors, like breeding and nesting. The regulations were upheld
by the Supreme (oLin
in I 995, so the taking prohibit ion now provides significant habitat protect
ion on private
lands, since unlike the consultation process, the take prohibit ion is not limited
to federal
activities or 7
lands.

the right

to

take listed

species as

The NSA piovides two ways to authorize takes of listed species: I throug
h the
)
federal consultahon process. and 2) through an incidental iake permit.” Private
act ivi tics
requiring f’edcral approval subject to NSA consultation may be approv
ed in the
consultation process by what is known as an ‘incdental take statement.”
An authorized
taking cannot jeopardize the species’ continued existence, and the federal agency
must
ensure that adverse e fleets of the take are iii mi in ized. ihe other way
to aLithonizc a
nonfederal

fbr

take of a listed species is through an ‘incidental take permit” issued by the
agency responsible for the species. This penilni requires preparation
of a habitat
conservation plan (I ICP). which must minimize adverse effects
of’ the take and
demonstrate that it will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
survis iii and
recovery of the species in the wild.’’ Typical lv. I ICPs require the permit
tee to set aside
some land or other habitat to piotect the species on to refrain horn certain
acti si ties
incidental e fleets oftheir otherwise awf’u
exchange

One benefit olobtaining an incidental take peniiiit is a lederal regulator\ pliey
pioinisinto Impose no new land ase resinictionsol aduitionai financial cumpe
iSCta)n

activities.

(if
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ment spending. As
viability, the 1)01ev isa recipe for extinctions or unanticipated govern
a result, the policy is now under court challenge.

The Pivposed Mu/—C o/unihut FJCPs

bia
In I 93 operators o I pufil ic utility district dams on the mainstem Mid—Colum
nmentalists
began negotiations with federal and state fishery agencies, tribes, and enviro
ChiefJoseph
to produce a conservation plan which would govern salmon restoration from
evolved into
Dam to the confluence of the Yakima and Columbia Rivers. That plan
Chelan. which have
separate HCPs tbr the three dams, Rocky Reach. Rock Island. and
preparing an
been submitted to NMFS. N MFS is now analyzing the plans and
expected until
environmental impact statement on them. A decision on the HCPs is not
sometime in 200 I

percent
The proPosed I—lCPs are for fifty years, and their goal is to achieve 100
means that
‘no net impact” for each salmon species affected by the three dams. That
exist if the dam
each species will complete its life cycle in the same numbers as would
this goal by
did not obstruct its migration. The proposed HQPs seek to accomplish
percent juvenile
ensuring 91 percent survival in the area of the project, including 95
compensated
salmon survival passing the dams. The nine percent mortality rate is to he
cinent program (two

by a hatchery program (seven percent) and a tributary iinprov
to the discretion
percent). I low to achieve these species survival goals vi1 I be left largely
will develop
of the dam operators and to hatcher arid tributary comnittices who
ry while
implementation plans. NM FS touted this appr(Jach as pruniot ing sal mon recove
the proposed
allowing pernlittec flxihil ity. Former Vice President Al Gore praised

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

improvement program actually compensates for a two percent mortality rate.
Moreover,
the HCPs assume that a two percent increase in habitat will correlate
to a two percent
increase in returning adult salmon, but there is no scientific support for that
proposition.
It is also questionable whether there is sufficient scientific support for NMFS
to make the
two statutorily required findings which are prerequisite to issuance of an
incidental take
permit: I ) that the HC’P will “niinimia and mitigate the impacts” ofthe
dams; and 2) that
the continued operation of the dams “will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of
survival and recovery of the listed salmon in the wild.” NMFS has,
as yet, done no
quantitative analysis of biological data on the Mid-Columbia salmon runs,
which would
seem necessary to make these findings?

Beyond the scientific questions. there is the legal question ofwhether federal
ly
licensed activities under the Federal Power Act qualify for an incidental
take permit.
Both the USA and NMFS’s IICP handbook appear to limit the activities
which may
qualify for an incidental take permit to non-federal actions. Incidental
takes may be
issued to federally licensed activities, like the Mid-Columbia datis, but
only through the
federal consultation process. to which the “no surprises” policy does
not apply. That
would mean that non-federal dam operators could not receive assurance
that nothing
more would be required of them during the term of their HCP.”

The length ofthe proposed TTCPs is their most troublesome aspect. Their 50-yea
r
length exceeds the proiects’ existing Federal Power Act licenses by roughl
y forty-live
years. The HCPs stipulate that any party may withdraw from the HC’P
if the federal
licensingagency,the Federal EnergyRegulator) Commission, thIs to includc
thcentirety
of the llC’P in its relicense of the dam, or adds terms and conditions “incon
sistent” with
the HCP. ‘The proposed liC’Ps also seek to prohibit the parties from invoki
ng or relying
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of compensating fr the costS
hatchery compensation has gone from the preferred method
measure that is now
of developments that damage salmon habitat to a mitigation
to hatchery production
considered one of the causes of salmon decline. A commitment
imprudent.
for another half century as mitigation for dam—related losses seems

Progrmcs
i7ie 40/) 5aliiioii ii it/c: EI1Lottlaç’Il?ç’ .Siaic arni Local ES1

ized through the
Activities resulting in takes of listed species may be author
s. 01 through 4(d) rules.
federal consultation process. through incidental take permit
the conservation of species
Section 4(d) of the ES\ requires NMFS to adopt rules far
its sister agency, the U.S.
listed as “threatened.’ I3efore the salmon listings. NMFS and
to make the same take
Fish and Wildlife Service, generally used 4(d) rules simply
ble to threatened species.
prohibitions that apply to endangered species also applica
unsuccessful efforts to avoid
I lowever, influenced by Oregon GovernorJohn Kitzhaber’s
sed in chapter 14), N\IFS
salmon listings by developing a state conservation plan (discus
ed how state and local
promulgated a 4(d) salmon rule in July 2000 which describ
prohibition for activities
governments may gain blanket exemptions from the take
affecting fourteen populations of salmon listed as threatened.

concerning ESA
The 4(d) salmon rule could revolutionize federal—state relations
to assume a proactive role in
implementation because it encourages states and localities
and local go er nments
protecting listed salmon. NMFS claimed that by encouragi ig state
than they would from a
to develop upprovable programs, salmon will benefit more
) hccause of ‘‘thc
blankei taking prohibition (which woti Id liavc been pic iniisl’ applicd
entities that practical and
program itself and by demonstrating to similarly situated
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state and local iovernnients to predict whether their programs will sans
fy the rule.
Although the rule did speci flcal ly approve a few conservation progra
ms. such as
Was hington’s lorest practices ri es and ()regon’s road ma mtenance prorain, the
rLihe is
replete with general I ties. For example, concerning local land development
oid inances,
the rule simply says they must I) ‘‘avoid’’ development in inappropriate areas
like
unstable slopes, wetlands, high habitat value areas and stream crossings
by roads and

——

—

utilities; 2) ‘‘adequately’’ avoid stonnwaterdiseharges, protect ripa nan areas. and preserv
e
the hydrologic capacity of streams to pass peak floods; and 3) provide “necessary’’
enlbi-cement. funding, reporting, nuplementation iuechamiisins_ and plan evalua
tions at
least once every live years. Moreover, the rule on lv requ i es N \‘l PS to take into
account
such lactors
there are twelve in all, including maintaining “properly functioning
ecological conditions
hut NM PS need not assure that a program fbI tills at
I
twelve
conditions. NMFS also promised to “periodically’’ e aluate approved prorLm
and
identify progim changes necessary to provide “desired’’ habitat functions to
support
poprtlation productivity levels needed to conserve listed saimonids. lfflose change
s are
not made, “in the shortest time feasible,’’ but no longer than one year, NM FS will
revoke
program approval, meaning that compliance with the program will no longer
insulate
developments from the statute’s take prohihition.

If the promised revolution in lederal—statc relations in i:SA implementai on i to
occur, the 4(d) rLmle nitLst Survive litigation. Both eitvronmentai ists and develo
pers ha\ e
filed suit. The environmental isis. along with coiiniereia lishing groups, claime
d ilai
appioval of the Washington forest practice rules and the local land use progra
m rules ‘vi
riot conserve salmon, as required by section 4(J) of the ESA. but instead v II
hariii
salmon by authorizing liahi tat destruction. They asked a federal district court to require
NMPS to prepare an eiiviromiinental miupaci statement which vuulu evaluate alte
rnati\ es
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writing.
challenge to the rules had been resolved as of this tm
The’ E&’I and Tribal Sabnon Ilan’esis

One troublesome issue of ESA implementation concerns the effect ofthe statute
on tribal salmon harvests protected by the Stevens Treaties. As discussed in chapter 4,
the tribes’ 50 percent harvest share under the treaties is 50 percent of the salmon available
.
for harvest c4ler conservation needs are met. The liSA in elThet redefines conservation
ts.
so it may be a mistake to depict a conflict between the liSA and tribal harves
harvests?
Conservation ofthe species always takes precedence over harvests, even tribal 7

.

,.,j

,:.,,fl

—

•‘.

y3:

How to allocate harvest cutbacks due to the liSA is hardly clear, however. One
might infer from several federal court decisions that the cutbacks would be allocated 50
percent to the tribal fishery and 50 percent to the non4ribal fisheries. But, as discussed
in ehapter4. in his 1969 landmark decision in Se’huppy v. Smith. Judge Belloni statedthat
restrictions on tribal harvests must be the “least restrictive” consistent with conservation
necessity. Moreover, a 1997 secretarial order on the liSA. treaty rights, and federal trust
responsibilities, described mote fully in chapter 12. requires that any restrictions on treaty
rights under the liSA be imposed only alter a detennination that necessary conservation
cannot be achieved by reasonable regulation of non-Indian aeth’ities alene. Under this
order. all of the additional conservation burden imposed by the liSA could be allocated
to non-Indian fishers, which is how NMFS interpreted the order in 2000. ilie tribes
to
would like to seethe orderapplied not only to non-Indian harvests by fishers. but also
a far greater source of salnirn murtality. The states
non-Indian harvests by dams

-‘
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recommendations otan interagency technical advisory committee,
whose first goal is to
ensure that there is su f’licieni. spawning tish for propagation. In I
995. .Judue Marsh ruled
that the recomm

action

of

the law.
”
7

endations ofihe advisory committee were federal actions subject to ESA
consultation. Tb is is an odd rul mu, since the recommendations
are not actually final
decisions hut merely advice to the court. And it is hardly clear that
a judicial decision
subject to frderal consultation Lmnder the ESA. Yet that is appare
ntly the
is an

current state

The Salmon c ff5.1 Leaci

The advent of the NSA era in salmon restoration has forever change both
d
the
implenientation of the statute and land and water use decision makin
g in the Northwest.
Whether the new era has actually produced changes that will henclit
salmon runs is ftmr
less certain.

The salmons legacies to NSA implementation are numerous. First, in
an example
ofhow the law shapes and constrains science, NMFS invented the
ESU concept in order
to manage the listing process. This concept limits the salmon popula
tions eligible for
listing to those considered evolutionarily signiticant, but the ESU
concept emphasizes
reproductive isolation at the expense of ecological considerations. Since
hatchery fish
are not reproductively isolated from wild fish, it is not clear that NMFS
has the authority
under this policy to list only wild fish under the NSA or to manag
e only for their
restoration. Moreover, the reproductive isolation criterion seems
misguided, since the
restoration goal is not to produc
e reproductively isolated salmon stocks but to have
Imealt by. sd f—sustaining stocks colonize quality habitat. \\IFS would
he wise to adopt
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lining culminated not
that about three—quarters ofthe ESA consultations sub;ect to stream
concunence approving
with a NMFS BiOp, but instead with a N \‘l ES summary

ent. Certainly
mitigation ueasui-es contained in an action agency’s biological assessm
lining may be to
benefit to expedited procedures. bLit the net effect of stream
there
agencies in inlprov ing their
emphasize NM FS’s oft—the—record negotiations with actioil
ed in written F3iOps. This
assessments, instead ol its biological expertise as reflect
cient assurance that biological
reduction in publicly accessible records oilers insuffi
considerations viil predominate in ESA consultation.

the use of multi—year
A third salmon legacy to ESA implementation concerns

hydroelectric operations. The
BiOps, first ill itiated in the context of Columbia Basin
I consultations by adding
institution of these long—term plans raised the stakes in feclera
ng attention devoted
a significant temporal dimension for ongoing activities. The resulti
to make numerous
to the multi—year BiOp on hydroelectric operationsencouraged NMFS
. Although these
compromises protecting economic concerns at the expense of salmon
courts have refused
compromises arguably were inconsistent with tile intent of the ESA,
to reverse tile compromises that NMFS struck.

completed)

ed the use
A fourth legacy of the salmon listings to [ISA implementation involv
ement plans like the
of the consultation process to enforce fwc—existing ecosystem manag
. as evident ill tTle
Northwest Forest Plan. These plans can include multi—year I3iOps
to ha c employed
Inland Land BiOp. Perhaps more significantly. \ MI-S appears

not vet
consultation to implement measures contained ill its proposed (but
In plans through federal
g
Columbia Basin salmon recovery plan. Ifiinplenicntm ecosste
thenlsclvcs he suheci
consultation becomes commonplace. it is inportant that tile pluls
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ate where the agency had iunored the iew
s olstate
and tribal biologists. This relLisal indicated
that the ESA demands a pltntilistic process
otintergoveriunental consultation in arriving
at bcst availaule science, a tacit recognition
o Ithe contested nat nrc olcunent sal mon scien
ce. NM VS appeared to agree. establishing
a process br independent scieni I lie review o itS
act ions Although NM ES was Ufl\\ illing
to accept the reconunendations olindepen
dent scientists on whether to breach the lowe
r
Snake River dams (see chapter 13). the process
ob obtaining independent scicnti tic review
now seems well established.

Suhinoii Leraci

A sixth contribution olthe salmon to the ESA
is an innovative use ol sect;oa 4(d)
of the statute. NM VS’s 4(d) rules br sal non
do not simply make the Act’s takbg
prohibitioii applicable to ‘‘threatened” spec
ies (as had been the case before the salmon
listings), they instead encourage states and local
ities to develop conservation programs.
I tapproveci by NM ES. these programs will aLith
orize “takes” obsalmon while, aeeordnu
to NM FS. contributing to the surv
ival ol the species. Whether the 4(d) rules
will actual lv
contribute to the salmon’s survival is unknown
hu feinu iii ted for other species, the rules
could produce signi ticant dehderalization
in ESA implementation.

The ES4

It the salmon’s effects on the ESA have
been nianv and varied, the I SA’s
contribution to salmon restoration is far less
certa in. There is no ouestion thai the I
listings have produced a massive amount ol proc
ess. a lbe I some of i now “sireaiiil inc
Even more process may be on the way, with
suggestions that N \1 ES may unLake a
in which Columbia i3asin hydroelectric oper
ations, hatchery opcrit iOfls.
‘‘mega—BiOp”
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escaped biological review. For example,
procesS, some damaging activities have
C licenses would seem to be an ongoing
hydroelectric operations under existing FER
r
ion, as v onld i3ureau of Reclamation wate
iedem’al action requiring ESA consultat
er type ot activity has been subjected to
deliveries under existing contracts. Yet neith
again that citizens ask courts to order the
consultation, and it may he necessar once
agencies to lid (‘ill their ESA duties.

——

——

Ss 2000 decision to continue
The most significant ESA decision was NMF
truck and barge instead of recommending
arti icially transporting juvenile salmon by
to let the fish migrate in the river. This
breaching the thur Lower Snake River dams
that what the ESA mostly offers listed
determination was perhaps the best indication
sensitive decisionmaking Despite strong
salmon is elaborate process and economically
means to recover listed Columbia l3asin
evidence that dam breaching is both the best
sought to avoid the political controversy that
salmon and economically atThrdablc, NMFS
g continued barging and trucking. Equipped
would surround dam breaching by supportin
a plan that
hydroelectric opei’ations
with judicial approval of its previous BiOp on
and Wi a potential
vering listed salmon
promisecljust a lifty percent chance of’ reco
some of the focus aav from hydropower to
“mega BiOp” in the wings that could shift
have su f’Lieient discretion to continue
other sources of salmon mortality, NMFS may
indehnitelv. Ii’ so. NM FS is unlikely to
arti ticially transporting salmon downstream
e Rivers flow, despite the ftiilurc ofthc
rnateially change the way the Columbia and Snak
discernible impro\clncnts in salmon returns
trucking and barging program to produce
over more than two decades,
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lly insensitive statute vhose inplementaiion focuses on species preservation
to the exclusion of all competing social val iics.
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\,i

ol AeL ‘Ihe
1972 amendments made ii national policy to ‘restore and inamtain the chemic
al, physical,
and biological integrity oi’the at ions waters.’’ They einphasi ed control ofpoin
t source
discharges: that is, activities employing pipes, ditches, or other ‘‘discernible,
delined, and
discrete convevancel s)’ to discharge pollutants into the \‘ aters of the
United States.
de lined to nc tide hot h navigable and nonnavwab Ic waters, Under the amend
ments, a
such dischargers reqrnre federal or stale—issued pcriuitN.w hieb must incorp
orate national
discharge standards and water qua I ny—based controls.
ioators arc subject to ci vi’ and
criminal penal ties, which may he sought liv federal or state agencies
or members of the
public in citizen suits.

The Clean Water Act is not limited to control of point sources, however.
It also
attempts to regulate polluted runol’l that is. everything that is not poi ii source
discharges.
genera I lv referred to as nonpoint source pollution. Tvpiea nonpoint source
s include
agricultural, timber, grazing, miii ing, and land development activit
ies such as roads,
pir1ing kIs, and lawns, where the runoff is not channel ized But
the Act does ate
demand that nOnpOint sources obtain a permit. and it leaves their regulat
ion a most
entirely to the states. As a result, the nonpoint share o I’ water polluti
on has gro\\ n
the last quarter century and now amounts to more than half of the nation’s
pollutant
load i rigs.

The Clean Water Act also requires states or the Lnvronmenmal Protec tutu
Agency (EPA) to set :nnbient standards !br waterways called water quality
smaudards,
Actual Iv. the water qual it\ stand’u’its requirement anieda ted the Act’s 1972 anmem
:i!ikts.
originating in the I 9(3 Water Quality Act. Congress el the ater
quality standards
pro sion intact hen it 0\ erhauled time law in I )72. when it added the
rcquirenieai of
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citizen suits has prompted EPA to get much more serious about making states set what
meet
are called “total maximum daily loads” (TMDL.s) for stream segments that fail to
water quality standards. Setting and enforcing TMDLs promises to shift the focus ofthe
Clean Water Act fromjust technology-based point source controls to water quality-based
controls on all sources of water pollution. And since nonpoint sources are in theory
y in
subject to TMDL limits, many nonpoint sources may be subjected to serious scmtin
cant
terms of their water quality effects for the first time. This new era may have signifi
salmon.
effects on Columbia Basin 4
Exempting Dams From Permit Requirements

Large hydroelectric dams, such as those in the Columbia Basin, produce
and
significant adverse waterquality effects. They release water low in dissolved oxygen
high in dissolved metals, temperature, and supersaturated gases (creating gas bubble
ses
disease in fish). They also trap sediments and alter fundamental biological proces
be
downriver in the Columbia River estuary. One way to ameliorate these effects would
to require Clean Water Act point source permits for dam operation. The permits could
n
specit’ operating practices aimed at achieving applicable dissolved oxygen. nitroge
would
supersaturation. and temperature water quality standards. Violating permit tenm
t
subject dam operators to Clean Water Act sanctions, which no doubt would promp
remedial action.

p

More than twenty years ago, the National Wildlifl’ Federation petitioned EPA to
s of
subject dams to the Act’s permit program, but EPA declined, mostly on ground
of
administrative convenience. EPA decided it did not want to assume the chore

—.
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, merely providing a medium through which water
passes. Without a discharge. there is no requirement to obtain a permit. In 1982, the
District Court for the District of Columbia disagreed with EPA, relying partly on the
ambitious purpose of the statute (to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation
’s
waters), partly on the fact that the permit program was Congress’s preferred method for
achieving that goal, and partly on the court’s determination that the goal could not be
attained without regulating dam-caused pollutants. But on appeal the D.C. Circui
t
reversed the lower court and upheld EPA’s interpretation ofthe statute because it was not
unreasonable. The appeals court did not emphasize the goals ofthe Clean Water Act, nor
how to achieve them without regulating dams. The upshot was that the water quality
problems caused by dams were left largely to inet’fectual state nonpoint source progra
ms
and to uncertain water quality-based regulation, which would not materialim for nearly
two decades.

A second court challenge concerned the alleged discharge of dead fish from a
hydroelectric dam into Lake MichigLtn, an arguable pollutant under the Clean Water Act.
The National Wildlife Federation argued that this situation was different from EPA’s
generic failure to demend permits of all dams because dead fish fell within the statute’s
definition ofpollutants, which includes biological imterials. Therefore environmentalists
contended that the dam was in fact discharging pollutants. triggering the permit
requirement. In 1987, a district court agreed with the environmentalists, holding that
dead fish amounted to an addition ofa pollutant for which the Clean Water Act required
a permit. The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court the next year, however, agreein
g
with EPA that the thin merely changed the form of the fish (from live fish to dead fish).
adding nothing to the water that had not been there before. Therefore, the critical trigger
of adding a pollutant was absent, so iz permit was 7
required.
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the chenhiL’al,
unreasonable, despite the statutes express goal of maintaining and restoring
lied to water
plivsica I, and biological integrity of’ the nations waters. The issue thus shi
int sources of’
qua I il’ standards, the sta lutes means of ensuring that both point and nonpo
pollution protect water qua Ii ty.

hVoier Qua/ui’ Saun/a,’d,s

the
The (‘lean Water Act requires states to set water quality standards “to protect
purposes” of’ the
public health and welFare, enhance the quality of water, and serve the
which must
Clean Water Act. These standards must he approved or disapproved by EPA.
not

rds we
promulgate federal water quality standards i l’it determines that the state standa
States must
sufficient to protect existing uses or meet other requirements of’ the Act.
s for point
review and hold hearings on water quality standards every three years. Permit
activities i t’they
source discharges must achieve water quality standards, as must federal
ng federal licenses
result in either the discharge or runoft’of’pollutants. Activities requiri
y with water
or permits must obtain certification li’om the state that they will compl

quality standards.

——

-

body
Water quality standards consist of I ) designated uses liar which the water
antideiiradalion
must he protected. 2) water quality criteria to protect those uses, and 3)
. They also
provisions designed to prevent significant deterioration of’ water quality
\Vaier quality
prohibit eliminating uses that exmsicd in I p75. whether designated or not.
such as no unreasonable efliacts on
criteria may he expressed in narrat ie lbi’mn
such as sped lied concentrations of pollutants.
or in nuriieric form
desienated uses
muiitdc clear that
\umeric critei’i a are more readi lv en l’orceabl e. but the Supreme ( ‘ourt has

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

Where vatcrbodies do not meet state water qua it standards, the Clean
Water
Act requires LPA or the states to identity the noncomplying stream
s (called water
quality—limited segments), rank them in order ol priority, and set TM
DLs to bring the
waterbodv into coinpl ance with water quality standards. A Per the
states ignored their
TM Dl_. obliiations or the better p’ of t\\-o decades. LR\ is now under
numerous court
te develop them. This TM l)L litigation oflbrs the prospect of
finally making
orders

requii’es

allocating pollution rights consistent with the TM DL, and

nonpoint sources subject to state water quality standards, Setting TM
1) Is ma become
an i nportant part ol salmon restoration eflorts, as tIme vast
majority of Columbia i3asin
streams have tempera aires too high for success tu l salmon spawning.
rearine. ann
migration. [3u1 setting a TM DL will not necessarily reqtm ire any point
or nonpoint source
to do anvth ing: that
the statute is

i/ia

(‘alum/i/ct Basin

extremely vague as to how that task is to be aceomolished
. l—Ios e\- er. the
Act requires hderal activities, including nonpoint sources like dams, to compl
y with state
water quality standards independent of the setting of TMDLs. This obliga
tion isat the
ot the suit involving the Lower Snake Dams, discussed in a succee
ding sect ion.

center

1J’,fei Oiicili/i’-Liniiiec/ Si,’cantv in
Throug

segments tested ibr water qlmal ity. and

:t no

hout the Coluinbia Basin, water qud utv ieiiiai is in poor coiidit
ion. largely
due to ineffective regulation ot nonpoint sources. In Washi
ngton. tor eanmplc. soule (3(i
stream segments lhi led to meet water quality standards in I 99S. His
represents lore
doubt tuiderstcie the

than halfof the stream

inri, irrigation

severit\ of the problem because of the states restricli e Isi lug criteria
More than one
halfof (he noncoinpi ing segments failed due to 1 gh temperatures. The
nam causes of
high teniperatures are noiipoint soui’ces,such as timber har estulg.o\
ergray
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es
Sound. federal studies have shown that even short, three-week stays in urban estuari
ncy
have significant sublethal effects on salmon, including causing immune deficie
normally.’
disorders and failure to migrate 2

In Oregon, them were 1,067 stream segments failing to meet water quality
meet
standards in 1998, involving 13,687 stream miles. Most ofthese segments failed to
d
temperature standards: 862 streams, involving 12,146 miles. The second most violate
on,
standard in terms of strewn miles was dissolved oxygen, with 1,130 miles in violati
involving 61 noncomplying streams and four lakes. Third was the hydrogen ion
on,
concentration (pit) standard (measuring acidity), with 1,117 stream miles in violati
standard.’
although involving many more streams than the dissolved oxygen 3

The situation is actually much bleaker than depicted above, since water quality
data is available for fewer than half of Oregon streams. Worse, as discussed below,
NMFS has recently called into question the capability of current standards to meet the
biological requirements for survival and recovery of listed salmon species, even in
4
streams where the standards are being met.’

..:

—

—.

.

In Idaho. the situation is not materially better. The water quality standard most
g
often violated is the state’s sediment standard. A total of 573 scream segments, totalin
ature,
6,483 miles, were in violation in late 1999. The second biggest problem was temper
ed
with 145 streams and 1.769 miles in violation. Iligh temperatures decrease dissolv
ratio,
oxygen levels and are often an indication ofexcessive sediments, poor width/depth
and loss of instream flows and riparian vegetation.”

fr
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increase the time necessary to hatch and decrease growth and survival rates. Low
oxygen
levels also inhibit the ability to migrate, forage, and avoid predators. They also
increase
the toxicity of metals and ammonia, a particular problem fir eggs in redds
(nests).
’
1

The p11 standard reflects the acid-based equilibrium achieved by various
dissolved solids and gases: low levels arc acidic; high levels alkaline. Low pH
levels are
toxic to fish, due to dissolved metals in the water column and sediments,
especially
aluminum. At higher pH levels, ammonia is a problem. Lower pH levels occur mostly
west of the Cascades; p11 levels rise in the eastern Columbia Basin. mostly
due to
geology and climate, but also due to acid drainage from mines, releases ofwate
r stored
in reservoirs, agricultural runoff, and nutrients from fertilizers and animal wastes
.

Not many states have sediment standards, as Idaho does. Sediment can inundate
gravel spawning grounds. In streams with elevated sediment levels, salmon suffer
from
reduced survival and size when they emerge from the gravel, particularly in stream
s with
low dissolved oxygen 7
levels.’
TMDL Liilgaiion in the Pacific Nonhwesi

_

Where waterbodies fail to meet applicable water quality standards. the Clean
Water Act requires states to identify infractions, establish a priority rankin
g, and set a
“total maximum daily load” (TMDL) for each pollutant that violates the standa
rds.
Although the TMDL requirement has existed for nearly thirty years. for most
of its life
EPA and the states ignored the requirement. It took citizen suits, beginning in
the I 980s,
to require EPA and the states to begin to set l’MDLs. In the Columbia Basin, the
TMDL
effort began in Oregon in 1986. when EPA agreed to a settlement ofa suit brough
t by the

r.
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entation
the slate would develop a complete list ol’ TM DLs. along with implem
with iii ten years.’

ent its
In Washington. litigation was also necessary to make the state implem
ates filed suit
TM DL duty. Environmental groups led by Northwest Environmental Advoc
,

p TM DEs.
in 1991 leading to a settlement under which the state promised to develo
ent was reached
When the state lhiled to meet the terms ol that settlement, a new settlem
a Ii lleen—year
in 1998 under which the state agreed to not only develop TM DLs on
unatelv. the
schedule. but also to accompany them with implementation plaits. Unlbrt
ent until 1999. In
Washington legislature did not fund implementation o F the settlem
will postpone
addition, EPA reached an agreement with the timber industry that
ent is now
development ol’ TMDLs associated with logging [‘or ten years. That settlem
rage future TM DL
under court challenge. This Federal and stale recalcitrance will discou
implementation
settlements and encourage environmentalists to seek court—ordered
schedules.’

ed TMI)Ls
In Idaho, environmentalists brought two suits that effectively activat
le for identil\’ing
in that state. In the First, the court ordered EPA to develop a schedu
shing a schedule
water quality—impaired waters and to cooperate with the state in establi
n that the state’s
for developing TMDLs. In the second, the court upheld an EPA decisio
promulgate new ones.
existing water quality standai’ds were deficient and ordei’ed EPA to
some 962 stream
The upshot ol the litigation and an en..ui ng settlement agreement is that
s over an eight—year
segments in Idaho will have new water quality standards and TMDL
be on the
period. The prospect of’ attaining l’isltab Ic s aters in Idaho finally nay
horizon:’
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In I Q99. a coalition of environmental ortan
:t.ations fed by the National WIIdH’e
Federal ion filed suit au4ai nsl the Corps ol
Eneineers, operator of the font federal dam
s on
the Snake River below ihe I lells Canyon Com
plex. The environmentalists charged that
these dams operate in violation 01’ the
state o 1’ Wash ngton’s numerical water qual
ity
standards for temperature and dissolved
gas. They also claimed that the operation
s
violated the slate’s

narrative criteria concern ini the iii pa i
rinent of’ reproduction of’
salmon, an existinrZ use of’ the Snake Rive
r, a violation 01 the stale’s antideuraclati
on
policy. Unlike most nonpomnt sources,
the Clean Water Act expressly requires
federal

tlat i he

nonpoint sources, such as federal dams,
to comply with stale water quality standards.
In
flict. the Forest Service has had several timb
er sales enjoined for failing to deinoi:strate
compliance with those state standards. The
Corps ol’ Engineers would seem to be no in
di fldrent a position than the Forest 2
Service
1.

Washineton’s waler quality standards for the
Snae River require

temperature must not exceed 20 degrees
Cels

.

ius due a human iieti\ uties, The stand
ards
also stipulate that dissolved gas cannot
exceed II 00l of saturation .Since Was
hington
designated the Snake River as a “class A”
river, it must also :tteel or exceed the need
s of
salmon migration, Spa\\ ning. and rearine
And [lie states anticegiadation policy requ
ires
that “existing beneficial uses shall he
maintained and ouieeted and no furth
er
degradation which would intertre with bene
fie al uses slui I heal 2
fowed.”

its BuOp on

The state has listed the Snake River as hniii
ig to fleet its water quality siam:d:uds
since l )94. identifying the likely caus
e for Ciilnre to fleet the temperature stand
ard us
‘‘stratification behind :mpoundineuits.’’
In I flX. the result was more than 0 days
of’
nycroeleet ‘ic upei’ai ions, \ VI FS determine
d that
temperature violations. in
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e Dams. The draft EJS considered
statement (ELS) on breaching the Lower Snak
the existing water quality standards,
alternatives to breaching, none of which would cure
tion. This drew sharp criticism from the
and failed to recommend a preferred course ofac
y address water quality issues and
EPA, which claimed that the EIS failed to adequatel
ity standards. The Corps responded that
lacked a plan for meeting applicable water qual
e EIS.” a claim that seems in error
water quality standards “were not within the scope ofth
ider the relationship between their
given EIS regulations requiringaction agencies to cons
nded by stating that the operation
proposals and applicable legal standards. EPA respo
n Water Act. The Corps denied it was
of the Corps’ Snake River dams violates the Clea
r managcment practices and runoff
in violation of the statute, pointing to upriver wate
agencies could not resolve their
patterns. The Corps suggested that if the two
ity stands, the matter could be resolved
disagreements over the applicability ofwater qual
rnatively, the Lower Snake Dams suit
by the Council on Environmental Quality. Alte
could resolve the iss&’

iZ.,

:....;p..•

I——-.

.:•.

consultation procedure by
Unlike the ESA. the Clean Water Act cuntains no
ations. So the court could order the
which EPA may sanction on-going activities or oper
with the water quality standards. In
Corps to develop a plan tbr achieving compliance
with environmentalists that the Corps
Mareh 2000, the federal district ofOregon agreed
standards in operating its dams, and
was not exempt from complying with ‘water quality
ity standards violations. The court
that the dams were a substantial cause of water qual
with standards, however. One option
has yet to order the Corps to take actiai to comply
ld be to breach the lbur Lower Snake
for improving water quality in the Lower Snake wou
Dams. as discussed in chapter 13?’

.
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clearly a federal action subject to ESA consultation, but this
was the first time in the region that NMFS subjected federal approval of a state’s water
quality standards to scrutiny under ESA procedures. Although the results produced only
one rejection of a state standard Oregon’s 68 degree Fahrenheit temperature standa
rd
for the Willamette River the long-term consequences could be quite significant.

The BiOp began by discussing the current state ofOregon water quality in terms
of its fitness to meet the needs of listed salmonids. It determined that because “not all
of
the biological requirements of the listed and proposed species for freshwater habitat
in
general, and for water quality in particular, are being met under the environment
al
baseline in many streams and watersheds.” there had to be “significant improvement.
..
to meet the biological requirements for survival and recovery of these species.”
The
BiOp reached the unsettl ing conclusion that “[a]nyfurtherdegradation in these conditions
would significantly reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of these species
due
to the amount of risk that salmon face under the current environmental 2
baseline.”
’

.

.

.

NMFS scrutinized 8PM proposed approval of standards for dissolved oxygen,
temperature, and hydrogon ion concentration (p11). as part of EPA’s triennial reiew
of
the state’s water quality. However, due to several problems. such as the fict that
the
temperature standards were not being enforced by the state, and the fact that many ofthe
standards themselves were not protective of listed species, EPA attached severa
l
conditions to its approval. Among these conditions was a “regional temperature criteria
project,” which is to develop and recommend over a two-year period “more ecologically
relevant temperature criteria protective ofall salmonid life history stages.” In thecns
uing
BiOp, NMFS determined that there were problems not only with the state’s temper
ature
standards, but also with its dissolved oxygen standards?’

_.
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vet’ chinook and
that has adversely a liected numerous salmonid runs, including Snake R
chinook and
steclhcad, Southern Oreuon coastal chinook, Upper Willamettc River
cutthroat, and
steclhcad, Ni iddle and Lower Columbia River steelhead, Columbia River

undertake more
Umpqua cutthroat. Moreover, N MFS also concluded that the state must
to protect sal monid
stringent mon itonng of i ntergravel dissolved oxygen levels in oidcr
ed was a hderal—
eggs after spa’mig. Among the conservation measures the state accept
spawning
state study to identify the geographic areas and time periods in which salmon
NMFS.
actually occurs in three pilot river basins to he selected by 27

ed oxygen
NMFS also concluded that both the stales cold and cool waterclissolv
bia

Lower Snake

Colum
standards were inadequate to protect a host ofsalmon species, including Lower
ad: Upper
chinook, coho, steelhead, and cutthroat: Oregon Coast ch nook and steelhe

minimum

of

Wi llamette chinook and steefhead; Middle Columbia steelhead: and
rds are expressed in
chinook and stcelhead. Part of the problem is that many state standa
daily
terms of daily or weekly averages, while NMFS concluded that a
2
dissolved oxygen was the key criterion in terms of fish health.

Oregon’s
The I3iOp also scrutini7ed the state’s temperature standards.
is 64 degrees,
temperature standard fbr streams where salmon rearing is a designated use
degrees. A 1995
except in the Lower Columbia and Willamette Rivers, where it is ÔX
atures above 60
study by a state technical advisory committee concluded that temper
, the standard during
degrees posed a risk to young salmon. Where native salmon spawn
trout streams, the
the period from spawning to emergence is 55 degrees. For native hull
g average 0±
standard is 50 degrees. All standards are expressed as a se\ eiHlay movin
some days can
daily maximum temperatures, which means thai higher lcmpcrat ures on
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“

l approval des
) ire tind ing that a wide van ely of’ salmon runs were “likely to
1
he adversely afiecij ed by the standards. “pos( nc a risk to their viability.’’ NM ES
in
turn determ ned that a 64 decree reanine standard was Rely to cause lethal and suihiethal
adverse effects” on adult sa mon, salmon eggs, and young salmon in the Snake, Upper

WI lamette, Lower and NI iddle Columbia. and L mpqua basins, and along the Oregon
Coast. Rut NMES also observed that attainment of the standard would produce
a
‘‘substantial Improvement over the current environmental baseline in many watersheds.’
Even so, accordmg to the agency, meetinc the standard ‘‘likely will not fleet
the

biological requirements” of listed salmon species. This seeiiis to he the equmivaleilt of
clamming that the new standard is an nnpro\ ement because the fish will die more siowE.

s

The spa\vmng temperature standard of55 degrees was problematic as well, since
N\IFS disagreed with most o f’the states spawning dates. As a result, NMFS concluded
that the standard would likely have adverse effects on early spawning spring/summ
er
chinook in the Snake, ;pper \Vihlamette, Lower C’ olumbia. and Oregon Coast. Simnila1v.
late spawning Snake River fill chinook would be adversely affected
by the state’s
wnmng dates.
’
3

designated

NM PS did not find that any of the standards woulc ,eop:irdize the continued
existence any’ listed salinoii species. but it did SL1CCC5I that EPA cooperate
with
it on
studies concerning I ) historic water temperatures in representative ecoregions
ci’ the
state: 2) models of’ stream temperatures that could be attained based on changes to
vegetation, flows, and restoration of hydrologic eon mieci ons to gi’oundwater and flood
plains in representative ecoreciomis: and 3) fish studies of ho\\ temperatures at uhletha
l
levels affect salmon disinihution and reproduction. \“l [‘S also recoinniended that
EPA
cooperate with the state oil any fish kill invesliuailomm in \aters meelinc the
states’
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and 3) expanding water temperature monitoring into the spring and lhll.

The upshot of the ESA consultation on Oregon% water quality is that NMFS
signaled it will no longer rubber-stamp EPA’s approval of state water quality standards.
Instead. NMFS has essentially issued a gentle prod to EPA and the state that more will
be expected in the future. This is certainly a welcome development in terms of salmon
restoration efforts, but it does not assure that more protective standards will be required
in the future and, in any ease, is a tacit admission that today’s standards are insufficient
to meet the biological requirements ofsalmon, let alone improve their condition to where
they might be no longer listed under the ESA. Thus, NMFS’s endorsement of EPA’s
approval of the Oregon standards seems to be a violation of the ESA, as claimed in a
environmentalists.’
notice of intent to sue by 2

The results of NMFS’s consultation on Oregon water quality standards are
unlikely to be confined to Oregon. If similar results occur in the other Columbia Basin
states, it may be that the ESA will become the engine to revitalize water quality standards
and propel the Clean Water Act into the forefront of ESA restoration eflbrts. It would
seem only logical that the statute should assume this position. since one ofits goals is the
attainment and preservation of fishable levels of water quality. Ironically, if the ESA’s
application to waterquality standards produces standards which are aimed at lhcilitating
salmon spawning, there may be less administrative discretion in approving activities
‘which threaten water quality standards, since there is no procedure in the Clean Water
Act similar to the ESA’s biological opinions which can sanction damaging activities?’
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ized by Congress are subject to the licensing requireza’nts ofthe
Federal Power Act (FPA). The FPA requires licenses of all large nonfed
eral dams
producing hydroelectric power. The statute is legally conqilex, vesting
the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with licensing authority but
also including
important roles for state water quality agencies. federal land manag
ers. and federal
fishery agencies. Unlike lèderal dams, whose authorizations haw no
fixed lifespans.
dams subject to the FPA are periodically subject to relicensingrequireme
nts. Relicensing
allows for review of the project and its environmental effects and
may produce
substantial changes to project operations. In a li?w cases, it has even led
to dam removal.
Since there are many FERC-liccnsed dams throughout the Pacific Northw
est, and since
those dams are often the key determinant of flows and access to habitat
throughout an
entire watershed, FPA licensing is frequently a critical variable in salmon
restoration.
In fact, a good case can be made that an FPA settlement agreem
ent controlling
streamfiows on the Mid-Columbia is chiefly responsible for the health
of the Hanford
Reach fall chinook, the last viable spawning population of salmon above
Bonneville
Dam)

Among the watersheds significantly affected by the operation ofFERC-lieen
sed
dams in the Columbia Basin are the Lower Snake, affected by Idaho Power
Company’s
hells Canyon Complex; the Mid-Columbia, athrted by five dams license
d to public
utility districts: the Desehutes, affected by Portland General Electri
c’s Pelton Dam
Complex: the MacKenzie. affected by several dams licensed to Eugen
e Water and
Electric Board: the Lewis taxi Cowlitz, affected by the city ot’Tacoma’s
Mossyrock and
Mayfield projects: and the White Salmon, affected by PaciliCorp’s (ondit
Dam. While
Columbia Basin-wide salmon restoration cannot be accomplished by
FFIRC Licensing
alone, neither can it effectively proceed by ignoring the opportunities
the relicensing
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Iweussug .4ulhori(t’

purposes.
Section 4(e) ofthe FPA authorizes FERC to issue licenses for power
vation. “the
requiring the agency to give “equal consideration” to energy conser
e (including
protection, mitigation of damages to, and enhancement of fish and wildlif
al quality. Under
related spawning grounds and habitat).” recreation, and environment
ns are “best
section 10(a) of the statute, FERC must determine that its license decisio
uses, including
adapted” to a comprehensive waterway plan accounting for a variety of
. and recreation.
water power, fish and wildlife, irrigation, flood control, water supply
merely to require
PARC prepares no such plans, however, since it interprets section 10(a)
are in the public
a fully developed administrative record showing its licensing decisions
uses which are
interest. In so doing, PARC must consider plans governing waterway
ia Basin Fish
prepared by others, such as the Northwest Power Planning Council’s Colunt
and Wildlife Program, although PARC is not bound by such plans?

istent
According to the Supreme Court, PARC may issue licenses that are incons
the Clean Water
with state laws, but states may effectively veto PARC licenses through
tions must
Act’s water quality certification process. Licenses on federal land reserva
Similarly. FERC
satisfy conditions prescribed by federal land management agencies.
fishery agencies.
licensees must meet “fishway” conditions promulgated by the federal
te damages to,
All FERC license decisions must “adequately and equitably protect, mitiga
e conditions
and enhance” fish and wildlife and their habitat. PARC’s fish and wildlif
h PARC may
must be based on recommendations of fish and wildlife agencies, althoug
reject such recommendations by making certain findings.’
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Rccoiiiiiic’ndai’io,i.c

take over licensed projects at the end of their lernis by paving
the licensee’s ‘‘net
investment value’’ in the project, pius severance claniages. FLRC may
also decide to issue
a non-power license.

Plc/i 011(1 1 hId/i/c’ C ()lidii/O11S 011(1

Section 1 0(j) of the FPA, added by amendments in I 9 require
s FIZRC to
md Lide in licenses conditions that will “adequ
ately and eqLlitably protect, mitigate
damages to, and enhance” fish and wildlife and their habitat affected
by licensed prjeets.
Section 1 0( ) conditions must he based on recommendations of federal
and stale fish and
wildl i fe agencies, but those recommendations cannot veto a project.
Moreover, if FERC’
he] eves that section I 0(j) recoinniendations are inconsistent with
the “purposes and
of the PPA or other statutes, l1RC must attempt to reso e
the

requirements’

inconsistency, giving

‘‘due weight’’ to the recommendations, expertise, and statuto
ry
responsibilities ot the fishery agency.
If FLRC decides not to adopt the
recommendations, it must publish findings explaining
I why the recommendations are
inconsistent with applicable law, and 2) how FFRC’
s conditions will adequatey and
equitably protect, mitigate damage to, and enhance fish, wild] fe,
and habitat. The
legislative history of section 10(j) indicated that Congre
ss intendea to impose a non—
degradation standard, stating that the “equitable” language in lie
staw ic ‘‘seeks to elisti cc
that non—power values are, to the greatest extent possible. as healthy
and abuiidtni ah
licensing and development as before.” It is not at all clear
that FER( has accepted this
interpretation
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the
10(j) recommendation under FERC’s regulations, agencies must submit
license
recommendation within 60 days of thc time that FERC’ publishes notice that a
endations
application is ready for environmental analysis. FERC’ requires 10(j) recomm
endations
to be supported by “substantial evidence” and will notconsideras lO(j recomm
te
those that it considers to be unsupported by substantial evidence. FERC may evalua
section
these recommendations under its general licensing authority but will not employ
10(j) procedures or findings.’

FERC has rejected numerous 10(j) recommendations. Moreover. it has rejected
not to
other recommendations for consideration under section 10(j), such as requests
for
construct or operate a project. requests for post-licensing studies, proposed fbnds
project
ecosystem restoration, and recommendations which would give authority over
than
operations or the final design of fish and wildlife enhancement to agencies other
under
FERC. This authority to “reclassify” section 10(j) recommendations as falling
was
other provisions of the FPA, which relieves FERC of making specific findings,
’s
challenged in American Riven v. NMFS. In that case, the Ninth C’ireuit upheld FERC
te
interpretation on the rather weakly reasoned ground that section 10(j) vests ultima
s.
decision making authority with FERC and does not allow other agencies to veto project
avoid
a other courts adapt the Ninth Cireuit’s logic. FERC will be able to continue to
falling
making the statutorily required findings by reclassifying recommendations as
avoid
under provisions other than section 10(j). This ability to reclassify in order to
10(j)
making statutorily requited findings is the most problematic aspect of section
implementation.’
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management agency.
The latter proviso, the conditioning authority of land management agencies, reflect
s the
fact that Congress did not intend FERC’ to have absolute decision making author
ity over
all hydroelectric licensing decisions. FERC was slow to understand this, howev
er, and
that produced an important Supreme Court opinion?

In 1984, in Esconclido Mutual Wiuer Co. r. La Jolla Band qfMission Indians, the
Supreme Court rejected FERC’s longstanding position that section 4(e) condit
ions were
merely advisory. A unanimous Court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute
required FERC to impose the conditions required by the federal land manag
ers. even if
FERC disagreed with them. The Court ruled that section 4(e) conditions could
not veto
a project, and they must be reasonably related to the reservation’s purpos
e. But the
determination of the reasonableness ofa condition is a matter for the courts, not
FERC.
to determine. The Court also confined the geographic scope of 4(e) conditions
to the
boundaries of the reservation: FERC licenses that adversely affect downs
tream
reservations are not subject to 4(c) conditions. Finally, the Court interpreted the
FPA to
allow FERC to license projects on indian reservations, even over tribal objecti
ons?

According to FERC’s regulations, like IOU) recommendations, 4(e) conditions
must be submitted within 60 days of FERC’s notice that the license applica
tion is
available for environmental review. The regulations also attempt to require
land
managers to “specifically identify and explain the mandatory terma or prescriptions
and
their cvidentiary and legal basis.” This requirement is open to some question in the
wake
of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation ot section 18 conditions, discussed below.
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protect operations.

Com/iIioii.

discussed below.’’

Fis/in’ai’

n
This position is also suspect under the Ninth (.‘ircuits decisio

lisherv
Section I 8 of the FPA authorizes li.deral fishery agencies (not state
lar to the federal
agencies) to prescribe bishway conditions. This authority is quite siiiii
ions under
land management conditioning authority to prescribe land reservation condit
and assumed its
section 4(e). Section 18’s fishway requirement was first enacted in 1920
on. Since the
current form in 1935. hut only recently has it received substantial attenti
section I 8 authority
4(e) conditioning authority is limited to federal reserved lands. the
In fact. section 1 8
is arguably the most important conditioning authority under the FPA.
ic utility.
may lead to darn removal, especially dams which are 0! marginal econom

...

on I 8. Its 1 99 1
FERC has taken a characteristically narrow interpretation olsecti
fir the upstream
regulations originally defined flshwavs to include only facilities used
thror of protest, F[RC quickly
passage of fish. When that definition generated a
ies. FFRC then
amended it to include both upstream and downstream lish passage 1tci1it
y prescriptions
attempted to convince Congress to amend section 1 8 to make the iishwa
y definition
advisory. but Congress refused. Instead, it overturned FFRC’s revised flshwa
of both federal
and required any new regulatory delinition to have the concurrence
that provide ‘for the
fishery agencies. Congress also defined lisliways to be mechanisms
limited to physical
safe and timely upstream and downstream passage ot fish
such fish, and
structures, lici Ii ties, or devices necessary iu mainiain all I iti stages ot
tishways.
of 2
project operations and measures” necessary to ensure the effectiveness
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the case of sect ion 4(e) condi lions. Ii RC has asserted authority to “icc lassi
Pc’’
sect ion I X conditions that li ii to meet the standard it has ci’eate
d for section X
conditions. Using this asserted authority, FERC has reccted 0100 toring
and inspection
requirements. consultation requirements. design testing. fjsh mortal
ity standards.
requirements dependent on l’utnrc conditions or new in lormalion, modi
flcations to protec
structures, and changes in project operations that hae the ellect ofregu
lating river Ro s.
All of these positions are questionable in light of the case discussed next.

In lmc’rwa,i Rii’e,,v i’. FE!? C, the U.S. Department of the Interior,
the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wild Ii Ic. and envi roninenta lists challenged
FERC’s rehicensing
of the Leaburg—Waltervillc piject on the 4cKenzie River in Oregon
. 01 prirticular
concern was FFRCs authority to reclassiPc soiie piolTcred section
1 8 conditions and
reject others. Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of section 46.4
conditioning authority in Lscoiid/ Io, the Ninth Ci icuit rcjec ted FERC
’s argument that ii
had the aLithoritv to define the term fishwavs. The court borrowed
a phrase from the D.C.
Circuit and described FERC as merely a” neutral forum,’’ responsible
lir compi Ii rig a
record concerning section 1 8 conditions for the coLirts ufa pcas. Accord
ing to the Ninth
Circuit. FERC

—

may not modify, reject, or reclassif any prescriptions subnut
ted
by
the
federal fishery agencies] under color ol section 8. Where {FERC
]
disagrees with the scope of a fishwa
y
prescri
ption,
it
na
withho
ld
or
voice its concerns in the court of appeals. but at the adin in istrativ
e
stages, ‘it is not FERC’s] role toj udge the val idit of the federal fishery
agencies’] posit on
SLibstantively or procedurally.’
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Quality C eriificaiion

Moreover, given the court’s equation ofsection 18 conditioning authority to section 4(e)
ural
conditioning authority, FERC may not be able to impose any substantive or proced
either.’
limitations on land management agencies 4
Waler

Not all of the conditioning provisions affecting the FPA licensing process are
license
contained in the FPA itself. Section 401 of the Clean Water Act requires FERC
uality
applicantsto obtain statecertification that theirprojeets will meet the state’s watcrq
shing
standards. Thus, although the FPA preempts most state laws, such as laws establi
s to
minimum streamilows, states may use the water quality certification proces
or
eflbetively veto FERC4icenscd projects which would violate water quality standards
Act gives
“any other appropriate requirement of state law.” In short, the Clean Water
available
states authority to affect FERC licensing decisions that would otherwise not be
act on
under the EPA. The Act allows state certifying agencies one year in which to
’s
water quality requests; liilure to act is a waiver of section 401 requirements. FERC
only
regulations require waterqualitycertification foramcndmcnts to FEkCapplications
if they produce a material adverse effect on water quality)’

The Supreme Court gave a sweeping endorsement to the role of water quality
v.
standards in FI3RC licensing in its 1994 decision, PUD No. 1 ofJçfferson County
rn project.
Washington Dçpi. of ELvlogy (Doscwallipx). involving the proposed Ellcho
run it
which would have diverted water from the I)osewallips River in Washington and
river.
through a pipeline equipped with power turbines before returning the water to the
ing a
In order to satisfy applicable state water quality standards that ,iiade salmon spawn

-
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protect salmon habitat, the designated water quality standard use for the
stream.
Even though the state had established no quantitative flow standards
for the Dosewallips
River in its water quality standards, the Court upheld the state’s author
ity to set flow
conditions for the project under general narrative criteria aimed at
protecting salmon
spawning and rearing. Alternatively, the Court suggested that
the antidegradation
provision in the state’s water quality standard could be the basis
of minimum flows.
Perhaps most importantly, the Court endorsed the imposition ofwate
r quality standards
on the project as a whole. Specifically, the Court approved conditions
on a withdrawal
of water from the stream, not merely on the discharge point of the project
. The Court’s
opinion gave states the ability to substantially affect project operations
oIPERC-licensed
projects. One place where the states’ ability to condition FERC dan’s
on water quality
standards may loom large is at Hells Canyon. where Idaho Power Compa
ny is attempting
to relicense its three-dam complex. and where downstream water
quality problems
produce a lethal environment for salmon. Interestingly, relicensing
the Hells Canyon
complex will require water quality certification from both Idaho and
Oregon.’”

Another important court opinion concerning section 401 was another .4aneri
can
Rivers v. flRC decision, a 1997 ruling of the Second Circuit which
rejected FERC’s
position that a state may not impose conditions which reserve to the
state the discretion
to reopen the certification whenever it deems appropriate. Quite like the
Ninth Circuit
concerning section 18 conditions, the court ruled that while states may
impose conditions
affecting water quality, the authority to decide which conditions are reason
ably related
to water quality resides with the courts, not with FERC. The court
interpreted the
Supreme Court’s Ewanditfo decision to mean that FERC lacks thc author
ity to secondguess conditions “imposed by an independent government entity with special
expertise.”
even where those conditions involve asiertions of authority over project
operating
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’ullip.c decisions,
The combination ol the Supreme Court’s Fv(ondido and Doseu
Circuits, gives flderal land
and the line,Ican RI iers decisions of the Second and Ninth
substantial authority over
management. federal fisheries, and state watergual by agencies
conditions apply to existing
the licensing and relicensing of FERC projects. Where such
conditions may be the
projects of marginal economic utility, the net effect of these
removal of the projects when they come up for rd censi ng.

ES1 (on.vuliu/ion

—

have escaped ESA
As discussed in chapter 9. FERC licensees seem somehow to
decisions sanctioning this
consultation once their projects have been licensed. The
have been based on procedural grounds.
one not granted by any statute
exemption
alleged ESA olations
One case held that federal district courts had nojurisdiction over
s courts: the otherconstrued
because the EPA gave exelusivejurisdietion to federal appeal
an order: its failure to
the FPA to giant judicial review only where FERC actually issued
not subject to review As a
act to implement the ESA was, according to this reasoning,
ofthe Ninth Circuit’s
result ofthese cases, FERC has been able to ignore the implications
in chapter 9, which ruled
decision in Pauijk’ Riyc’rs’ Council i’. Thomas, also discussed
were subject to ljSA
that previously approved federal land management plans
are subject to ESA
consultation. If previously approved land management plans
arc not. Nevertheless, FERC
consultation, it is hard to see why existing FERC’ licenses
g to subject Idaho Power
for some time has taken no apparent notice of a petition seekin
Company’s I lells Canyon projects to ESA consultation.’
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Rc’iwim

definition of federal actions subject to ESA consultation. Yet L’LRC—Iicensed
seem to have evaded ESA review as of this writing.’

Re/1nL’IisiJn. and E,iviru,in:tnia/

projects

EERC requires its applicants to engage in \vhat it caNs pre—filing consuitution
with environmental and fish and wildlife agencies. This consultation is supposed
to be
the basis of lish—protecti
conditions iniposed both b FLRC and othe
agencies. Of course, there is now some question as to whether FERC
may impose
piocecluri1 requirements on agencies promulgating conditions under sections
4(e) and I
of the EPA and section 401 of the Clean Water Act, due to the N mb Circuit’s
I 9)9
tllflL’I’UUIi Rime,s i. EER( decision. License applicants must also
Ii Ic an ‘Exhibit h
report with F1IRC that detai Is both the project’s anticipated en ironruental impacts
and
the results of the required consultation with the resource agcncies.

In 1997. FERC changed its regulations to offer a ‘‘collaboi-atmvc option fu
i Is
existing licensing procedurcs. The new rules allowed lbr the establishment of
aiternal Re
procedures that will he governed by a “communications protocol” agreed to
by consensus
among he license applicant, the resource agencics, Indian tribes, and citizen
groups

requests br studies and pre im mary Esh and \\ i Id fe’ ecoinimiendations, mu
conditions, and comments are due during the pie—filing period. 1-lowever,
due
to the
Ninth Circuit’s ;Iinciican Rinei,s decision, it is no oncr cicar that FLRC can
impose
procedural requ’ements like these on mandatory conditions pron iu Igated under sect
Ions
of the EPA and sect ion 4() I of the Clean \Vuir Act.
4(e) and I
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conditions existing at the tint the project sought a new license. The environmentalists
contended that FERC’s interpretation would skew the evaluation ofalternatives required
by the National Environmental Policy Act. For example. under FERC interpretation.
the mandatory “no action” alternative would simply be a continuation of the status quo,
instead of a decision not to relicense the project. Moreover, any improvements to the
status quo would then be considered to be “enhancement” measures instead ofmitigation
project?
For the environmental danmge caused by the 2

lnAsnerkan Rivers p. PERC the Ninth Circuit sided with FERC, concluding that
a current conditions definition of the environmental baseline was a reasonable
interpretation ofthe FPA. The court thought apre-project baseline “defies common sense
and notions of pragmatism [because it would] require [FERC] to ‘gather information to
recreate a 50-year old environmental base upon which to make present day development
decisions.’” The court did observe that adopting a present-day baseline would not
preclude consideration ofconditions “that enhance fish and wildlife resources and reduce
negative impacts attributable to a project since its construction.” But if present-day
conditions are the standard fromwhich to measure a project’s effects on the environment,
it seems obvious that much less protection and restoration of fish and wildlifb is likely
decisions.
to result from relicensing 23

Another contentious issue in the relicensing of FERC projects is the treatment
of cumulative impacts of multiple relicensings in the same river basin. Licensees warn
FERC to consider only the impacts of individual projects: envirnnmcntal ists want FERC
to defer all long-term license decisions until ull the projects in a river basin can be
considered simultaneously. FEW has chosen a middle path in its policy on cumulative
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quo of existing adverse environmental conditions without a thorough assessment of
cumulative 24
inpacts.
The MkI-C’olwnbia Ag.wnienl

One of the most surprisingly successful uses of the FM licensing process in
terms of Columbia Basin salmon was the Mid-Columbia proceeding. There are live
FERC-licensed dams on the Mid-Columbia (see map I. page 11), one of which. Rock
Island Dam. was discussed in the preceding section. In the mid-I 970s. state and federal
fishery agencies and the Yakama Indian Nation petitioned REliC to modify the dams to
require improved flows for salmon spawning and rearing, and to improvejuvenile salmon
passage at the dams. A long. Lortuous administrative process ensued, culminating in a
1980 interim agreement, which led to another interim agreement in 1984, which was
finally superseded bya Iong-termagrecmentin 1988. The agreement called for ensuring
that flows remain low during fall spawning, and for maintaining tiows in the winter and
spring to ensure that the salmon redds (nests) remain inundated.’
5

.

.

&

With the help of the Mid-Columbia agreement. Hanford Reach fall chinook
continue to be the only self-sustaining salmon population in the Columbia Basin. While
that success story has often been attributed to the fhct that the area is undammed. it is
important to also recognize that the flow regime vital for salmon spawning and rearing
is a controlled one, not a natural one. Since most human intervention in the name of
salmon restoration has failed or backfired, it is useful to recognize and learn from success
stories like the Mid-Columbia agreement. Among the lessons to be learned is that the

..

£fl’&t.a;;

.4.
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laws.
it would deny licenses to projects that could not meet requirements ol’applicable
FERC, however, anticipated that denial of licenses in relicensing proceedings “would
s
rarely occur.’ FERC also contended that it possessed authority to order project Found
to be environmentally damaging to he removed, and for the site to be restored to pre—
s
project conditions. This position is. to say the least, at some tension with FERC
e at
position, upheld by the Ninth Circuit, that the proper environmental baselin

ERC declined to impose the
1
relicensing is the river with the dam in plac’. Although I
ual
cost ol’ a decommissioning Fund on all o F its licensees, the agency noted that individ
he responsible for meeting a reasonable level of
licensees “will ultimately
decommissioning costs.’”

.

—

—

FERC lirst applied its decommissioning policy in 1997 in the Edwards Damcase.
the
There the agency ordered the removal of the 3.5—megawatt Edwards Dam from
, and
Kennebec River in Maine. FERC agreed with lishery agencies. the state of Maine
een
environmental groups that the 160—year old dam should he remo’% ed to restore sevent
sted
miles of fish habitat Fur Atlantic salmon and other fish. FERC’s decision was neverte
of
in court because the parties reached a settlement agreement under \vhich the cost dam
in exchange Fur delays in the
removal would he funded by upstream dam operators
fish to
imposition of fish plssige requirements at their facilities until there were enough
and Bath Iron Works, as mitigation for filling wetlands to
warrant flshways
accommodate shipyard expansion. The agreement called for the removal ot the dam by
to the local
January I. I 9Q9, and required the licensee to cede the project site
’
2
municipality and pay S 100.000 to help establish a city park.

—
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of federal lshcry
agencies,

may
make

relicensiiig of’ many projects

funding

economically in feasible. Since those projects may not continue to operate without
I
licenses, and since FER(’ may not relicense a Protect without cotuplvinu with section
8.
the real question becomes not whether the dam will he removed, hut who will
pay the
cost. Under FERC’s decommissioning poi cv, reasonable” costs of removal lii upon
I

the licensee. But as the Edwards Dam case suggests, there may be creative
opportunities available to share dam removal costs.

One of’ the flrst applications of sect ion 1 8 to produce dam removal was Cond
Dam on the \‘v Ii lie Salmon River in southwest \Vasliington. The river is a potentiafv
important salmon spawni ig tributary of the Columbia just above l3onnevil Ic Dam. When

the operator o F the dam. Paci tiCorp. attempted to obtain a new license For its
ncar:y
century—old project. fishery agencies, tribes, and en jronmental groups objected,
calling
For dam removal or installation of fish passage measures to i’estore salmon spawning
to
the White Salmon. Condit Dam liad blocked salmon migration since I 913.

FERC initially rceeted dam removal as too e\pensive, but section lX gave
Federal l’msher agencies the authority to require installation of’ tish passage mcnsure
as
a condition of’ issuing a new license to the project. Due to the high costs of installing the
tishways required by federal fishery agencies and the marginal economic util tv I’ the

.

project. PaciliCorp eventually agreed to remove the project, since removing the
dam
would he cheaper than install nv the fish passage measures. ‘Fhus. over a se\en-ve,::
periork with the assistance of’ some S 17 million in resaratjon costs paid by Paci ‘iCor.
the dam will come out. restoring sa linon spa\\ ii nv to a ri ver reach sea led oft for O\ er 5(1
Years. The Condit Dam removal could become the first n a ave of’ clam renuc\ a is.
prompted by either section 18 tishway conciltions or sect ion 4(c federal land reser\ at
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Th’ H/ddc,, Pn),Inse
,

the FPA offc. s substantial
Through long—ignored provisions like section 1
opportunities to provide important salmon restoration in certain watersheds A lthouuh

the EPA is administered by an agency with little sympathy to salmon restoration, the
statute assigns signiflcant roles for federal fishery agencies, Federal land managers, and
state water quality agencies. Sensitive use of those authorities can materially improve

salmon passage at FERC—licensed projects and salmon habitat affected by the operation
of those projects. and can even produce dam removal. The EPA may therefore be
rightfully considered a hidden promise of salmon restoration.

Ii is not entirely clear how long the FPA will extend this hidden promise.

provision
however. In late 2000, the hydropower industry convinced Congress to add a

to the Energy Act of 2000 which called upon FERC to submit a report, reviewing
of
reliccnsing procedures and suggesting legislative changes to reduce the cost and time
obtaining a license. This report may encourage Congress and the Bush Administration
rd iccnsing
to reduce the role of kdcral fishery and land management agencies in the
restoration,
process, a result that would effectively revoke the EPA’s promise of salmon
and perhaps do serious damaee to fish, wildlife, and recreational resources throughout
y.
2
countr
the ”
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dicated in chapter 4, the courts have interpreted the treaty right of taking
fish at all usual and accustomed places to mean that tribes have the right to half of
the
harvestable salmon. In the case that established that principle, United States r.
Washington. the tribes argued that the treaties also entitled them to I) halfof the harves
ts
of salmon originating from hatcheries, and 2) protection for habitat upon which the
harvests depend. Judge Boldt defcm.’d those two issues until the fundamental issue
of
whether the treaties guaranteed the tribes a share of the harvests was decided. That
did
not occur until the Supreme Court’s affinnance of the Boldt Decision in 1979.’
The Orrkk Deetvion

Shortlyafterthe Supreme CourVs ruling, the tribes asked Judge Boldt’s successor,
Judge William Orrick, to decide each of the deferred issues, in what became known
as
Phase II of United States s’. Iflishinglon. Judge Orriek had little difficulty determ
ining
that hatchery fish were indeed ireluded in the equal sharing formula articulated by
Judge
Boldt and the Supreme Court. This was not an insignificant ruling, given the region
’s
overwhelming commitment to hatcheries as the mitigation option ofchoiceto compe
nsate
for habitat damage due to aquatic development throughout the Columbia Basin.
In fact.
recognition ofthe close link between hatcheries as compensation for damage to natural
ly
spawning salmon was a chiefreason the Ninth Circuit allinned Judge Orrick’s inclusi
on
of hatchery fish in the equal sharing formula?

The most notable aspect ofJudge Orrick’s decision, however, was his conclusion
that the treaty promise of taking fish did imply a right of’ protection for the habitat
necessary to maintain the fish runs, writing that “[tjhe most fundamental prenquisite to
exercising the right to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken.” His decisio was
n
a

r:%..5r —
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Were this trend (loss of salmon habitat ito continue, the rieht to take fish
would eventually be reduced to the right to dip ones net into the
and bring it out empty. Such a result would render nugatory
water
the nine—year eliort in Phase I of Uniwd Slates i’. JJiv/iiiigioii
sanctioned by this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court, to
entbrce the treaties’ reservation to the tribes of a su f’ficient quaiil ity of’
3
fish to meet their foir needs.

degrading or
Judge Orrick ruled that the treaties require the state to retrain liom
tn be’s ‘‘moderate
a uthorizing the degradation of fish habitat it’ it woul ci inte rf’erc with a
Further, the Orrick
living” needs, a phrase drawn from the Supreme Court’s opinion.
—damaging
opinion made clear that it would not be easy for the state to prove that a habitat

the tribal
development would not interfere with a tribe’s moderate living needs. When
’s formula there
allocation share was set at 50 percent of’ the harvest, under Judge Orrick
. Finally. .ludge
was a presumption that the tribe’s moderate living needs were unmet
right ran not merely
Orrick determined that the burden of’ satisfying the implied habitat
parties.’
against the state but also against the frderal government and private

standard the
ludge Orrick’s decision macic the Supreme Court’s moderate living
ted that the tribes’
centerpiece of the treaty right to take fish. The Court had sugges
interpreted
harvest share entitled them to no more than a moderate living: Judge Orrick
ount’ dependence
the treaties to promise them no less. Given the tribes’ historic ‘param
tors that the
on their fisheries, the shared understanding of’ tribal and federal negotia
the in portant role
treaties won Id sa ft’guaid the tribes’ eomnhei’c ial fishing livelihood, and
seemed justified
that tribal fishing continued to play in the post—treaty econoin\ .the court
right In nianitain a
in recounizing that the essential treaty bargain l’oi’ the tribes was the
livelihood.
viable commercial fishing 5
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e ‘‘reasonable steps commensurate vi iii the

resources and abi it es ot each to preserve and enhance the
fishery.’ A though the panel
opmion also suggested that state—approved private development
s which discriminated
aiminst tribal lisheries would violate the treaty right, the panel ruled
without explananoa
that the right did not bLirden private l):nties.’

The tribes and the ftderal government j’t it ioned the Ninth (‘ircuil
. (‘or a rehearing
and, in an unusual procedure, an en hone (eleven—judge)
panel agreed to hear the ease.
The en ha,ir’ court at’l’i rined .J udge ()rrick on the hatcheiy
issue hut vacated the district
courts habitat ruling, meaning that the lower courts ru l
tug has no e tt’eet. A majortty ol’
the eleven-judge court believed that articulating the scope
ol’ the treaty right in a case
with no concrete (acts was) ud ic ally imprudent. ossibivuroduc
ing legal rules that on Id
be imprecise in del’inition and Lincertain in d nensioii.’
The court noted that the legal
standards governing the state’s habitat protection ((Ut ies under
I lie treaty “will depend for
their detinition and articulation upon concrete lads whici
underlie a dispute :n a
particular ease.’ Thus, in I 9t the Ninth (fircuit hat: the
LLiL’suon of the impl cc rigut
of habitat protection before it, and it squarely ducked. prefl,ir
ring to await a specific foe
situation in which to decide whether the treaties protce ted
salmon habitat and. ifso. ho\v .

The tribes decided against bringing another ease with speei
1c facts ant! mstead
concentrated their efforts on helping to implement the Colum
bia Basin Fish and Wild!: fi’
Program Lnider the Northwest Power Act (chapter 7 and negotia
ting and implementing
the Paci lie Salmon Treaty (chapter ). Asaresuit. nearly
two decades afte.Iudge
()rrick’s decision, there s no definitive answer about t heiler
the treaties of the nud- I t)Ih
century include the right of habitat protection, largely beea
use (lie tribes have chosen to
negotiate rather than litigate with stateand t’edcra1 o;iieiais.
I hese negotiations produecu

--

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

77w Pisca,i Pro/It

to habitat
When the tribes do return to court to vindicate their treaty right
spec die habitat—damaging
protection, they should be successftil. In several cases with
with re1iel requiring
facts, lower courts have almost invariably provided the tribes
other adverse aquatic
changes in dam opemtions, enjoining dam construction and
water rights to protect the
developments, and awarding the tribes “pnor and paramount
that money damages are
fish that are the subject of the treaties Although one court ruled
salmon at the hands of
unavailable to compensate the tribes br past losses sustained by
treatY salmon habitat.
development, it did not deny the existence ota servitude protecting
concrete facts that were
Those decisions, discussed below, were based on the kind of
recognize a right to
lacking in United Stales i’. J1’ishinglun. Collectively, these cases
ought to recognize as a
habitat protection for the right of taking fish, which the courts
and remove a resource Irom anothers land.
plo/il preiidi’e: that is. the legal right to take
e fish.
The fishing right is a piscarv pro/il: the right to take and remov

i/ic’ ..S/ie//Jìsli Case

-—

e concerned the
A recent case confi ruling the treaty right as a pro/li ‘ prendi
the tribes “shall not take
shellfish proviso in the Stevens Treaties. The proviso states that
ainty over the meaning
shell fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens Lncert
and two Nmth Circuit
of the words staked or cultivated produced three district court
not suprising since \Vashington is second only to
opinions beiw een 1994 and I 99
and the commercial harvest ( clams. mussels,
than 52(1 million to the slaic’s economy in I 997. Shellfish
oysters contributed more

Louisiana in national oyster production,

and

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

or cultivated” meant merely that artificial shellfish beds were excluded from tribal
0
harves
ts.’

The first district court decision agreed with the tribes, interpreting the proviso in
light of what the tribes intended at treaty time, which was to continue to fish as they
always had, and the local practice at the time involved no staking or cultivating of
shellfish beds. As a result, the court interpreted “staked or cultivated” to involve only
artificial beds, meaning that natural shellfish beds were subject to the equal sharing
principle of the Stevens treaties until the tribes achieve a “moderate living.” The court
specifically rejected the contention that the tribes had attained a moderate living. In two
subsequent decisions, however, the court expansively defined what constituted artificial
beds to include any grower-enhancement efforts, such as netting or seeding or predator
control mcasures. The court also imposed on the tribes the burden ofsurveying tidelands
to determine whether natural beds existed and clarified that although the tribes could
cross private lands to exercise their rights, they had to demonstrate a need to do so. and
that there was no other way to access the shellfish beds.”

ea•

All parties appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which mostly affirmed the district cout.
ruling that only artificial beds were “staked and cultivated” within the meaning of the
treaty proviso, that the tribes had to demonstrate a need to cross private lands before they
could do so, and also approved time, place. and manner restrictions that the lower court
imposed on the exercise of the treaty right. However, the appeals court corrected a
number ofdetails of the lower court’s decision, including I) imposing the burden on the
growers to prove that the beds had been enhanced, rather than imposing the burden on the
tribes to show they had not 2) ruling that un like private growers, the state’s enhancement
efforts did not result in an exclusion oftribal harvests; and 3) rejecting the district court’s

-
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tribe’s unful hued rrnht to a moderate living. ‘

[)uin (‘uvc

The st case to recoenize the habitat protection potential in the treaties involved
proposal ol two Rdera I water management agencies, the l3onneville Power
a I
Administration (BPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers, to change the ope won of
power to
Columbia l3asin clams to increase the (jams’ capability in order to produce
BPA’s I lydro—
satisl’y peak load demands. This peaking power proposal was a part of’
wanted to
Thermal Power Program. discussed in chapter 5. The two federal agencies
increase daily and weekly water levels and tiows in the Lower Columbia and inundate
pails of three Indian flshing sites in the reservoir behind Bonneville Dam. The tribes
violated
sued to enjoin the program. claiming that the proposed peaking pover policy
their treaty fishing rights.’

in

...

salmon
Four years later, the tribes returned to lëdei ill coLiri. seek iv to Preser\c
Catherine Creek in northeastern Oregon’s (irandc Ronde Basin. The Corps

.

In 1973. Judge Belloni approved a settlement in the ease that lbrbade the federal
for the
agencies l’rom proceeding with peaking operations until there was protection
for
fishing sites. He noted that although Congress authorized modi hications to the dams
an’
peak power generation. it had not authorized operations that would “impair or destroy
secured by Treaty with the Indians.’ Ihe ease could be interpreted as
lishing rights
salmon
the lirst judicial recognition that the treaty right to fish could he used to protect
ii a b i tat

habitat
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oni could find no express congressional reco
gnht on that
the project would jeopardize treaty fishing
rights, and he re Fused to in icr cutlttrcssioni
intent to ahrou.ate the triba rights liom the
mere authorization o I’ the dam As a result.
he enjoined its construction, and tile darn was neve
r built. Bvall’iimning tile principle that
only clear congressional autilorizat ion may abro
gate fishing rights, the decision protected
fish 5
habitat.’

The implied right o F habitat protection has reaeh
eu hevond protecting particular
tribal l’isliing sites. in tile l’al I of’ I 9O, the
Federal Bureau ol Reclamation clecidec to
reduce flows Feom the Cc LI urn Darn in the
Y akima Basin due to the end ol’ the irrigation
season, threatening salmon redds (nests) with
dewateri 11g. Sal mon had spawned
unusually high in the Yakimlia River that fttl
beca use oi greater thatl nornla storage
releases For irrigation. The Yaka
ma Indian Nation, which had been unable to
exercise
its fishing rights in tile ‘akima River For seve
ral years due to depleted numbers
Of’
returning salmon, requested the basin’s waer
master to order he Bureau of Rec Jamai ion
to maintain the flows needed to prote
ct the redds. The watermaster in tttrn aske
d the
federal court if he had authority
to do so. The district court ordered the nlast
cr to
undertake a number olmeasures to protect the
redds, blelud ing I) releasing storaile v amer.
2) attempting alternative means of preserving the
redds, and 3) studying ways to avoid
such conflicts in tile future.’”

fishing eieumKls

Irrigation districts served by the damn appealed
this decision and. over tile course
oF the next three years, tile Ninth Cire
Liit issued three di tTh’rent opinions
, all upholding the
district court’s decision. in tile
first decision, the appeals court note
d that “[1
parties
ihe
to a treaty bear a duty to relraiti front actions inler
lering with either tile Indians acce
ss
or tlte amount oF fish present there.” Ihe cour
t ruled tlltlt tile tribes’
to
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rights.’
ng 7

progressively less clear about the nature of the tribe’s fishi

court affirmed the flow
In its second opinion, issued in February 1985, the
t but stated “we need not decide
releases and other measures ordered by the lower cour
to note that the Indian fishing
the exact scope of the treaty fishing right. It is enough
release of water was justified in
rights are protected and under those circumstances the
revoked atler the en bmw Ninth
order to avoid damage to the redds.” This opinion was
Washington.’
s v. 4
Circuit handed down its Phase II opinion in United Slide

Farms

uit issued a third opinion.
Six weeks after the en bane decision, the Ninth Circ
time stated merely that there was
The court once again aflinned the trial court, but this
and that the lower court’s flow
“no abuse ofdiscretion in the [districtj court’s decision,”
under the circumstances.
directives constituted “reasonable emergency measures”
ions grew vaguer about the nature
Although the language in the three Ninth Circuit opin
protection ofthe fish, which
ofthe treaty fishing right, the court upheld the district courVs
treaty.’°
the appeals court referred to as a “vital purpose” of the
Pipelines. Marinas, and Fish

concluded can violate the
Dams are not the only developments that courts have
hern Tier Oil Pipeline, which
treaty fishing right. Construction of the proposed Nort
s, was chalLenged lbrviolating
would havecrossed Puget Sound as wellns numerous river
ough the district court determined
environmental statutes and treaty fishing rights. Alth
tcs, Judge Belloni ruled that
that the project complied with environmental statu
d adversely affect salmon and
sedimentation from burying pipelines under rivers coul
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Another aquatic development that clashed with treaty fishing rights was a
marina
in Washington’s Elliott Bay. Construction ofthe marina, which required
a federal dredge
and fill permit from the Corps of Engineers, would have eliminated part
of an offreservation fishing ground of the Muckleshoot and Suquamish Tribes
. In a carefully
reasoned opinion, Judge Zilly granted the tribes’ request for a preliminary
injunction.
The court recognized the tribes’ right to fish as a “property right which
may not be
abrogated without specific and express Congressional authority.” Judge Zilly
concluded
that the right of access to a particular fishing site was a separate elemen
t of the treaty
fishing right from the right to a moderate living from fishing. Thus, even
if the tribes’
moderate living needs would be unaffected by the marina, as the develo
per and the Corps
argued, the court refused to “collapse[] the right of access into the right
to a fair share
of the fish or to weigh the loss of fishing access against the benefit of the
marina, absent
an act of Congress.” Although the state could restrict fishing in the
interest of
conservation of the fish, the marina hardly qualified as a fish conservation
measure.
Consequently, the court enjoined construction ofthe marina, and in so
doing con firmed
that the treaty right to access customary fishingsites could protect those sites
from habitat
destruction. A reconfigured marina was subsequently constructed under
a settlement
agreement between the tribes and the developer?’

A proposed net pen “fish farm” for rearing salmon in the Rosario Strait area
of
Puget Sound similarly violated the access rights of the L.ummi Nation. Like
the marina
in Elliott Bay, Northwest Sea Farms’ net pen would have blocked access to
a tribal fishing
ground. Unlike the marina, the Corps denied the required federal permit,
and Northwest
Sea Farms filed suit. The court upheld the Corps’ permit denial on the
ground that the
Corps had a fiduciary duty to consider the tribe’s treaty rights, even though the
applicable
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‘‘

-

though. as with the marina,
(‘onseif uentlv, the court upheld the Corps’ permit denial even
a ffeeted the amount ol
there was no evidence that the proleet would have subsiani ally
Corps lacked an thoritv to
fish available for tribal harvest. According to the court, the
ess has sLich power.
make regulatory decisions diminishing treaty rights, as “only Congr

developments
These cases provide examples of the kinds of habitat—damaging
block access to traditional
that the treaty fishing right can restra in. Where developments
regard less of their
tribal fishing grounds, the courts have not hesitated to en oin them,
piafli has two separate
cl’fects on the supply of harvestable fish. Thus, the treaty p/scan
lisTiing grounds and a
components: an affirmative casement to gain access to tribal
ize the supply of fish
negative servitude (restriction) limiting activities that jeopard
necessary to furnis h the tribes a moderate living.

Waiei- Righis CLvcs

, and fish
Like most aquatic developments, the dam construction, pipeline, marina

—

involve broade

—

the treaty right to access
farm cases dealt with specific locations, and theretbre implicated
like the dam operation
specific geographic fishing areas. I lowever. water rights cases
r geographic areas and the tribes’ right to a moderate living from
cases

water rights doctrine can
fishi rig. As the cases discussed below demonstrate, the reserved
e of water rights by other
restrict salmon—damaging activities resulting fiom the exercis
t of water instreain to
parties. The doctrine also entitles the tribes to a quantified anioun
supply the tribes \ dli both a
fulfill the treaties’ fishing ptirposes. The treaties therefore
uses which damage fish
right to a specified amount of water and a right to i estrici water
the obligations ufnon—
hahitaf. Quantification ofreserved waterrights \otild iiiakc clear
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One decision that did quantity the amount of water iii the reserved tishing right
concci-ned an adjudication o ‘water rights in Chamokanc Creek in Eastern Washington.

In that case, the fledcra I district court conel tided that a pL’ of the Spokane
Indian
Reservation was to ensure mamtenance of fishing in the creek. As a result, the
court
rLllcd that the quantity of reserved water was an amount sufficient to preserve fishing
in
the creek. I3ccause the court determined that native trout propagation required
temperatures of64 deetces Fahrenheit or less, it ordered fiowss uflicient to maintain
that
water lemperalure, and in no case less than twenty cubic feel per second. This decision
was the first to many the amount ol reserved water to the quality of that water.
’
2

The Chamokanc Creek case was more fir—reaching than the peaking power or
Catherine Creek cases because it extended the scope of the reserved fishing right
beyond

particular fishing locations to include a right to su flicient water to sListai n tribal fishing.
The decision prevented state water rights holders liom diverting water from the
creek if
the diversions interfered x ith env ironniental conditions necessary to maiitain
fishing.
Thus, the case was one of the first to recognii.e the potent ia ofthc treaty right
of taiitg
fish to protect fish habitat throughout a watershed.

While the Chainokanc (‘reek decjson recugi1ivec a right to iaintin
environmental conditions necessary to sustain a tribal fishery, another case introduced

a restoration component to the treaty right to fish. The \ i nth Circuit ruled
that tic
Colville tribes had a right to sufficient water to devetop an on—reservation troLit
fishery
In replace their historic salmon runs lost as a result of the cuiiipietioil of coiistrueilui
of
the G i-and C’oulec l)am in I 4 I To fulfill the purpose of the tribes’ reservation
and to
preserve its acccs s to fishing grounds, the district court permitted the tribes
to usc some
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to lish includes a restoration as well as a maintenance component.’

A difflient panel ofthe Ninth Circuit addressed the important issue of the scope
olthis restoration component in a I 9X3 case involving the Klamath Tribe’s water rights
br on—reservation hunting and fishing. The court affirmed a trial court decision, which

on the
concluded that the tribe had a “time immemorial” right “to as much water
Reservation lands as they need to protect their hunting and fishing rights.” The appeals
“to
court accurately termed the tribal fishing right a negative right, enabling the tribes
prevent other appropriators from depleting the streams [sic] waters below a protected
the
level in any area where the non—consumptive right applies.” However, worried that
implications of the district court decision might be interpreted to impose a “wilderness

servitude” on the K lamath Reservation, the Ninth Circuit ruled that restoration oftrea ty—
i’.
time (1864) streamblows was not required. Like the district court in United States
Washington. the Ninth Circuit tied the scope of’ the right to the Supreme Court’s
are
“moderate living” standard. Implicit in this standard is the conclusion that the tribes
level
not entitled to treaty—time fishing levels unless, as the Ninth Circuit noted, “no lesser
vil I supply them with a living.” The moderate living standard gives the treaty fishing
right a restoration component, yet eliminates the draconian “wilderness servitude’

2
pOSSi bilitv.

Four years abler the Klamath decision, in 1987. the Ninth Circuit recoizrnzed
another “time imn ieiuorial water right for lish in a ease involving the tribes of the
Flathead Reservation in Montana. Irrigators served by a reservation irrigation project

roject operatioiiN designed to
sued the Bureau ofindian AiThirs, seeking to enjoin ne 1
the
provide flows to Protect tribal tisheries. The district court granted the irrigators
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for fishery purposes. This date was prior to any reservation irrigation water rights (the
reservation had reserved water rights for both irrigation and fish), since the water
protected a use that antedated the reservation itself. Therefore, the tribes did not have to
share their “prior and paramount fishing water rights” with irrigators who had obtained
reservation irrigation rights. The court noted that the exercise ofreserved rights “arise(sJ
without regard to equities that may tvorcompetingwater uses.” The Flathead ease thus
made clear that water for the reserved fishing right takes precedence over all irrigation
water rights?
7

The Aequavella Case. An exception to the course taken by most courts in
implying a right of habitat protection occurred in a 1990 state court case involving the
long-running adjudication of water rights in the Yakima Basin. A Washington trial court
ruled that the Yakanm Indian Nation had a treaty right to water for fish but determined
that the scope of the water right reserved for fish habitat had been diminished
substantially by government actions throughout the 20th century. The trial court did
conclude, however, that the tribe was entitled to a minimum instream flow to maintain
salmon according to annual prevailing conditions. The state supreme court affirmed in
1993, in an unfortunate opinion that created a new category of“diminished” treatyrights,
which apparently are not subject to the exacting standards courts require to demonstrate
an abrogation of treaty rights.
2t

The Washington Supreme Court purported to recognize the rules of treaty
construction by liberally construing the treaty language and interpreting ambiguities in
the tribe’s favor; the court even applied these rules to actions ofadministrative agencies.
Tue state court also determined that, like the Flathead Reservation, the Yakama
Reservation had both agricultural and fishing purposes. and the tribe possessed reserved
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increased

the

also held that

tribe’s

irrigation water dghts, ahroeated the treaty ii ght to fish. The court
uovernmcnt actions n the form o F an unspecified series of

inconsisteiit

“coiigresSona I. executive, administrative, andj udicial acts’’ fiom 1 905 through I 96$ did
Instead, the
not abrogate treaty rights in the absence of clear congressional termination.
federal government recognized the existence of lishing rights by installing fish screens
and fish ladders.

Yet in two puzzling sentences the court allowed these same unspecified

“

government actions to “diminish’’ the Yakama Indian Nation’s treaty fishing rights. The
court stated, “Ewle conclude, however, that there was encroachment upon and significant
damage to the Indians’ treaty fishing rights during this period Th us, although the treaty
Under this unprecedented
rights were not extinguished, they were diminished.
interpretation, government actions inconsistent with the exercise of treaty rights may

apparently substantially diminish them, despite a lack of clear congressional intent
required to abrogate those rights. This result is particularly regrettable because it invites

both federal and stale courts to discover such “diminishments” of treaty rights on the
basis of subjective judicial interpretations of history. The tribe, perlnips fearing that a
hostile Supreme Court would affirm and give the case national implications, decided not
to appeal.°

The IlcquarL’//u decision has no support in prior case law interpreting the scope
of the treaty fishing right. Un like the s inth Circuit in the Klaniath case, the Washington
Supreme Court made no attempt to link the Yakama Indian Nation’s “diniinished’’ treaty’

fishing rights to the U.S .S upreine Court’s interpretation that the treaties promised the
tribes a “moderate living.” In fact, the state coLirl, seemed completely oblivious to that
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s in (lie Y akina i3asin water rights adj udication have
minimized its
effect. Two trial court decisions in I 9)5 interpreted the state
supreme court’s recognition
ot a limited right of habitat protection ‘‘to maintain fish Ii
hf’ in the liver to apply to
several ‘i’akima River tributaries with tieaty fishing ground
s and to require fish flows to
flush salmon downstream in the spring. The elfect was to
ratify a “systems operation
committee’’ recommendation of’ releasing Some 600 acre—
feet of storage water for fish
migration, etlectively recognizing the duty ofthe Bureau ofkecla
mation to provide flows
to ‘‘maintain all Ii fe stages’’ of salmon. The Yakama Indian
Nation’s attorney eonsdered
these results to revolutionize project operations in
the Yakiina Basin, requiring the
Bureau to manage water tor both irrigation and flshf

The Washington Supreme Court’s un ibunded “dimin
ished treaty rights’’ ruling
may have been a consequence of the same concerns that
led the Ninth Circuil in the
K lamath case to opine that the treaty fishing right won
Id not impose a wilderness
servitude. Lnlike the Ninth Circuit, however, the \Vashi
ngion court failed to see that the
way to avoid req uiring a return to treaty—time env i ronmenta
conditions was to articu ate
the scope of the riglu t in terms of tile Suprenue Courts
‘‘moderate I iviiig’’ stai dard.
Untortunately, instead ot fbi lowing the Supreme Court’
s precedent, the Washington earl
created a novel theory of ‘‘diminished” rights Ii eli
appare
ntly
eounlenances part ai
abrogation of treaty rights without clear coneressionii approv
al.
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court ignored
would be impeded by reserved water rights for fish. In doing so, the SRBA
the Stevens Treaties
the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that the fishing purpose of
aimed to provide the tribes a commercial livelihood.

the tribe
The SRBA court noted repeatedly that at the time of the treaties, neither
Yet the lack of
nor the federal government intended to create an implied water right.
that the fishing right
specific intent did not prevent the Supreme Court from concluding
property. 2) implied
included I) an implied affirmative right of access across private
fees or enacting
negative rights restricting the state front charging the tribes license
tive right to onelegislation discriminatingagainst their fishing, and 3) an implied affirma
the treaties’
half of the harvests. Presumably, these results were necessary to fulfil)
but they had no
central purpose of allowing the tribes to pursue a fishing livelihood,
noofitreservation water
apparent effect on the SRBA court’s conclusion that the tribe had
5’
rights.

•.:..k.

-

-iiH:;

.

S

created
Central to the SRBA court’s decision was its conclusion that the treaty
reasoning was based
no property rights in water off the tribe’s reservation. The court’s
earlier ease (the
on the flawed logic of the federal district court of Idaho which, in an
no ownership
Hells Canyon case discussed below), concluded that since the tribe had
could kill fish and
rights in specific fish due to the treaty, Idaho Power Company dams
fish isa pro/il
destroy fish habitat with impunity. But in reality the tribe’s right of taking
has enabled other
âprendre, a real property right recognized at common law, and one that
ary to a reasonable
profit holders to restrain developments damaging habitat necess
exercise of the profit.”

—.
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agrecmentdiminishing the sizeof tribe’s landreservation necessarily dimini
shed itswater
rights. To reach this result the court had to confuse proprietary rights (like fishing
and
waler rights) with sovereign powers (like the power to regulate), rely on an irrelev
ant
Supreme Courtcase concerning sovereignly, and ignore a more recent, relevan
t Supreme
Court case on proprietary rights.”

The tenuous reasoningemployed by the SRBA court ought to mean that the result
will not survive an appeal, and the case is under appeal as of this writing.
After the
SRBA decision was handed down, the tribe learned that the presiding judge was
in fact
a water right holder who had a pecuniary stake in his decision, as did his family Thus,
.
he should have disqualified himself from the case, or at least disclosed his
and his
family’s stakes in the case to the parties. The tkt that he did not seems a violati
on ofthc
state code ofjudieial conduct

If the SRBA decision is not revoked due to a breath ofjudicial ethics, the only
courts to which the decision may be appealed are the Idaho Supreme Court
and
the
U.S.
Supreme Court. State courts have been historically hostile to tribal reserved water
rights,
and the U.S. Supreme Court has been antagonistic to almost all Indian rights for
nearly
two decades. If results like the SRBA decision are upheld, the 21st century will
be
remembered as a time in which tribes lost their most precious remaining natural
rcsource,
their water, through judicial opinions.’
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Plan.
dependent on forest habitat, particularly restrictions in the Northwest Forest
designed
Congress included in a 1995 appropriations bill a rider with several provisions
9
to expedite public land timber harvests, known as the Timber Salvage Rider?

d
One of the timber harvest authorizations contained in the 1995 Act require
ing any
federal land managers to release from habitat protection restrictions “notwithstand
t to an
other provisions of law,” all uncompleted Limber sales which had been subjec
of those
earlier appropriations rider that expired before the sales were finished. Most
d by
sales were never subsequently offered due to habitat restrictions like those impose
d land
the Northwest Forest Plan. Consequently. the Timber Salvage Rider directe
including
managers to complete these earlier timber sales despite the plans restrictions,
Oregon.
°
eight sales on the former reservation of the Klamath tribes in south-central 4

The tribes sought to enjoin these revived timber harvests, claiming that the 1995
that the
statute was not intended to abrogate their treaty rights to hunt and fish, and
for their
timber sales would destroy prime old-growth habitat for mule deer necessary
breached
subsistence. The tribes also argued that by offering the sales, the Forest Service
lands to
its fiduciary duty to the tribes by failing to manage their former reservation
abrogate
protect their treaty rights. The federal government agreed that the statute did not
because
the tribes’ treaty rights, but maintained that the sales did not offend treaty rights
the sales.
the Forest Sen ice consulted with the tribes throughout the process ofawarding
claimed
Timber companies and contractors awarded the sales intervened in the case and
the sales.”
that the appropriations rider terminated the tribes’ treaty rights with respect to

The district court agreed with the tribes and enjoined the timber sales in 1996.
the tribes’ treaty

First, the court concluded that the Timber Salvage Riderdid not abrogate
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COflS tat ion with the Klamath Tribes on
a eovernnien t—to—government basis, that the
resources on which the tribes treaty rights depend wi I be protect
ed.” By separating the
federal government’s proceduril duties from its substantive duties,
the decision clearly
indicated that there is a Icderal duty to protect tribal property
rights.

The He//.c (an mu

The cases discussed above demonstrate that the treaty fishing
right has been
regularly interpreted to contain an implied right of ha bitat
protection. Un ibri unate y
while the case law reflects a consistent conclusion that lhe/1seanpIo/
iI gives the tribes
some authority

to restrain habitat—damaging deveiopnienis, the courts have been
unclear
about the scope of the right. In Fact, in the case described
below, an Idaho federal
magistrate completely ignored the Supreme Courts moderate
living standard in cenying
the Nez. Perce Tribes eiai ii for compensation or habitat damag
es due to Idaho Power
Company’s lid Is Canyon clams.

‘

The Nez Perce sued Idaho Power, alleging that the construction and
operation of
its three—dam complex in the I Eel Is Canyon reach of the Snake
River io lated treat\ r:ghts
by reducing the number of salmon returned to trinal hsiuiig wound
s and by niundiiting
those grounds. The tribe argued that it was entitled to daitiages
under section 1 Oc of the
Federal Power Act. That jrovision makes each licensee under
the Act “liable for all
damages’’ to the “property’’ of others caused by the constru
ction, maintenance, or
operalioil of its projects. 4
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—

to prospective, equitable
l(IShintt()!? Phase II district court decision, which was limited
fusion about the
not retrospective, monetary damages. The magistrate’s con
relief’
to consider most of the
nature o 1’ the treaty right to fish v as a product of his thilure
ing of the f’ew cases he did
decisions discussed earlier in this chapter, his misunderstand
rights, a concept the
mention, and his inability to see that the treaties created property
44
Supreme Cmi rt had tim-rn ly estabi shed nearly 90 years earl icr.

from property
The courts basic mistake was its attempt to separate treaty rights
terminating a tribe’s treaty
rights, due in part to Supreme Court precedent suggesting that
taking of propei’ty recflnriflg
hunting or fishing rights would amount to a governmental
the Snake River salmon
constitutional compensation. Since all parties stipulated that
ex was commenced in the
runs had “greatly declined since the Hells Canyon Dam Compl
e Court decision on the
mid I 950s,” the magistrate distinguished the earlier Suprem
party, not the fderal
ground that there the tribe was seeking damages irom a private
, not “property rights,”
government. By characterizing the tribe’s claim as “treaty rights”
nsation claims to those
the magistrate apparently thoughi he could limit tribal compe
it not only ignored the
against the government. The trouble x i lb this distinction is that
ignored the results ofa
Supreme Court’s 90—year old language in S. r. Winan,s, it also
ns making clear that the
number of more recent Supreme Court and lower court decisio
agreement, mncludingboth
treaty right is a property rightwhich burdens non—parties to the
private parties and subsequently created states.’

opportunity to
The niagistratc was also convinced that the ‘‘tribe O\\ ns only an
specifically reectcd the
exploit’ the salmon runs. However, in 1979 the SLipremne Court
harvest fish on a am—
notion that the treaty fishing right was only an oppoiiunmty to
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—

“he that hinders another iii his trade or livelihood is liable.., for so hindering him.” In
modem times, fishers have successfully maintained common law actions against those
causing envimnmental damage to fisheries. Even recreational users have been
successful. In 1994, for example. the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that the
owner or a hunting and fishing prqfit a prendre had a right to enjoin a housin
g
development which would have “unreasonably interfered” with the exercise ofthe profit.
Certainly the Nez Peree Tribe, whose treaty fishing right promised the tribe, in the words
of the Supreme Court, a “livelihood that is to say, a moderate living,” ought to have
at least as much protection as recreationalists without treaty 6
rights.’

..:‘..

.

The magistrate quoted from the vacated Ninth Circuit panel decision in US i’.
Washington, which recognized that the treaty fishing right applied to
“the building of
dams. factories and highways provided they are State-authorized.” But he failed
to
emphasize that the panel decision also mled that the treaties imposed an affinnative
obligation on federal and state governments to “take reasonable.. compensatory steps
to protect and enhance the fishery” when approving projects “threaten[ing] then-existing
harvest levels.” There are numerous problems with this articulation of the scope of the
treaty duty, including the fact that the vacated panel decision misinterpreted Suprem
e
Court precedent by excluding private parties from treaty-imposed duties. The Ninth
Circuit panel also apparently assumed without evidence that the tribes’ moderate li’ing
needs were satisfied by then-existing harvest levels. Nevertheless, even though it rejected
the tribes’ claim of damages for the construction and operation of the I tells Canyo
n
complex, by adopting the vacated panel decision the magistrate presumablyaeecpted the
fundamental premise of that decision, which atuinned the existeneeol’a habitat protection
right.’
7

‘I;..
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the river to fish.
In be’s right o Faccess was nothing more than a right to cross land to reach
pment
The court exaggerated the tribe’s claim to amount to a right to prohibit all develo
ion. The
of the river banks and responded that the treaty gave the tribe no such protect
e Court’s
result is inconsistent with a number of’ other decisions, including the Suprem
of’ their
admonition that the treaty right pre\:eilts the tribes horn being “crowded out”
fisheries.x

a
The reasoning of’ the court in the l-Iells Canyon case was deeply flawed ,A.t
a piscari
basic level, the court Failed to recognize that the Indian treaty fishing right is
years beflire the Hells Canyon
plo/Il a pi’eiidrc that is, a ploperty right. Some 90
a “right in
decision, the Supreme Court described the fishing right as a ‘‘servitude” and
exclLision
land.” It’ there is a defnsible justification For enjoining the Winans brothers’
in the I 990s
of’trihal fishers ti’om Ccli lo Falls in the I 90s. while refusing compensation
Canyon, the explanation
for Idaho Power Company’s inundation of’ f’ishing sites in I—tells
ty right.
does not lie in attempting to label the treaty right as something other than a proper
not to
Idaho Power seemed to recognize this reality, paying the tribe over SlI million
appeal the ease.

l
Although the court’s concern about establishing an “absolute’’ environmenta right
ng that
that would block all development is understandable, its error was in assumi
Few property
recognizing the treaty right as a prop’I.y right would produce such a result,
universal. An
rights arc absolute. And remedies for rights violations are contextual, not
in most property concepts ould have
understanding of the great flexibility inherent

Supreme
allowed the court to avoid the embarrassment of attempting to deny what the
of
Court had expressly recognized nearly a ceiltI.ir’y earlier. I lov to articLilate the scope
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The uncertain eope of the right ol habitat protection has been an o’ erridin
g
concern o I the courts that have considered the issue. For e\Llmple, the
en bane
o
(lie Ninth Circuit in t
i. (Cix/iinelo,i was leery of articul
ating a right of habitat
protection in Li ease without concrete acts, possibly becaLise it feared
that application oh
the district courts decision could result in a \videsprea(_ halting
oh development

throughout the Pacific Northwest. Similarly, the Ninth CireLul’s opinion
in the Kiamath
wai,er rights case, the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in the
1cqiiaie//a case, and
the Idaho district courts decision in the I-jells Canyon case all reflect a judicia
l reluctance
to express the scope of the treaty fishing right in Li turn ncr that might require
a re.storalun
of conditions that cx isteci at I reaiv time.

—

This udieial concern with the specter of establishing a “wilderness servitu
de.’’
as the Kiamath court phrased it. is actually quite detached from reality
. Nowhere in the
Pacific Northwest do the fish at the center oh the treaty barrain
the “res” (the object)
of the treaties, as Judge (now .lustiee) Kennedy once put it, benefit
Iroin treaty—time
conditions. oreove

\‘l
r, no tribe has argued flw restoration 0 ftbosc conditions. The reality
is that, far from returning to the pristine env ironnient the judiciary has
found worrtsome.
current conditions threaten several salmon runs with extinction Judicia
l pred let II ‘us
abou the success oh federal and state testoral ion programs rendering
the treaty hubi a:
right unnecessary have proveu to be fanci lii
The irLitli is that widespread hLibi tat
degradation has been the rule, producing a status quo in which the tribes trcq
uent l\ “d
their nets and conic up empty,” a condition that tl e Supt etne Court proscri
bed more than

two decades ago.’
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same
same conservation requirements. Non-treaty development should be subject to the
lt to
restrictions that burden non-treaty fishing. Surely it should not be more difficu
ts
protect the treaty fishing right by restricting hydroelectric operations or timber harves
ise
than by restricting non-treaty fishing ifthe damage to the treaty fishing right is otherw
equal.

—

A third shortcoming in decisions like the Aeqna’vlla water rights adjudication
a
and the Hells Canyon dam case is the failure to see that, by its very nature as apivJit
The
prendne, the treaty fishing right hardly threatens to establish a wilderness servitude.
moderate
Supreme Court has made clear that the scope of the right is cabined by the
living standard. At common law, the scope ofprotection affordedproflts aprendrc’ is “no
“no
unreasonable interference” with the exereise of the profit. Applying this
would
unreasonable interference” standard ma tribes moderate living needs obviously
ing the
require judicial discretion. But prior case law and administrative orders involv
application of the treaty right against non-treaty fishers have narrowed the scope of that
discretion. Ifthe overarching goal is to protect the fish, the “its” of the treaty, the courts
—who, in Judge Kennedy’s words, have constructive custody ofthe fish should apply
ing
the same principles to both those who harvest the “its” of the treaties by destroy
hook-and-line.’
salmon habitat and those who harvest by 2

Vie Proper Scope qfihe Trea(v Riglu to fkthiwt Proicciion

Indelining what constitutes an “unreasonable interIirence” with the treaty fishing
in
right, the courts ought to draw heavily on the conservation standards laid down the
first
case law allocating harvest rights between treaty and non-treaty fishers. The
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different than in harvest allocation cases: development activities
which threaten the
existence ofa fish run should be prohibited. In the language ofprofli prendr
c)
e law, such
developments “unreasonably interfere” sith the exercise of the profitp
erse.”

.

..

But the purpose ofthe treaty fishingright is not simply to preserve museu
m-piece
fish runs: the purpose is to provide the tribes with “a livelihood
a moderate living.”
Thus. an unreasonable interference with the treaty fishing right should
be articulated in
terms of the moderate living promise. The contours of the right exist
in two court
opinions and in a 1997 secretarial order on tribal rights, federal trust respon
sibilities, and
the Endangered Species Act.

The first court opinion outlining the scope of the treaty habitat protection
right
is Judge Belloni’s 1969 “fair share” opinion, which provided a mixtur
e ofprocedural and
substantive protection for treaty harvests. In addition to instructing the
state to revise its
regulatory policies to ensure that the tribal harvests were considered
on an equal basis
with non-Indian harvests, he directed the state to allow the tribes
to “participate
meaningfully” in harvest management decision making and to ensure
that restrictions on
tribal harvests were “the least restrictive alternative” consistent with preserv
ing salmon
for spawning. The Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled that the state’s obligat
ion to provide the
tribes with a tbir harvest share was a separate duty from its obligation
to guarantee the
tribes access to their fishing grounds.”

•

The second opinion is Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence in the United
Stales v.
JVaslsington, Phase H panel opinion. which also adopted a blend
of procedural and
substantive protections. As Judge Reinhardt explained:

•::•
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sa feguarded
...

by every reasonable means.

“

n of “due consideration’’
Like Judge Bel Ion i, .ludge Reinhardt cal led br a demonstratio
lil I participation” ofthe tribes
olihe treaty rights throughout the regulatory process and
right. Judge Reinhardt
in making decisions about developments that affect the treaty
e alternative locations.
added that development must include an evaluation of feasibl
stration that the pioject
incorporation ofal I reasonable mitigation measures, and a demon

the Indians’ fish supply.’’
is ‘‘necessary in light of its probable adverse impact on
supply could not “be
Unhartunately, Judge Reinhardt also stated that where the fish
last resort reqLiire the
protected by any other reasonable means, the State may asa
ded interpretation would give
perniittee to pay compensation to the Indians.” This misgui
ity to abrogate treaty rights.
states, and presumably flderal agencies, unprecedented author
then only if Congress is
authority the courts have wisely limited to Congress. and even

t.
55
explici

t environmental
A third approach to protecting treaty fishing rights agains
ries of the interior and
degradation was provided by a 1997 order issued by the Secreta
Endangered Species Act.
Commerce on tribal rights, kderal trust responsibilities, and the
protect the treaty lishing
The order echoed many of the udicially created standards to
must he “reasonable and
right. It required that I ) any restrictions imposed on treaty rights
purpose served by these
necessary’ for conservation ofthe species: 2> the conservation
ndian tishers alone; 3)
restrictions cannot be achieved by reasonable restrictions of non—I
to achieve the hene (its of
the restrictions must he the least restrictive alternative in order
way against treaty fishing: and
deelopment: 4) the resirictions cannot discriminate in any
achieve the conservation
5) voluntary tribal conservation measures must he inadequate to
purposes befbre restrictions are imposed.”
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t

than uovernments to exclude tribes From heir flsliine oround to
s.
deprive them oF their
air share o Ithe salmon runs, or to destroy treaty-protected hsh. II
owever, private lrI es
requiring government approval br their developments may use
the approval process to
deumonstrate compliance with treaty obligations. State or Federa
l agencies which initiate
their own projects. or approve third—party de\ eiopnients. nay demon
strate thai then
reatv p/sctin p,o!i/ d /uIc1lc/Ic by

actions will not unreasonably inter Ibre wi tIm the
satist’mng the Following live requirements:

Consider treaty rights, speci heal iv the tribes right to a moderate
living
horn tlshing, throughout the development process:

2.

Give tribes the opportunity to pii:iicmpae meaningFully as govcrnmen:s
in all development decisions

vi no

unsure that developments (10 not interFere wi ii tribal moder
ate
ii eeds:

3.

4.

a.

showing mhiat the develotimeni is necessary despite those ad erNe

showing that the benelims oFthe de\elopincnt cannot he aclHc\ cc
without adverse eihcts on treaty ishine rights;

Ii tribes have not yet attained a moderate livjng. demonstrate that
the
development will not unreasonably nterfere” with the attainment oh
a
‘moderate living,” which would require satishying six criteria:

hi.

elects:
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5.

p

e.

C

showing that the development incorporates all reasonable
measures to reduce the adverse effects en treaty fishing: and

showing that, despite the adverse effects ofthe development, the
tribal moderate living needs will be met within a reasonable
period of time; and

Provide the tribes with “just compensation” for the loss or diminishment
of treaty rights ifthe proposed development satisfies the above criteria
but still produces a significant loss oftreaty fishing rights which impairs
tribal moderate living needs. This eompcnsatim must be congressionally
approved before the project may proceed.”

—

.

••.c

.

The “no unreasonable interference” standard that protects common law prq/iIs
ct of
ci prendre, as defined by the principles articulated above, would avoid the prospe
ions that
imposition of a “wildemess servitude” or a return to the environmental condit
tion,
existed at the time the treaties were signed. However, it would promise some restora
apply
as the above principles would not be limited to row developments but would
Thus, this
equally to ongoing activities like the operation of Columbia Basin dams.
gful
property rights approach to the treaty fishing promise would provide meanin
States
protection and restoration to the remaining salmon runs on which the United
the
promised tribal members they could pursue their livelihoods, which promise was
est
basis ofthe bunjain Lbr permitting peaceful settlement of the Pacific Northw

—......
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disqualified themselves as being biased in favorofthe tribes. They were not biased when
they began to preside over the ease, but as they became educated, both decided that the
tribes had the superior moral and legal arguments. The judgments of these respected
jurists, the product of long-term involvement in treaty rights disputes, should not go
unnoticed. Consider these remarks from Judge Marsh after he disqualified himself:

What remains to be seen is how those treaty rights will be affected by
the dwindling sbrs [of fish runs] and to what extent those treaty rights
may be used as a means of exploring salmon protection measures far
beyond what anybody could imagine [under environmental statutes like
the ESA].... You can hear why rm getting off the case.’
tm

[n January 2001, twenty tribes in Washington state went back to federal court,
alleging that the state% poor construction and faulty maintenance of eulverts (pipes
carrying water under roads and railroad tracks and through embankments) violated their
treaty rights. The tribes claimed that improperly designed and maintained culverts block
salmon from over 3.000 miles ofstreams, one reason why they now harvest no more total
fish than they did prior to Judge Boldfl 1974 decision. The outcome ofthis lawsuit may
determine, thirty years after the filing of US v. Wü.vhingron, whether the tribe? treaty
rights protect the habitat on which salmon depend for their survival.”
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lhc plight ol the Snake River salmon became one of the nation
s fremust
envirotunental issues at the dawn of the 21st eentur. even rising
to the attention of the
2000 Presidential candidates. The Snake is the C’ol uinhia Ri vets
largest tributary, and
the Snake Basin. including Idahos Inued Sal mon River.
contai is some of the best
1-emaining salmon habitat in the Columbia Basin. I listoric
a lv, the Salmon River
produced over 40 peftelit ol the spring/summer clii nook of the
entire Columbia Basin.
But, as discussed in chapter 9. all Snake River salition runs are now
on the endangered
species list. This is due largely to the Lid that Snake River salmon
must traverse a series
of federal dams along the lower 140 liii les of the Snake (see
map l 0).

—•-

These four Ldcral dams
Ice harbor Lower Vlonuinental. Little Goose. and
Lower Granite Dams
are all operated by the CS. Army Corps of Engineers. Not
only
have the liur Lower Snake Dams destroyed spawning grounds, they
also pose substantial
obstacles to both upstream and downstream migrall hg salmon Al though
there are other
causes for the decline of Snake River salmon, the overwhelming
reason for their listing
under the Endangered Species Act was the construction and operati
on of these dams U\ er
the last forty years.’

Since approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Progra
m in
restoring Snake River Sn mon runs has been a regional priority. 1
lie Endangered Speeie
Act listings of the I 900s added a federal restoratton plan tIm tough
the ESAs federal
consultation process. Neither plan has pioducee the pomnised
etoratmun. hc>\\ e%er,
despite reported expenditures as high as S3 bill on
a I though that figure is \igomLS ly
challenged by some, who dispute the premise thai the priiiai
pp of the Columbia
Basit, dams is to maximize hydroelectric rc venues. Tit s
Etilure is not altogether
en that the NM [5 1 995-)Q l3iOp g eni ne hi\ J:oelectrie operati
ons
sLmrprisin2 gi
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survived scientific

ized the need for
Although the 1995-99 BiOp on hydroelectric operations recogn
s ensued. Instead, the
major modifications! o fedet-al dams, no significant change
program of trucking and
centerpiece ol the salmon restoration program continues to be a

not
bargin JU’\.Cfllle salmon around the dams, a technique that has
scientific support, and
scrutiny. Although the dam breaching option has substantial
a wa e of opposition
studies have shown it to be econonucall feasible. it generated
officials.
throuihout the rural North\\ esi. part cu larly from elected 3
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do supply a navigation channel that makes Lewiston. Idaho, over
450 miles from the
ocean, a seaport, but that navigation is some ofthe most heavily subsid
ized transportation
in the United States. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that
the overall economic
benefits of breaching the Lower Snake Dams could substantially
outweigh their costs.
particularly if the real costs ofthe dams to the salmon runs are
accounted for. One study
estimated those costs to be approximately $500 million annually
and the loss of25,000
family- wage jobs in fishing and related industries. This chapte
r makes the scientific,
economic, and legal case for dam 4
breaching.

The Transpurtailon Program

For roughly 25 years. the Corps of Engineers has been transporting
salmon smolt
by truck and barge to avoid mortalities at the dams and in the reseno
irs. This program
has created the odd situation ofsometimes trucking salmon on Interst
ate 84, the highway
paralleling the Columbia. while grain and other agricultural produc
ts float in barges on
the river. Although the transportation program has been unable to
reverse long4crm run
size declines, NMFS has continued the transport ofjuvenile fish under
ESA consul tation.
Since the status quo seems to be a recipe for extinction of several salmon
species, in its
2000 BiOp NMFS was basically heed with a choice betwee
n improving the
transportation program and breaching the four Lower Snake River
dams. It chose the
former, including improved barging and trucking techniques. structu
ral changes at the
dams, and increased flow augmentation to speed the tish to their collect
ion points and to
help those which cannot be collected migrate in-river. More
flow augmentation, which
the 2000 BiOp asks for but does not require, would mean draftin
g additional amounts of
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scient lie reports.

Following is a discussion of eight
a program based on restoring natural river conditions.
recent

Time Science o/ Darn Breac/nrn. mc. Dvn.vpoi/aiion

ber 1093. Ibderal and
Tue Dci’ailed Fi.c/icic ()pe/ufi/ic. P/an (1093). In Novem
interagency Columbia Basin
state fishery agencies and treaty Indian tribes, through the
for operating Columbia
Fish and \Vildl ft. Authority, prepared a comprehensive plai
The plan advocated seasonal
Basin dams in a manner compatible with salmon migration.
more natural river conditions.
reservoirdrawdowns and flow augmentation to help restore
truck transport of juvenile
The fishery agencies and tribes concl tided that barge and
the operation of the dams
salmon could not overcome poor river conditions created by
decline of the Snake River
and noted that the transportation progmm had Ibiled to halt the
portai ion to a last resort,”
runs. The stale agencies recommended restricting use oftrans
the tribes opposed continuing
to be used only in extremely low flow conditions:
transportation under any circumstances.

reservoirs to “minimum
The plan called liar drawdowns of the Lower Snake River
each year. This seasonal
operating pools” between April 1 5 and December I of
or Cecil Andrus at the
drawdown plan. which originated in a proposal of Idaho Govern
uently dropped for being of
‘Salmon Summit” in 091 (chapter 9), was subseq
operating plan also endorsed
questionable efficacy at high economic cost. The I 99$
Dworshak reservoir on the
signi licant amounts of flo a ugmcntation fioin both
calling for 927.001) acre—feet
C’learwater River and reservoirs in (lie L’pper Snake Basin.
f.et by I 90g. A 1 094 report
ftom Upper Snake reservoirs in 1904 and 1 .927 niml lion acre—
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770.’ 1iid’pcinlcni Peer Reeü’n’ of 7c,iivpoiluiion (1 994i. Because NM FS’s
I 993
hydropower BiOp relied heavily on truck and barge transport
a status luo that caused
a fldera I judge to suegest that salmon recovery el’fbrts need “a major overha
ul”
representatives ftoin NM L’S, the U.S. Fish and \-\‘ildli fe Service, state lisheri
es agencies.
and treaty Indian tribes convened a peer review ptmne
1 to study the scientilic issues
involved in the transportation program. The ensuing report, completed
in May I 994.
concluded that the transportation approved by the N \‘l F’S
was “unlik
[3101’
to halt or
ely
pre\’ent continued decline and extirpation of I isted species ofsalrnon in the
Snake River
I3asin. “ The report noted that while transportation provides “a temporary
respite’ from
dam—related mortalities, it fat led to protect sal non horn mortal it ies associa
ted with river
system conditions that exist throughout the sal mon life cycle. Theref
ore. the report
explained, in terms of elThetina a program ot’salrnon recovery, it really doesn’
t flatter
ii the transported sal mon survive at a Ii iglier ate than untransported salmon
, unless the
overall survival rate lhr the population is sufficient to recover the
speciesi.’’

—

The Independent Peer Review criticizeu the transportation ogmin
‘or
proceeding in the absence ofa standard for hydroelectric passage survival.
The scientists
observed that ibis de licieney made the utility of the transporiation progra
m ‘highly
speculative.’’ despite pcI imi nary i rid ieations that sonic sah non species seemed
to benefit
from transportation under the adverse river cotid lions existing at the
time the
transportation experiments were conducted. The report a so 1
uestioned a ke asstimiipt on
of the preliminary studies, which had claimed apperent bene [Os roni transpo
rtai ion by
explaining that ‘‘Flush appeared to be similarly handled and marked rega
’’
les of
whether they were transported or desie.nater [‘or ri—ri\ cr inmeration.
‘1 lie scient ist
suggested that the critical premise underlying the si aches supportive of transpo
riat icii
the assumption that juvenile salmon, winch were hai idled and marked and then returne
d
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the Snake River Basin.””

The 1994 A,nendnwnis in the Colunthia Basin Fish and Widhjè Pmgrcun. The
1994 amendments to the Northwest Power Planning Council% Columbia Basin Fish and
s’s
Wildlife Program incorporated a phased approach to Idaho Governor Cecil Andru
suggested seasonal drawdown plan. The amendments also called for conducting “a
mainstem experiment” in which approximately equal numbers of fish would be
transported as would be allowed to migrate in-river. This experiment would require a
decrease in the number of fish transported in order to allow a legitimate comparison of
the ability of transported versus in-river salmon to produce return adults.’°

Except for the mainstem experiment, the Council voted to restrict transportation
to “extremely adverse” river conditions, essentially low water years. Although the
Council approved a continuation of transportation in the short term under low flow
conditions, it warned that barging and trucking salmon “should not be regarded as a
substitute for changes in the river ecosystem” or “as a device to delay substantial
improvements in in-river survival conditions.””

--

—

The Triba1RL’sioraiion Plan (1995). In June 1995. the treaty fishing tribes ofthe
The
Columbia Basin released Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-KIsh-Wii (The Spirit qithe Salmon).
tribal plan completely eschewed artificial transportation ofjuvenile salmon, advocating
instead gravcl4o-graitl salmon management, including dam breaching to restore natural
river functions. The tribes cal led lbr a long-term goal of achieving “mean historical
detined as flows which would have occurred without water resourees
flows”
during the spring juvenile
development and in the absence of irrigation depletions
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foreclosed by the transportat iou program. The
tribal position on terminating the
transportation program was hardly extreme, as it echoed the
Northwest Power Planning
Councils earlier call for ending arti ticia I transportation, albeit
only in the long term.

The National Reveai’ch Coi,iicil Report (1 J96). In 1992, the Nation
al Research
Council formed the Committee on Protection and Management
of Anadromous Salmon
to review the population status, habitat, and environmental
requirements of’ Pacific
salmon species in the Northwest. The committee gave only
a qualified endorsement to
continued transportation in the short run, citing studies showin
g increased survival of
transported salmon compared to salmon migrating in—river. Howev
er, the couimittee
failed to consid

er the fiuct that, as recognized by the independent Peer Review
of
Transportation, salmon migrating in—river suffer stress as a result
ofmarking and handling
due tcu the transportation program, and the committee also seemed
to assume that river
conditions could never be 14
improved.

One of the reasons the National Research Council oerlooked
sonic of the latest
scientific information on transportation may have had to do with
the composition of the
committee, which might have compromised its report.
The chief author of the
committees treatment of transportation and its alternatives
was Donald Chapman. a
biologist who spent his career in the employment of’ utilities
and electricity—inteuisie
industries like aluminum companies. Given the contested nature
of’ salmon science, it
was surprising that the National Research Council would
choose such an obviousl
interested scientist, Nevertheless, the report did endorse a policy
of reliance on natural
river Junctions in the long run, arguing thai:
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echoed in subsequent
This endorsement ol restoring natural river functions would be
Independent Scienti tic
reports, particularly in the Northwest Power Planning Council’s
Group report that same year.

Northwest Power
The Inclepeiicieiit Sc’ieii/ilk’ Group Report (/996). In I 994. the

influences, the ISU’s
eminent scientists and structured to insulate them horn political

ific Group (ISG). Comprised of
Planning Council established the Independent Scient

the Council’s lish and wildlife prognim
ll’po was to analyze the science underlying
later, in I 996, the ISG
and to suggest a scientific toundation lbr the program. Two years
a coherent conceptual
issued its report, which criticized the Council’s program for lacking
conditions, or the
foundation and recommended what it cal led “normative river”
of native fish and wildlite
restoration of ecological processes consistent with the needs
relying on such foiled
species. The scientists fau ltecl salmon restoration efforts for
juvenile salmon, and it
technological fixes as hatcheries and ari t’icial transport of
river system. The ISG
suggested that technology was an unlikely substitute for a natural
no scientific study and
noted that these technologies were adopted with little or
bear the burden of proot,
recommended that in the future such measures should
implemen ted only a fter intensive evaluation.’

.

.

.

“

ce, ‘a]vailablc
The report concluded that, even after a quarter—eenturyofexperien
a primary or supporting
evidence is not sufficient to identify transportation as either
” This conclusion was
method of choice for salmon recovery in the Snake River Basin.
provide “the minimum
the result of the scientists’ finding that artificial transport cannot
let alone those
levels
survival rates necessary for the maintenance of poprilition
Rebuilding salmon
survival rates necessary for rebinlding of salmon populations.”
nents of the region’s
populations is critical if salmon runs are to become vial, Ic compo
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To accomplish mainstem habitat restorauon. the ISG recommended
permanent
reservoir drawdowns, specifically suggesting that [lie John
Day or McNary reservoirs be
lowered to expose alluvial reaches that historically supporled salmon
spawning. The
report also noted that drawdowns of the Lower Snake reservoirs would
be consisteni with
its normative river concept. The scientists cal led attention to
the restoration ol mainsteni
habitat

Idaho

DepLIIinIeIn

—

of Fish uiid Conic Report C gc)yi. In v1a

995. the Idaho

, rather than tributary habitat, because it was the mainstein which
historically
supported “metapopu lations’ of salmon
large populations which allow fbr dispersal
of spawners to neighboring areas, Iheilitating recolon izat on ofhabi
tats where extinct ion
has occurred. The ISC argued that restoration efforts should
locus on areas that
hi storica I ly were home 10 melapopti lations. Restoring areas that
historically supported
sal mon populations in the mainstem will recgnre permanent reservo
ir drawdowus .nd
breaching of scnie dams.
The

Department

of Fish and Game (I DFG ) issued a report on the causes of the dcci
ne ui’
Idaho salmon and the available options for recovery. The report
concluded that the
primary cause of the decline of’ Idaho salmon was the construction
and operation oI the
federal dams bLult in the l 960s and I 9
70s. The report also observed that the
transportation program ‘‘has not compensated for the daiiis and
is unlikely to provide
recovery.” The IDFG called for the establishment of’ a 2 to
6 percent smolt—to—adn lt
surv i’al standard tbr salmon recovery and embraced the indepe
ndent scientists coilcept
of a “norniat ive river” as the best means to achieve Oi is standard.
The report ohNcrved
that “fa]vailahle data provide no indication [he current transpo
rtation program] cail
sustain a 2—6% smolt—to—adu It survival’ and noted that cal ic.t operati
ons also finI to i icel
l.ioth the 24- and I 00-year sinvi sal standards.
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reservoirs to
additional water stored in reservoirs in Idaho to flush salmon through the
not indicate how
collection stations. The IDFG concluded that existing “data does
citing Idaho’s
augmentation can provide enough survival bene hits for recovery,”
cannot he attained
comments to NMFS which claimed that “Ih]istorical water velocities
a result, the
with current reservoirs, even using all reservoir storage in the basin.” As
that breaching
IDFG endorsed dam breaching to create natural river conditions, noting
ded that “the
had “a high likelihood of meeting recovery standards.” The report conclu
and steelhead in
natural river option is the best biological choice for recovery oh salmon
ty ofsuccess
Idaho. This assessment is logical, biologically sound. has the highest certain
nt,fic data.”’
and lowest risk of hilure, and is consistent with the preponderance ol’scie

( PATH
The PA TI—I Reports. The Plan li.r Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses
’s 1995 I3iOp on
was an interagency working group of 25 scientists created by NMFS
alternative models
hydroelectric operations. The BiOp charged PATI-i with evaluating

...

n, on the basis of
for Snake River salmon recovery in order to help Nvl FS make a decisio
rtation program or to
the best available science, whether to continue the artificial transpo
lie uncertainties
recommend dam breaching. NMFS created PATI-I to review the scienti
g evidence, to
atlecting salmon survival and “using expertjudgment. based on all existin
conflicting hypotheses about the effects of
ciuantify the relative degree of belief in
followed scienti tic
management actions on stock pcrtormances.” PATH studies
reviewed.
procedures developed by scienti tic consensus and were peer 2

—---.-

-

-

--—

three
In a March 1 99i report. PATI-l scientists compared three alternatives under
transportation.
computer models: I ) nlaintai n ing the status quo, 2) plirSui ng maximum
ter model, Fish
3) recommending drawdowns to natural river le\els. Under one compu

-—.
-----—
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A revised analysis in August 199%, however, concluded that the natural
river
drawdown was the best alternative lbr recovery in the long run,
with close to a 100
percent likelihood ol recovery over the 4%—year and 100—year time period
s. The CRiSP
model remained considerably more optimistic about short—
term (24—year) recovery under
the transportation alternative than the FLUSH model (a 61 percent chance
ofrneeting the
survival standard versus a 10 percent chance under the FLUSH
model), but even the
C’RmSP model Ibund the natural river alternative sLmpcrior to transportation
(a 76 percent
chance versus a 61 percemt chance). The FLUSH model, on the other
hand, produced a
much lower probability o tsurviva I under the transportation alternative:
just a I 0 percent
chance of meeting the survival standard in the short run (24—y period
ear
), a 12 percent
chance of meeting the standard in the mid—term (4%—year period), and
a 37 percent chance
in the long run (100—year period)

ARer analyzing the August 199% PATH results, staliof the Idaho Depart
ment of
Fish and (lame determined that, in light of recent sniolt—to—adult returns
ol transported
fish of less than one—half percent. survival rates remain tour to twelve
times below that
required for salmon recovery. The staff concluded:

The natural river option is now the best biological choice regard
less of
which aggregate hypothesis (model) is used. The natural river option
is
the on! recovery strategy that is robust enough for the l)sh under both
aggregatehypotheses and a variety of assumptions
Under the natural
river option. Snake River fall chinoo
k
recove
ry
could
approa
ch
levels
evident in the Hanford Reach. which provides a high lv produc
tive
2.
fishery

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

ring Snake
that breaching the Lower Snake Dams would double the chances for recove
scientists,
River spring/summer chinook populations within 48 years Ac cording to the
percent under current
dam breaching would improve the recovery chance fi’om 40
the chances of
operations to 79 percent. Barging all possible fish would actually reduce
ment of Fish and
recovery to 35 perceit. i’he Chief of f’isheries of the Oregon Depart
settled in tiavor
Wildli f’e concluded that this report showed that the scientific debate was
was ‘il I ing
of breaching the darns: what remained. he suggested, was whether the region
to pay the social and economic costs of’ hreaching.

mrdrawdowns
The final PATI I report liar 1998 confirmed that Snake River reservo
concluded that
would give all salmon stocks the best chance of recovery. The report
recovering fall
natural river drawdowns would produce a 100 percent prot’imlity of
ok. depending on
chinook and a 47—65 percent chance of’recovering spring/s ummerchmno
ted the recovery
how soon dam breaching got underway. In contrast, the report estima
rtation alternative
chances Linder both current operations and under a maximum transpo
atust 15-35 lercenL2)

Lower
The A—Fish AppelIdLv (1999). With widespread interest in breaching the
. the U.S. Army
Snake Dams as a restoration strategy for imperiled Snake River salmon
issue. In late
Corps of Engineers began an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the
to improve
1 999, the Corps issued a drafi EIS which considered several alternatives
ed none. Flowever,
salmon migration in the L.ower Snake, including breaching. but endors
, which
the drafi FIS did include an appendix (A—Fish Appendix) written by NMFS
salmon.
examined the likely effects of hydroeleciric system changes on listed
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salmon recovery.

—

—

The A—Fish Appendix contrasted the PATI I hndings with those
of the CR1. vhicli
broadened its analysis be ond the hydropower system to
include all sources of salmon
niortahi tv. The CR1 analysis emphasized that in [lie case
of Snake River spring/suiluner
chinook, the species reu in ne I lie largest improveimients in
annual population growth to
reduce extinction risk, breaching would not assured recove
ly
r thai species unless clam
removal nearly doubled survi ‘al below Bonneville Dam.
The C RI cone luded that the
best prospects for sprmg/summncr chinook
which faced a “considerable risk of
extinction’’ within a decade
consisted of a combination of habitat restoration. harvest
limits and predator control, in addition to hydropower improv
ements. For Snake River
IhIl chinook and stcelhead
species not as imperiled as Snake River spring/summer
chinook
the CR1 suggested that extinction risks might be adequately
reduced through
management actions like harvest reductions, improved transpo
rtation and fish pis:age.
or dam breaching. But the A—Fish Appendix admitted that
tue best alternative fbr
increasing 1ill chinook populations was clam breaching,
since it would provide flC\\
spawning and rearing habitat bar the largely nainsiem—spawning
species.
’
2

The reluctance of the A—Fish Appendix to endorse breaching
was a consequence
of the CRI’s emphasis on the Lincertaillies inolvcd in what
is cal led delayed iuumtal It
oftransporcd juvenile salmon; that is, unexplained mortalities
suffered after transported
flsh are released above Bonne ille Dam. The (‘RI believed
that PATH’s emphasis on
dam breaching was (ILme to high estimates of delayen mortal
tv, which SOfliC recent stud es
hinted may not he warranted. If dclacd mortal it is lower
than estimated h\ PATh I
which based its conclusions on I 994o)(, data), breaching nay not
he significant lv better
than transportation. especiali\ for spi’imtgsuinin clitmiouk
Although die A—Fish
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including scientists from the U.S. Fish and
Critics of the A-Fish Appendix
bia River
Wildlife Service, the states of Idaho. Oregon, and Washington, and the Colum
faulted its conclusion that transported fish may have
Inter-Tribal Fish Commission
ned the
higher survival rates than the PATH data indicated. The critics also questio
ity rates could
Appendix’s assumption that the remaining uncertainties in delayed mortal
d mortality
be resolved through years ofadditional research. and its suggestion that delaye
. The Idaho
could be attributed to any source other than the hydroelectric system
Columbia runs with
Department of Fish and Game contrasted adult returns in Lower
latter since the
adult returns in the Snake runs, the former having a rate of five times the
ment levels
mid-1980s, and also noted that Snake River populations were below replace
Wildlife Service
in 12 of 16 years since mass transportation began. The U.S. Fish and
endorsed
included a separate appendix to the Corps’ draft [US. Appendix M. which
as well as wildli íè:
breaching as a long-term benefit to both resident and anadromous fish

..

.

[Breaching] would improve migration conditions for anadromous
saimonids and other migratory fish through the area of the four lower
Snake River dams, restore riverine habitat and spawning habitat for fall
chinook salmon, and improve water quality. Returning the lower Snake
River to a free-flowing river would benefit most resident lish native to
Overall sportlishing in the study area would be enhanced.
the area.
With the restoration of a tiinctioning riparian zone and floodplain,
habitat critical for many wildlifc species would develop and be
maintained in the long term.

While the breaching of the lower Snake River dams would have some
short-term adverse impacts to fish and wildlife resources, the long-terni
benefits would far outweigh the potential itwacts.’”

:fla
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The scientific studies discussed above show that a significant part of the
scientific community believes that the centerpiece of current recovery efforts
. the
trucking and banjing ofjuvenile salmon, is a failure and unlikely to restore the Snake
River salmon runs. The studies also illuminate a growing scientific consensus
that
breaching the daim to restore natural river conditions is the best option to save Snake
River salmon. As the economic studies discussed below indicate, breaching is also
an
affordable option.
The Economics qfDtnn Breaching

—

‘,.

I

Historically, there were four reasons for building dans: I) flood control, 2)
hydropower production. 3) irrigation and water supply. and 4) navigation. Althou
gh not
traditionally a reason for building dams, recreation is now generally regarded as
a fifth
category ofpublic benefit. Each of these perceived benefits carries with it certain costs.
The perceived benefits of dams usually have been fully quantified and overstated,
while
the costs have been greatly understated or ignored. Traditionally, cost-benefit analys
is
did not calculate true social costs, such as environmental damage, amortized
dam
operating and maintenance costs, and support subsidies like those provided naviga
tors
and irrigators. Environmental damages were usually not included in the economic costbenefit balance sheet because their impacts were dispersed or more difficult to quantif
y
than dam benefits. These costs did not disappear. howeer they either becam
e a net
drain on the regional economyor reappeared as costs tobe paid by taxpayers, ralepay
ers.
or fishermen. In the case of the once abundant Columbia Basin salmon runs, the
economic costs have been substantial: up to S500 million a year and 25,000 jobs.”

:cj
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in land, a seaport. But the barge tra fIle they allow
the countiy.
transporta [ion in

is

some o fthe

most

heavily subsidized

of
With science increasingly pointing toward dam breaching as the best means
of action is
restoring Snake River salmon, the chief issue is whether such a course
ing is in kict a viable
affordable. A series of recent reports suggests that dam breach
economic option. Following is a discussion of six of those reports.

restore

I larza
The 1—Jar:a Report (1996). tinder a contract with the Corps of Engineers.
lity ofvar ious salmon
Northwest issued a report in october 1996 on the economic feasibi
ded that permanent
recovery opt ions. including reservoir drawdowns. The report conclu
to implement
natural river drawdowns were ten times less costly and three tinies faster
g down the tour
than seasonal drawclowns. I larza estimated that permiieiitly drawin
natural river flows would increase salmon survival
drawdowns
Lower Snake River dams to

d ifthe
by about 72 percent over [lie status quo and run sizes could he double
on the Lower
were coupled with passage improvements at the remaining dams

bia.
33
Colum

reduced
The report suggested that the cost of natural river drawdowns could be
irs by 2004 and the
by planning lbr the drawdowns in stages, drawing down two reservo
recreation. and
other two by 2010. This phased approach would allow navigation,
further

be
hydropower users to develop alternatives in an orderly manner. Costs could
e the artificial
reduced by eliminating expensive studies and measures to improv
I lana estimated
transportation prograui and to maintain the four Lower Snake Dams.
contrast. Harza
that the aiinua I cost of dam breaching would he $75—S I 53 mil lion. In
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‘

report cone! nded that breach wig is an eflbetive way to
save
xpayers and electncitv ratepavers the expense of maintaining
and fixing dams, hoot
the retiion’S economy by S24 million, end the burden of
the Endantered Species Act.
protect Idaho water and restore economic balance.” The report
suggested that breach rig
the dams would he “an eflbciive way to restore fish runs to the levels
ofthe I 960s. w hen
75,000 adu It salmon

returned to Idaho streams and rivers,” and that, without breach
rig.
there isc1 “high probability’’ thai. Idaho salmon Will disappear.
According to the report,
breaching would save $98 ni lion per year in subsidies
to barge navigation, create a
healthy fishery producing S 150 million or ldah os econo my, provid
e another 598 mill on
in income for the Net Peree Fribe, and aid Idaho irrigation
by reducing or eliminating the
need li.r Idaho storage water to flush juvenile salmon to the
sea.

The SIaIe.vmLln report noted that the four Lower Snake reservo
irs produce just 5
liereent ot the Northwest’s electric power. which could be replaced at compe
titive prices.
The dams also supply

water to only thirteen heavily subsidized irrigators and provid
e no
flood control at all. Overall, the report estimated the annual costs
of breaching the dams
to he $509 million, while the annual benefits would he $692
million, a net benefit ofS I 83
million annually. The report concluded that ‘[c
livi lization lg by using the
experience of the past to make fife better fhr the next, genera
tion. With the advantage of
three decades of’ hindsight, it is easy to see that breaching would
put the North est hack
on track.’ Thus, the leading newspaper in the state of IUaiio
. not known for endor ag
extreme environmental pui cies, adopted dam hruaehine
as the most cost etteci \ e
solution to recovering Snake River sal mon. \‘i ost lciaIuIns
did not agree. a reminder that
salmon restoration efibris often are not the proulei of eeonon
ueally rational dec iSiOlis.”
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science.
and wildlife plan grounded on sound 37

wns on
To understand the economic implications of potential reservoir drawdo
ing agency, the
the Bonneville Power Administration, the region federal power market
il to perform a
group asked the staff of the Northwest Power Planning Counc
arios, including
“reconnaissance level” cost analysis. The staffanalyzed a variety ofscen
reservoirs and John
continuation of current operations, drawdown of the Lower Snake
wn that would take
Day reservoir to natural river levels by 2007, and a staggered drawdo
ofeach scenario
place between 2006 and 2018. The report determined that affordability
price of BPA
correlated less to the costs of reservoir drawdowns than to the market
power?K

iw

n..,..

.

.

..

•.x

.

tt hour),
lfthe price ofBPA power remains around 20 mills (1/10 cent per kilowa
term, whether the
the report concluded that “[BPA customers] will do well over the long
ez BPA would
five dams are drawn down or not” Ifmarket prices fall to 16 mills, howev
Drawdowns by 2007
lose about S50 million per year, even under current operations.
debt payment to
under a 16 mill scenario would produce losses less than BPA’s annual
then would yield
the U.S. Treasury, an average ofabout $200 million for twenty years,
scenario would cut
net benefits ofabout $80 million thereafter. A staggered drawdown
es ofabout $100
the losses in half during the first decade, then would produce net revenu
produce annual
million annually thereafter. At 20 mills, drawdowns by 2007 would
would reach nearly
losses during only six ofthe thirty-year study period, and net benefits
drawdown would
5400 million annually during the second decade. The staggered
annually. Thus,
produce a benefit almost immediately, aeraging around $300 million

-.
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not just the economic costs of natural river restoration of the Lower Snake
but also the
“net economic benefits” ofrestored river flows. The report defined net econom
ic benefits
as the economic cost to society a 11cr all costs are taken into account The Lansin
g report
concluded that, when all costs and benefits are considered, natural river flows
would save
$87 million annually. The report estimated that the actual current cost of
Lower Snake
dam operations exceeds $236 million annually, including operation
and maintenance
costs, salmon recovery costs, and navigation and irrigation subsidies.
The cost of
restoring natural river flows, on the other hand, was estimated at $149.5 mil
lion annually,
including the costs of providing replacement power, alternatives to
navigation, and
purchasing farmlands (to retire irrigation 4
diversi0
ons).

Although the Lansing report’s methodology was endorsed by the Chairm
an ofthe
University of Montana’s Department ofEconomics, it probably undere
stimated the cost
of reservoir drawdowns, as it did not consider a drawdown ofJohn Day
reservoir on the
Lower Columbia., and it assumed no flow augmentation would be necess
ary after the
reservoirs were drawn down. The Northwest Power Planning Counc
il’s independent
economists called into question the Lansing report’s conclusion ofnet econom
ic benefits
from dam breaching, criticizing its assumptions that SI 95 million could
be saved in flow
enhancement, monitoring, research, and habitat restoration costs; and that
replacement
electric power could be purchased for 1.6 mills. The advisory board conclu
ded that not
all ofthe $195 million could be saved, and that replacement cost power
would likely cost
around 2.0 to 2.5 milLs, increasing costs by about 50 percent, or around $65
million.”

Nonetheless, the Lansing report’s main finding remains intact: the net
econom
ic
benefits of the four Lower Snake River dams are less than their total operati
onal and
maintenance costs, associated subsidies to navigators and irrigators, and
fish and wildli ii,
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the costs of
economically significant for the four Lower Snake Dams. But even there,
maintenance.
river transport as a whole (including the costs of dam operation and
greater than for
ratepayer subsidies, and salmon mitigation measures) are actually
equivalent transport by rail or truck.”

stic about
The Gotublein Repori (1998). An economic report that was less optimi
Goodstcin
the economic savings associated with dam breaching was produced by Eban
Lewis and Clark
for the PEW Charitable Trusts. Goodstein. an economies professor at
and, using
College. reviewed the literature on breaching the Lower Snake River dams
ing the dams
conservative assumptions, concluded that the economic benefits of breach
Goodstein did
would be roughly equivalent to the costs oldam removal. Unlike Lansing,
m could be
not assume that all of the costs of the current flow enhancement progra
3’
saved.

—

—

—

—

including lost
According to Goodstein, the cost of removing the dams
and lost flatwater
electricity, extending irrigation pumps. lost navigation to Lcwiston,
ic
will range from $1224288 million annually. Most of the econom
recreation
ng elimination
uncertainties concern lost power sales. The economic benefits includi
and subsidies to
of dam operation and maintenance costs, fish and wildlife costs,
activities and
navigation, coupled with new revenues from free- flowing river recreational
would range from $1 16-S 193 million annually. Although
increased fish harvests
be “roughly
Goodstein concluded that the economic costs and benefits would
runs were
comparable,” he observed that if the “existence value” of restored salmon
y overwhelm a
included in the equation, the benefits of dam breaching would “clearl
hundred million dollars or so of foregone electricity.”’

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

ios hut the market price of’ power.
U nder high market prices, B PA would
experience positive nd revenues under a
hsh recovery scenarios, including a five—
reservoir drawdown scenar
io (IL.. breaching the lour Lower Snake Danis
and dra\Viflg
down John Day reservoir). With medium market
prices, UPA would have positive net
revenues under all hut the most costly scenario
(dam breaching coupled with flows and
dam moW heal ions necessary to comply with
the C’ lean Water Act). Under low tiiarket
conditions, BPA would experience negative revenu
es under any scenario that
ineeaseU
its costs. The report indicated that, with financial
reserves ol 5300 mu lion, under a low—
market price scenario BPA could minimize the
adverse effects of drawdowns but not

eliminate defic
45
its.

——

—

The Council repoi assumed continuation o i’the numer
ous subsidies targeted for
elimination in the Lansing report. Funher, it made
no attempt to calculate benehits in
order to estimate net social benefits. Neverthel
ess, the report did indicate that a live—dan i
drawdown \vould be a ffordable under both the
high and mcdi uni market price scenard s.
Only under a persistent low market price scenario
wi i elm the report deseribec
as
very likely but possible’
would dam breach ng threaten BPA’s market
place
competitiveness. The Council reports conc
lusions were largely coriflrincn by
subsequent BPA briefing iper on hundi hg [he cost
of various lisli recovery

.

The Co/p.c 0/ bi,inec,.c Drop LLo/lo/1lic :lppeio
/tv “I 9i9,’.
The Corp 0
Engineers draft EIS on the Snake Rivei diinis kind
the
eiieeih on
u\ciiile salmon
migration included an liconoitiiu Appendix. which
was ihie product ol lie ‘‘l)ra\\ do\\ 1
Regional Economic Workgo iLip (1)1< E’vV
DR I \k’ esi i outed m lie economic effects of
maintain dig the dams on the Lower Snake as oppo
sec to hi cuchii ng theui.
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existing conditions. As
to suggest that there were no costs associated with maintaining
t system is hardly cost-free
several ofthe previously discussed studies indicate, the curren
requiring expenditures in excess of 5200 million annually.
—

economic effects of
According to the Economic Appendix, the average annual
” were minor, both
“maximum transportation” and “major system improvements
each alternative would
producing small estimated benefits over existing conditions. But
On the other hand, the
produce fewer wild salmon returns than existing conditions.
ted net cost of $246
Appendix estimated that dam breaching would produce an estima
estimated net costs would
million annually. due to power costs of $271 million. Those
ly, if the tribes’ prefenttd 0
decline about $40 million, to roughly S208 million annual
ed 6.875 percent rate)”
percent discount rate is employed, instead ofthe Corps’ preferr

.:._

-‘

value estimates for
The figures above do not include passive use (or existence)
to a free-flowing condition
recovered salmon runs or for returning the Lower Snake River
ed by the Goodstein report
(independent ofany effect on salmon populations). As predict
the other estimates of costs
discussed above, use ofthese existence values overwhelms
value associated with wild
and benefits. The Appendix noted that there is a passive use
widely: from a low of $66
Snake River salmon increases, but the estimated values vary
million. The estimated
million to a high of $879, with a middle range of $142-$508
. The Northwest Power
existence value ofa free-flowing Snake River was $420 million
ged the Appendix’s use
Planning Council’s board ofindependent scientists quickly challen
acknowledged that they
ofestimated recreational benefits and existence values: the board
were not accurate enough
might represent “best available scientific knowledge.” but they

.....
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annual megawatts due to breaching (the estimated hydropower costs
from breaching
when compared to a baseline consisting of improvements in curren
t conditions the
environmentalists thought likely). The study. Going With The Flow:
Replacing Enesxr
From Four Snake River Dams, by the Northwest Energy Coalition
and the Natural
Resources Defense Council. concluded that the cost ofreplacement power
would amount
to $ I-$2 per 1,000 kilowatt-hours for 20 years (from 2002-21) if the
replacement power
was from gas and coal fired sources, and $1 -S3 per 1000 kilowatt-hours
ifreplaced by a
“zero carbon” scenario consisting of conservation and renewable resourc
es like wind.
The latter would produce no rate increase over the former it’ electric
prices are in the
medium expected range. and would be cheaper if prices are
high. Another
environmentalist-funded economic study concluded that morejobs would
be created than
lost under a dam breaching scenario: a net gain of over 3,000 new
permanent jobs in
commercial and sport fishing, operating new power plants and transm
ission lines, and
transportation and shipping.”

.

These economic studies indicate that dam breaching is aflbrdable under
the most
probable marketplace scenarios, even assuming continuation of the subsid
ies which the
Lansing report identified as amounting to $236 million annually.
In fact, both the
Lansing and Idaho Statesman reports expressly factored in the
costs of economic
mitigation, such as providing alternative sources ot’electricity, alterna
tive truck and rail
transportation, and alternative means ofwater diversions. Only ifimp
robably low market
conditions persist for extended periods of tinw is dam breaching
of questionable
aftbrdability. Even then, ifcurrcnt subsidies to irrigators andnavigators
were terminated
and placed in a contingency reserve, some $4.7 billion could be saved
within 20 years,
a substantial reserve?’

—

&
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(I/Dali? BreaIlilig

ued artificial

Even in a worst—case economic
unhkeiv scenario of low market conditions fir 20 years.
wou Id produce onl about
scenario for Northwest electric rates, natural river drawdowns
tly pay around 40 percent
a I 0 percent increase to Northwest ratepavers, who curren
average.
below the national 52

The Lao

decision.

or contin
The initial decision on whether to endorse dam breaching
operation oI’thc Columbia
transportation was NM ES’s reconsideration of its l3iOp on the
t to judicial review under the
Basin hydroelectric system in 2000. This decision is subjec
enting federal agencies on
Endangered Species Act, as are the decisions of the implem
continues to dominate the legal
whether to follow the NMFS opinion. Although the ESA
Act, the Clean WatcrAct, Indian
landscape, the Northwest PowerAct, the Federal Power
also a iTect the drawdown
treaty fishing rights, and the Pacific Salmon Treaty ecuid

the action”

Basin hydroelectric
E,4 Decisia,, ‘vJakim,’. NM FS’s 2000 BiOp on (of umbia
ize the continued existence Of
operations concluded that dam operations would jeopard
t alternative, which
listed Columbia Basin salmon without a reasonable and pruden
and habitat protection and
included a non—binding plan cmi improved hatchery operations
is a final agency action. As
restoration measures. A court can review this l3iOp, since it
ing on the agency proposing
the Supreme Court has made clear, a BmOp is viii ually hind
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Judie Marsh upheld a revised Bi()p, even though it tolerated massiv
e mortalities ot’
juvenile sal mon (up to
percent at’ sockeye and spring/sun nier ch nook and 1)9
ot lill chinook), and even though the judge expressed doubt about the
high level of
species risk NM FS chose to tolerate. The coLirt seemed influenced
by NM FS’s claim that
it \ as implement inc an ecosystem approach to salmon reco cr,
accoun
tine for
Competing ecological considerations like concern for other species. and
the fact that the
basin’s Indian tribes were not unanimous in chal lengine the revised BiOp.
54

NM 1S will surely have to defend its 2ti0() B:()p iii court on the basis of’
using
best available science, including consultation with state and tribal biolog
ists, not on the
basis ol economic savings. (‘loser judica ie ew ot NM! S’s
decision may he
lorlheoini ng it’ the tribes can show that the decision was made
without care

consideration of’ the t’ederal trust obligation to undertale :rotective
measures \vacii
actions threaten tribal treaty rights. But NM I-S’s biggest challenge nay he to
eon vi ice
a court that its attempt to avoid species jeopardy through rehance on a nonbin
d no plait.
implemented in large measure by non-1edera entities. coinpi es with
the ESA.

The F//cc-i of Oilic’i’ fcdc,’al .S1L1lOft’,. Like the ESA, the Northwest Poci Act
demands decision making on the basis ofbest available science. The Ninth
Circuit has
ruled that this standard,

along with another North\\ ci Po\\ er Act p ovisiomi calling for
improved liver flows tor salmon to meet “sound biological abiectv
cs.” requires “a high
degree of deference” to the biological advice of’ federal aix!
stale fishery agencies and

Indian tribes, The court exprcssly thrhade sacri 1’ici ng fish and wi 1(11 i I’e
goals iii pu ‘so it
of what the court termed ‘‘the lowest common denamiimai’r accept
able to pover
interests.” The 1 994 amendments to the Non
est Power Act salmon restoration
program called for season a! (irax\ Ui)v ns ol two oi the four Lower Snake
Ri er dams. but
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exceedingly poor, with high temperatures and low levels of dissolved oxygen. The
Environmental Protection Agency and state water quality agencies have identified the
water quality problems in the Lower Snake River and asked the Corps of Engineers, the
operator of the dams, to produce plans to remedy than. Failure to meet water quality
standards is a Clean Water Act violation, and environmentalists filed suit. The district
court of Oregon subsequently determined that the operation of the dams is in fact a
substantial cause of water quality standards violations. However it has yet to order the
7
Corps to develop and implement a remedial plan!

As federal dams, the Lower Snake River dan’s were congressionally authorized.
and therefore not subject to the licensing requirements of the Federal Power Act. But
their existence could have a material effect on the relicensing of the Hells Canyon
complex, three dams owned and operated by Jdaho Power Company, upriver from the
.
Lower Snake Dams (see map I. page 11). These dams will need to be relieensed shortly
as noted in chapter 11.

.—.•

-

Three of the more problematic hurdles Ldaho Power will face in getting its
projects relicensed are section 7 ofthe Endangered Species Act, section 401 ofthe Clean
Water Act and section 18 of the Federal Power Act. Section 7 will require a BiOp on
the efibet of the operation ofthe projects on listed salmon downstream. Section 401 will
require a water quality certification from the states stipulating that the operation of the
Hells Canyon dan’s primarily fbr power generation will meet water quality standards
applicable to the Lower Snake River. Both requirements could require substantial
changes in project operations. Section IX requires “t’islwiays” at licensed projects. as
prescribed by the Interior or Commerce Secretaries. The Ninth Circuit has recently

‘
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Indian Treaty Rights. As discussed in chapters 4 and 12. Stevens
and Palmer
treaty tribes have the right to take one-half ofthe harvestable fish
destined to pass their
traditional fishing grounds. an uncertain right to habitat protection forthe
fish, and a right
to sufficient water to carry out the purposes of their reservations. The
amount of water
reserved is also uncertain, but because the purposes of virtually all
Indian reservations
in the Northwest include allowing the tribes to continir their
fishing livelihoods.
sufficient water must be made available to support a tribal fishing
economy. These
instream water rights carry very early priority dates, probably “time
immemorial” rights.
trumping virtually all competing water claims under Western water
law’s “first in time.
first in right” principle.”

In Idaho’s Snake Ri’.er Basin Mjudication, all water rights to the
Snake River
and its tributaries are being determined in a massive adjudication involv
ing 87 percent
of the water rights in the state. The Nez Perce Tribe, and the federal
government on its
behalf, has made substantial instreain flow claims in support ofthe
tribe’s treaty fishing
right. These claims create substantial uncertainty for virtually every
water user in the
state, especially agricultural users who irrigate with water stored
in Upper Snake Basin
reservoirs. This uncertainty has not diminished in the wake
of the initial decision
denying the tribes’ claims, since the 5MM court’s opinion in the Nez
Perce water rights
case was filled with errors and ignored both precedent and bedrock princip
les of Indian
law, as explained in chapter 12. However, it is quite possible that the
Nez Pace would
reduce its claims forfiow augmentation to aid fish migration, which
in turn would reduce
effects on upstream diverters. in return for breaching the Lower Snake
River dams and
lowering John Day reservoir, since those measures seem to offer the
best opportunity of
restoring the tribe’s fishing economy. A settlement that promised restore
d salmon runs

—
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dams. Second, the Lower
approval. First, Congress would have to lund breaching (he
br navigation, irrigation and,
Snake Ri ‘er dams were authori,’ed by Congress
eliminate the navigation
secondarily, power ptnJioses. Breaching the dams would
iire, Congress \vOtikl have to
channel they create and the power they produce. Tlierel
produce (dam breaching would
approve retiring the dams and the navigation channel they
)
not necessarily eliminate irrigation

al to Indian water rights
Congressional approval and funding are usually essenti
water right claims to the Snake
settlements, so in approving a settlement of the Nez Pci-ce
While it might seem unlikely
River. Congress could also authorize breaching the dams.
congressional delegation came
that Congress would enact such legislation, if the regions
the irrigation economy ol
to realize that this approach is (lie hest way to siflguard both
to ensure relicensing or Idaho
Idaho and Eastern Oregon and Washington, as well as
l action would increase
Power’s Hells Canyon dams, (lie chances of congressiona
substantially. ‘

220—mile stretch of free—
Breaching the l.ower Snake Dams would create a
Snake’s confluence with the
f1o irig liver between the Hells Canyon Dam and the
ndent Scienti tic Group of the
(‘olunibia. In its Re/ui-u to 1/ic Ricer report, the Indepe
ing and enhancing the
Northwest Power Planning Council looked closely at protect
tion, the kill chinook ofthe Mid—
Columbia Basin’s onlystablcniainstem—spawnin popula
concluded that drawdowns of
Columbia’s undammed Hanford Reach. The scientists
bia would likely restore mainstem—
\‘lcNary and John Day reservoirs on the Lo\er Colum
population, since historically
Spawning populations as extensions of the I Ian fltrd Reach
ted large salmon populations.
the areas nos iiiundated by those reservoirs once suppor
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ctioning as a core population that could reseed adjacent areas!’

Without the four Lower Snake Dams, it appears likely that
the fl\\ lv erealce 221)—
nile stretch of lree—flowin.i Snake River \VOLild replica
te the experience ol I.he now—
productive 40—mile stretch of’ the I Ian ford Reach. “or examp
le. in I 99i fslterv oiteiais
reported that upriver bright hill chinook, which historically
spawned in the Upper
Columbia Basin, had begun spawning in great numbers
in the lower river in sha
pools below Bonneville Dam because they found sin table habitat
there. It seems probable
that similar scenarios woLild be replicated many times over
in a free—flowing Lower Snc
River, which would be more than live times the sue of
the I lantord Rcaeh

Even ii a free-flowing ma instem Lower Snake River were ul
tima telv to prov ICC
little in viable habitat, it still serves as the gateway io ldaaos
Salmon and Cleurw aler
Rivers Basins. I listorical lv. the Salmon alone orovided
more than 40 percent ol the
spring/summer chinook produced in the entire Columbia
Basin, so basinwidc sal ii:oii
recovery plan can ignore the potential of this area, given Is iiislori
c abundance and sia I
pristine habitat, comprise ci largelyol’national forests and wilder
ness areas. ft seems clear
that restoring Snake Basin salmon must bea foea poi in
of any iable sal mon recovery
program.

—--

Rescuing Snake River sal mciii Il’om the edge of e\t net
on is now one oft he
fremost items on the nations environmental agenda. Tl e cx st
ne method of preserv iig
the salmon runs —barging and trucking juvenile salmon
around the dams
has tailed
for over two decades to stem the decline of die species. Consid
erable scientific evidence
suggests that the best way to recover Snake River salmon
is to breach the four I R’
Snake Dams aim dva\.vuo\\ n John I )II reserv on to rstui
e nat ural ii vet conil I oii and
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can be replaced by
the most highly subsidized transportation systems in the country,
izing restoration of
aflbrdable rail and truck alternativcs. Indeed, the legislation author
ic mitigation to
natural river flows on the Lower Snake could also provide for econom
al rail and mack
affected river transport interests in the form of improved region
in Indian water
infrastructures. Similar sorts ofeconomic mitigation are commonplace
rights settlements.”

Snake
Ifthe Lower Snake Dams are not breached, demands for water from Upper
Species Act,
Basin reservoirs to restore salmon runs in order to satis& the Endangered
One analysis
the Clean Water Act, or the Nez Perce’s water right claims will intensi&.
lose water under
estimated that some 400,000 acres ofirrigated agriculture in Idaho could
ent of federal
one flow augmentation plan. Settling this conflict through enactm
ng the fishing
legislation authorizing dam breaching offers the best chance of restori
sinailtaneously
economy of both the Nez Pcrce Tribe and the state of Idaho. while
legislation could
preserving irrigation in Idaho and Eastern Oregon and Washington. The
Canyon dams. An
also remove obstacles to relicensing Idaho Power Company’s Hells
-based tourism
investment in effective salmon restoration would revitalize Idahe’s fishing
to the state’s
and related industries. whicheould contribute $150 million annually armore
realities, they
economy. When regional aix! national politicians begin to understand these
breaching the
may be led to endorse the science, economics, and law that point toward
Snake River
Lower Snake Dams and lowering John Day reservoir as the only viable
salmon restoration plan for the 21st century.”
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ade oiler the first Columbia Basin ESA listings, there is enough
experience with that statute and its provisions to suggest that those responsible
for
implementing the ESA will avoid decisions that might jeopardize entrenched econom
ic
activities like navigation on the Lower Snake River. The coneept of using ecosys
tem
management to restore salmon runs, while hard to dispute in the abstract, amy provid
e
ample discretion for agencies to engage in what Professor Oliver Houek has referre
d to
as “polities with a strong flavor of law-avoidance.” allowing difficult decisions
to be
evaded or deferred. In the ease ofColumbia Basin salmon, ecosystem amnagement
plans
can also make it appear that serious salmon restoration strategies are being pursued when
in fact the existing activities that produee the lion’s share of salmon mortalities
are
allowed to continue.’
The COncept ofEcosysteni Manageinen?

The origins ofecosystem management can be traced to a 1932 nature sanctuary
plan by the Ecological Society ofAmerica’s Committee for the Study ofPlant and Anima
l
Communities, which recognized the importance of protecting both ecosystems and
individual species and argued for use of a core reserve/butter zone approach to natural
area protection that factored natural disturbances into management policy. Later,
managing to maintain ecosystem integrity became a core element of Aldo Leopo
ld’s
seminal book. A Sand County Almanac. But only a &w visionaries took serious
ly the
idea ofcentering natural resources policy around eeosysten until the early 1990s.
Then
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt adopted it as a means to ameliorate the singlespecies approach of the Endangered Species Act, which he claimed brought on
“train
wrecks” like the conflict between logging old growth threats and preserving northe
m
spotted owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest?
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I/it’

C m/inn/iu Bash,

monitoring

5
diversity; 4) management that uses ongoing research and data collection: )
Ii tv in the lice
that provides management with ongoing feedback: b) management flex ihi
cooperation among
of uncertainty through use of adaptive management pr wiples: 7)
S omyanizationa I
governmental entities and between government and private pail ies: )
I)) recognition ofihe fundamental ole of humans
changes in natural resources agencies:
policy goals.
in ecological processes; and 10) dominance of human values in setting

O,kin.v vJ E ovi’sl(’ui Maiiuc,iic’ii1 in

Columbia
The first real example olan ecosystem management approach in the
nistratioii’s response
Basin was the Northwest Forest Plan, which was the Cluiton Admm
tions ol tederal
to the I 9’0 lISA listing ot the northern spotted owl and ensuing injunc
and adjacent to
timber harvests. The plan, covering sonic 24 million acres both within
ng on a grand
the Columbia Basin, brought ecosystem management to federal land planni
scale

aims to
The heart of the plan is an ‘aquatic protection strategy” (AC’S) that
ecos sterns. The
restore and maintain the ecological health of watersheds and luiitic
y 2.6 mil lion acres,
AC’S has four main elements: I ) riparian reserves, consisting of roughl
to salvage
or about 1! percent oflands subject to the plan, where timber sales are linntcd
ves; 2) designated key
operations that advance ACS restoration and maintenance objecti
g: watershed
watersheds to serve as refuges for aquatic species. that limit road buildin 3)
in key watersheds
analyses that must precede developments iii both i’iparian reserves and
tion program to
to ensure that ACS oh jectives are carried out: and 4) a atershed restora
ch Council
irnpro e fish habitat. riparian habitat, and water quality. The National Resear

-I-
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\\iiteislied analysis. the linchpin of the
Northwest R>rcl Plan’s approach to
ecosystem management. iS a systemati
c procedure to c\ al uatc em rent ripaiiilfl conditions.
assess the eflbet of proposed activit
ies on the \va[emslled. institute monitoring flrO!ia
iUS.
reline the boundaries of ri parman resei es. anu
develop restoiat ion po jeeis. The in ida i
response of tile courts to the contenis of
the North\\ Csi I um est Plan was that hs
requirements are judicially enforceable and may
mlposc morestri igent requirements than
the I7SA. Federal timber sales must I herefhre mdepc
ndentiv satisfy both the ESA arid the
Northwest I ‘oresi Pia ii be fore proceeding.”

.

An even broader cale ecosystem ii pianuinv efloi I is
the Interior Columbia Basin
Lcosystem Management Project. which m ol e
some 7(1 million acres of Ibderal lands
east of the Cascade Mountains and
extending into \loititiii and Idaho, an area about three
ii mites larger than the Northwes
t I orest Plan eo c
I hi project was also prompted by
LSA litigation, which reLlumrei.m the lorest Ser
cc and Bureau of Land Managemiiciil to
subject previotisly approved land managciiient p1w
5 mo ESA consultation aberthe listing
s
of Snake River salmon. The consultation rcsulie
u in the establishment of iflterml
protections fbi salmon habitat and a prom se to de\
elop an ecosy stern—based management
strategy for all federal lands east of the Cascades.

Ifl I )97, two dra ft environmental impact staten cilis
were released on the project.
both of which devoted a great deal of attention
to aqtianc eCos\ sterns. But they were
attacked by environmentalists br failing to spee
il\ maiiageiileiit standards or identify
conservation reserves in which development acim\ itles
would he prohibited or curtailed.
I )evefopnieni interests. especially ura/ers and
logers. also opposed the project and
nearly succeeded more than once in convincing
( ongress to remove funding for it. its
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ever.
7
how
River
ELo.as1enI 7iJtiiugenien1 and the “7VO,7na/ii’e

is in I 996 br salmon
The National Research Council endorsed watershed analys
means

.

rshed analysis was an important
restoration. The Council suggested that its wate
use it combines habitat—inventory
of assessing cumulative effects of developments beca
ts over relatively large areas.
information with environmental—hazard assessmen
to successful watershed analysis,
However, the Council reported several barriers
interactions between physical and
including spatial and seasonal variability, dynamic
rshed, and local sensitivities of each
biological processes, unique attributes ofcach wate
fhc report recommended habitat
watershed and stream reach to management practices.
ining conditions that provide some
restoration and rehabilitation to reestablish self-susta
01’ the ecological requirements of salmon

ch to salmon restoration was
A more concrete ecosystem management approa
il’s independent scientists in I?euirn io
proposed by the Northwest Power Plannine Cotinc
chapter 13, the scientists charged that
the River, also released in 1996. As discussed in
uate conceptual foundation and
the Cotincil’s t]sh and wildlife program lacked an adeq
which emphasized the importance of
proposed an alternative normative river approach
logical
sses needed to sustain salmon populations, not techno
restoring ecological l)r
The report focused on restoring a
substitutes like hatcheries and aiti ficial transport.
and maintained by natural physical
complex network of interconnected habitat, created
between habitat, environmental
and biological o’ss. Ii also emphasized the linkage
diversity, and salmon lil history diversity.’
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to minimize these effects. The normative river they espoused
was not, however, a
natural, undeveloped river, as they took pains to clan
fy:

f(j

JS4 Lisiinus

It does not imply that we must return to a
pristin
e.
pre—development
state. It requires that we learn the critical features
of ecosystem and
salmon perfornmnce and then strive to manage
our cultural features
(hydropower, irrigation withdrawals, navigation, flood
contro etc.) in
l.
ways that more closely approxi nate those norma
tive
features. V
[iat we
1
actual lv do will depend on where the actions
are
to he taken and what
amount of’ alteration has already taken place
I leadwater spawning
areas can be left pristine. Storage reservoirs already
in place can he
managed by reregulating to achieve normative feature
s
by
providing
more normal seasonal cycles of how and
temper
ature.
Mainstem
reservoirs can be managed to provide habitat, including,
in some cases,
drawdown or removal of some dams. Areas
presently exhibiting
normative conditions that are producing salmon (such
as
the
Hanford
Reach) can be made into refuges. Mainstem
proiect
s can he
designed and operated to more closely mimic key
ftatures of the
normative river, such as reregulation of flows
to stabilize daily
fluctuations in flow that allow food web development
in shallow water
habitats.

I:covi’siein Management as a De/i’i,se n’ Cunipk’,iient

—

The threat of hSA restrictions has clearly been a
principal motivating force in
energizing widespread interest in ecosystem manag
ement. The paradigmatic e\unmpfe
of this phenomenon is the development of the ( )regon coho
plan. which later evol ed into
ihe Oregon salmon plan. The state dc eloped this
plan in a vain attempt to ward off a

—-
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removal regulations convinced NMFS not to list Oregon coho in

1997.”

ged by a number
This decision not to list Oregon coho was immediately challen
agreed with the
of environmental groups. In 1998, the federal court in Oregon
listing, because it was
environmentalists that the plan was not sufficient to avoid an ESA
liSA requires “existing
based on promises of future regulatory measures, whereas as the
enforceable measures.
regulatory measures.” which the court interpreted to mean current
based on a patchwork of
The court therefore refused to allow NMFS to defer a listing
ions, and volunteerism.
existing. largely unen forced state laws, promises of new regulat
liSA.’
’
2
The court’s ruling convinced NMFS to list Oregon eoho under the

may still have
Although the Oregon plan was unable to prevent an ESA listing, it
4(d) of the Act. That
a role in implementing the liSA. due to the effect of section
which species listed as
provision authorizes regulations prescribing the conditions under
statute. Through section
“threatened” under the liSA may be taken without violating the
certain activities resulting
4(d) rules, states and even localities may retain control over
recovery, although
in “takes” of threatened species. thereby gaining a role in salmon
and Washington have
NMFS must approve of these efforts in its 4(d) rules. Both Oregon
(d), although that
developed state salmon plans which NMFS mayapprove undersection4
ed regulation of private
is not certain as of this writing. Both states promise improv
enforcement of existing
timber harvests under state forest practices statutes. increased
s problem is that state
environmental laws. and various restoration efforts. An obviou

by the court in 41w,
As noted in chapter 9. the listing ur( Innjm cohn ias struck dovm
2003). I lowever. as suggc’.icd there,
fltllry Allkinc r. lCnnas. 2001 WL 110(15 ICkI (U. (It. Sept 10.
in datn,pha.izc reprnducti’e isoladion.
‘cMFS could remedy the problem II) rdelinfriu its ESU concept

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

ighly uncertain.

Maiiagcinen! and .Iudiciu/ Rerit’ii

For spec es listed as “endangered’’ 4t d) rules cannot author
ize takes, although the
federal consul tat ion process and incidental take pernu Es
under section 10 ol the ESA nay.
Private activities subteci to kdcral approval may be ant
hoiized through incidental take
“statements approved as part of the consul tat ion process
Pr vate activities not subject
to federal approval may he authorized by incidental take
pL’rniits, which, as discussed in
chapwr 9. remre the preparation ul habitat conservat:on
piins. like those being prepared
by twO \‘I id—Columbia public utility districts concerning the
operation of their dams.
Ecuvt’s/ei,i

One of the first uses ofecosystem management in the cont
e\t of Columbia Basin
salmon concerned a challenge to NMFS’s revised
BiOp on hydroelectric system
operations. As discussed in chapter 9. alter NM ES sater
ed down the provisions in its
1995—99 Bicp, a coalition ol environmental groups
challenged it as being inconsistent
with the ESA. parti eLilarly its heavy reliance on truckin
g and barging juvenile salnion.
But Judge Marsh, who only three years earlier struck doss
n a NMES BiOp as itibi trw y,
management claims.

this time upheld NM ES’s l3iOp in paifl on the basis
of ecosystem

NM ES maintained that its artificial tiansporlaliomi pmgra
mn was necessary to
conduct an e>penment comparing the survis al rates of
tn:nsp uted fish with those Ic It m
the river to migiate The agency also noted that ot he:
speies. like bul trout and
sturgeon, might be adversely affected by the higher riser
flows the envmmonnicntal sis
were seeking ftr salmon. These ecosystem nianaoenent
claims seemed to convince
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review occurs
A more therapeutic effect of ecosystem management on judicial
requirements, since
where there is a discrete ecosystem management plan, with specific
ctive of requirements
the courts have ruled that those requirements must be met irrespe
Umpqua timber sales
imposed through IESA consultation. That is one lesson from the
rds contained in the
case, where the court enjoined the sales for violating standa
consultation. The
Northwest Forest Plan, even though NMFS approved the sales in ESA
management plans;
ESA therefore does not trump requirements imposed by ecosystem
In lhct. in the Umpqua
instead, courts will separately enforce both sets of requirements.
tem management
case. the ESA process became the means to enforce the ecosys
5
requirements of the Northwest Forest Plan.’
The Ba.dnwide Sethuon Strategy

I

•b.

‘4

breaching the
In 1999. with several scientific studies pointing to the efficacy
Engineers released a
Lower Snake River dams in salmon recovery, the Army Corps of
compared breaching
Lower Snake River draft environmental impact statement (EIS) that
on the Lower Snake
those dams compared with other ways ofimproving salmon passage
ed in chapter 13.
River. An appendix to that draft US, the A-Fish Appendix., discuss
River salmon than
concluded that dam breaching was more likely to recover Snake
er, the A-Fish
leaving the dan intact and maximizing artificial transport. Howev
the probabilities
Appendix also noted that there are enormous uncertainties about both
although some of the
ofsuccessful fish recovery and the time available to accomplish it,
ies, experiments,
uncertainties might be reduced by a five- 10 twenty-year program ofstud
“dUThrential delayed
and monitoring. The report specifically recommended studying
river due to barging and
transportation mortality,” or delayed fish ,nortalities in the lower

-
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NMFS began altering the conclusions in the A-Fish Appendix almost
immediately. Just four months after its release, in August 1999. NMFS scienti
sts issued
a draft “cumulative risk analysis” (CR!) as an addendum to the A-Fish Appen
dix. The
CR) reviewed activities other than dam operations adversely affecting the
salmon runs,
including hatchery operations, harvest controls, and habitat destruction.
Expanding the
focus to consider many sources ofmortalitythroughout the salmon ecosystem
opened up
options beyond just dam breaching or continuing artificial transportation
. For example,
the CR1 claimed that breaching might not be necessary to recover springlsumm
erchinook
if improvements in habitat protection and hatchery operations were made.
The increased
options produced from evaluating hlropower, habitat, hatcheries
and harvest
management as an integrated system were so welcome that the CR! approa
ch quickly
evolved into a federal “all-H” approach (after 4-K clubs objected to its being
labeled the
“4-H” approach).”

In November 1999, nine federal agencies, including NMFS. released an “all-H”
working paper that laid out a series of alternative strategies. The agenci
es offered no
preferred alternative, merely a sampling of possible “integrated alterna
tives,” two of
which involved dam breaching, two of which relied on continued barging
and trucking.
However, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service broke ranks with the other
federal agencies
and called for breaching the Lower Snake River darns as the best way
of avoiding
extinction of the Snake River runs. But the other federal agencies
endorsed an
“aggressive” habitat protection option. which the CR! claimed would have
a high
potential for contributing to salmon recovery, although requiring “significantly
increased”
land and water use regulation by states, localities, tribes, and the federal
govcrnmem.
Environmental and fishing groups and Indian tribes claimed that this new
“ecosystem
approach.” while theoretically sound, had the etiect ofdiverting attention
from the dams,
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—

wide
Not surprisingly, it was the “all-il” approach. now denominated the “Basin
Federal
Salmon Strategy.” which was approved by the coalition of federal agencies (the
hydroelectric
(‘aucus) in December 2000. as a complement to NMFS’s BiOp on
ide strategy
operations. discussed in chapter 9. In fact it was reliance on the basinw
produce
which fueled the BiOp’s conclusion that hydroelectric operations would not
enting
jeopardy to listed salmon in 2001-2005. The strategy’s stated priorities implem
biological
actions with I) the best chance of being implemented. 2) the most predictable
allowed the
benefits, and 3) the broadest benefit to the greatest range of species
breaching
Federal Caucus to look past the conclusions ofthe A-Fish Appendix about dam
devised a
being the best recovery option for Snake River salmon. Instead, the caucus
all major
strategy which emphasizes a series of perfonnance standards concerning
sources of salmon)’

The centerpiece ofthe basinwide strategy is protecting and restoring tributary and
federal
estuarine habitat through sub-basin plans. improved salmon habitat protection in
tion
land management, creation ofmore natural habitat areas along reservoirs, and restora
non-federal
of estuarine habitat. Many of these measures are under the control of
“ofihite
agencies, so one effect of the strategy is to shift recovery responsibility to the
g of
mitigation” efforts of state, local, and tribal governments. Whether this shiftin
y also
responsibility violates the Endangered Species Act is open to question. The strateg
still
promised hatchery reforms to minimize adverse effects on wild salmon, while
ms as a
providing fish for harvest, and use of supplementation and broodstock progra
limited
“safety net” to avoid extinctions. The strategy’s harvest measures were largely
vity of
to capping harvests at existing levels and making an effort to increase selecti
species.
°
harvests to decrease incidental takes of listed 2
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proved

Snake River t1o s. and a flood control study
were left
extremely vague. The strategy promised science—based, peer—review
ed evaluations of
perfomii.tmmce at. three, five, and eiuiit—vcar nterviIs and ill reopen
the darn breachIng
question ii progress is inadequate or the Snake River populations 1
decline.”
’

One niiuht suspect that the real reason for the federal agencies enthus
iasm for
the basinwide ecosystem approach is that it seemed more politically
Palatable than the
darn breaching option. Since darn breaching would have to be author
ized by Congress.
and since

powerilil U.S. Senators, like Senators Slade (iorton (since retired) and Gordo
n
Smith. declared themselves to be ‘adamant and inflexible opponents”
of dam breaching.
there may have been political wisdom in designing a recove
ry strategy around
maintaining the dams. however uneconomical they may actually he.
Given the great
sementi lie uncertainties involved in salmon recovery, and the deferential
judicial review
likely to be accorded to an ecosystem—based recovery plan. the 2000
NMFS l3iC)ps

—

emphasis on making improvements in non—hydroelectric system
sources of salmon
mortalit, hi Ic retaining the Lower Snake Darns, certainly made politic
al sense
even
it’ the result increased the risk of extinction. ‘\l ES has been
willing to subordinate
biological needs to economic concerns in the past, and ii may have
done SO again.
21

The Tribal Eros isicn, A’fai,aie,neni P/an

The F3asinwide Salmon Strategy, which rc(1,eee a resioralion program
to bout
rescue Snake River salmon and preserve the l.ower Snake Ris er Darns,
stands in sharp
contrast to the I 0)5 proposal made by the ( ol umbIa Nasi n tribes
with Stcv eiu Treaty
fishing rights. (See map 7. page ?.) lhc tribes plc] ‘osce an CcOs
steiiu—baseu salmon
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and streans of the Columbia Basin: 2) emphasize restoration strategies that rely (in
natural production and healthy river systens; 3) protect tribal sovereignty and tribal
rights; and 4) reclaim the anadromous fish resource for future generations. The tribes
established two means of achieving these goals: halting the decline of salmon
ville
populations within seven years and increasing adult salmon returns above Bonne
of
Dam to four million fish within twenty-live years. The plan also included a series
river
shod-and long-term measures for improving salmon survival, including increased
drawdowns?
flows and permanent reservoir 4

—

,.

\ •:

.:

•:.;

With respect to river flows, the tribal plan did not call for fixed flows based on
stic
particular cubic feet per second. Instead, apparently on the belief that it was unreali
to set flow targets because of a lack of stored water in the tipper Snake Basin and
restrictions on Dworshak reservoir, the tribal plan included a volume of water. based on
acre-feet. to be set aside for fish flow augmentation as follows: one to three million acreir;
feet from Upper Snake Basin reservoirs; AS million acre-feet from Brownice reservo
et
and 1.5 million acre-feet from Dworshak in the spring and another one million acre-fe
the
in the sumna.’r. These amounts would be made available to fishery agencies and
tribes to maximize fish benefit, similar to the Northwest Power Planning Council’s water
budget. On the Columbia, tbe tribal plan called for sliding-scale flow levels in the spring,
and
ranging from 220,000 to 300.000 cubic Ibet per second, similar to the fishery agency
tribal recommendations to the Council in 1981. Over the long terni, the tribal plan sought
flows that ivould have existed prior to water
to achieve “mean historical flows”
resource development-— during the ju enile salmon migration period, and reductions in
daily and hourly flow fluctuations. These fluctuations are largely due to peak power
operations.”

.W*Q

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

n can continue. In the long run, the tribal plan called for one
ofthree drawdown
plans, including one which would draw down John Day and
all ofthe Lower Snake River
dams to natural river level, essentially breaching the dam
s. The tribes expected juvenile
salmon survival rates to increase four-fold under this long
-term 2
plan.
’

The tribal plan called forendingjuvcnile transport by truck
and barge altogether,
consistent with its goal of keeping fish in the river. The
plan also endorsed the use of
hatchery supplementation to combat “fragmented and decli
ning” fish populations, at least
“where other remedial actions cannot be implemented quic
kly enough or on a scale that
is large enough to halt further population losses.” The tribe
s advocated supplenmntation
techniques simulating natural conditions and managing natu
ral and hatchery fish groups
as one gene pool. The goal of the tribes’ suppleme
ntation program is to establish
naturally spawning salmon runs, not simply to main
tain harvest levels, as current
hatchery operations do. The tribal plan outlined hatchery
goals foreach sub-basin above
Bonneville Dam. with an emphasis on reintroducing salm
on to areas from which tlty had
been extirpated. The tribes considered hatchery suppleme
ntation to be “an indispensable
part ofany restoration plan.” They claimed that any gene
tic concerns can be effectively
managed— a contested conclusion— and maintained that
“the increasing likelihood of
species extirpation is in fact the far greater genetic 17
risk.”

The tribal plan blasted the approach pursued by NMFS unde
r the [!SA. attacking
NMFS’s faiLure to “articulate a clear jeopardy standard”
and the agency’s failure “to give
due weight” to the tribes’ and state fishery agencies’ recomme
ndations. The tribes alleged
that the 1995-99 ESA plan failed to meet both survival and
reentry standards for Snake
River spring and till chinook, while the tribal plan wou
ld achieve survival and recovery
of both. The tribes even questioned whether NMFS shou
ld have an active role in
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e as taxes and the internet.
Ecosystem management now seems as inevitabl
focused only on the Columbia l3asin
Twenty years ago. the Northwest Power Act
etiects on salmon. Today. that single—
hydroelectric system and attempted to reduce its
equate and incomplete. It is certainly
issue approach has been widely repudiated as inad
necessary to salmon recovery, and that
true that focusing on the entire salmon Ii cycle is
restoring spawning habitat is doomed
any approach that does not include protecting and
perilots to salmon, especially in the
to failure. But not all life cycle stages are equally’
authorized hydroelectric dams to
Columbia Basin, where the I 99599 NMFS BiOp
“harvest 0 to 90 percent of juvenile salmon.

gh to have been employed
Ecosystem management is a concept malleable enou
ram, a two—decade old experiment

many advocates of ecosystem management.

prog
to justify continuation of a barging and trucking
ept became a central justiflcation br a
with no proven value. Subsequently. the conc
hydroelectric operations, including
basinwide recovery stnitegy built around existing
thoLigh those dams are biologically
maintenance of the tour Lower Snake Dams, even
any plan that focused exclusively on
disastrous and economically marginal. Ob’course,
likely inelTective. But to crati a plan
the removal ol’these dams would be incomplete and
ng the existence of Snake River runs in
around the dams continued existence while riski
ept a defense to status quo operations.
the name of ecosystem managenwnt makes the conc
s. This is a result that would surprise
which are contrary to sound biology and economic
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Stevens and Palmer treaties, the wild salinon runs of the
Columbia Basin have been
reduced by )) percent .S ome salmon inns have gone extinct: nearly all ot the others
are
now listed under the federal kndangered Species Act.

—

Its sometimes said that the plight olColuinhia Biisin Saliflon in the 20th century
reflected society’s chanuing values: from valuing salmon on lv for harvest to
valuing
hydropower, flood control, and navigation more than sal mon to
at the centLiry’s end
questioning the choices of earl icr generations. The h istorica record does not suppor
t
the perspecti\’e that sal non po
1 icy has mirrored soctal \ alucs. however, at least not in a
deliberative manner. No responsible governmental entity ever declared that ColLimhla
Basin salmon had to he sacrificed in order for civi Ii zanon to progress. On the
con irarv.
over the years there have been renea ted promises that the march of civilization
was to
occur simultaneously with harvestable runs of (‘olumba Basin salmon. In tvnicui
American fashion the Pacific Northwest was to have it
all
developed rivers and
harvestable salmon runs without sacri lice or compromise:

’ Pio,nrvc’.c
1
T/i

—

lile first p.omise concern inc salmon was made in the c50s Ireanes \\ ii the
Indian tribes, who were promised that they could m:nniain their fishing livelih
oods n
return for ceding to tile federal government O\ er 60 nil lion acres in one of the
lai’eci
peaceful real estate transact ions in L .S. history. I h s first n olnise
the bedrock of
white set tleinen i of [lie Pacific \ orIh\vest
las beci honorcu only in the breach. The
tribes have not received the basis of the bargain for winch they gas e up so niucli.
3
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—

stocks of wild and hatchery fish. Worse, them is now considerable evidence that
hatchery fish crowd out wild fish through competition for scarce food and habitat and
produce damaging genetic effects. The allure of having salmon without protecting
illusion.
salmon habitat of having dant and salmon was another false 4

—

—

Restoration efforts, which began in earnest two decades ago with the enactment
ofthe Northwest Power Act, have produced many plans, new institutions, litigation, and
lots of optimism but few spawning salmon. But the restoration attempts were halting,
compromised plans built around maintaining a status quo that favored electric users,
navigators, and irrigators groups that one court retbrred was “entrenched river users.”
Even as the Northwest Power Act program gave way to Endangered Species Act
consultation, the ensuing plans were premised on maintaining the status quo as much as
possible. or what the same court called “the lowest common denominator.” This meant.
for example, continuation of an artiticial transportation program that, like hatcheries,
even after more than two decades of thc
could show no discernible benefits
experiment The promise of real salmon restoration remains elusive?

—

—

-I

Other promises, like the Pacific Salmon Treaty’s promises of reduced salmon
,
interceptions and chinook rebuilding, the Clean Water Act’s promise of fishable waters
and the Indian treaty promise of not leaving the tribes with empty nets, remain inchoate,
unfulfilled. They apparently will requirejudicial enlbrcement. unlikely in the case ofan
international agreement and uncertain in the other cases. A surprising promise, the
Federal Power Act’s promise of “fishways” at federally licensed dams. may prompt dam
removals as it has in the case of the Condit Dam but those are likely to at’feet only
a tbw dams cm Columbia Basin tributary streams. While perhaps significam in terms of

..
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other plans have been able to defeat this measure, at least so far. Instead, the
region
committed to an “ecosystem management” approach, which, while considering
all “four
il’s” olsalmon mortalities— the hydrosystem, hatchery, harvest, and habitat
had the
effect ofdeflecting attention from the chief source of mortalities in the Colum
bia Basin:
hydroelectric development and operations. The upshot maybe more extinct
ions
ofSnak
e
River salmon, as those species might be considered to be on life support. with little
time
left. If extinctions occur, unlike earlier extinctions which arguably were unkno
wingly
countenanced, these extinctions will be the product of much more willful choice
s: the
Snake River salmon will have been sacrificed to maintain a seaport in Lewist
on, Idaho?
77w MPrIh,v

If the region is ever to establish a viable salmon restoration program
for
the
Coluntia Basin. at least eight myths must be recognized and overcome. First, althou
gh
there is now widespread recognition of the myth that hatcheries can compe
nsate for
salmon habitat lost to dams and other river developments, about 40 percent of salmon
restoration money in 1999 was spent on hatcheries. There may be a role for hatche
ries
in a viable Columbia Basin recovery plan. but if there is, hatcheries will not eonsun
t 40
percent of total expenditures. And hatchery expenditures almost surely will involv
e
something patterned after the tribes’ supplementation plans. which are design
ed to restore
naturally spawning rum, not just maintain harvests, and to have as few advers
e etTeets
as possible on spawning salmon while in fact promoting spawning.”
-

—

Second, an accompanying myth
that the cfli.’cts of development can be
overcome through artificial transport ofjuvenile salmon remains a central elemen
t in
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ng Council in
recognized by the independent scientists of the Northwest Power Planni
continue
1996. but was lost in the National Marine Fisheries Service’s 2000 decision to
to rely on barge and truck transport as a key element of salmon recovery.’

—

Third, there is the myth that salmon recovery will require a return to a piting sd It
development river, a “wilderness servitude,” as one court put it. The only renatin
k of the
sustaining salmon stock in the Columbia Basin is the Hanford Reach fall chinoo
stretch of
Mid-Columbia. While it is true that the Hanford Reach is the last undamnied
flows in the
the mainstem Columbia and Snake Rivers, it is hardly a “natural” river. The
artificial
I lanford Reach which have allowed salmon to thrive are the product of an
ia FERC
environment, albeit one created with salmon in mind. The Mid-Columb
ention,
settlement agreement. which governs those flows, was the product of years ofcont
for
litigation, and administrative proceedings. That agreement ought to be a model
Lower
creating a viable flow regime in other parts of the Columbia Basin, especially the
is a myth:
Snake. The notion that salmon require a pre-development. natural river
scientists
recognizing that myth. the Northwest Power Planning Council’s independent
functions
called for the creation of “normative” river conditions restoration of river
without
within the existing developed river that would promote salmon recovery
benefits.’
dismantling all development and its 0

—

r
Fourth, the myth that science will make decisions easy is widespread. Senato
ry spending
Gorton of Washington believed that more science would rein in fish recove
require
under the Northwest Power Act, so lie had Congress amend the statute to
ries
scientific review. But scientific review showed that technological fixes like hatche
expense.
and transportation would not restore the fish runs and helped to reveal their
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logical science but political science. The science needs to be separated from the
pol cv, as much as is possible, so that the public is fully inlormcd of the basis for
dec is ions.

Fifth, the myth that the ESA is a draconian, anti—developmental statute remains
widespread. despite the fact that the statute has al be. cc NM F S to sanction continual
ion
olartihcial transportation ol juvenile salmon instead ol repairing salmon habitat. In fact,
the ES A’s recovery plan fur Columbia Basin salinoit is less protective ol S pawnine
sal mon than that ol the unen furced pltn’is ot’eilher the North\\ esi Power Planning
Council

or the Columbia Basin tribes with treaty flshing rights. It is true that the ESA
occasionally blocks some de\ clopinents. like the Inland Land irrigation proposa:
(discussed in chapter 9), but to suggest that the “ESA blockH all development,’ as
one
I
recent analysis concludes, is qLute inaccurate Actually. the ESA has su h’ficient flc\lbt

to have authorized timber harvests that would dairiace Lnipqua Basin salmon hab:tat
(subsequently forccloscd by the Northwest Forest Plait, also discussed in chaptcrQ) LSA
consultation also rat ijed dredging the Lower Coi t:mbia River to deepen the nv
c: S
navigation channel subsequentlv blocked by slate vatcn ouality coticerns). despite
the
fact that the health oh’ that estuary is a prime reason diat \.\l PS’s scientists suggested tImi
breaching the Lower Snake Dams would not by itself’ leco ver Snake River salmon. In
short, the ESA is hardly draconian in implementation and !‘recpleni lv reaches resuil
that
are quite sensitive to economic 2
interests.’

A sixth myth is the idea that the rcstorat:un of Columbia Basin salnior is a
regional issue \\arrant:ng a regional solution. The nu::oit that \ortiiwesterner should
be left to solve the salmon p01)1cm has wide cLirreilcy :imoile regional politicians because
it essentially means that they should resolve the issue. But ( oluinhiti Basin stihiticin
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fulfill international treaties. Calls for a regional solution are usually code phrases at
discounting these legitimate federal interests.”

—

—

Seventh, the rise of ecosystem management as the recovery plan of choice
contains the seeds of its own myth. It is certainly true that any program of salmon
restoration needs to account for all of the “H’s”: adverse effects from hydroelectric
operations. harvest, hatcheries, and habitat damage. But if ecosystem management is
used tojusti& continuation of trucking and barging salmon the apparent antithesis of
the concept is revealed to be so malleable as to be without
an ecosystem approach
substance. Lf ecosystem management% chief function is to reduce the likelihood of
searchingjudicial review, as in the case ofNMFS 1995 BiOp on hydroelectric operations,
it is hard to see how salmon will benefit. The new “all H” approach trumpeted by NMFS
in its 2000 BiOp seems designed to deflect attention from the salmon mortalities
produced by the hydroelectric system, where the lion’s share of mortalities occur. By
diverting attention away from hydroelectric mortalities to habitat concerns, where states
are responsible for most land and water use decisions, the federal government redirected
attention away from itself While an ecosystem perspective to salmon recovery is hard
to criticize in theory. in practice it could produce a recovery plan which is badly
misdirected.’
4

Finally, the sonrtimcs-mentioned notion that the Columbia Basin salmon
problem could be solved ifthe stakeholders could just talk among themselves is another
myth. This idea was tried and found wanting in the “Salmon Summit” of 1990, but it
continues to be discussed as if it might produce a viable solution. Such conversations
might get the parties to know each other’s representatives better, but these conversations
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Making predictions about the future is a hazardous
enterprise. The current
Endangered Species Act status of the wild salmon of
the Columbia Basin is the fruit of
more than a century of unwise policies, and it will not
be remedied quickly or painlessly.
The failed efforts of the Mitchell Act, the Lower
Columbia Fishery Development
Program, the Lower Snake Compensation Plan, and
the Northwest Power Act, ought to
counsel against expectations for a quick fix under the ESA
. Tn fact, experience with ESA
implementation since 1993 suggests that there will be
no dramatic changes in the fortunes
of Columbia Basin salmon.

Still, much has been learned in recent years. Perhaps
the most important lesson
was from the Northwest Power Planning Council’s
1996 report, Relurn in Ike River,
which counseled that the mainstem Columbia and Snake
Rivers should not be thought of
as merely transportation corridors but should be considere
d potential spawning grounds.
as they were before the dams were built. This did not
mean, according to the scientists
who authored the report, that all the darns should be remo
ved. But they did suggest that
some reservoirs should be lowered to pennit spawning
in historic mainstem spawning
areas. The idea would be to attempt to replicate pre-d
evelopment conditions in as many
areas as feasible in light of the developed river.”

The “normative river” endorsed by the scientists
in Rentru in the River is a
worthy model fir the 21st century. The way to impl
ement this vision is to decide what
is feasible by determining what is atIbrdable. But
what is atIbrdable in terms of
remaking the Columbia Basin into a fit place for salm
on spawning must begin with an
examination of the costs of current operations. Reliable
estimates exceed S200 million
annually, including the costs of current salmon trans
portation program. Economic

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848587

y costs less than two years of their
If breaching the Lower Snake Dams reall
t to be (he cornerstone ol any serious
annual maintenance costs, their breaching ough
g would create a free—Rowing Snake River
Snake River salmon recovery plan. Breachin
than the Mid—Columbia’s I lanford Reach.
ofover 220 miles, more than rye times longer
now spawn .A\s he regional director
where the basin’s only self—sustaining salmon runs
terms ofbiologv the breaching alternative
for the U.S. Fish and Wildli fo Service stated, in
is clearly superior: “a no bra iner.

—

be sufficient to recover the salmon
Breaching the Lower Snake Dams may not
comply with water quality standards,
runs, however. The liee—l1owing river mus still
re that they meet the Clean Water Act’s goal
which themselves must be scrutinized to ensu
complete overhaul: where hatcheries arc
of fishable waters. I latchery practices need a
should be discontinLied. and the money
adversely affecting wild stocks, they
supplementation plans, on the other
reprogrammed to habitat protection. The tribes’
ning salmon while avoiding adverse effocts on
hand. which are designed to proluce spaw
monitoring and evaluation. 1—larvests also
wild stocks, ought to proceed under careful
itoring and evaluation. But it ought to he
should proceed on the same basis ofclose mon
red the longest and most severe cutbacks
recognized that tribal harvesters have suffe
since I 964, and no harvests of spring chinook
no commercial harvests olsLiminerclnnook
e settlement of the PaciRc Northwest was
since I 977-—and that the basic premise of whit
ihoods, a promise lorgotteil for most of
that the tribes would maintain their fishing livel
the past century.
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farms
and the political power of a narro group of
economic interests to resist changes to the stat us rflio. Columbia
l3asi ii salmon have heci
sacrificed bar much more in the past. The pity is that the’y are
now being sacr iced i
Iiitle.

SO
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other than salmon. Few
species are us prized as salmon in the N,orthwest.
although there may be some. But the
more than 20—year effort to restore salmon runs,
largely unsuccessfiu] thus lhr despite
Indian treaties, federal statutes, an international treaty,
numerous scienti lie and economic
studies, and a growing wave ol lilieation, counsels
caution, not Optimism. It is much
more difficult to restore a wildlife species which has
suffered long—term decline than to

protect one from prospective harm. Restoring a species
whose decline is due to activities
with apparent economic benefits is even more daun
ting, perhaps beyond what can
realistically be expected from policymakers

The deselopmenl ofColumbiu Basin streamliows
for hydropower, floodeontroL
navigation, and irrigation crippled the basin’s salmon
runs. Rut there was never any clear
intent to destroy the salmon resource. In fliet. the
operu1i e assumption was that the
region could have both developed rivers and harv
estable salmon. a myth that could persist
only as long as hatcheries could be viewed as viable
substitutes for the habitat lost due
to the dams. By the time that the notion that one techn
ology could compensate br the
adverse etThcts of another fell into disrepute in the
I 9QOs, it was very late in the game.
The weight of history had coalesced around a develo
ped river ot dams, barges, cheap
electricity, and irrigated agriculture. That these
activities required enormous federal
subsidies was less significant than that regional econom
ic interests had come to rely on
the developed river. These settled expectations
seemed to matter more than the best
available science about how to recover the salmon runs,
even toa suppusedlybiolouicallv
oriented agency like the \ationa I Marine Fisheries
Service.

The \ortliwcst Power Acts call tom parity between
lwdropuwer operations and
salmon migration reflected the optimism of I t)f4p• Perhap
s influenced by pover interests’
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Lictance on the part of kdera I agencies
the measures in the program, and a persistent rd
ent the program fashioned by the
with water management responsibilities to implem
Northwest Power Planning (‘ounci I.
interstate agency, the

“entrenched economic river
The opposition of’ what the N mth (_‘ircu it cat led
burdened the ( ounci l’s restoration
interests” and uncertain federal—state relations
the court ref’erred to as the “lowest
progiu causing the Council to resort often to what
of the measures the Council approved
common denominator” and making implementation
omised measures such as the \Valer
prolileiimtic. Not only did the pgmm include compr
short a time to sign i flcantly aid salmon
budget, which contained too little water fir too
proved reluctant to implement measures
migration, hut the f’ederal implementing agencies
nal statutory missions. These di t’ficult
they pei’ceived to he inconsistent with their traditio
signi flcant than the innovations in the
institutional ai’rangements ultimately became more
wildl i f mitigation to include dam
9iO statute, such as i’cde lining the concept of’ fish and
federal, state, and tribal fishery agencies:
operational changes: det’erring to the views of’
adopting a system\ ide approach to
lowering the burden of proof for remedial action:
hydropower revenues. The lesson may
i’estoration efforts; and funding those efThi’ts with
tually sound, are no substitute for
be that statutory innovations, however concep
implementation track record in this
implementation of’ actual measures. The proglm’s
regard tll well slioi’t ol its promise.

shortcoming of the salmon
Implementation problems were no the only
Act. The program had a limited
i’estoratioii program authorized by the North cst Power
ons, public land niauagement act i i ties.
scope of ant hority: it did not reach water diversi
d by hydropower revenues. The
harvest con tro Is, or hatchery operations not f’uncfe
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hnnls that the program appealed onb to the lowest coinnun
denomniator. It was no surprise dial this interstate proeritin wits eclipsed in
the 1 QU)s 1w
the listings uI salmon under the Endangered Seems Act.

When the procram authorized by the Northwest Power Act was in its ist years.
representatives Irom lie U.S. and Canada euliiiinaied two decades ot netiotiations wit

lie signing oft he Paci he Salmon I reaty of I
1 he treaty was necessary because ol
the oieat ceocraphical scope o I’ the salmon h l er ce. in svh teL sal mon spa iii ne iii the
Columbia Basin hequently were harvesteu in Canadian and Alaskan waters.
These
relatively uncontrolled distant harvests made a comprehensive approach to salmon

restoration impossible. But although the treaty proud sed eLju I ahie harvests between the
countries, in practice they could not agree on what equity meant. In Liet, the U .S. itsel I

was divided, with Alaskans having a diflrent view than the rest of the delegation.
Alaskan harvests ofCanadian —spawned salmon produeett Canadian eta] ial ion iii the for:n
of increased harvests of Columbia Basin—origin salmon. Ihese rlcveiopmcnls frLmstrated
the treaty promise ol preventing overlish ing. A I )9 amendment to the treaty introduced

abundance—based harvests, which may curtail overhas ests, since ii inks harvest eves
to available fish, but the science ot estimating avadaae hsh is hard! an exact one
Moreover, although the lieu ty romised to rebut ci sa mon runs, the long controversy over

equitable liar ests kept attention riveted on harvests at the e\pense ut habitat pro(e a a
and lest oral ion. Whet her that locus can shift under lii e ne ahundanee—hased hai v est
scheme is lhr from clear. Perhaps its in the case of the N rtii Csl Power Act, agrceitte
to high-minded pr lempies is much easier than nnplenienttnn them

The Endangemee Species \et ( ES i\ ), S0I)iL’tt mes r frrred to as the pit—bull oh’
environniental statutes. was broutlit tu hear on the Columbia Basin salmon cii in the
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its reputation for ignoring economic consequences. in practice the biological opinions on
federal actions (hat aflbct Columbia Basin salmon revealed a remarkable sensitivity to
economic interests. In fact, the latest biological opinion on hydroelectric operations
opted not to recommend breaching of the Lower Snake River dams, even though that
clearly is the best biological option for saving Snake River salmon.

Somewhat surprisingly, the marriage of Columbia Basin salmon and the ESA
seems to have led to more ehans in the implementation of the ESA than in the
condition ofthe salmon. Among the most prominent ofthe salmon’s legacies to the ESA
are the definition ofsalmon stocks subjectto ESA protection as evolutionarily significant
units, the introduction ofmulti-year biological opinions for ongoing federal activities, the
creation of streamlined procedures which avoid formal biological opinions prepared by
NMFS in tivor ofbiological assessments by action agencies, and the use of section 4(d)
rules to authorize takes of salmon which are consistent with approved state and local
conservation plans. Many ofthese innovations will be employed in the future far beyond
the context of Columbia Basin salmon. Unfortunately, the ESA’s legacy to Columbia
Basin salmon is hardly as impressive. In fact, the Northwest Forest Plan has imposed
greater restrictions on tinter harvests than the ESA, and the ESA has not been applied
at all to ongoing operations ofFERC-licensed projects or to water distribution actions of
the Bureau of Reclamation.

Judicial interpretations ofthe ESA’s application to Columbia Basin salmon may
also influence activities beyond the Northwest. The initial decision, striking down as
arbitrary the biological opinion on hydroelectric operations and calling for a complete
system overhaul, interpreted the ESA’s inundate of making decisions based on “best

-I:-:
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management principles to defend its chosen course of actio
n. Even though the court
questioned the level of species risk NMFS found tolerable,
it would not overrule the
agency’s choice, since the ESA said nothing about what was
an acceptable level of risk.

—

—

The unwillingness of the court to closely scrutinize NMFS
’s risk decisions no
doubt encouraged the agency to eschew dam breaching and
endorse
despite two
decades of poor results a continuation ofthe program of
barging and trucking salmon
downstream. To reach this end. NMFS had to discount
a series of studies it had
commissioned from an interagency team, under the rubric ofth
e Plan for Analyzing and
Testing Hypotheses. since those studies indicated that dam
breaching was by far the least
risky way of restoring Snake River salmon. NMFS then deve
loped a new series of
studies, the Cumulative Risk Initiative, authored by its
own Science Center. which
employed mathematical models to question whether the reco
very of Snake River salmon
required dam breaching. The new studies thus provided NMF
S with scientific cover to
continue artificial transportation. along with promised
programs of offsite habitat
restoration and hatchery relbrm.

An obvious question is why NMFS. an agency charged by the
[iSA with rescuing
species from the brink of extinction, would prove to be
so sensitive to economies in
practice. The answer undoubtedly lies in the power ofotg
aniad interest groups to bring
pressure on decision makers to protect a status quo favoring
their economic position.
Over the past two-and-a-half decades, since completion of
the last of the Lower Snake
Dams, ports and farmers have come to relyon cheap tranonatio
n and, to a lesser extent.
cheap power and irrigation water froni the developed Snake Rher
. Their intense interest
in maintaining the status quo has convinced regional polit
icians and apparently even
NMFS to support their position, an example ofthe power of
concentrated presstrre l’rcsn

-
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dams, the chic fki I lers oL( oluinbia
ihe appl cation of water quality standards to federal
in (lain operations. Further, the
I3asmn salmon. may produce substantial changes
standards themselves could produce
application of ESA consultation to the water quality
be consistent with the C’lean Wutcr
standards protective ol listed species, v hueh would
fish Ii Ic. The Federal Power Act’s
Acts goal of providing water quality protective of
ion ol ledera I land reservations,
proms ions requiring Imshway condo ions and protect
certi lication. should ensure that a new
coupled with required water qua lily standards
more sensitive to salmon concerns.
generation of rd icensed non—flderal projects will be
make the cost of rd icens ing high
Moreover, application of these requirements may
it was in the case of the Edwards and
enough to make dam removal a viable option. as
less universal applicability than the
Condit Dams. Although the Federal Power Act has
cts rclicensing it can have dominating
Clean Water Act, in riverbasins with licensed proje
effects on imperiled species.

-

to dominate Columbia Basin
Ecosystem management principles may come
This development is hard to (lisputc
salmon restom-ation in the early 2 I st century.
part of the salmon I mfl cycle through
theoretically. since attempting to affect only a
ed unsatisfactoryresults in the past.
regulation ofharvests or hatchcryeonstruction produc
concentrate on the short term and on
Single—focused attempts such as these tended to
is a Columbia River in x hich more
technological fxes to the salmon problem. The result
and where more than half of the
than 80 percent of its salmon is of’ hatchery origin,
ported downstream b truck and
upriver uvemle fish are taken out of the river and trans

barge
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river.

A normative rivet’ is not a natural rver. but a river environment
Sill table or sa mon which can be obtarned by
clutng ng the operation ot the de eloped
river. To an extent, that was precisely the result the drafter
s of the North\\ est Po\vc
Acts salmon restomation program intended. Enboitima tel,
that statute has been
interpreted to require creation ob’ suitable conditions br sal mon
while making no more
than minor changes to the hydroelectric system. But it is the hydroe
lectric system which
has the Ilexibi lity to accommodate the salmon: the sal mon do not
have similar flexibil dv.
as the widespread ES/-\ listings show. The normative rvcr concep
t is one that other river
basins may find quite useflml.

it

seeks to resolve.

Ecosystem management, like the ESA, is no panacea. Its holistic approa
ch could
encourage diverting attention trout the source ob’ 50 percen
t or more of non— na ural
salmon mortalities: the hydroelectric system. In flict, NM ES has
invoked ecosys tern
management as a dcbnse to its reliance on barge and truci transpo
rtation instead oldamn
breaching to save Snake River salmon. This invocation proclu
cedjudicial deference floin
the sanie court which had overturned an earlier IS Ml l’s decismon
as arbitrary. I feeosystem a
management leads to a reduced emphasis on h droelectric
operations. it will retard
Columbia sal mon restoration in the interest ob
l inc an intrigLmm up concept that ntal.es
intuitive sense but that cannot succeed it’ it loses sight ol the
context of the broader
problem

An ecosystem mianageinent program worth oleiii laiion i the tribrd
restom’at:u::
plan. which embraces a gravel—to—gravel managcmcm phi luophy
br salmon restordi on.
The tribes ability to heeomiie ntaior nlayers in salmon resiomation
decision making usi 20

years after the Supreme C oumi al 15 med their propertY rights in sal
mon is a ;‘eiiiarda ole
development. They have quickly developed go eritinental abil
dics in response to the
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made in the I 850s,
The ultimate promise to protect salmon may have been that
taking fish in common with”
in a series oHrealies which promised the tribes ‘the right of
this language to promise the
white sell lers. Al though the Supreme Court later interpreted
fish habitat in particular
tribes a livelihood, and lower courts accorded protection to
the treaties include a generic
situations, the cmiils have been reluctant to declare that
es is inevitably dependent
right to protect fish habitat. Because enforcing treaty promis
In the case of’ Indian
on judicial action, enforcement is slow, uncertain, and costly.
ratic process is not willingly
treaties, however, there is no real alternative, since the democ
ty of the population. But, in
going to enforce promises that seem now to henctit a minori
although most of the benefits
fact, entbrcing the treaty promises has benefited everyone,
64 million acres of Pacific
to the majority froni the largely peaceful settlement of
tishingeconomy remains
Northwest land accrued longago, while the promise ota viable
promise of’ a fishing
elusive 150 years later. The truth is that enforcing the treaty
bia Basin salmon: non—
livelihood will redound to the beneht all who care about Colum
who believe that now,just
native commercial and recreational harvesters as well as those
paramount symbol of the
as a century—and—a—half ago, harvestable salmon runs are the
Pacific Northwest.
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—

edited for eleven years between 1979 and 1990. had numerous footnotes in
each issue.
Over twenty years offootnotes wearied me, so when I read Richard White’s The
Oiyank
Machine: 77w Remaking oftiw Columbia River— a book without any footno
tes at all
I was inspired to emulate White’s example. However, several reviewers discou
raged me
from pursuing that idea, so the book I wrote has numerous footnotes.

But 1 did make a diligent effort to limit the number of footnotes by confining
them to the end of paragraphs and limiting the references ma few source
s. Frequently.
the footnotes contain references to my law review articles, which often contain
more
detailed citations to authority.
Citations conform generally to The University of Chicago Manual of Legal
Citation, supplemented by The Chicago Manual of Style. except that referen
ces to my
law review articles are by short cite only. Those include the fbllowing (in
alphabetical
order):
—

Amphibious Salmon
The Amphibious Salmon: The Evoluzion qf &vsjwletn
Management hi the Columbia Basin, 24 ECoLoGY L.Q. 653 (1997).

Be)vnclParity—Beyondthe Parity Promise: Siruggllngio Live
Colum
bia
Basin
Salmo
n
in the Mid-199Ltc, 27 ENvTL. L. 21(1997) (with Michael A. Schocssler &
R.
Christopher Beekwith).
—

Fu{flhling Parkv Fuj/llling the Parity Promise: A Peiwpective
on
Scientj
fic
P,vqf
Economic Cost, and Indian Tswasy Fishing Rights hi the .4pproval
01 the
Columbia Basin Fi.ch and WildIj/i Program. 13 1N it. L. 103 (1982).
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—

C’i/ianbia liasin

iiiipleiiIe’lluilg Pci/i/i’

—

lio,,
I1i?p/e’IiicIiIIII/’ 1/li’ lcii’ill’ l-’i’aniise’: .4n li’a/i,a
vi’ani, 14 LNVTL. L. 277 ( 19X4).
iI
auei i1ih/li/e’ 3

F/c/i

of

1/ic’

l?c’i’ii’iiic 1/ic’ Panti’ Pi.aiiiise’,

Ilie’ Pacific
Tue India,, Ti’e’a/c Pi.vca,i’ Pin/il and Hahi tat [‘rateelian in
Pise’air Pin lii
407 (199%) (with
Nort/iit’e ct i Pauper/c Rig/i/s .‘lppraac/i, 69 V. CoLa. L. Rcv.
Brett M. Swilfl.

I? e’i’ii’ine Par/ti’—- Calui,,/,ia Basin Sa/iiian and 1/ic’ ((flirts.
25ENv’rL.L.351 (1995).
—

I/ia

tanc’ou,v/i’:

(‘a/iini/cia

is
Scn’ini. Iclaho’c So/man: .4 Hision’ a! f’ai UIL’ eiiid a l)ii/,iai
5ii’im,’ hlahia’v Salman
I’u/iire, 2% IDAhO L. Ri,v. 667 (1 992)
——

—

s J’raai
Sa/nion Lc’s.vans Salmon and/lw LiicIciiiie’i’c’dSpecic’s .4(1: Lesson
Basin. 74 WAsn. L. Ruv. 5 I 9 (I 999) (with Greg D. Corbin).

..

a/nia,i .Siniu/
file’ Case’ Far Dani Bi’c’ac/iing Sea/ag Sun/cc’ Rice’,’ 1T’aic’,’andS
lift’ i.an’er Snake
The Biological. i:roiiaiiiu, (aid Legal Cave’ Far Bi’c’ae’/iing
’atuia/ Ru-a,’ F/an’s, 2%
[)ains, i.an’c’riiig in/ui [)ai’ Rc’sc’i’i’ojr, (111(1 Restoring 5
RohIl &
L 997 (1Q98) (with Lairil .1. Lucas, Don B. Miller, Daniel .1.
ENV1
Glen S. Spain).

pon’ei’, Salman, and
Li,irai’e/i,ii Pai’ilr--—- The’ Uui’ace’/ui of tile’ Rat/i’ Pranitse’: Ffoli’o
(1991) (with Andy
in l/,c’Co/nnibia Basin, 21 Er’vri,. L. 657

Sunrin).

Endangerc’dSpccic’s
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& Cut I (ci ed in note I), at 3.

HiStORY

urttn

\it’.: A R(SsitSit .\>)iiRRU iN nit-: PAct ntr Ni ini\t
lix i 22.
18! (Altied A. Knopi 990) (“tutywItere a aIntoii can
cet to,’’ ‘‘rittiiltzcd ftrtneatioii’’): Vv’iIii\Nt
Diii nien. N itti lw ns r P\sx.\o
i:
Ttn
(ito-s
r(ort
UIit.\
Rivrn I XS (Simon and Schuster l995t (Clark
quote): At sushi S \kL:ttAi & mu>. N. Curt:, Ssr.t&e’. 7
(All/ed A. Unupi 108—4) (ocean jwieins)
S\Kr RU

id at 4: Just-rn E. TAYLOR
Ill.
MALI
Nu
S\iMo
N:
Ax LxviutoxxitNlAt
Noti ito-isv isminnins (nisis II—7 (U. \‘Vashington Press
I 99°).

Sxnntosi & C’oi i (cited in note I) at 7; Axi iioxv Nvi
nov. Tntt(niv sinns Rivnn S;\isiuN ANI>
Sniintn [‘RUnT: Tnntn Fi(Itti ton Sijitviv
:si
16—17
(ti
\\aslnitgton Press lOSO): TAYlOR (cited in
tote 3) at 33 (noting that time First Salmon (‘eretnonv was
not univcr,sjliv entploved)

Ni:i nov (cited in note 4). at tO (salurioit attracted Asmati natives
); Untted States v. \V:isliingion.
384 F Supp. 312, 350 (Wi). 1974) (universal
depend
ence):
tJnel
For the litdian lobes in W:usliuitgtoit
Washtttgton
State
(onitne
rcutil
Passen
ger
Fishin
Vessel
g
Ass’ti.
. 143 US. 658 (1979) at 7, quoting Dr.
Barhara Lane ott native trade( I hereinat(er cited as 1 ribal
Bnie(: American Intends Servic
Coniii
e
i,
(N ONtMON C’os it<OV(Rsv: I-iSitN( Rtt,ti
rsmt in
ML
kitsioii, Pvsi.rt’ AM) Nisoissrnv i>.tiisx
s
3(070) (rtchest abortgtt]:ils) heretiiat)er cited as LJ\uo\
ivtoN (ox tnuvi:Rsv}: It J. CniLDtniiosn &
MARJ i’RiM. l’A(itt( S-srsto>. 5 (U. Washington Press l97)
(salttion eqiivalent to hut’I’alo and reiitdeer).

(ktonni WOi(t)tO( k. Pnoi’Lt:s or iii: Cuss i It? (Itidi:i
n:i U. Press 1977) (elaborate
procedures); Inibal Brtel’(eitcd in tote 5), at 6 (hailing
eatioes): Cn.AtutS F WiLkiNsoN, (‘RossiNu
Nist MLktt)iAN: L\stN WA I Ltt. sNo itin
I—ui
oni
orita: Wnsi [85 (Island Press 992): Ni:itu’s (COcci
itt note 4). at it (peer presstire, religious taboos
): T.sviots (cited ti note 3), at 27—38 (eultural and
spirnuat it nm is).

.

iernitori.il

Act. 9 Sit.

Ron:.iti Buvi), [tiICOM1N(, Ott iii Si’ini
rOt
[‘uS:
,Li\ : lNRi5)Ur it) Ixtic. ions D:.sssi
.x
A>.u Poi’ L\Tt0N Drc Li ‘SIt A\toxO N’ itti t isiS i INDiANS
1774—1874 (U. W:tshittgtoit Press 990):
Count Ls>.n L Svti it. S,ustmmx Ftsnntcs 01 ititt Nowtii
ss sz 5 5
Oregon St U. Press 1979(( 85)
estimate): 1\VLOR (cited ttu note 3). at 22—24 t 5—ttitle treich
(
o
river
scippo
ted
over
t
1,000
people
.
attitual 41 millioti pounds, relying on Raitdall F. Schalk
. E’thuioon Solutio
n
cool
Siec/It
eod 0cc
dic
‘n/ton/lu Bus/u L/cfu, /‘5O: 1/n toiln’opo/og/co/ /‘ p:i
2 No F’ss ri
9—21 ( t9860

Tribal lltiet’(eited in note 5). at iquotcto Dr B:i:baucu lane):
(ic_con
323 t [848): Oregon land Donation Act. 9 Stat. 496 ((850).
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Tribal Briel’(citcil in note 5), at 17:
in chap. 4, text with totes 3—4.

(cited in note
Cnti.otititttst & IRI\t (cited in note 5), at 9: Wit tj\so’
(cited in note 4t, at 21, 23—24.

(i),

at I 88: Nii toy

Tribal brief (cited in note 5). at 17—
1
Wlt.KtNSO\ (cited in note 6), at ISS (frenzied fiee—16r—atl);
: Nit toy (cited in note 4). at 21 (tribal fishing
18, 22—24 (prolikration ofcatineries, new technologies)
contributing to canneries).
Not nov (cited in note 4), at 10—2)) (salmon preser’es.

//. at 34—36.

A

1005) at 20, cited in SM! nit, at 74
Svtt ni (cited in tote 7). at 74; Pie/fIt.’ Ei,slieinia,i 3 (Aug.

CittLtrnttttost: & Ttmwt (cited in note 5), at lb—Il.

tttt:t.s Ot’Tttt: CoLt:vtntA
On fish wheels, see generally Fttt:ot.ittr t. K. C’tt.\\1tR, Ftsttw
(l3infords & Moi’t 1971).

tt.ll

oui)S:

: Btoi N, Moi:r’.’n\tN IN ‘nt-to Ct
Sit’t’tt (cited in note 7). at 74 (1909 harvest I; Bisuot
er I 9821(1935 harvest; previous hai-vesis
Stuto, it Fott ‘into Wit,n S/si MoN 147 tSimon and Schust
averaged 48 million fish).

.

Grand Cottlee Danti; flonnc-il1e
DtEiRt(’[l (cited in note I), at 278—79, 310 (Rock Island Darn;
731 (eodihed as lb U.S.C. 832(a). (1994)). On the
Protect Act of 1937, Pub. L. Nt. 75—329, 50 Stat.
Dttttest (Washington St. U.
i
t.t:te H\ttNtssi\t,
building of Grand Coulee. see P..ui. Pt t tnt, (itt.’\’ct Cot.
Press 1994).

tit

205—07.

report ofthe Commissioner of
JJis/ropon’ci’ i’.s . So/mon. at 228—29 (discussing the 1937
passage problems).
Fisheries); Diut Rl(’tt (cited in note 1). at 337—38. (downstreani

Reriige.
I lt’th’t poller vs. So/on In, at 22’!—34: JJm’ilroe/t’c’u’u’

1
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•
L)tt: ticruit >eited in note 1). at 38!

HuIroponti
u’s.
SaIn,o
n,
at
273—
74
(Lowe
r Snake hatchery progr:miri); 6 WA hiS ANti WA FiR
Rioiuts 89—90 (Robert I:. I3eek ed 1994) (hatche
ries as a narcotic).

JIM LIriiAtO\5 hr ii. S,\t MON Wt t ion F
RiveRs: A [lustosy OuTuit, Pseti re S.\uAo
uN Ctctsts 170201 (Island Press 1999 (comparing (he Colum
bia and Fraser Rivers); Mathew

Evenden. F/c/i is. Power:
RL’/uuuk/ng Su/nmcm, Scicncc -tnt! Snt’It’i’
(Ph.D. Diss. York U. 2000): Ct itt.otRt ICC. & IRIM
(cited in note

5), at 29.. 89-100.

Federal Power Commission v. 1_dalI, 3S7 U.S. 42%.
437—3% (1 967). discus
sed
in
Micha
el C,.
Ftltimnm & F. lorraine l3odm, (_‘oiuonen!ari. in Nos
t urwes r SAl \ION CRIsIS’: A Docu\tl \r.\ucv
Htso.uss
129—130 (Oregon SI. U. Press I 9Q() [luereinafler NW
S-stvio’s Cststsl.
2

l.:d ( haney, -I Oucsiion of Ba/ant
a:
J1’ak’,
:bie,’g
i’
/ialinoii ti,ut/ .SlL’L’/IU’Ud P,oc/iitiion in i/ia
Upper (‘olunubin f/liar Basin 13—17 t Northwest Resou
rce lni’omiatuon (‘enter 197%).

Sohappy v Smith.
302
F.
Supp.
899
([).
Or.
I 069) (harvest “litir share”); United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 3 2 (WI). Wish 1974>
(haIl’the harvests).

F,’i’ U, ColtiN, ThF,sttbso\ Tmu..si: The C’oNIhNt INC
(2ostm
wuvt’t
csy
oveR
NORrt
tWlst
lNot,\\
FISHING Ricat is 3—1 7 (U. Washington Press
1986); United States v. Washington.
520
F.2c1
67o
(9th
Cir.
1976): 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 97%> (afflrrnanees
by the court oiappeals): Washingtoti v. Passen
ger
Fishing Vessel Ass’n.
(I5
443
.
658
(1979)
(Supre
me Court all’irmance); United States v. Washington,
573 F.2d at 126 t9th Or. 1978) (‘except (or
some desegregation cases”).

974).

lrnted States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 1(132
24 vif’harvest).
Settler v. [.arneer. 507 F.2d 231 (9th (‘ir.

Unted States v, Washington. 506 F. Supp. 187 (W. I).
Wash. 1 980): United States v.
Washington. 759 F,ld 353 (9th Or. 1985).
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l3lttnttn & Ilodt (cited

.4

itt ni’te

27). at 263—26

si

the (iovernntent of
the Government of’ the Uniued States of’ America and
in note
I 985. T.l.A.S. No, I 1(191: Bfittrini & Bodi (cited

“.

0

S/tie/tv a!

(sockeye
ctnetlts): 56 Fed. Rem 58,69 (1991)
S’itt’ittg Iclaho8 Salmon, at 692 (1991 flow requil’
): \it’l,
ltsttitg)’.Stilmnon 1.nvonc, at 528—48 (other isitogs
listing): 57 Fed. Reg. 14.654 (992) (chittook
Sb (its of Tjc’sj (‘otis’! So/motto/s.
Marine 1’ i sheri es Serv., //‘oloitgc’,i’c/ S/licies let
9pdC’.
‘lttlp:/www.nwr.noaa.ios /s,ilmesa:puhs/pg9Q

. Foc//k’ Sa/tooti ‘Ii the (rtcs’o’oa,/c:
\\‘tlla Nehlsen, Jack \ViIlt:ttns & .lntt Ltchatosvtch
o,,, I 6 Ft stiut: is ito. 2, at 4 t I 99 I
Ris?, /rooi C’ti/i/oi’itio. Oregon, Idaho, anti 11 ishingi

iuis Rtvt:t:, it It S.\L\to\ E (iss’s I t\t,
42
Joti’s NI. \“, ‘t.tss-i.sN. A RI ti-it l’s Costsi, i’s: Ttti: Coi.us
(drawdowtt proposal
Water Policy Review Advtsoi’y Contm’n. (997)
ANt) WAt ti: PiiLt/ y 85—86 (Western
Po,’it,’. at 725—26 (drawdowit proposal).
aitch casing Upper Sitake hastn ssatcr): C-’ni’ai-eling

.

ns): National Mantle Fishenes Sers-’. & Oregoit
55 Fed. Rem 37,342 (1990) (Snake River pcttuio
oh
tlan c’ of S,to/se Rite,’ .S’oekc’t’c’. .S’oi,kc I?ii’c,’ C7t/no
[)ept ot’ Fislt :tnd Wi ldf i fe, Post anti P,’nt’,tt .‘l/’iin
11(1989) (6% ot’ 1961).
and Loie,’,’ Co/ton/na //ic,’ C ho, I 960—SX. ztt

tsto’s ANt) rut: Pi:cu’i.t- orrttr; Not: t itwi
.Iost-i’ii (‘i/Nt, A (‘Iron’s F.svt: 12’stnN(;t tt;t,S-s
Fed. Reg. 32,085 (1989) (Sact’attiettto listing).
36—39 ( Henry HoIt 1995) seeds sown in I 987); 54

Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon. March IS,
e).
361. tt 276 (littlore to restrain habitat damag

Treaty Between

t ion. Preservat toll and Extension of die Fraser
United States—(’anada Convent ion f’or the Protec
3867;
System, signed May 26. (930, T.1.A.S. No.
River Sockeye Salmon Fishery of the Fraser Rtvcr
ng declnte).
I3lutitiu & Bodi (cited itt tote 36), ttt 275 (startli

g/ng
(“fitir share”): see .1 i-/ott J,ii’ Afitno
Sohappy v. Snttth. 302 I’. Snpp. 99 (1.). Or. 196’))
J1’ihtittiujc’s .1 hove Bo,toc’, i/k’ Dt,nt
/1001 t?t’ ( o/iiotbui Rite,’ anti its
J’;sJit’t’it’S on .51 ,c-/,s ()ulgi,tt,Itn,i,’
States v. Oregon.
,getiiv’iii Iit,,t (October 7. I 988): Ut tied
February 25. I 977): ( ‘0/Ion hi,, Rite,’ Fish :Fit,oo
576 (9th Cir. 1 ‘191)) (approving in amended
699 F.Supp. 1456. 1458 ([). Or. I 988), ij’d. 91 3 F.2d
Pi’o/it. ;it 460—462.
conipreliertsive plan). ,Sev’ a/so [‘/51 ‘art’

—w, ,t
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Northwest
Resource
lnf’orniation
Center
v.
Northwest
Power
Plunnine
Council.
35 F.3d 1371
(9th C’ir. 1904): Idalto Dept of’Fish and Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv.. 850 1-’.
Supp. 586. 90))
D. Or. 1094) (“sertously
ilawed”).

The Case Jo, Doni Btcachiog,

at

1)23-31 (citing studues).

at

86

\

Nat i anal Marine
F
i
shenes
Service.
Jiio/orica/
Up/,i/omi
nit
Re/mn//alit
in
‘o,u.vti/lo/
of(
ft in on I 99/95 (ipeitinon of Fi’di.’,’a/ Co/nnz/’ii, Ri icr Poimv’i’ .Sta!e,,i (111(1 liii intL Iromi v/ioilo!iin
Pi’ogmiomi in / 905
anti Fonoc )‘c’aI’s 80 11995). discussed in Bcioiut/ i’aritt. at 62—
s.ss’ also il. at 49—62 (discussmg the
7
1994 antendinents to the Columbia Basin Fish and WiIdliti Program). The 2000 BIOp is Act/f Afouic
Fisheries .Se,iue, /hoiogftoI Opinion on Opera! ion of the S cv/i’il/ Co/ion/ia Rue, Pon’ci’ .Si’s!’,n,
Imiclui/ini,’
the
lit
tent/c
17.cit
7ioivpiirAit/
on
ig/’inmi
Po
umui
9
I
Bum’eati
of
Ret
iainti!i
in
Piojeclc in flit’
(‘0/ion/na Rosin at A—S to A—4 (Dec. 21. 2000) hereinafter cited as 2600 /iiOpJ. discussed
in chap 9. te’t
with notes 26—33.
Reiiind Foil/i, at 103—07 (“salmon budget”).

See 0/. at I (7-19 (Senator (iortonS science aniendineitt(: Vat KMAN (ettcd in note 42).
effect of science review): The (axe for Damn Breach/n, at 1012—23 (scientific studies).
0

to

lNiiFt’FNi)iN) St
liNuitit.
(maLi’.
Rtotixio
int
Rus
iv:
Ris:OiIAT1O
N
itiS,sivttiNio
Ftsios
itt Cati sims Rivins Ft osys ii si xvii. 4—5. 268—uO. 509 (Notiliwest
Power
Planning
Council
1996)
(hereinafter cited as Rn riii,’ 10 itt Riven). A revised version of this report was released
by the
Northwest Power Planning Council in late 2000: .s( e Doe. 2000—IS. at adable at ‘iwww.nwcouneil.org.

(‘di lure

iii

Oregon Natural Resources Council ‘v. (‘.5. 1-orcst Service. 59 F.Supp.2d t085 (WI). Wash.
I 999) liii Lire to pcrlimi iv i dli IC sun cys): Pact fic ( oast Federation of Fishermen’s Assue. s Nauona
Fisheries Serv., 71 F.Supp.2d 063 ( W.[). Vs ush. 1999). of/’d 253 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 201)1>
implement aq untie eonset’vat ion strategy).
Maritte

Oregon Natural Resources C ouncil v. Dalev, 6 I
,Sttpp.2d
1139,
1159
Or.
tI).
1998).
‘fee
Christine (ioltglitly, The O,ceoit Coa.vtii/ hit/mon Riaioaaio;i lou/ante .4 Tban’edMieoipi
/0.1 ioiif
ES.4 Li,tfiig, 7 N.Y.U. ENcr u. J. F. 395 (1999)
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Too SuND..sy ()ttttiON
(olii,iuhia Ri er Birvoi: i/u’ A111,S
20(0)).
Notes to Chapter 2

Persperti’e, hi

,

Ba, Rivou Nows no. 2. at

(Nail. Res. F. Inst. Winier

i)i it cit (cited in chapter I note I ). at 324 (sources of’ human wonderment and human
Ssi.etiia Lito I—Iisiouiis (U.
veaI)h): see geneirdli’ tuaNtuos (iaoot x’sr Li:o \4ARttt.ls, i;as., P\ctnc
British Columbia Press l0) I) [hereinafter cited as Pscnir Sl5iiiN Liii: h-Its iouiisj.
—

Ltc iA tow to I I (cited in chapter 1 , note 2t). a) I I I 2 ( freshwater arid ii. ocean cooling);
5.0 (cited in chapter I. note I at 31 tleshsater flush).

SKuR,\I & C

Ni:riort,
Ssuuusi & Cot ii (cited in chapter I. mite I ). at 3 (iwo distinct Species): ANrtJov
S\1 o: Tot Wout,ns Mos r fl\it\ssi.n Fist i 32 (Winchester Press 1980) (more extensive ocean
migrations).

in
Ssui its) & (‘oil (cited ni chapter 1, note I), at 4—5 (“brIghts’’); Cuit ot:tstiosi. & TRIM tcited
chapter 1 . lute 5>. at 31

I,
SsKt;icI & Coot: (cited in chapter 1, note I), at ti—7; CIIIL0ItuIosi: & Tatsi (cited in chapter
5,), at 32-34.

5—h
Nd! ins (cited in note 3), at 3u—37 (weight): Ssucicsi & Coro (cited in chapter 1, note I), at
(e hi ut sal imjn characteristics

itote

COLt:

(cited in chapter 1, note Ii, at 7—8; C.’tttt.nottttost; & Titisi (cited in chapter I.

Cinormittiost: & Titist (cited in chapter 1, note 5). at 32—34.
S,.\utFR.ai &
note 5), at 37-38,

Is tilt’
Lt it.\tei\\ cu (cited in chapter 1, note 26), at 164. 234 (two types of chinook):
Ttusi (cited in
i
S,\i.vtoN Ltim HtSTnRlts (cited in note I o at 314 (below 50th parallel); Ciiit,ouititos &
chapter 1, riiite 5). at 37-42.
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Pstttc S,sitii i’s Lire 1-lisi otttts (cited in note
). at ix (two Asian species).

BRow’s (cited in chapter I. note I 8). at 62
(Elwah): Lietistowii_ii (cited iii chapter 1.
note 26t,
at 2 I (spawning pretèreioee).

.

Lii i i I OW it:t (cited in chapter 1 note 2(o),
at 233—34 (least abundant. two types of chnioo
k ):
Dii locH (cited in chapter 1. note I). at 325
(spring chinook).

(cited in note I), at 400.

l_N(O’stMON

L’ssotiiis Co’si RiiYtRs’s (cited no
chapter I. note 5). sit 46—49 (tribal relianc
e
on hill
chinook); Erie Lemelson. Brett Switi & Shaun
a \Vhidden,
[)l/!kii
/i
Cho
kes
Face
Po/ui’n
iakerc on Fiitioe
o/ 1l>o,f%od Reach. 2 Ba Rivets Niws no.
I. at I (NatI. Resources I. Inst. FaIl 1995 (1
Tanford Reach):
,S’a/nioi, Lcsco,io. at 530—36 (chinook listo
ntis).
7

051175

Licniowt
cii
(cited
in
chapte
r 1, note 26). at 234 (cohn lOb history):
to’s rttcivetosv tcitecl in chapter I, note
5), at 49 (coho).
Pst etc Ssisiio’s Lire His

LIUtIAIowil ii (cited in chapter I, note 26). at
207—06. 212
teoho
harvcs
is
62
Fed.
Rev. 24,568
1997) coditicd at 50 C.F.R. 227.4(i)t: 63 Fed
§
Rcg. 24.58% ((997) (Northern (%iliti
.mia/S
.outhern
Orcgoto coho): 64 Fed. Reg. 42.587 (1996)
(Oregon Coast
coho),
Centra
l
Calitbn
uisi
colon
were listed in
1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 56.13% ( (990). but Sacram
ento River coho went extinct in the mid—
I 9$(ts without
ES\ intervention.

IJNcostvto’s
Co’si
rove
ios
(cited
in
chapte
r I. note 5). at 149; P
ctrtt S
1
t to’s Lire
1
His 1051175 (cited in note I), sit 99 (reduced intenic
tion I.

tROS%RSY tcited in chapter

\tiFiiO (cited in note 3), at 29 tsocke
ye):
PAcits
c
S\ito
’s
Lire
1
(cited in note I), at
5 (range to Sacramento River); Thomas Jensen
, The United States—
Canad
a
Purl
/ic
Salmo
n
lniei
cepoii
Trot>.: An Hisiaiical and Legal Oi’ervien’,
16 E’sv; i. L.363. 374 (1986) çlOI()
C’onve
ntiori);
56 Fed.
Reg. 58.612 (1991) (sockeye listing): L\ro\tSiO
N CoNt RoVtHi,SY (cited in chaptei I, note
5). at 149 n2.

Lii I is10\ itt (cited
in
chapte
r
1,
tote
26).
sit 235: Ls(OMMON Cii’s
I. tote 5), at 150: Nni tim (cited ni note 3), at 29.
33.

ZZIR
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; .scc <www.nw r.noaa.govs I
chapter 1 note 26), at 235 ( stcelhcad ninge)
s).
995), 64 Fed, keg. 14,517 (I u99) (steelhe:id listing
steelitead runs listed): 63 Fed. keg. 3.347 (I

.

Cit

,” habitat and sal non
(cited in chapter I, note 26). at 22 (“ccitt ra I thcnics

text accompanying totes 18—20; Ni; rtto
See chapter 4’s discussion of the Pio’allnp cases,
Basin greatest producer).
(cited in chapter 1 note 4), at 4 I ( (.‘ohi inbia
Ltct nvrow
i next ri cab lv Im ked ).

-N
ic Suilinoii, in [li;RFDi FARY AN!) ENVIRONM!
WE. Ricker. l’hc Stork ‘ono’p,inii ii, Pun/
rtoNs I 9—160 (U. British (‘olninbia Pt’ess 972);
F\C (11(5 Artmu riNo (‘l.tcr\mN Ssi MONIt) Pot’utA
:tt 5—6.
Nehlseri c/ct!. (cited in chapter 1. note 43),

).
(cited in chapter I. note 43). at II (depIcted stocks

P.sc:mttc

FAt.

chapter I, note 52). at

ix! it;

wiped
57 (reporting the late spawning fall ruti was
Bios’s (cited in chapter 1, note lx), at $0,
out d tie to irrigation practices).

of.,

Rmvit< (cited

iii

UI’sttuAi : S,xm.stt.uN ANt) Soctnrv
NAi’toNAL ACAtuMy itt Su,’mINCns,
inafter cited as UrsiREJ\Mi.
NotcvitwnST 148, 319—20. 31)4—14 (199(3) [here
Nelilsen ci

o iii!

note 52). at 71>, 72-74.
Rn rLn To Tt to Rmvox (cited in chapter I.

Id. at 7(3-77.
Id. at 80.
litsFRiAM (cited in note 30). a! 164; Ri t Ltts
at 203.
131; United States v. Washington. 506 F. Supp.

Usi ROAM (cited iii note 31>), at 180—99, 2(11

Id. at 2. 75-79.
Id. at 2-3, 76-77.
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runs. Id. at I 4.654—55.
Id. at 4.660.

between the two

lit. (hydropower the clnefcanse):
5”)
Fed.
Reit.
42,529
,
-42,53
0-31
(I °9$ (eniergercv tntcrnn
rtmle). In 11J98. NMFS ultnuatelv decided not to elassiI
’ tile
species
as
endang
ered,
citing
increas
ed
adult
returns. 63 Fed, keg. I 607, 1809—
1(1(19
98)
(sprnig
-sumitiei chinook numbers iiji Ii) (1500 in 997
loin
1116 in 995: faIl elnnook up to 726 foni 350
itt 19951.

,

(In ocean conditions. see Ois’giin and 1/mu .i/linng
ummiu
mil
o/(
0/if
mnbim
R,i’ui
Sci/im
iomi:
P,’ikuednigs if a Sinins/mmmmi (Northwest Power
Piann inc (none ii Due. 9o) I. (I
usia
o
A.
B
she
I,
e.
.Tuly I, 999). For in cx:iniplc ofan opponent
of freshwater rcstor,itmon charts see Bticli:ml cited
in
eli apt er I note 46).

Nat until Marine I 45 heries Servic
e.
tho/o9
iua/
()pinio
9o5
ii
/
101
io J 99,5 1 too/tom Opi odom;
ii, i/ic ( ‘olo,n bin &rvi,i 36 I 995
(
I herci na fter cited as I 995— 995
)
[iou
berm
l(i(
)p
N
at
tonal
:
\lari ne
Fisheries Service. i/to/i og ri!
Op/mm
/on
on
-l mi/fluid [‘ii i/iagim//oii in i/ic ( dnmmibii 1/nc/n
1 Marc Ii 29. 1 999
[hercinafler cited as /999 lfth/mumi’ l?d)p
I.
Id. at 43,942-44.

,Sec 64 Fed. keg. 14,30%
(1999)
(Upper
C’ohnnihii spring chinook): 04 Fed, keg. 1.59%
(1999t
(Columbia Riser cOunt): 64 Fed. keg. 14.52%
(19991 (lvlmd—(’olumhi:. s:eclhcadg

at

101-03:63 Fed. ken. 11,77.). 11.775, 11,78(1(1998
).

Ui’si Ri.ASt (cited itt note 30). at 101; (42 Fed. keg.
43.937
(1997)
lLppcr
Ooluit
ibia
and
Stoke
River lisnngs); 63 Fed. keg. 13.347 (1998)
(Lower Cohninbta 1is:ng): 94 I—ed. keg. 14.517 (l999
\i.—
Colnisihia and Upper \Villaitmettc listings).
Ld’su:i,sst (cited in note 30).

f

-

Inst it utc fOr F mslierr Resources. Thu (7am i o/ L
o/mig .‘
t
o/In,i,c [Iii’ [(0/iOiii ii J$ii,/rsi tiJ 50/1,0.
7
l*’c/imiu.s in th’ Co/imoi/ia Rim’i’i this/ti 2 (I 996)
hereinafter cited
as
(‘ifs!
Tb’
of
[)oing
/oi/im,
g
I
(8500,000 atiitual costs. 25.1)00
jobsm:
//umom
ii/
Pam/mm’.
at 126 g:ioting (‘hairnian ‘lcd Strong): on
the
judicial interpretation ofmlie ( olniithia Basiits
Indian treaties, sec chaptco. 4 and 12.

4,,
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(fishing at hills): D
rut (‘uu \im.\ 5—14 (Oregon St. U. Press 1079)
Ic At nih lest Salmnomi and Stcelhcad: lilt’
.Stinposnmm on Lcgal .S’it’uetiircs Jam Managing the I’m_i/
l
Ri:v. 417, —446 ii.117(l 086) (three distuici cultura
Biological and Jiisloiicol ( nhlc’.vl, 22 It)AiiCm L.
and
y, Status, Matiageme nt. and H arvest of the Sal non
groups): Joint Statement Regarding the Biolog
ic Peninsula Drainage Areas of Western Washington.
Steelhead Resources of the Puget Sound and Olymp
Fish and W ilelli Ic Sea ice, and Washington Dept. of
compiled 1w Washington Dept. of H shames, U.S.
:
9213 W.D. Wash.. May 14. 1073) (coastal tribes)
Game for United States i, Washington. Civil No.
Reserved indian l’i.c/ung Rights: Pacific North a’vst
Stephen Dow Beekham. Ethmiohl,ciorical Cioiic.o of
States v. Washington, Civil No. 921 3B. Phase I
Ti’etiiies. l/(51—1855, (report prepared liar United
Catch 42—54 (Sept. I 1 984>1 (fishing practIces).
Determination Re: Accounting liar the Non—Treaty

.

k INDiANS: Tti,xuim_sovtiii l..ossuts
Roisi:aiFl. Rota & Joan A. [liwwx,TtiuCtIlNoo
Iribal Brief
(salmon exchanged liar mami faciured goods);
(oi.I Mili A 2 I —22 (U. ( )k lahoma Press I 976)
I.
Vancouver, ownership olsites): (bin LAND Srvtirt
cited itt chapter I, note 5), at I 8—20 (Quiniper and
n &
excess of 5 million pounds); Charles 1. \\ tlkitiso
Fisu on Cu Rn I 12 (Oregon Sea Grant 1970) titi
oiiiidamt’
l”i,v/icit: I omiserlnlion (((ILl -I llotaition a/a i,amisb
Daniel ( ontier. i/IL’ J,aii ‘f the Pacific Salmon
in
.
Ri.s 7. 20 (1083) (dipnei platforiust; l AS wit (cued
C’ontaion Pivpc’m’i Resource. 32 U. KANS L.
rights).
chapter I. note 3). at 36—37 (individual and village

.

,

at 1(1— 14 (half—century before ho fhil a:
U ‘o:i mM vu ix Con rnov iiRSS (cited in chapter 1 note 5).
tigton. 384 F. Supp. 312, 352 (W.D. Wash.
cordial relations svitlt fur traders): United States Waslu
Grazitig. Report
Office ot’lndian Affairs, Div. of Forestry and
1974> (exports): U.S. Dept. of the Ititerior,
ti’Jiscc//om,eous Related Rights of Certain
, amid E.vte,a 0/i/Ic l”is/iitig, I-honing and

cited as Swindell I? r’poi’i] (little fishing by whites>.

on i/ic ,Soiocc.Naoe
[hereinafter
(July 1942) (compilec( by Edward Switidell. Jr.)
hic/,ao 7)16cc in Oicgon onil lJo.c/iimigion 35

1, \tslvIM is.

.

Co’ Rovitcss (cited

ill

chapter I, note 5), at 1(1—17.

not force):
upp. at 353—54 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (by treaty,
United States v. Washington, 384 1-’. 8
n
(Orego
496
rial Act): Act of Sept. 27. 1850, 9 Stat.
Act ofAug. 14. 1848, 9 Stat. 323 (Oregon Territo
443
State (oinntercial Passenger Fishing \‘essel Ass’n.
Land Dotmation Act); Washington \- Washingroit
):
ger l”i.vlang l/cscc/1 (80 percent population decline
1,_S. 658. 664. (1979) [liereiriatier cited as Passen
tion estimatet: sc’ general/i’ Rout- nt BYD. Titn
TAYLoR (cited in chapter I note 3). at 41 11841 popula
.xv
tn lxntsriOiiS DtsL\sLs sxt Poi’iisi o\ Dir
(‘SlING OFrtli5 St’IRIToFPrSTILENCL: Ix rnooix
Washington Press 1099).
Avto’n Nunaiiwrs r Co.ss lxin,-sns. 1774—1874 (U.
S
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,

Stiiin/tll Report (cued in tote 4), at 340—41 353.
Id.at355,-1l7.

2
United States v. Washuigtun, 384 . Supp. at 354—55
(creating new political entities): B.s kit
SkiS
LsNi. POLE! it.Ai,,\Ni) hcONOMic Assi.ci
Soc
lNiti.sN
-Wuiii. (‘ucri. it.sL Co’ At t is Wi:siiirs
w!\snis(io\ 5 inc Mio—N.tst:i tics it Ci:’siu
Rv 28(1973), at 28 (appointincilt o)’ehicf’s>.

,

United States v. Washington. 384 F. Supp. at 355—
56 (Chinook jargon); U’.n. IMNtON
Ut is I ROy I its (cited in chapter I ilot e 5), at 23—2
4 ( Stevens’ interpreter, George Gibbs): i’rtbal Brief

(cited in note 1), at 17—I 8 (treat’v language): Us si:
tcited m note 12). at 28 (no precedent liar legal
documents. nor alienation).
1

United States \‘. Washittgton, 384 F. Stipp. at 351) >clepe
ndcnue on salmon): Sit iiic/eli Rrpout
(cited in note4). at 351—52 (“fisIt in common with the
whiles’).

htt’otdc’// Repair (cited in note 4). at 351

Joint Biological Appen
dis
(cited
in
note
It.
at
327 (qtioriing (‘ommissiotter of lndiait Aftiiirs):
Pavsc’nt.er Fishing Vessel, 443 ItS. at 1166 u.S 1Y79>
(“catch most of otir tishi.
(

‘7

Id. at 348 (emphasis addcd)
(Steve
ns’
quote
from
treaty negotiations>: J tick l...anda u. I:nipi’
Victories: hid/tot Trenit’ Fishing Rig/its in i/ic
Pw/lIe 7
Vo,ihui es! I )) Es V Et.. I... 4 I 2 (1 98(1) (64 million
acres): Tribal Brief (eited in chapter I, note 5). at
25 (Stevens’ quote to Senate); U.S. COMM’S 0\ Civtr
Rtot ‘is. Isniss Ta tittS: A Cost StuNt QLES Foil
Si, RVivAi. 64 (1981) Iconeern about small reserves).

,

.

i isa. ii (cited in chapter I. tote 1>, at 15o (Stesen
1
l)ii
s’
broken
proilits
e):
Baows
ci
ed
in
chapter I note I 8) at 1 32 (Northwest Indian
Wtw); UNcOMMI Os (osi ROy! sv (ci tell in chapte
r I note
5). at 34-3’) (delayed treaty ratification).

,

itt tote

3>. at 30—31.

Passeu,ge,’
Fi.vh/i
’
1
fccv
ig
l.
443
U.S.
at
(764
(most fish hat’vestcd and sold by natives): Tnhat
Brief (eiteel in chapter I note 5 ). at 2o i n hat ‘ole
iii fronttei’ ecotiotity).

Wt lktitsott & Conner (cited
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i niterent

check ott harvests).

59.

chapter I, note 3). at 23. 63-65.

it

t).
46—59 (eil’ects of white developutent on saitnoit h;ibila

iii

Id,
it

to Chapter 4

Id.

T.svi. i( (cited

Lt(uI,vio\(ictt (cited in chapter 1, note 26). at 44-47.

TAYLoR (cited iii chapter I, note 3), at 44-45.

LtQtt\ios\ i(ti (eHed in chapter I, note 26) at 33-37
an
25 (native custom. k tnslii p, cereinion cs, and taboos created

25

Notes

uacr Fislun Vessel Assn.. 443 U.S. 655.

Washinuton V. Washuiuuiton State (onumercial Passcn
U’sselj.
654 1979) Jbereinafler cited as Passenger 1’isIuln,u
Taylor (cited in chapter 3. note 22). at 312.

at

242—43.

. Terr. I 557). l’hc injunction :i9ainst the
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26.
Addressing mid Controlling Nosipoint &nn’re Pollution (Feb.

rds, 1313 (water quality
Id. ft 1301(bXIXC)(pennits must meet Water quality standa
Act of 1965).
standards): Pub. L. No. 89-234,79 Stat. 903(1965) (Vater Quality

al

r, 29 £w’iao. L. Rep. 10.46’)
•
On TMDLs, see Oliver A. Houck. 14101.s IV”: The Final Fnmtle ion Ltwvt Maur
L Litigat
(1909). and earlier articles in the series: Ruben %V. Adler, New TA’lD
c: The kçt’ to Unlocsllug the Class, If’ster
Unanswered Questions, 6 Rtvt’tts 269(1998); Nina Bell, TMDL
,lct, 5 Bit, Rtvmt Saws no.4, at I (Nat’I. Rn. I.. Iitst. Fall 1999).

l970s when the agencs reaction to the Nation
•fl author was an attorney for EPA in the late
the water quality problcnn. dams cause. see
Wildlife Federation’s petition was under consideration. On
1297-1303 U). D.C’. 1982).
‘lational Wildlife Federation r.(iorsuch,530 F.Supp. I2l.
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every three years), 1301(h)( I )((‘) (pen
is
to
aelnev
e
water
quality staiidai’ds), 1323(a) (iederi:ietivities
to achieve \s.iter quality standards). 131 l(.i) (water quality
certilieatiori for t’deiaIlv licensed and
pei’in tiLed activities).

4 on the ‘IMDI. lttiyation and its significance.

Id. 1.3 3(e))> )(2)(13) (contents of’a
water
quality
standa
rd>:
PUD
No.
olieHc
I
rson
(‘olitttv v.
Wiislnngtnn Dept of’ I/ei locy. 5)1 U.S. 70(1, 712—72))
(1994). djscnseiI in 4 W’ IRS .s.sti \Vs tit Riot s
ii
40.0S(e)(2) (Robert F. Beck. ed.. 1)96 ed),

§
See lie sources cited in note

e Wash i iigton Dept. of 1 :eologv, I.’eo/ogi S / 996 t.ni
d/t/ow’ I,isi n/ IOii/i’L (I co,d !h,’rsite,tt’i/
H1nc11od/. s ih.’ .103(/) 1./ct. http::;’
vww.w
a.iiov.
eeolog
y/uq30$d (visited Oct. 20. 1999):
(_oininents of Nina Bell. Northwest Unvironnienwl Advoc
ates to :tttthor (Jan. 13. 2000) ( Wasltingtoits
restrictive criteria (or listing non—complying sviitcrhod
es: sm gui huant sublethal efihicis in urban estuaries).

text

in this chapter on N \i PS’s

.

N at tonal Ni arnie F tslmenies Serv., Ill /og/rii/ itii/ (‘oiiJia
’coi e O/dni(n in I ppiv a) a) ()ia’yoo
i>’ocr uoli’ Sicni1o’ds Jar li/s cdix d (.)xi’g
ii, Trio/k i’ino’c. oni/
1jj at I 5 t July 7, 1 996,i I beret naf)er
ci ted as f/JO/i 00 ( )i’cgo,i (foci’ Qua/in’ .Sioulnrr/s
1(1. (data on half o I’ ‘streams): ‘see notes 25-33 and aceont
p:mving
qttestion inc the adequacy of ( )rei.ion water quii ity
standards.

Personal eoinmunmeat ion betwee
n
\i
ike
cln’ir’n
I:
tlson. idaiiii Div. of Ins i rotirnen nil Quality and
Melissa Powers (Oct. 22, 999): (‘oninieiits ofNmiia I.(cll
(cited in note >2), at 3 (temperature as :t
‘1irrogatc (‘or other water quality problents).

Bell (cited in mote 4).

tii

3 (discussitig the cases>.

Id. at 19 (sediment), 45 pH).

IJIOp on Oi’ci.ni (Voice Qua//tm’ Stu,mdo’d.c (cited in tote
13), at 19 (Uissilveil oxygen. 29
temperamLu’u).

iS

Id. at 3-4.
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.

I 323(a) (lèdei
that Forest Service timber sales s uolatecl state water
stauudards). The 11051 recent ol floir eases iiudiiig
I’hiinias. 37 I-3d 145. 153 (9th (jr. I 9’)S) (citing
ig (‘ouugress
quality standards was Idaho Sporiii
Slates Forest Sers ice, 534 I-.2d 542. 552 (9th Cur.
Oremin Natural Resources ( ouncil s-. Lni(ed
l
Rice, 914 F.2d 179, I 52—53 (9th (‘ir. ‘(90) (“ Die judicia
S,’, i/c,, Marble Mouiii,nn Aiidiiboii 50ev
701—706, permits pris:ute cilu/ens to
U.S.C.
i-esiew provision i,(’the Administrative Procedure Aet, 5
froni itonpoitit souree’’ F Oregon Natural Resources
sue Oar alheeed slate waler quialitv control violations
l’)S9 (‘‘ (he CWA also requires states to unpleiiient
l.yng. 552 F.2d 4)7, ] 424—25 (9th (lr.
(‘ouncti
of’thue reasoning
l agencies flutist comply’). I-or ill able critique
sva(ei- quality standards with svliicli f.idera
Idaho .Sioiilng C oiigm- ci i’, T/,ont,m.c ,i,nl
ol the /d,i/io Sjuoi-tl,n ( ‘oh iess ease. Sec Robin Ktidis Craig.
,S’,nnc’
oup i/jut Sotos cc, I/ic’ 1 1’.’), mid I/jr [/euioog of ‘In I/ic’
7
S iu5’15’iLiim l,,tn,o,ioi-. [c IL-i-ui [oem/itt A
Bitt/ti, 530 F\\ it. I.. 527 (2000) (argtnng
iklioio,i cut,! ioilte Sins’ J/.vs,’iii us uuii- .Voii—poi-c’iumnicuiru1
y with state water quality sta,tdaids only when
that the (lean Water Act reqmnres lederal llieihities to compl
ledem) nonpomt sources).
the state would impose similar requirements on noit—

O2Schni)
173—21)1 A— l30(9S)ta—b) (teniperatlire). 173—201 A—i(S
Wash. Adinin. (‘ode
rd for class -k svatenc), 173—21(1:5—070(4)
(dissolved gas), 173—2(11 A—t)30(2)(a—b) (nariaitve standa
(anlidegr:nlation policy concerning class .5 Waters).

.

B/Sm In/lug (4-it/u-. (‘oluinhta Basin
Ace 5-like O’Bryant, PP.-) (Pu cc (‘ui-pc Soak,- Ri,’,’i’
o,ti: -: U.S. l-.nvuronnmeni:il Protection Agency. C oiuouu/’j,u
Bulletin (April 25. 2(100) .liitp:- cbhnlletun.r’
199’)) (l:.PA f’itidmng) 40 (‘P1/ §
R/,’,-i- Ienijuei’utuic’tc.ct’.s:suiieou Won/ui/on Cl,’t/na/,c ((‘eh.
o)sshetliei a proposed action threatens
5(01.27(b)) lOt (NFPA iegulatioti icquiring consideration
co, I/l’I ,S1/I -f//eu- (‘ui-p.s ()i’’,- ‘lil-i,’d (‘lean Oute’i
iolation of fedeial, tale, or local lasv) 1,sam francis
discussing a Jul .31. 201(1) letter of 1.PA to the

(ut ps)

11

ole,

ti

note

3, at IS-b 6.

2000).
Corps o(l’.ngtneeus. 92 1”. Suipp.2d 1072 (I). Or.
(lund/i, Snni,lmu’cls ctied

ins

.1<-i I uoliutio,u.s. Ci t-\RiNO Ut’, Aug. 14, 2001), at II

ii,, ()uc-goii

Natiotial \VildIt)e l—ed’n sB/Op

LPA’c coutdtiouu:ii lip1mr,is. /, :,inucjiutict:tS 2
2,
hI. at 9-10 lack ui uuilpienieumtation, idi ewe etliaems.
rs anon iume,istmres which time stile ssilI unpiemerut).
(letter expiessing EF’A\’s eoi,ditioiual ippuoval>. 3 (conse
((i egionuul ft-inpeiol:ire c’ritem’i,i ‘i ueet
Id. :1 20-22.
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to Petlorot Mandatory

Ot

(lniptei I I

Duties

Under he (lean Water Act and Iatdattoeied Specie
s Act çjuly (0. 2000).

3 U.S.C.
l25l>iU2) (national ooal o(watet ptaht\ ‘isteetitte the
‘ropatettioit ol lisit.
shel lItsh, and wtkIlt c).
Notes

(section TOOt)).

Secuon (Ota((2( coittains the

The Federal Poset Act is eodi(ied at 6 USC’.
791-525. In isdictioti under the PA
extends tu tr,tchtionitlly tas
iiaahle
waters
and
post-i
93
proicet
s I1(ciitt itterstate ccittttttetee, See 4
i’Ctn Is 40.03 Rob’t. 6. Reek, ed. 1996 ed. 200))
supp.).
RN AND \\‘\ttit

I) U.S.C.
797(e) (section 4(e)), 503(a)
dtreetive to consider plaits ptepared 6’. others.

ure

First Iowa llvdroelectoc Corp. ‘.. CPU.
328
U.S.
(52
((9-0) (((RU licenses may ignore its:
state laws): Calilonita v.
CRC.
495
49(1
U.S.
((990)
(rea(hn
ttnto I7tsi boo): [‘CD No.
(‘oitttty v. Washington Dept. ol’ Ecology .511 U.S. 70(1
(99-I> (State waler quality stattda
rds
nay
conditiott FLR(’ projects): 33 U.S.C.
1341 (tsater mutlll
eettit’i
eat(on
condit
ions):
16
U.S.C.
CS )7(e).
803(j). 811 (federal land inanagetnelit cottditiott,
Itslt and wildii)d recoiiioiettdattoi:s. Osltwa
y
coiidit iotts).

(‘otto..

2d Sess. 30(1 95(0 (leo4:hve

16 U.S.C. 799 (ttiaitnuto 50-sear tenDs): hR.
Rep. No. 034,
O)th
(‘otto..
2d
Ses.s.
22
l9(4’)
(“new look’); Attieriean Rivetx v. F[RC’. 201 F3d
II 86. 1(95- 99 (9th Cu. 201(0); 6 U.S.C.
81)7
federal takeover>. 805(l) (itoh —po’. er Ii eellses).
6 U.S.C. § 8O3j) (sectioti 10(j)): Ilk. Rep. 567. tOth
Ni story o l’ I 986 an let tdme its).

itt

\V’., iS R:ot
(fir. 2)100).
\.)

40.0O(e

itatiot,ai parks nd tin,itteitts). 79
7(e) (see:iott

i

56 Fed. keg. ol,i37, 61.139 (Dee. 2, 991)
)lttt.ii:
tLl
toNes do lot qualify uitder sectioit 100):
4.34(e) (60-day (tue period). (el(S) (sibstantial
c’ idenee cca(re:tart).

U.S.C. li 79((2) nhoil(hithng (eenscs

On ECU.s interptetat:on 0! section 0j), see 4 \\
\t.RS
tote I); American Ri’.et’ ‘.. l:l:RC, 201 F.Sd 1186 1202-:
205

18 CUR.

itt

(i

W-
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appmuv e

changes to the prJ cm

. Inc.. 81 F.E.R.C.
16 U.S.C. XII (section l8: I’uget Sound Energy
itiorti ttg authority).
(state I) shery agencies do not have section I S cond

61.354 at 62.o56 (1997)

§

WAi FR

40.09(h (cited ni

original definition): 56 Fed. Reg. 61.137. (mI.14()—
56 Fed. Reg. 23,108, 23.146 (I 991) (FERC’s
02—466. § 1701(b), (06 lOut. 3008 (vacating FLRC’s
45 (I 9’) I) (FERC’s revised dehtittion): Pub. L. No. I
dehnition 1.

4 Ws FiRS ANti WArIR Rttt’t s
(Dit FERC’s interpretation of section IS. see
. 4.34th).
note I ). The 60—clay tnne limit is imposed by IX C’.F.R §

,At)

(9th C’tr. 2000). quoting from l3angoi’
American Rivers v. FERC. 201 F.3d at 1187, 12(0
Cir. I .i96).
Flydro—Electric Co. v. FERC, 78 F.3d 659, 663 (D.C.

Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 709—721
P[[) No. I ofjefYerson Coutttv v. Washington Dept. Of

t ton ofstate laws. sec 4 WAt IRS
33 U.S.C. §i 1341(a)) I t. d): on the EPA’s preemp
(7)(imi) (amendments to original license
Riuti s § 40.07 (cited m note I IS C.F.R. §, 4.36(fl
tgs
applications). I 6.8) fl(7)( iii ) (ainendnmettts to re—I icensit

(1994).

Il (2d Cmr. 1997) (mhestate’s conditions
Airterican Rivers v. FLRC, (29 F.3d 99, 107, 110—
the pm, ect and
to rev icw and approve any gil i ficarit changes to
nv olved a reservation o I’ state authority
es coltcerrmiitg fish pass:tge ttitd canoe portage facilities:
all niairitenance activities: cotistructiori deadlin
tial
mittinicim water levels and peak water flows), The substan
itriposed by 16 U.S.C. § 803(a). 825U.
is

cotiditions concerning

evidence standard

and operational

tIiiided. or carried out’’ subject to [S

‘t

, 967 F. Supp. (166 (L). Arm,. 1997’t
0
Southwest (‘enter for Biological Diversity v. FERC
v. FERC, I 70 F.3d 696 (‘Oh C’i i. I 996) (FE RC
(jurisdiction only for appeals courts); Anterican Rivers
chap. 9. text accoimipat us tug tote 64 ; P:ie i fi e Rivers
order a prereqtusi te Or .j udicial review), discussed in
0,
suhcet to F SA eons tiliattori). discussed in chap.
Cottnctl v. Thomas (existing land management plaits
text with notes 52-53.
ri,cd.
9
16 U.S.C. § l536(ti)(2 (all federal actions ‘‘autho
mienons I.
review): iS C.F.R, 402.3 (all federal discretionary
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(11)59),

§

2.23.

American Rivers v. FIiRC, 201 [‘3d 1186, 1197 (9th
Cii., 2000),
59 Fed. keg. 6o,7 14. 66,718 (I 994), codified at IS
(ER.

2.24.

citinu

54 “ed. Reiz. at 23,776

The background and early implementatio
n
time
of
agreem
ent
is
traced
in
I’.
1._orra
me Bodi.
l”ERC’8 .(lid—C/.4tonbiei Pe’oceev/otg: hian )e.’u:c and Still (sean/m
g, 16 [isv i.. i
(1986); sr’e also
V iLk\i.\N (cited in chapter I. note 42). at 71—72.
(sO Fed. keg, 339, 340 (1995). codilied at IS C.F.k.

Edwards Manufacturing Co.. XI [‘[‘.RC, (11,255,
at 62,208—09 (1997): 4 W.srnKs st
Rioters 40.13 (cited
in
tote
§
I):
Ameri
can
Rivers
v. EERC, 2(11 F,3d 11 So, 1210 (9th Cii’. 2000)
flshsvay cond nuns are ss ii h in the discretion of’ liadera
l fishery agene es, not F ERC 1.

.

Charlion I I. l3onlsain, The Rt’eooi’aI of( ‘ondii Aeon:
.1 4luer of E1’ononiics 5 Itto R:\’umt Ntsss
tie. 4 at 7 ) Null. Res. I... Inst. Fall 1 999);
Churl
ion
II.
Hon
ham,
Tin’ ( ‘and!! Daoi [icino cal and S’ecitoit iS’
of time Fee/coil Pot rue’ ,i(i: .1 Coerced ,S’ctilc,oi’oi, 1 4 EN
J.
V
ri,.
I & I. itO. 97 ) 2000): Jenathan
Rrinckmtmn. Ct/file Pluses In Reine ii’&’ t_’oeeelii Dam. Ti in Ottiui,
esisN, Sept. 23, 999, (999 W[. 28262512
(S (3 .7 million for dts nt removal, 82 million )br permits and
mit ig:iti oia and S I mill ion isa r the Y akania
Indian Nation’s Fishery Enhancement I’ ond).
Emiergv Act of 2000, Pub, L. No. 106—469 603, 1 14
Stat. 2029.
§

Notes to Chapter 12

See discussion of the Supreme Court’s (lecisiolt, in chapte
r 4. text with notes 26—27.

Cited States v. Waslnngton, 75’) F’.2d 1353, 360
(9th Cir. 1985), aif’g 506 FSupp. 187, 197
(WI). Wash. I980. (‘or art earlier Ninth Circuit amrma
nce on the hatchery issue, see I. nited States v.
Washington. )‘94 l’.2d t 374, 1379—85 (9th Cii. 1982).

United States v. WiishiiiIceit. 501’ F.Supp. at 2(13—04 (Vs
I). \Vaslt. (980).

hi at 208, citing
Washi
ngton
v.
\Vashi
ngton State Conimerci,il Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 )j5 65$, (sS6—87 i, l979)( liereniutIer Passce
tger Fish/meg 1 ‘e’. sclj.
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985), but the court reversed itself

( Oil:

(‘OMIASS \NI) (huitui
i)n the tiinbei’, 11th and wildlife tereeijieiii, see ksi N. (iL,
E\V1iaNM1 NI 120-24 (Island Press
Seit”o I’ ,\NOPOI Hits Hit liii P00111 ioN Hi’ till

\iIN(

ruled hit it possessed no jnrisdtetiori iii du
slip. op. 5397 (9th Fir. i)ee. 17,
suminirvjudtsnieiii in No. 8)—SI
ivitli the iupittii>it cited (list iii this tote,

INIiik
093).

,

1.2(2) (21(1)))): S l’iiuNnSON ON
g\ rtt.nis)
I Risi \li\ti NI Hi iitiLtiw )iPi<(Ii’iititi (Si
(Iary U. Meyers. l4tiflecl Stoics i’. /)u.’,h/tijion
RiAt. Pisoi’i.u rti 65 1 Divtih A. Titontis, ed.. I 994):
/iis, 67 on.
7
,Si’i’t’iiiuc/r’ I’ll Oil 4,,’’ 7)’c’iu/i f’/sIiio R1
iia,s i’ II) I/i iao lid: /1/ i/u/is/Hoc’ (ill 1,11 t’ju’uiiitii ‘,i6i/
1
f
a) tilts chapter is adapted Ironi [‘watt [So/il at 463—
I.. Rtv. 77) 783 84 (988). Most ot’thc remainder
s inure e’.tensi Vu
of’ (‘ala rado law Review), win eli contain
502 (Ii sed isv penlussiu n of’ tite l.n i versltv
cHit ions itu iiiilictrittes.

5-

Alesander. 440 F. Supp .553. 555-56

ii

Ris :n (Oregon St. U.

hi’ 157 IT3d 63))

46) —62.

1—32 1 W.[). \Vi4i. 904) (She/I/is/i I):
linited States v. Washiiigtoii. 873 I’Supp. 1422. 143
698Ba/i/i /.)ecisj,uui /itini’otsioir/, 29 Lxv IL. 1.. 683.
Mind J. lJombs. (.;nte,I Shut’s i’. ii ishitii,un, The
700 (11)1)9).

Resei’v,it,on ti.

a. 2-2 1 I, slip. op.

[MBA

91)5), 5
i
Ii(/(’c/
(10
’

46: Site/f/is/i 1/, 508 F.Supp. at
S/ic//fish I, 573 F.Supp. a 1435—37, 44 (—42, 1445—
1472—73: She//fIsh I/I. 909 F.Supp. it 792.
35 i’.3d 615. 634—41) (9th (‘ii’.

\\ts. ANti I 01 Ut S
See Ronn is Ui.n ii. EMi’ Is Ni. Is: INn] NNS. F)

L’nited Stites v. Washnigton.
(9th Fir, 11>1)8).
5

Press 1991)).

C’oiifederated Tribes ot’the Ijniatilla Indian
977).

attuii v. (‘alhiwav
(otiftler:ited Tribes at the Linatilia 1ndan Resers
7 (1). Or. Aug. 17. 973).

(U. OR.

01st.. 7o3 1.21) 11)32, 1054 9th Fir.
Kittitas Reeltni,utioiu l)is’, ti, Sn:i1,vsillc \‘ille Irtigation
n).
1985) (discussing the district cotiri’s unpublished opinio
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8luckleslioot Indian
\\!isli I 988).
nbc s.

dci

50-I, 1505-00. 152-14. 15 7,

VSiipp 1515.

522-23 (Wi).

5 8-22 (\V.D.

ellis ot the treats hshitg riulti in l.nited State-.

or o I tH. 9

lall. 698 F.Snpp.

N,ortiiwest Sea Panns v. lJniled Slates Annv

The Ninth Circuit itf’lirnecl the is\Ii.> separate
Oregon. 71$ 6.24 299. 3(1-I n. (i (9th (hr. 1)83).

Wash. 996).
2.
V.

United States v. Ander.soii. 6 Indian
L.
Rep.
I--129.
6-131
(ED.
\Vai
July
23, 079). Utis
decision
coiicer
ned
a
hind
Ieser\a
t
ion
created
1w
l2xecutis e hider, not a Siet eiis or Palmer
ireaty. and
involved an oii-rewrsatioii l)simiiig right. The results
ueie adopted by .tnotim
ei
distric
t
judge
(the
pmesm
ou.
judge Imavitig died). and eli undisturbed by the Nititli
(‘ircuit. United States v.. \midersott. 5)I F.Supp.
I
(ED. Wash. 982). i/I’d, 73(1 F.2d 135$ ((tIm (ii.
984).

(‘in.

394. 1411. 414-15 (96m I r.

9%)% i//’g

7$

Sung. $o.

(olvilie (otilderated Iribes v. Walton, -16(1 FSupp
1320. 133(1 (El).
\\asli.
1978),
oi/’/. 0-7
F.2d 42. 46. 48 (9th (ii’. 1981). In a subsequent
decisio
n,
the
Ninth
Circui
reverse
t
d
the
distric
t courts
deternii tatton allocating only about liallof the
351) acre—let of water pci year needed fbi
the ttmhal li4ter’;
alter gi’anti ig lndtan and ton—Indian in’igat
ors
their
lull
aitioun
t
oI’ivat
er.
The
Ninth
Circuit ruled that the
tribe should get its (liii atnontit of’ 350 acre—f et.
subjec
t
to
pru—I
i
ilo reduction when insuilicien:
ss
was available. apparettily
recogn
izing
a
reserva
tion
date
priorit
y
(or tile rephaceittent lislteiy. Colviihe
Cool derated Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397. 404-05
(9th
1985).
United States s. Auatm. 723 1.24
345 ID. C)r. 979).

purposes.

secure

V

is

...‘

ules

Tic

Ir

nuts

Joitit (3d. olC oltrol of the Ilathead. Mission md
bc 1 Irrigation Dts:s.
Uiiited SIa:e. N$:
F.2d 1127, 1131—32 (9th (‘ir 1987), ietu. 6411 F.Sttpp
. 4(0. 426
(U.
1)851.
Mont.
The
Dawes
Ac
designed to prontlIte the allotment and irrimzation
of’ Indian lands states in part: “In
cases
ss
here
the ue ut
water for irrigation is necessary to render tile antis
within
my
Indian
reserva
tion available
agnlcliltLmimmI
the Secretary ui the Interior authorized to prescri
be such I
and regulations as
deem tecessary to
a lust and equal distribtitmoit
Dmmwes Act. 24 Stat .38% (I 887) (cmli lied iii
elevant part it 251.5 h
381(1994).
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Il

Id: at 1323—25.

hi. at 1323.

ver,

,

Accustonted Fishing I’ laces. State Dept.
Order Re: [‘reaty Reserved Water Rig It ts at sn;, I and
”
Sup. (‘t. Mar. 1, 1995): Order Re: “Flushitig Flaws.
of Ecology v .Aeijuaselki. Na. 77—2—014S4—5 (Wash.
84—5 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Apr. I 3. 1 91)5 t; Fintotity
State Dept. of Ecolaity v. Aciluavella, No. 77—2—014
Polk P,afxI (Portland, Or. May 20, I 995 ).
Reu,a,J,s a) 15.’ A nil,,, ‘us’! I (‘ole, Li,,,’ mu!
Wea

in

. Case No. 39576 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Nov. 10,
In Re SRBA. Ne7 Peree Tribe lttstream Flow Claims
Vt ishtn..,t an P ivsl_nkcr I ,shin. \ vs’,..] \sn 4
I 91)1)) /p op it 4’3 40 47 icnot in.. Vt ivhincion
chapter 4. text with notes 27—28.
U.S. 658. 686 (1679), discussed

regii

e Court eases at (E,,an.v tatlirmattve
SRHA decision tctted in note 34), at 3—33; the Suprem
Iii ttanst are discussed tn
II (no discri m, xi tory
access right To/eu (no I teense fees t, and / ‘at ol!ai’
decision is etted in nate 34 above.
chapter 4, text with totes 7—10. 12. 18: the harvest share

(‘a.. 847
ott Ne Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power
SRBA decision teited in tote 34), at 34—37. relying
aecontpanyttmg notes 43—5)); an time t4shitig rtglit as a
F.Stipp. 791 (D. Idaho 994). discussed below text
6, 52.
p/W/i( Ci pt’codrc, 5CC this chapter text st tb totes 45—4

ii

chapter 4. unite 26).

Tribe,
on Smith Dakota v. Yanktoi; Sioux
SRBA decustott (cited it tote 34). at 44—46. dying
s. \IuiIe Lacs Band ot Cltippewa Indians. 526 U.S. 172
522 U.S. 329 (1998) and ignoring Minnesota
tt. VCv’ Michael C. RIut,tm, Dale D. Gable. Judith
(1969); for a mote detailed cnitieisnt of the SRT3A dce;s;o
Cave,
aaoi, (?/ Treat IIairi Rig/its: the SnoJ,s’ Rite,
V. Royster & Mary Christi,t:u Wood, fur/k/al Te,at/a
3o 1i). u L. Rnv 459 (2)300).

see (ictc)ies (cited
On tlte Suprente Court’s attiagomsiri to Itidiar; rights.

er Relic) ,mnd Recissiotis Act. Pub. F. \‘o.
Emergency Suppletneitta] Appropriattoits fer Dts:ist
e. Forest Service, Re, ol,! o/ Decision/or
104—19, 109 Stat. 194 ç (91)5); U.S. Dept. at Agruetthttit
n fAa ,aacm.’ WIthiN the R,i,,ct,’
Suit/cc’ alt,! Bins it ‘‘/ t and .l/an,Oro,, ‘a, P/a,ii;/
.tinpiithiou S .Stlninn. itt 668—72.
i1’e ,.V n’the,n .S)taIieil On’! (I 994), &i i sevis’.cu in
,i/

1 uieiic/iiueitis ía

.

‘

Legis!i;i;c /115/107 all/ic luiiii, hut
Cut the 1995 rider, see Slade Gaiton & .Iuhe Kass.
Jtm5,, (4,unioii,’nt., ill iS,
vv: .4 Snto!/ I”icio,’
Sa/togc 1 iicthiica1s En ic icr ii, I/ic 164t1; (3’ ttg S
\lleltael .‘\xlinc, [a?, 51 fJisUn 00/i/li’ /‘o/ilk 0/
[‘a,i/k Vnri/;,i’cvl. 26 Exv :t.. L. 041 t I 9’6’:
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Klamath tribes v U.S. forest Ser ice tefled in note
41), iii 21. 24-25. 1 )n the fderal tidtieiir
duty, see 81 arc (‘h ri ,i ni Wood, 1-’nl/d1ioi the Fret
ni/re ‘V 7)’iixi
Respo
iisib
il/ti
loi
‘aid
the
Nii’e
‘Vol ioo’s oi ho ij, niInr lila! Issues;
.4 l’ai’iiol (‘rith
uc’ of the ( ?n!on ,ti1ooni.sosauin ‘V l’iyonrve.s
1
(10(1
I’eijoiiiaoee. 25 Lxv it L. 733 (1995).

Federal Power Act, 10 U.S.C. $03(ct. The inbe
tiled suit
becaus
e
tIte
statute
of
limitat
ions
was about to run on its claims. lime I 982 Indian
(‘laimns 1_urutation Act extended the statute of limitat
ions
for pre— I960 tribal damage claims acranist private
parties
.
allowi
ng
these
claims
to
be
submit
ted
to the
Bureau of Indian A Li irs (hr detertnmnat ion of wlm ich
claims the Depart ixent
of
Just
ice
won
il
lnrstm
e. In
December l991, the bureau infomnmed the Nei
Pemee
that
it would not recommend the Justice
Depamiment
pursue its claim
agains
Idaho
t
Power
becaus
e
damag
es
would he dm1 licult to prove As a result, the tribe
had until December 20. 1992. to pursue its claims in
court, which it did.

Nez Perce ‘I’ribe v. Idaho Power Compa
ny,
847
F.Supp. 791. 794. 809—12 ([). idaho 904)
hereinafler Ne: Pei’ie Ti’ibe(: United States v. Winatm
s, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 384 (1905), discussed in
chapter 4. text with notes 7— I 0.

Ne: i’e,’ee Tribe. 847 F.Supp. at 794. 81 1-12:
‘VIeno
minee
Tribe
of
Indian
s
v.
United
States,
391 U.S. 404, 413 (I 968):
on
the
prior
ease
law
burdening private parties. see chapter 4. text with
noteS 9.
II and this eltaptei’_ text with notes 1(1—12, 26—2
7.

“

Pars c’itger Fishing levseI, 443 US. at 679, (iSO
(1979)
(no empty net dippmngh Keeble v
Hiclseringill. 11)3 hing. Rep. 1127,
1128
(KB.
1809)
(duck
pond citse): Union Oil Co. v. tippen. 501 F.2d
558. 568 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing a dam:tges action
agains
t oil companies by commercial lishers
clatnaged by an oil spilLu I-mgluiizi V. F. Cireato Shooti
ng Club ol Lake lvoshkonong. 516 N.W.2d 419
li
Vs isc . 1 994) (awarding au injunct
ion
to
recreat
iona
lists); Al len H. Sanders, I)aiiiimdog Jot/ian 1 ivan’
Fisheries: .4 l”iolcitio,m of Tribal Pivperii Rig/its
?. 17 Thin. L.sxo & Rtsraiio I s U. Rev, 153, l62—6
(1096) (collecting other cases): J’usseoger
1’’icliiog lIsLe!. 443 U.S. at 686 (ritoderate living)
I’he magistrate did not completely
rc(ect
the
right
to
habitat
protect
ion,
howev
er. Relying on
the s acated panel decist ott at’ the Ni nit hi C ire ott mit
P base II
of
(
nued
Stoie.i
i.
Ft
os/ioig
ioo.
he
decided that
mite habitat protection right applies only to
a developirieni that was ‘part o( a paitcrii of disemi
niiiiatiou
i mist treaty f sIt mg runs.” N and i sen in
mnaior
y
“reaso
nable
develo
pment,
”
die
magist
rate opined. sliou Id
he borne PIty/fitly by treaty amid non—mreary
fishei’men. Nez P ye Ti/he. 847 F.Supp.
at 59t), iclyimig on
Cmmimecl States v. Wushii4mun. 994
F
24
1374,
1389
(9th Cir. 982. (The magistrate recognized that tIme
en /soi( Ninth Circuit vacated die patiel opinion
in I 1.185, Nevertheless, lie heated
lie i ribes’

ii

the vacated panel
opinion as iion—himthm
hut
g
well—
reason
ed
author
ity
and
(Lund
ii retisoning ‘‘persuasive’ on ibe natum’
e of
etux’ right to hi bit,i t protection. 847 F. Supp at: 5i (8
. It ow the tribes cmi Id slioss

i
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..

case to the
Idaho Power
million of
Canyon dams.

.

tinendation and Dismissing Action. Nez Perce Tribe
Order on Second Report and Recon
s
at 5—8 (0. Idaho Sept. 28. 1994), ignoring ki)tita,
Idaho Power (‘o.. No. 91—05 I 7—S—I Ilk. slip op.
ing an
on oust 763 I’.2d 0)32 (9th (‘ur. (985) (a hmrnm
Reclaniation 1)isi. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigati
erated Tribes ot the Linatilla Indian
aiioii ol salnion rcdds): (on(d
In)unction preventtng the inuutid
ola federal dam that
or. 1977) (enjoniing construction
Reservation v Alexander, 440 F.Supp. 553 tI).
out’’).
I/dung (,‘x.sr’/, 443 U.S. at 676 (no ‘‘cruu’,’,dinma
nould inundate (ribal lishitig urounds: J’o.ss,’m,’,

‘0)5). I’Iie Nez Percc appealed the
United States s. Winaiis, 98 U.S. 371, 381 (I
the parties reached a settienient iii which
Nniih Circuh. but before the court heard the case,
1.5 01 which was to settle tile eaSe. and 55
agreed to pi some 516.5 011111011 to the tribe. SI
Power’s attempt to relicense its three Hells
which was for time tribe’s ‘‘full support’ oh idaho
dams receive new licenses.
The 55 million is nut payable to he tribe until the

when 1.5 reasoning was adopted by
The error ut die I lells Canyon case was compounded
the Nez
a companion case concernnig damages caused
another lodge in the federal district oh Idaho ni
reirios ed in 963
danis ill the (‘Icaiscater Iliisni, suinchi lm:id been
Perce by uwo Washnigton Water Poscer
v
runs and its fish imng sites. Nez Perce Trib e
amid I 973 but cvii cs had damaged the tribe’s 6 sh
olpropeitv
—HI.R (I.). Idaho \iar. 28. I0’)6). On the flexibiltm
\\ashington \\‘aier Power. (‘iv. 61—05 hS—S
;’ Pu’oIli. at 498 in. 4 I 0— 1
and the context iial nature of remedies, see I’i.c,au
concepts

.

(I 979) (no eniptv net dipping): (n ted States v.
Si
Pusc’uugi’r l’/ching I ‘vu/. 443 L’S. at 667. 684
Adair. 723 F.2d
(“res” per lodge Kennedy): United States
Oregon, (m57 L2d I 006. 1015 (6th (‘ir. 982)
de”).
1394. 1411 (9th Cir. 1983) (‘wilderness servitu

Kennedy on udicial cons(rticuive cus1u’d): I
Lnited States v. Oregon, (s57 l.2d at 1016 (lodge
4.9 (21)00) (no unreasonable interference standarci
Rust ,c t,’tisi t (101)10) or Pnuut’i toy: Stivvmiuuts
plo/os u pi’uoths’h.
for servitudesf cci’ Id. I. 1)2) (seremiudes include

.

414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973) (Put u//op II)
53
ment of Gatne ofWasli. c. Puiyallup 1 rube. lc..
Depart
165.
IJ.S.
v. Department of (iahuie ofStimtc ot W:msh.. 433
(Justice Douglas quoies): I’uyahlup ‘l’ribe. Inc.
Oregon.
Si,utes
m Cu conservation regulations. Uttited
175—77 ( 977) (Ptncu//ii’ III) (tribal iis[ming subiee
ian fri he v.
(hr ,‘o nser’ atuon putrposes ): Dolt Itid
657 F. 2cl (upholding an in] unction against a in hal fishery
Kreps. Liv. No. 79-541 I). (Jr.
1981 ): Conl’ederaied Tithes
[3aldridge. 522 F.Supp. 683 (W.[). Wash.
to non-tribal ocean iheries).
Sept. 10, 1976) (applying conservation ieuuluussns
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American Indian )rmhal Rights. lsidcial-l nba
trust I spotisihilitics. and lie Lndcntiiered
Specie’ Act. U.S. Dept’s
ol
Interio
r
and
(omnin
eree.
Sec. Order No. $2ti6 and :\ppeitdtx o (june 5,
discussed in \Villsmnsomm (cited in chapter 0, mote
510.

(itations proudniu precedents or each oDhe en
eniti
nuw
be
Rood
/‘iueor
it
v
Icr/il. ii 4070)1)
nn.453—04. —ot’ an :cltertiatise mpproaelm tic
inpenmenmiitu time Stevens reatV
pmoitl
se
sit
h,ibitai proiec:Iccil.
one cal Imno hr rebum Rung salniomm runs to their
cppros
ntumte
histori
levels
c
and
mccrie
v
damages payable to
time Lii bes nnt I tlttit iou) ms:ie coitip I islmed, see SI an
( ‘hnist na \Vood
,
The
Ti//in!
l?//ii
to I I ‘i/c/i//i’ (op/oil
(Pc im! II): .l.sst’rong i Sc mere/go 3
lIiu/c’ to [,c ncr! ho/si/sit o/hiiij ri/s’s Spec/c
/
u, 25 Viii tin i\i L. Ri V.
355 2O((I).
Sonic elaboration oldie moderate liummig standard
is cvarrai
cted
here.
Itouve
ver.
Althou
gh Otis
sitimidard hums received a good deal oh’ critical eoinm
tientamv. I ‘defined pmperly, it is a usctiii
criterion,
First. the standard reflects the Supreme Court’
s recominmnon
hat
the
treaties
’
basic
promis
e to the tribes
was that tltev could continue to pursue their litielm
itood is cccinniei citil fishers: the pronlise was not
ust
that the tribes retained ceremonial and subsist
ence
lislitni
rights.
i
Second
.
while
the
eqnal sharing
tbnnnlim imposes a eeilntii on the tribal right, the
nioderate livnig
test
provitL
es
a
floor,
and
is
at least as
consistent with the likely eontemnporatueous tribal
understandina oh’tite meaning n) the treaty
as the eqti:O
sharing lbrmultm. Third, (be moderate ltvmttg test,
if’
interpr
eted
tic
require
a
signifi
cant
change
ni
circumstances (the Supreme Cisurt nienti oned
fess tribal fishers or
abando
n
i
fishing
op
)
as
preret)
a
inst te
anti use ota tiitilti—taetor test (including per
capita income froni fisltnig. the percen
tage
of
tribal
members
below the poverty Ii tie, the health circumstances
ot’ tnt hal
ntenth
ers.
and
tribal
unemp
loyme
nt
rates) like
that suggested by the district court in United
States v. Washington. 573 F.Stipp. 422. 446
(\V.D. Wash.
094) and endorsed by die Ninth Circuit, 157
F.3d
630.
(is)
—o43
(9th
l91X,
fir.
would
probably protect
the tribes I/urn arbitrary reductions in their
shttire, 50 oil)! :i5 tilt’
cetitral
pi’cmi
i
of
the
treaties
that tile
tribes could continue as commercial (islteis
is p:mi’t olihe analysis. Set’ o/scc Lie (‘ourte
Orethies Kand
of Lake Supet’ior C’hippew:t lttdians v. State. (sS6
F,Supp
.
22o,
22S—
30
çW.D.
055)
Wise.
I
(tittcm
npt mica to
translate treaty—ti me Ii tëstvles iron modern income
requ i retnenis attd conclud trig that about S2it.i Ott)
per
household iii 050 dollars would be requite
liar
d
the
tribes
in
qtmesu
the
omt:
court
cottelu
ded Ottm: cue:: if
the tribes harvested all ol’the resonmees in their lnmum
ing ::td
hshitig
roomid
s.
hey
svccmuid
not
oiain
this
stitnittirtl of hivingt. At any rate, the issue is quite
actideinie at dims point. when the average tribth
Iishernttci:
on the (‘olunibia Riser loses money: //ei’o,tcl
,mt
I’cic’il
120
i’:
(quiltin
g
(‘oluoc
hia
River
inter—
Tribal Fish
(otniniusicmn (hiairmtiti led Strong to the eI)iatt
that the :iserag
e
nibal
fisheru
iai:
loses
ahccct
5700t1
t
per
year). Finally, time iticmder,cte lmvnig test simpltlies an answer
to Iicssc is cctriet: about tIme treaties re
m:iritig
51
t’estoraticsn of treaty-time enviroimmi,emimiml cc,nditimmits
and
an
end
to
alt
develo
7mltet
lt.
Instead
. the tne:m:es
require only habitat citaulitiins itcct”sarv to limIt/I
l the treaties pioinise of a able fishing ecomio
mn\.
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n River productivity): on the
RKtt;n to rita RIVER (cited in diapter 1. note 52). at 90 (Salmo
•
Case For Dean Breaching, at 999-1000 n.4.
factors causing the decline of Snake River salmon, see The

ities): Jhn Yustaviteh.
1995 Hydra IliQp jcited in chapter ‘), note 19). at 72 (estimated mortal at II. 18. ($3 billion
cur, Summer 1998,
Breaching. Drawvicnrns, and the Art ofSahman Recoveiv. to
itunst. however, since the estimates usually
estimate). Many conservationists dispute the estimated expend
since it assumes that the primary purpose
include “foregone hydropower revenues,” which is controversial
that is not the primary purpose for which the dams
of the federal dams is to produce hydropower, and
were authorized. See Beyond Parity, at 103-04.
major dam modifications). On
1995 i*dav 8iOp (cited in chapter 9, note 19). at SI meed flr
at 1004 nn. 25-26 (citing articles). Breaching
the political opposition, see The One For Dam Breaching.
prevent erosion. removing the earthen
a dam would involve a slow lowering of reservoir levels to
in a drIock state. Engineers claim that
embankment and leaving the concrete locks and powerhouses
g one. Breaching all four Lower Snake Dams
breaching a dam would be considerably simpler than buildin
ering studies. Bill Lotus. Hair tea B,wdi a
likely would take four to seven 3turs, including time for engine
Dana. Ltiwtslcnc Mccwtac; Tkiarrca. June?. 1998, at ID.

The Last For Dana
Saving IdaI,oc Salmon, at 672 (dam? original cost-benefit ratio);
); The Out ofDoing Nothing (cited in
BreachIng, 1023-24. 1027 (dan’is curran benefits) (citing studies
25,000 jobsi.
chapter 2, note 51). at 51 (cost ol’$SOO million annually and

tto & Ebel (cited in chapter 0,

On the origins of the Corps’ transportation progqm, so Meghe
note 20). at 119-20. 123.

fe Agencies. Detailed
Columbia Basin Indian Tribes and Staae & Federal Fish and Wildli
*
[hereinafter cited as Detailed Operating
Fishery C’,ygft,g Plan, JI7th 1994 Operating Criteria (1993)
in 1985. is a coalition of federal. state.
Plan]. The Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority, formed
ency coordination on issues of regional
and tribal fish and wildlife agencies which facilities interag
d operating plan but also a schedule of
significance. The authority not only fbnnulateJ the detaile
and a int.’gntted hasinwide plan aimed at
biologically based river flows to tbcilitate salmon migration
s (33 (Robert £. Beck ed. 1994).
doubling the salmon runs. See 6 W,vfnRs AM) WATER RiciHi

an-fldmoitston Engineerinp, Report itt’
Detailed C4’senttlng PAns (cited in note 6), at 6-8; Bookm
Oppurianitiec within the’ Smok Rice rltasin
the Snake Ricer Basin 1is&’r C’o,nmittee. IfOte .(Lsnage anvu
r 9. re’t with note 3.
8-9, 12(1993). On the “Salmon Summit” proposal, see chapte
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of the Conned and NMFS under the OSA. see
V t,_xi\N (cited in chapter
IV—4l to IV—50, IV—05 to IV—7l.
I 994 C o,teil P,’or,’i’c,,,i (cited m note 0), at 5—46

19. 506. 510.

,

note 42), at

‘lear

Ti//al I?esioi’otion P/au (cited in chapter (,, note
at 5[t—24 to 5B—3 I; see Melissa Powers.
30).
The .$o/r/i if Th
5 Salon ni: lfoo’ the i)/hull Resli jot/on P/an
C jut/i Restore Coittnthu, i/a sin So/mon. 30
Ex V FL 1,. 867 (200(t).

On the Council’s program. see tins chapter. text with
notes 10—Il
Ut’s rttt:sM (cited in chapter 2. note 3(1). at vii, 241

.

Jul. at 4; on the nfl nence and hick around o [Chapman.
see Pan I Kohersi em, Fish,’ .S
I—li ni ,Sc’ieonsts iiiidaiigr’,’ the ,Sa/mo,i, C \ s(sD
i Ft M ns.Jan. I 9%. it F 0, 13.
Rtrt,imti 10 Itt RiVER (cited in chapter I. tote
52), at xvii.

1,1. at xx, 26$—6). 328, 509, 513. (In metapoputattt
its. see Id. at 24—30. 76.

Idaho Dept. ot’
Fish
&
(lame. Report to i/ic i)irec’ior, ldo/ios .1naclrooiotis
1-ic/i .Sioeh,s: Ihe,r
8.11—1.3 t1908).
3-I?.

StunttsoiulRr’c’oi’c’ri’O/itnnHO.

Id. at

1905 Hi div B/Op (cited
iti
chapte
9,
r
nOte 19), at Cu; P/an for .4nm’,’z ng cotd Jesting Tlipoti
tevo
(I’’1 7th, P,’e/hnioart’ Decision Anti/iso Report
on .S’nake Rivet’ .Sm’ing5’iioioic’i’ (‘/i/nook n (DR.
\iarinorek & C.”.. Peters eds., I 9u)$) [hercinatler
cited as [“I T[J /?e,un’tl.

P411/ Rejino (cited in note 2(t). at vi-vii, 59. (iS,

So/oem

di S’tee/hou/ Recover,’ 1 plitIte 2 (Any. 13, I 9”$
t.

‘vlcmoranctuin from PATI-l Planiting (iroup
to Tinp1ernentat iou Team. (,orrectuons to the
(‘A fl—I
Pi’etiruiimar\’ Repoi’t ‘s. ,uhle L—I (Aim9. 4. %5t.

Idaho I )ept ofF’ ish & (lame.
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ES—? I F
399
l
on

,

lili/nirl ,Sjiiit’iiit’iii, Ip
the IA Il-I studies and the fRI.

11(71017 liii’1l7’IIiliL’Iitu/

at

A ES-7
ill

see

A IS-S. A4-23 to A42/

Ill, at A ES-5 to A ES-6, \ ES-S.
Id.

(‘0,1!

chapter 9. text with totes 23—24.

(/j3rnig chiiiook(.

of [*iinc ,Noihon (cited in chapter 2.

note

3.
On 21)01) BiOp, see chapter 9, text with notes 26—3

T/u’

of region’s electricity),

0

n -lao/i :ç/( La 1cr ,S,iolce lea c/h,/ii’ .Sitidt’
[Iar7a Northwest. 1 ile., Fi,ia/ Reimo’/; So/moon Decis/o
1—10(19%)

5°,

:icconipiiitvitlO note 2: U.S Army Corps ol’
On the dams’ original cost—benefit ratio. see text
I to 5—2 (1 1)95 ) (no flood control. I title
(‘o/n,,i/na K/i s’, St v’,n Opm’rc lion, Rem /eii 3—3.5—

51). at 51.

’,’ Dam R,’nioi’ol, Ti t-. Os i’R t V
1
,Siio/u’ Ri’
Sec Ri ib Mason is. flu’ .S(-u’,i!i/i (‘i.s r to,’ Loo’cr
2000. at 4—5 (surveying critics of the A—[ish Appendix):
(newsletter oI’ihe I’edcration of I’Iy Fishers). Jan.
M 135—13 (quote).
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (cited iii note 29k at

to

irrigailoit,

[high neers.

—9

Id. at 1-10 to 1-1.1-14.

i/u’

.S’oi’ec Fish and (h maci. 10 -St
& Rocky Barker. Breach/ag: ‘I ,‘Wnia’af Riic’i’
,S’!awcnia,, Repor’j.
‘tO?, at I 2A [hereinafter Idaho

Susan W hatel
St-St t-S’t:\N, july 20,

Id, at ISA.

1-2.

i—z

B. at 3—5.

it

in !/i /hu -i/li Waif.’ i ui: Ricah hug
W itt Andcrsoit, ci a?.. F/s-li and I) ‘/6/11% Re 1 ri
.coin.euietuietxpanidcadlimck-lw iepnrt.litnul
IT’uud/muuk (Nov. I 5,1997) <http:www.ttesssdaia

tti aup.

Id. at 5, app. B.
Ia’,

---.:—-—•---
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.

iii

9.

( r. 24. I
5): I ndep ende it I cow ii ic Ad vi sorv Hoard
Re mcmv,
(‘o,,inic’,it,v on kccioi’i my (lie Lou i’r ,Sno/,e k/mom’:
Sm/mI Sn i/c k/icr .Smm/nmon ,oii/ .501/ni! ,‘flommei’
(presented at the ( ‘ouneil’s meeting on Nos 4—5,
995).

Limmmc/ny Rcioi7 (tiled ni lute 41)),

icr

LOan ( odstein. l)ammi Loom moid :v: Omen/
ti
m’
and
.‘lp/ic’
iii/oii to the Lu
Snake k/is’,’ C-S.
5 to (‘—20. in Fred \‘litnso
n
&
Scott
I
Tiriltle
ymum
n.
l)ai,m
It,’non
a/as ci iooI 1(0’ .l,i(oI,’oniomo fish
rusts I 9’)Xt,

Rc’stc’i’otio,,: hi ,1,s’t’soiic’/i/ (report to the PI:W
(‘h:mritahle

mit

.‘t/m/)e’ni/i.v /

40): li/a/mci Siaicrommioi kcpo,’t (cued

(‘-

I’m c/i I”m,,md/ny Options 2 I

1:co,ioiiiies.

in note

35).

‘,

-

Id. at (‘-5 to C-IS. (ioodstein reported that a study
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